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Network Working Group                                      S. Echeverria
Internet-Draft                                                   CMU SEI
Intended status: Informational                                  L. Seitz
Expires: September 9, 2019                                          RISE
                                                           D. Klinedinst
                                                                G. Lewis
                                                                 CMU SEI
                                                           March 8, 2019


                 ACE Clients in Disadvantaged Networks
             draft-secheverria-ace-client-disadvantaged-00

Abstract

   This document describes a set of recommendations to use when
   implementing ACE/OAuth 2.0 clients that are working in disadvantaged
   networks.  Issues such as token revocation have a much higher
   priority in scenarios where Resource Servers are IoT devices, and
   network connectivity is limited and intermittent.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Sample Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Use of Client Introspection for Token Revocation  . . . .   3
       3.1.1.  Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       3.1.2.  Specific Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.3.  Alternatives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   Authentication and authorization in IoT (Internet of Things) devices
   can be difficult due to constraints in terms of memory, processing,
   user interface, power and communication bandwidth.  OAuth 2.0 and
   derived standards, such as ACE, can be still applied to these
   scenarios, often with some modifications.  However, when IoT devices
   are working in disadvantaged networks, there are even greater
   constraints in terms of communication bandwidth.  Nodes in
   disadvantaged networks operate in what are called DIL environments
   (disconnected, intermittent, limited), which means that there is
   limited and unreliable connectivity between nodes with potentially
   periods of full disconnection.  This document will focus on practices
   that are recommended for clients using ACE/OAuth 2.0 while working
   with IoT devices in disadvantaged networks.

   There are cases in which a client may need to obtain further
   information about a token without communicating with a Resource
   Server (RS).  One such case is when a client needs to know the active
   status of a token that it possesses.  This is particularly useful in
   disadvantaged environments where RS impersonation and sabotage are
   likely threats.

   Section 2 describes a sample scenario and Section 3 describes
   recommendations for client implementation, including the use of
   client introspection: ensuring only authorized clients can perform
   client introspection, enabling decryption of self-contained tokens,
   and limiting information returned in the introspection response.



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2.  Sample Scenario

   A sample scenario is the following: let's assume we have IoT devices
   that are deployed over a large area to monitor it after an
   earthquake.  These IoT devices may be small sensors of different
   types (temperature, motion detectors, etc.) that are constantly
   collecting information from their environment.  Each of these IoT
   devices will act as an RS, and we want to be able to give
   authorization to access their resources to mobile clients.  The
   Authorization Server (AS) will be mostly static, or slow moving; it
   could be deployed in a nearby building, or carried along in vehicles
   if there is no central location.  Clients would most likely be
   smartphones or tablets, carried by users in the field.  Due to the
   mobility of the clients and the large area over which the RSs are
   deployed, clients would only intermittently have connectivity to both
   the AS and to each RS.  Clients would ask the AS for access tokens
   when they are in range of the AS, and use the tokens to get
   information from the RSs when they are in range of the IoT devices.

   In this situation, being opportunistic about what to do when a client
   gets in range of an AS is an important thing to consider.  It is also
   highly likely that clients or RSs may be impersonated or sabotaged.
   This makes it a high priority to identify tokens associated to a
   compromised RS or sent to a compromised client.

   A specific situation for this would be if the AS admin learns that a
   certain RS has been compromised.  The AS does not have constant
   connectivity to clients, so it can't let them know right away about
   the issue.  However, it wants to prevent all clients that had tokens
   to communicate with that RS that they should no longer use those
   tokens.  The AS admin can manually mark all tokens issued to that RS
   as an audience as revoked (internally).  However, a means to let
   clients know about the revocation of their tokens would be needed.

3.  Recommendations

3.1.  Use of Client Introspection for Token Revocation

3.1.1.  Procedure

   One way to let clients know when a token has been revoked is to
   extend the existing protocol to add specific messages to handle this.
   But an alternative, simpler way would be to use client introspection.
   The end goal is to be able to revoke tokens for a RS that has been
   compromised, by letting clients poll information about the tokens,
   and then letting them know that they have been revoked.





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   A client can opportunistically poll an AS using the same
   introspection mechanism defined in the OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection
   RFC [RFC7662], to obtain information on whether a specific token is
   still valid or not.  That RFC defines a method for querying an
   Authorization Server (AS) for metadata about a token.  The
   introspection process focuses on how a Resource Server (RS) could
   benefit from this information.  This is because, in most cases, the
   token is assumed to be opaque to the client, as it is intended to be
   a secure way of sending information to a RS, without the client being
   able to modify it.

   This same mechanism can be used to detect revoked tokens
   opportunistically whenever a client gets in range of an AS.  It
   should work in the following way:

   1- A client that gets in range of the AS, uses that opportunity to
   contact the AS and to ask it about the state of its non-expired
   tokens.  More specifically, it sends a client introspection request
   for each of the non-expired tokens it is using.

   2- The AS replies to the client with information about whether each
   token is "active" or not.  For every token that has been revoked, it
   returns that the token is not active.

   3- The client receives the response and purges non-active tokens from
   its list of tokens.

   Thus the client will be protected from contacting the compromised RS.
   Of course, this does not prevent the client from contacting the RS
   before it can access the AS and ask about the tokens, but there is
   not much that can be done about it until the client is able to
   communicate with the AS.

3.1.2.  Specific Recommendations

   The following recommendations are useful to consider when
   implementing client introspection:

   1- The AS should have a way to limit which clients are allowed to
   send introspection requests.  This ensures that only clients that
   really do need the information are allowed access to it.

   2- The "kid" header parameter as defined in [RFC7519] and [RFC8152]
   should be used when the token is encrypted in a structured
   information object such as a JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] or CBOR
   Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392].  The AS can store a key ID in this header
   that can be associated with the RS key used during encrypted token
   creation.  If the AS does this when generating every encrypted token,



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   then it should always be able to decrypt that token on an
   introspection request coming from a client or from a RS.

   This is needed because an encrypted token can only be decrypted if
   the proper key is known.  When an RS performs introspection, the AS
   can use the identity of the RS as a hint to find the related key.
   However, if a client is performing the introspection request, the AS
   receiving the request needs more information to know what audience
   the encrypted token was issued for in order to decrypt it properly.

   3- Only the value of the "active" parameter should be returned for
   introspection requests coming from clients.  An introspection
   response has several parameters, but all of them are optional except
   for the "active" parameter.  The "active" parameter can be used to
   indicate that a token has been revoked, and does not provide any
   information about the claims, which the client should usually not
   need.  This prevents the disclosure of additional information to the
   client.

3.1.3.  Alternatives

   An alternative way to handle token revocation would be to prevent the
   AS from issuing more tokens for the same RS/audience, and for the
   client to request a new token each time it is in range of the AS.  In
   this case, tokens would not be revoked, but rather clients would be
   implicitly notified to no longer contact a specific RS.  However,
   this has at least two downsides.  First, a client would have to
   request a new token each time it is in range of an AS, constantly, to
   be able to detect token revocation by getting the token request to be
   denied.  This could lead to many tokens issued to the same client and
   for the same RS in a short period of time, which may not be even used
   in that timeframe.  In addition, this generates additional traffic in
   an already constrained network.  Second, client would be interpreting
   a denial to issue a token from an AS as a warning not to contact that
   RS anymore.  This could lead the client to dump a previous token that
   it has for that RS, to prevent potentially dangerous contact with it.
   However, the denial may be for other reasons, but there is no way to
   differentiate when denying a token request to a client.  Thus, a
   client may end up dumping working tokens because of a potentially
   different issue with new token generation.  In summary, this option
   depends on the client making too many assumptions to successfuly
   prevent it from accessing a compromised RS.  Using client
   introspection to detect revoked tokens is a much simpler and direct
   way of handling this issue.

   Another similar alternative to revoking tokens is to issue tokens
   with very short lifetimes.  In this case, even if a device having a
   token is compromised, the short lifetime will make that token expire



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   quickly, making revocation notifications unnecessary.  The main
   problem with this option in disadvantaged networks is that clients
   will not often be in range of the AS that issues the tokens or of the
   RS they want to use the token with.  Thus, if tokens have very short
   lifetimes, they may not last long enough for a client to actually
   send that token to the RS it needs to contact.  Or even if it does,
   if the token expires shortly afterwards, the client will not be able
   to contact that or other RS in the same audience again until it comes
   in range of the AS to obtain a new token.  Thus, in this type of
   environments, the lifetime of a token must be carefully balanced in
   relation to its intended use and the frequency the devices will be in
   range of each other.

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no request of IANA.

   Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
   RFC.

5.  Security Considerations

   There are some potential security issues with the recommendations
   described in this document.  Because the AS would accept
   introspection requests from a client, claim information associated to
   the tokens and not intended for a client could be sent back to it in
   a response.  The recommendations above explicitly indicate to only
   send the "active" parameter as the response to this type of request,
   but it is still up to the implementation to do this properly, and to
   properly identify a device as a client (or more specifically as a
   device to send limited information to in a reply).  If this is
   properly done, compromised or rogue clients sending introspection
   requests would not be able to obtain more information than the token
   active status from these types of introspection requests.

6.  Acknowledgements

7.  Normative References

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7662]  Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
              RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.





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   [RFC8152]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.

   [RFC8392]  Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
              "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
              May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.

Authors' Addresses

   Sebastian Echeverria
   CMU SEI


   Ludwig Seitz
   RISE


   Dan  Klinedinst
   CMU SEI


   Grace Lewis
   CMU SEI



























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