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Network Working Group                                         S. Leonard
Internet-Draft                                             Penango, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                             June 29, 2014
Expires: December 31, 2014


        A Uniform Resource Name (URN) Namespace for Certificates
                       draft-seantek-certspec-03

Abstract

   Digital certificates are used in many systems and protocols to
   identify and authenticate parties.  This document describes a Uniform
   Resource Name (URN) namespace that identifies certificates.  These
   URNs can be used when certificates need to be identified by value or
   reference.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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1.  Introduction

   Digital certificates are used in many systems and protocols to
   identify and authenticate parties.  Security considerations
   frequently require that the certificate must be identified with
   certainty, because selecting the wrong certificate will lead to
   validation errors (resulting in denial of service), or in improper
   credential selection (resulting in unwanted disclosure or
   substitution attacks).  The goal of this namespace is to provide a
   uniform syntax for identifying certificates with precision in Uniform
   Resource Identifiers (URIs), specifically Uniform Resource Names
   (URNs).

   Using this syntax, any protocol or system that refers to a
   certificate in a textual format can unambiguously identify that
   certificate by value or reference.  Implementers that parse these
   URNs can resolve them into actual certificates.  Examples include:

   urn:cert:SHA-1:3ea3f070773971539b9dbf1b98c54be3a4f0f3c8
   urn:cert:issuersn:cn=AcmeIssuingCompany,st=California,c=US;0134F1
   urn:cert:base64:MIIBHDCBxaADAgECAgIAmTAJBgcqhkjOPQQBMBAxDjAMBgNVBAMT
                   BVNtYWxsMB4XDTEzMTEwNTE5MjUzM1oXDTE2MDgwMjE5MjUzM1ow
                   EDEOMAwGA1UEAxMFU21hbGwwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMB
                   BwNCAAS2kwRQ1thNMBMUq5d_SFdFr1uDidntNjXQrc3D_QpzYWkE
                   WDsxeY8xcbl2m0TBO4TJ_2CevdoOX0OMIOaqJ_TNoxAwDjAMBgNV
                   HRMBAf8EAjAAMAkGByqGSM49BAEDRwAwRAIgPyF8ok6h2NxMQ4uJ
                   OcGcXYcvZ1ua0kB-rIv0omHcfNECICKwpTp3LDIwhlHTQ_DulQDD
                   eYn-lnYQVc2Gm1WKAuxp

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

2.  Motivation and Purpose

   Although certificates have diverse applications, there has been no
   uniform way to refer to a certificate in text.  De-facto standards
   such as PEM [RFC1421] and PKIX text encoding [PT] are used to include
   whole certificates in textual formats, but this practice is
   impractical for a variety of use cases.  Certificates that identify
   long public keys (e.g., 2048-bit RSA keys) and that contain required
   and recommended PKIX extensions can easily exceed many kilobytes in
   length.

   The purpose of this document is to provide a uniform textual format
   for identifying individual certificates.  Certificate specifications,



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   or "certspecs", are not designed or intended to provide a search tool
   or query language to match multiple certificates; the goal is to
   replace data elements that would otherwise have to include whole
   certificates in order to identify them.  When a URN resolver resolves
   a "certspec", the resolver's output is expected to be a single
   certificate or nothing.

2.1.  Static Identification

   Identifying a specific certificate by reference or value allows
   diverse applications to have a common syntax.  For example,
   applications can store certspecs as local or shared preferences, so
   that users can edit them without resorting to application-specific
   storage formats or relying on the availability of particular
   protocols represented by URLs (such as http:, ldap:, file:, or ni:
   schemes).  When conveyed in protocol, a certspec can identify a
   specific certificate to a client or server using text-based formats
   such as YAML, XML, JSON, and others.  The format described in this
   document is intended to be readily reproducible by users using common
   certificate processing tools, so that users can easily create,
   recognize, compare, and reproduce them at a glance.  For example, the
   hash-based identifications use hexadecimal encoding so that a user
   can easily compose or compare an URN with a simple copy-and-paste
   operation.  Accordingly, some tradeoffs have been made in favor of
   human usability.

2.2.  Resolution to Context-Appropriate Schemes

   When the certificate represented by a certspec needs to be resolved,
   an application can resort to any number of schemes.  For example,
   when the certificate is identified by hash, the application can
   resolve the certspec to a Named Information (ni:) URI [RFC6920] for
   further processing.  When the certificate is identified by issuer and
   serial number, the application can resolve the certspec to an LDAP
   service (for example,
   ldap:///cn=ExampleCA,o=ExampleCo,st=California,c=US ).

3.  One-Per-Kind

   A certspec is intended to identify a single certificate
   unambiguously.  A certificate has no more than one corresponding
   certspec per certspec type; however, a certificate is expected to
   have an array of certspecs that identify the certificate.  The choice
   of which certspec to use in a given situation is context-specific.







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4.  certspec Syntax

   A certspec is a URN that complies with the modern URN syntax
   [URNBIS], with a few accommodations for usability.  Following
   [URNBIS], NID is "cert", and the Namespace Specific String (NSS) has
   the ABNF below.  The query and fragment productions are relevant to
   certspecs; these are discussed in Section 7.  Rules from [RFC5234]
   are also used.

NSS              = certspec-hash / certspec-content / certspec-el      /
                   other-certspec-type ":" other-certspec-value

hexOctet         = 2HEXDIG

certspec-hash    = "SHA-1"   ":" 20hexOctet /
                   "SHA-256" ":" 32hexOctet /
                   "SHA-384" ":" 48hexOctet /
                   "SHA-512" ":" 64hexOctet

certspec-content = "hex"     ":" 1*hexOctet /
                   "base64"  ":" base64url / base64relaxed

base64url        = 1*base64urlcharP
base64relaxed    = 1*(base64urlcharP / "+" / "/")  ; not pchar

base64urlchar  = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_" / pct-encoded ; from RFC 3986

certspec-el      = "issuersn" ":" distinguishedNameUC ";" serialNumber /
                   "ski"      ":" 1*(hexOctet)

distinguishedNameUC  = 1*pchar-no-semi            /  ; close to RFC 3986
                       distinguishedNameUCrelaxed
serialNumber         = 1*hexOctet

; semicolon omitted, since it delimits serialNumber
pchar-no-semi = unreserved / pct-encoded / "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" /
                "(" / ")" / "*" / "+" / "," / "=" / ":" / "@"

distinguishedNameUCrelaxed = 1*(pchar / WSP / UTFMB) ; not pchar
                                                     ; from RFC 4512

certspec-type        = scheme                        ; from RFC 3986
certspec-value       = 1*pchar                       ; from RFC 3986

other-certspec-type  = certspec-type
other-certspec-value = certspec-value

                          Figure 1: certspec ABNF



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4.1.  certspec-type and certspec-value

   A certspec NSS is comprised of two parts: certspec-type and certspec-
   value.  The certspec-type identifies the certificate specification
   type.  The acceptable characters for spec-type are the same as those
   in an URI scheme name (Section 3.1 in [RFC3986]); types are compared
   case-insensitively.  The certspec-value identifies the certificate
   specification value.  The acceptable characters for spec-value depend
   on the spec-type, but are never more than pchar except for relaxed
   human usability reasons in a few cases discussed below.  To simplify
   processing in several other cases, characters are significantly
   restricted to the point that percent-encoding is prohibited.  In such
   cases, a generator MUST NOT generate percent-encoded values, and a
   parser MUST treat the production as an error.

   Several certspecs use hexadecimal encodings of octets.  Generally: if
   the hex octets are malformed (whether in the source material, such as
   the corresponding certificate element, or in the hex text), the
   certspec is invalid.

5.  Standard Certificate Specifications

   Standard certificate specifications are intended for interchange as
   durable, persistent, unique, and intuitive (to users and developers)
   identifiers for individual certificates--the exact criteria for URNs.
   This section provides four cryptographic hash-based certspecs, two
   content-based certspecs, and two element-based certspecs.

5.1.  Cryptographic Hash-Based Specifications

   A cryptographic hash or "fingerprint" of a certificate uniquely
   identifies that certificate.  For hash-based certspecs, the hash is
   computed over the octets of the DER encoding of the certificate,
   namely, the Certificate type in Section 4.1 of [RFC5280].  The
   certspec-value is the hexadecimal encoding of the hash value octets.
   For example, a 256-bit SHA-256 hash is represented by exactly 32 hex
   octets, or 64 hex characters.

   Lexical equivalence of two hash-based certspecs that have the same
   certspec-type SHALL be determined by a case-insensitive comparison of
   certspec-values, or by converting the hexadecimal certspec-values to
   octets and comparing exact equivalence of the octets.  A conforming
   implementation MUST reject values that contain non-hex digits, such
   as spaces, tabs, hyphens, percent-encoded characters, or anything
   else.

   Conforming implementations to this Internet-Draft MUST process these
   hash-based certspecs, unless security considerations dictate



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   otherwise.  Acceptable reasons for refusing to process a certspec
   include a) the local policy prohibits use of the hash, or b) the hash
   has known cryptographic weaknesses, such as a preimage attacks, which
   weaken the cryptographic uniqueness guarantees of the hash.

5.1.1.  SHA-1

   The certspec-type is "SHA-1".  The hash is computed using SHA-1
   [SHS].

5.1.2.  SHA-256

   The certspec-type is "SHA-256".  The hash is computed using SHA-256
   [SHS].

5.1.3.  SHA-384

   The certspec-type is "SHA-384".  The hash is computed using SHA-384
   [SHS].

5.1.4.  SHA-512

   The certspec-type is "SHA-512".  The hash is computed using SHA-512
   [SHS].

5.2.  Content-Based Specifications

   A certificate may be identified reflexively by its constituent
   octets.  For small-to-medium certificates, identifying the
   certificate by embedding it in the certspec will be computationally
   efficient and resistant to denial-of-service attacks (by always being
   available).  A conforming implementation MUST implement base64 and
   hex specs.

   The octets of a certificate are the octets of the DER encoding of the
   certificate, namely, the Certificate type in Section 4.1 of
   [RFC5280].  The DER encoding includes tag and length octets, so it
   always starts with 30h (the tag for SEQUENCE).

   Lexical equivalence of two certspecs that are value-based SHALL be
   determined by decoding the certspec-value to certificate octets, and
   comparing the octets for strict equivalence.  Accordingly, it is
   possible that base64 and hex certspecs are lexically equivalent.

   Because users may end up copying and pasting base64 or hex-encoded
   certificates into certspecs, and because these certspecs will
   routinely exceed 72 characters, a production might contain embedded
   whitespace.  If there are contexts where line breaks or other



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   whitespace must be allowed for practical reasons, the implementation
   should consider the URN in context as "a URN, possibly with embedded
   whitespace (which is ignored)".

5.2.1.  base64

   The certspec-type is "base64".  The certspec-value is the base64url
   encoding of the certificate octets (Section 5 of [RFC4648]), but MAY
   be relaxed as follows.  Unlike the data: URL [RFC2397], URN NSS
   productions are not supposed to have the "/" character, which is
   integral to standard base64.  On the other hand, it is anticipated
   that users will want to copy-and-paste base64 encoded certificates--
   such as those produced by PKIX text encodings--directly into base64
   certspecs.  Generators of base64 certspecs SHOULD emit base64url-
   encoded data, where the characters '-' and '_' refer to values 62 and
   63, respectively, and where the trailing equal signs '=' are absent.
   Alternatively, generators MAY emit base64 data with precent-encoding
   for the non-pchar conformant characters (specifically "/").  In any
   event, generators MUST NOT generate non-pchar conformant characters
   (specifically "/").  Parsers of base64 certspecs that are not under
   strict URN conformance constraints MUST also accept '+' and '/' as
   values 62 and 63, respectively, and MUST accept trailing '='
   characters in conformance with standard base64.  None of '+', '/', or
   '=' have reserved meanings in this certspec-type.  This relaxed
   parsing rule is reflected in the base64relaxed production of
   Figure 1.

   Similarly, [URNBIS] states that non-reserved characters (in this
   case, alphanumerics) must not be "%"-encoded, but a lenient
   implementation MAY decode these "%"-encoded characters anyway.  This
   document neither recommends nor discourages such leniency, but
   implementors should weigh the benefits and risks as discussed further
   in the Security Considerations (Section 11).  Overall, percent-
   encoding in base64 certspecs is permissible because unlike most of
   the other certspecs, the complete base64 encoding is not expected to
   be human-readable or identifiable at a glance.

5.2.2.  hex

   The certspec-type is "hex".  The certspec-value is the hexadecimal
   encoding of the certificate octets.  Percent-encoding is not allowed;
   implementations MUST NOT process percent-encoded values.  The reasons
   are because percent-encoding would reduce the human readability of
   the certspec, and (marginally) increase the complexity of certspec
   parsers.






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5.3.  Element-Based Specifications

   A certificate may be identified by certain data elements contained
   within it.  The following certspecs reflect the traditional reliance
   of PKIX [RFC5280] and CMS [RFC5652] on a certificate's issuer
   distinguished name and serial number, or a certificate's subject key
   identifier.

   If some of an element-based certspec is based on the DER encoded part
   of a certificate, and if the encodings are incorrect, the URN is
   invalid.

5.3.1.  issuersn: Issuer Name and Serial Number

   The certspec-type is "issuersn".

   The distinguishedNameUC production encodes the certificate's issuer
   distinguished name (DN) field in LDAP string format, whose characters
   are subsequently percent-encoded to conform to URN NSS syntax.  The
   <distinguishedName> on which distinguishedNameUC is based is defined
   in [RFC4514], and <SEMI> is defined in [RFC4512].  [RFC4514] no
   longer separates relative distinguished names (RDNs) by semicolons,
   as required by its predecessor, [RFC2253].  Accordingly, ";" is used
   to separate the issuer's DN from the subject's serial number.

   Care should be taken in escaping and percent-encoding the relevant
   characters.  In particular:

      "?" is permitted in a distinguishedName, but MUST NOT appear in a
      URN unless it delimits the query component (see [URNBIS]).  Any
      "?" characters in distinguished names MUST be percent-encoded when
      placed in the certspec-value.

      "#" is used as a token at the beginning of the hexstring
      production for attributeValue data, but MUST NOT appear in a URN
      unless it delimits the fragment component (see [URNBIS]).  Any "#"
      characters in distinguished names MUST be percent-encoded when
      placed in the certspec-value.

      "\" is the escape (ESC) character in LDAP strings (see [RFC4514]),
      but is not in the URI repetoire.  Any "\" characters MUST be
      percent-encoded when placed in the certspec-value.

   For reference, only the following characters are permitted in
   distinguished names in the issuer production of a URN:

      ALPHA DIGIT - . _ ~ ! $ & ' ( ) * + , = : @
      pct-encoded (% followed by two HEXDIG)



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   If human input is anticipated, an application MAY relax its
   processing as suggested in Appendix A.

   The serialNumber production is the hexadecimal encoding the DER-
   encoded contents octets of the CertificateSerialNumber (INTEGER,
   i.e., not the type or length octets) as specified in Section 4.1 of
   [RFC5280].

   A conforming implementation SHOULD implement this issuersn certspec.
   If the implementation implements it, the implementation MUST process
   serial numbers up to the same length as required by Section 4.1.2.2
   of [RFC5280] (20 octets), and MUST process distinguished name strings
   as required by [RFC4514], including the table of minimum
   AttributeType name strings that MUST be recognized.  Additionally,
   implementations MUST process attribute descriptors specified in
   [RFC5280] (MUST or SHOULD), and [RFC5750] (specifically: E, email,
   emailAddress).  For reference, a complete list of required attribute
   descriptors is provided in Appendix B.  Implementations are
   encouraged to recognize additional attribute descriptors where
   possible.  A sample list of such attribute descriptors is provided in
   Appendix C.

   Lexical equivalence of two issuersn certspecs SHALL be determined by
   comparing the serialNumbers for exact equivalence, and comparing the
   issuer distinguished names for a match.

   The lexical equivalence of serialNumbers SHALL be determined by a
   case-insensitive comparison of them, or by converting the hexadecimal
   text to octets and comparing exact equivalence of the octets.  A
   conforming implementation MUST reject values that contain non-hex
   digits, such as spaces, tabs, hyphens, percent-encoded characters, or
   anything else.

   The lexical equivalence of issuer distinguished names SHALL be
   determined by (percent-)decoding the URNs, followed by parsing the
   LDAP strings.  The resulting distinguished names match if they
   satisfy the name matching requirements of [RFC5280] and [RFC4517].

5.3.2.  ski: Subject Key Identifier

   The certspec-type is "ski".  The certspec-value is the hexadecimal
   encoding of the certificate's subject key identifier, which is
   recorded in the certificate's Subject Key Identifier extension
   (Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280]).  The octets are the DER-encoded
   contents octets of the SubjectKeyIdentifier (OCTET STRING) extension
   value.  A certificate that lacks a subject key identifier cannot and
   MUST NOT be identified using this spec.




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   Lexical equivalence of two ski certspecs SHALL be determined by a
   case-insensitive comparison of certspec-values, or by converting the
   hexadecimal certspec-values to octets and comparing exact equivalence
   of the octets.  A conforming implementation MUST reject values that
   contain non-hex digits, such as spaces, tabs, hyphens, percent-
   encoded characters, or anything else.

   A conforming implementation MAY implement this ski spec.

6.  Other Certificate Specifications

   The additional certificate specifications in this section are
   provided for applications to use as local identifiers that are
   useful, intuitive, or supportive of legacy systems or overriding
   design goals.  These certspecs SHOULD NOT be used for interchange.

6.1.  data (Reserved)

   The certspec-type is "data".  This document reserves this spec-type
   for future use.

   An implementation may embed the contents of a data URL (data URI)
   into the certspec-value.  Specifically:

                    ; from RFC 2397
   certspec-value = [ mediatype ] [ ";base64" ] "," data

   See [RFC2397].  In such a case, the mediatype SHOULD be "application/
   pkix-cert" since the data URL components identify a certificate;
   however, an implementation MAY be able to support other media types
   so long as a single certificate is extractable from the data
   production.

   Data URLs containing certificates generally will not conform to URN
   syntax "as-is".  The considerations of stuffing base64-encoded
   content into URNs discussed in Section 5.2.1 apply to this certspec
   as well, bearing in mind that data URLs only contain traditional
   base64 (not base64url)-encoded data, or binary percent-encoded data.

   Because this certspec is content-based, an implementation can
   determine lexical equivalence with other content-based certspecs.

6.2.  dbkey (Reserved)

   The spec-type is "dbkey".  This document reserves this spec-type for
   future use.





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6.3.  subject (Reserved)

   The certspec-type is "subject".  The certspec-value is the RFC 4514
   LDAP string encoding of the certificate's subject distinguished name.
   Characters MAY be percent-encoded; implementations MUST process the
   percent-encoded characters in the certspec-value before further LDAP
   string processing.  All the considerations of encoding the issuer
   field in Section 5.3.1 apply to this type.

7.  Query and Fragment Productions

   [URNBIS] clarifies that the query and fragment productions of
   [RFC3986] apply to URNs.  This document provides semantics for these
   productions, as applied to certificates.

   ; query for certspec URN
   certattrs      = query  ; from RFC 3986
                           ; *( pchar / "/" / "?" )

   ; fragment for certspec URN
   certpart       = "v" / "sn" / "sig" / "issuer" / "notBefore " /
                    "notAfter" / "subject" / "spki" /
                    "ext" *(":" extoid *(":" extpart)) /
                    "sigval" / other-certpart

   extoid         = numericoid    ; from RFC 4512
   extpart        = fragment      ; from RFC 3986
   other-certpart = fragment      ; from RFC 3986

7.1.  Equivalence Unaffected

   As a certspec identifies a single certificate, two certspecs are
   identical lexically or semantically if the NSS parts identify the
   same certificate.  The query and fragment productions do not affect
   this equivalence.

7.2.  Query (Attributes)

   A certspec URN can have attributes (i.e., metadata) that are
   associated with--but not instrinsic to--the certificate or its
   identifiers.  The syntax is intended primarily to convey certificate
   metadata such as attributes found in PKCS #9, PKCS #11, PKCS #12, and
   particular implementations of cryptographic libraries.  This document
   does not further define certattrs; the characters of certattrs can be
   any valid query character from [RFC3986].






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7.3.  Fragment

   A certspec can include a fragment that identifies a part of interest
   within the identified certificate.  For example, a user agent may
   wish to draw attention to the notAfter time for an expired
   certificate.  This document defines the following fragments
   ("certparts"):

    +------------+---------------------------------------------------+
    | Identifier | Certificate Part (ASN.1 identifier)               |
    +------------+---------------------------------------------------+
    | v          | tbsCertificate.version                            |
    | sn         | tbsCertificate.serialNumber                       |
    | sig        | tbsCertificate.signature; also signatureAlgorithm |
    | issuer     | tbsCertificate.issuer                             |
    | notBefore  | tbsCertificate.validity.notBefore                 |
    | notAfter   | tbsCertificate.validity.notAfter                  |
    | subject    | tbsCertificate.subject                            |
    | spki       | tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo               |
    | ext        | tbsCertificate.extensions                         |
    | ext:<OID>  | tbsCertificate.extensions                         |
    |            | {Extension matching extoid == extnID}*            |
    | sigval     | signatureValue                                    |
    +------------+---------------------------------------------------+

    * The particular extension in the Extensions SEQUENCE is identified
              by OID only; there are no textual identifiers.

                            Table 1: certparts

   The certparts defined in the table above are case-insensitive.
   Should additional certparts be required, a future document may
   specify additional certparts that match the other-certpart
   production.

8.  Registration Template

   Namespace ID:
      cert

   Registration Information:
      Version: 1
      Date: 2014-06-29

   Declared registrant of the namespace:
      IETF

   Declaration of syntactic structures:



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      The structure of the Namespace Specific String is provided
      above.

   Relevant ancillary documentation:
      Certificates are defined by [RFC5280] and [X.509].

   Identifier uniqueness considerations:
      The certspec-type is assigned by IANA through the IETF
      consensus process, so this process guarantees uniqueness of
      these identifiers. The uniqueness of the certspec-value
      is guaranteed by the definition of the value for
      the certspec-type. For cryptographic hash-based certspecs, the
      cryptographic hash algorithm itself guarantees uniquess.
      For contents-based certspecs, the inclusion
      of the certificate in the URN itself guarantees uniqueness.
      For certspecs that identify certificates by certificate data
      elements, as long as certificate issuers issue
      certificates correctly, and the resolver's database of
      certificates and the resolver's implementation
      of certification path validation [RFC5280 sec. 6] are
      consistent, no cert URN will identify two different
      certificates.

   Identifier persistence considerations:
      A certificate is a permanent digital artifact, irrespective of
      its origin. As the URN records only information that is
      derivable from the certificate itself, such as one of its
      cryptographic hashes, the binding between the URN and the
      certificate is permanent.
      Once the set of cert URNs identify a particular
      certificate, that fact will never change.

   Process of identifiers assignment:
      Generating a certspec (cert URN) does not require that
      a registration authority be contacted.

   Process for identifier resolution:
      This Internet Draft does not specify a resolution service
      for certspecs. However, resolving certificate references
      to actual certificates is a common practice with a wide number
      of offline and online implementations. See for example
        [RFC5280] sec. 4.2.2.1.

   Rules for Lexical Equivalence:
      Certspecs (cert URNs) are lexically equivalent if they both
      have the same certspec-type (compared case-insensitively)
      and the same certspec-value, and therefore impliedly point
      to the same certificate.



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      Comparison of certspec-values depends on the rules of the
      certspec.
      Additionally, the contents-based certspecs, base64 and hex
      (and--if implemented--the data certspec), can be compared for
      lexical equivalence between each other by decoding the
      certspec-value to the underlying DER-encoded certificate
      octets, and comparing these octets for exact equivalence.
      Query ("certattrs") and fragment ("certpart") components
      do not affect certificate identification, and therefore
      do not affect lexical equivalence.

      Certspecs are semantically equivalent if they both resolve
      to the same certificate.

   Conformance with URN Syntax:
      The URN of this namespace conforms to URN Syntax
      [URNBIS] and Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax
      [RFC3986].

   Validation mechanism:
      Each certspec defines the validation mechanism for its respective
      value. It may be appreciated that validation of the URN is a
      completely different process from the Certification Path
      Validation Algorithm [RFC5280] sec. 6, which determines whether
      the *certificate* is valid.

   Scope:
      Global.

9.  Use of certspec outside URN

   certspec is useful wherever a system may need to include or refer to
   a certificate.  Some implementations may wish to refer to a
   certificate without enabling all of the expressive power (and
   security considerations) of URIs.  Accordingly, this section provides
   a uniform method for using a certspec outside of a URN.  Examples:

   urn:cert:SHA-1:3ea3f070773971539b9dbf1b98c54be3a4f0f3c8
   urn:cert:issuersn:cn=AcmeIssuingCompany,st=California,c=US;0134F1

   To use certspec outside of a URI (URN) context, simply omit the
   prefix "urn:cert:".  All other lexical rules apply, including
   percent-encoding, query (certattrs), and fragment (certparts).  Care
   should be taken to process "?" and "#" in particular, since they
   delimit the attributes and parts.  A conforming implementation of raw
   certspecs MUST permit the prefix "urn:cert:" in addition to the raw
   certspec.  Additionally, this document guarantees that the the
   certspec-types "urn" and "cert" are RESERVED and will never be used.



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   However, implementors must take note that a raw certspec is not a
   valid URI, because certspec-types are not registered URI schemes and
   do not have the same semantics as URIs.

10.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests the assignment of formal URN namespace ID
   "cert".

   [[TODO: Consider...This document requests the creation of a registry
   to record specs.]] New certspec types shall be ratified by the IETF
   consensus process.  [[Some commenters have suggested the creation of
   a registry for certspec types.  This is under consideration.  One
   drawback is that it is desirable to limit the certspec types for
   interoperability and recognizability reasons--probably the only
   reason to include more types is for using new hashes as old hash
   algorithms become cryptanalyzed.  The current view of the author is
   that no registry should be created.]]

11.  Security Considerations

   Digital certificates are important building blocks for
   authentication, integrity, authorization, and (occasionally)
   confidentiality services.  Accordingly, identifying digital
   certificates incorrectly can have significant security ramifications.

   When using hash-based certspecs, the cryptographic hash algorithm
   MUST be implemented properly and SHOULD have no known attack vectors.
   For this reason, algorithms that are considered "broken" as of the
   date of this Internet-Draft, such as MD5 [RFC6151], are precluded
   from being valid certspecs.  The registration of a particular
   algorithm spec in this namespace does NOT mean that it is acceptable
   or safe for every usage, even though this Internet-Draft requires
   that a conforming implementation MUST implement certain specs.

   When using content-based certspecs, the implementation MUST be
   prepared to process URNs of arbitrary length.  As of this writing,
   useful certificates rarely exceed 10KB, and most implementations are
   concerned with keeping certificate sizes down.  However, a
   pathological or malicious certificate could easily exceed these
   metrics.  If an URN resolver cannot process a URN's full length, it
   MUST reject the certspec.

   When using element-based certspecs, the implementation MUST be
   prepared to deal with multiple found certificates that contain the
   same certificate data, but are not the same certificate.  In such a
   case, the implementation MUST segregate these certificates so that it
   only resolves the URN to certificates that it considers valid or



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   trustworthy (as discussed further below).  If, despite this
   segregation, multiple valid or trustworthy certificates match the
   certspec, the certspec MUST be rejected, because a certspec is meant
   to identify exactly one certificate (not a family of certificates).

   Certificates identified by certspecs should only be used with an
   analysis of their validity, such as by computing the Certification
   Path Validation Algorithm ([RFC5280] sec. 6) or by other means.  For
   example, if a certificate database contains a set of certificates
   that it considers inherently trustworthy, then the inclusion of a
   certificate in that set makes it trustworthy, regardless of the
   results of the Certification Path Validation Algorithm.  Such a
   database is frequently used for "Root CA" lists.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [LDAPDESC]
              IANA, "LDAP Parameters: Object Identifier Descriptors",
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/
              ldap-parameters#ldap-parameters-3>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2141]  Moats, R., "URN Syntax", RFC 2141, May 1997.

   [RFC2397]  Masinter, L., "The "data" URL scheme", RFC 2397, August
              1998.

   [RFC3406]  Daigle, L., van Gulik, D., Iannella, R., and P. Faltstrom,
              "Uniform Resource Names (URN) Namespace Definition
              Mechanisms", BCP 66, RFC 3406, October 2002.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC
              3986, January 2005.

   [RFC4512]  Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
              (LDAP): Directory Information Models", RFC 4512, June
              2006.

   [RFC4514]  Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
              (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC
              4514, June 2006.





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   [RFC4517]  Legg, S., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP):
              Syntaxes and Matching Rules", RFC 4517, June 2006.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC5750]  Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
              Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Certificate
              Handling", RFC 5750, January 2010.

   [SHS]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard", Federal Information Processing Standard
              (FIPS) 180-4, March 2012,
              <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/
              fips-180-4.pdf>.

   [URNBIS]   Saint-Andre, P., "Uniform Resource Name (URN) Syntax",
              draft-ietf-urnbis-rfc2141bis-urn-07 (work in progress),
              January 2014.

12.2.  Informative References

   [PT]       Josefsson, S. and S. Leonard, "Text Encodings of PKIX and
              CMS Structures", draft-josefsson-pkix-textual-02 (work in
              progress), April 2014.

   [RFC1421]  Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
              Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication
              Procedures", RFC 1421, February 1993.

   [RFC2253]  Wahl, M., Kille, S., and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory
              Access Protocol (v3): UTF-8 String Representation of
              Distinguished Names", RFC 2253, December 1997.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, September 2009.

   [RFC6151]  Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
              for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
              RFC 6151, March 2011.



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   [RFC6920]  Farrell, S., Kutscher, D., Dannewitz, C., Ohlman, B.,
              Keranen, A., and P. Hallam-Baker, "Naming Things with
              Hashes", RFC 6920, April 2013.

Appendix A.  Relaxed Processing for Issuer Distinguished Name

   If human input is anticipated, an application may relax its
   processing of the issuer distinguished name in the issuersn spec.
   The following techniques will not produce a strictly conforming
   certspec URN, but may prove useful in mapping borderline inputs to
   valid URNs (and therefore, to specific certificates).  Most of these
   techniques are reflected in the distinguishedNameUCrelaxed
   production.

   A real-world LDAP string will likely contain spaces, such as between
   words.  Parsers SHOULD accept spaces when parsing this certspec;
   generators MAY emit spaces when strict conformance to URN syntax is
   less important than human readability (for example, when the URN is
   rendered for display, or in cases where the URN is expected to be
   handled by humans).

   Distinguished name attribute values may include Unicode characters
   outside of the US-ASCII range (0x00-0x7F), as well as characters that
   need to be escaped with [RFC4514] rules.  The interaction between
   URNs, LDAP strings, and human usability allows for multiple
   representations of these characters, two of which are strictly
   conformant and one of which should be anticipated for human input.

   At the LDAP string level, a non-ASCII character can be a UTF-8
   sequence, or can be escaped with "\" followed by two hex digits for
   each UTF-8 octet in the sequence.  At the URN level, a UTF-8 sequence
   must be converted to "%" followed by two hex digits for each UTF-8
   octet in the sequence; if the characters are already escaped, "\"
   must be converted to %5C.

   Example Attribute:

           Name: sn
          Value: E. Mu1oz$el<Toro?
             <1> is actually U+00F1 Latin Small Letter N With Tilde,
                 UTF-8 encoded as octets 0xC3 0xB1.
              $  is sub-delim; it may appear in a URN assigned-name.
              <  is required to be escaped per LDAP string rules.
              ?  is gen-delim; it may not appear in a URN assigned-name.

   Conformant LDAP Strings:





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       sn=E. Mu1oz$el\<Toro?
       sn=E. Mu\C3\B1oz$el\<Toro?

   Conformant URN Productions:

       urn:cert:issuersn:sn=E.%20Mu%C3%B1oz$el%5C%3CToro%3F;22
       urn:cert:issuersn:sn=E.%20Mu%5CC3%5CB1oz$el%5C%3CToro%3F;22

   Humans will likely supply (and UIs will likely display) characters
   without the requisite escaping.  Therefore, a parser that accepts
   human input SHOULD be prepared to accept raw UTF-8 characters and
   reserved characters that are not percent-encoded per URN rules.
   However, such a parser SHOULD strictly reject sequences that do not
   conform to LDAP string [RFC4514] rules:

       urn:cert:issuersn:sn=E. Mu1oz$el\%3CToro%3F;22

   In the example above, " " is not percent-encoded, 1 (n with tilde) is
   neither LDAP-escaped nor percent-encoded, and \ is not percent-
   encoded.  Contextually, however, the intent is obvious.  In contrast,
   the escape character \ (whether or not percent-encoded) SHOULD
   precede < because without it, the string does not conform to
   [RFC4514].  The ? character SHOULD remain percent-encoded as %3F
   because otherwise the suffix ;22 would be interpreted as the query
   component.

   URNs supplied by human input may include ";" as a delimiter between
   attributes, or if escaped, within attribute values.  A strictly
   conformant certspec parser will reject such inputs.  However, a
   parser specifically designed to process issuer distinguished names
   MAY distinguish these semicolons from the serial number separator by
   searching backwards in the string, skipping any query or fragment
   components.  The last semicolon would be treated as the separator,
   while other semicolons would be treated as parts of the issuer LDAP
   string.

Appendix B.  Mandatory Attribute Descriptors for issuersn certspec

   As per [RFC4514], attribute descriptors case-insensitive.  A
   conformant implementation MUST recognize the attributes in the table
   below, both by the OIDs and by the names recorded in the LDAP
   Parameters: Object Identifier Descriptors registry [LDAPDESC].

   +----------------------------+-------------------------------+------+
   | OID                        | Names                         | RFC  |
   +----------------------------+-------------------------------+------+
   | 2.5.4.3                    | cn (CN)                       | 4514 |
   |                            | commonName                    |      |



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   | 2.5.4.7                    | l (L)                         | 4514 |
   |                            | localityName                  |      |
   | 2.5.4.8                    | st (ST)                       | 4514 |
   |                            | (S)*                          |      |
   |                            | stateOrProvinceName           |      |
   | 2.5.4.10                   | o (O)                         | 4514 |
   |                            | organizationName              |      |
   | 2.5.4.11                   | ou (OU)                       | 4514 |
   |                            | organizationalUnitName        |      |
   | 2.5.4.6                    | c (C)                         | 4514 |
   |                            | countryName                   |      |
   | 2.5.4.9                    | street (STREET)               | 4514 |
   |                            | streetAddress                 |      |
   | 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.25 | dc (DC)                       | 4514 |
   |                            | domainComponent               |      |
   | 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1  | uid (UID)                     | 4514 |
   |                            | userId                        |      |
   | 2.5.4.5                    | serialNumber (SERIALNUMBER)   | 5280 |
   | 2.5.4.46                   | dnQualifier (DNQUALIFIER)     | 5280 |
   | 2.5.4.4                    | sn (SN)                       | 5280 |
   |                            | surname                       |      |
   | 2.5.4.42                   | gn (GN)**                     | 5280 |
   |                            | givenName                     |      |
   | 2.5.4.12                   | (T)*                          | 5280 |
   |                            | title                         |      |
   | 2.5.4.43                   | (I)*                          | 5280 |
   |                            | initials                      |      |
   | 2.5.4.44                   | (GENQUALIFIER)*               | 5280 |
   |                            | generationQualifier           |      |
   |                            | (GENERATIONQUALIFIER)         |      |
   | 2.5.4.65                   | (PNYM)*                       | 5280 |
   |                            | pseudonym (PSEUDONYM)         |      |
   | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1       | (E)*                          | 5750 |
   |                            | emailAddress                  |      |
   |                            | email                         |      |
   +----------------------------+-------------------------------+------+

   Names in parentheses are variations that are not assigned as such in
    [LDAPDESC].  Implementations MAY parse these names, but SHOULD NOT
                              generate them.
      Names in ALL-CAPS may be emitted by some certificate-processing
   applications; these names are compatible with lowercase or mixed-case
                   variations due to case-insensitivity.
   * Name may appear in some implementations, but is not in [LDAPDESC].
      ** Name commonly appears in implementations, but is RESERVED in
                                [LDAPDESC].

                      Table 2: Attribute Descriptors



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Appendix C.  Recommended Attribute Descriptors for issuersn certspec

   As per [RFC4514], attribute descriptors case-insensitive.  [[TODO:
   complete.]]

Author's Address

   Sean Leonard
   Penango, Inc.
   5900 Wilshire Boulevard
   21st Floor
   Los Angeles, CA  90036
   USA

   Email: dev+ietf@seantek.com
   URI:   http://www.penango.com/



































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