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Versions: 00 draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz

ACE Working Group                                               L. Seitz
Internet-Draft                                                      SICS
Intended status: Standards Track                             G. Selander
Expires: April 21, 2016                                         Ericsson
                                                           E. Wahlstroem
                                                              S. Erdtman
                                                        Nexus Technology
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                                ARM Ltd.
                                                        October 19, 2015


        Authorization for the Internet of Things using OAuth 2.0
                     draft-seitz-ace-oauth-authz-00

Abstract

   This memo defines how to use OAuth 2.0 as an authorization framework
   with Internet of Things (IoT) deployments, thus bringing a well-known
   and widely used security solution to IoT devices.  Where possible
   vanilla OAuth 2.0 is used, but where the limitations of IoT devices
   require it, profiles and extensions are provided.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  OAuth 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  CoAP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Object Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Protocol Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  OAuth 2.0 Profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  Communication Security Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  Authorization Information Resource at the Resource Server  12
     5.3.  Authorization Information Format  . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.4.  CBOR Data Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.5.  CBOR Web Token  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Deployment Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  Client and Resource Server are Offline  . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.2.  Resource Server Offline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.3.  Token Introspection with an Offline Client  . . . . . . .  21
     6.4.  Always-On Connectivity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     6.5.  Token-less Authorization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     6.6.  Securing Group Communication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   Appendix A.  Design Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   Appendix B.  Optimizations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   Appendix C.  CoAP and CBOR profiles for OAuth 2.0 . . . . . . . .  35
     C.1.  Profile for Token resource  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       C.1.1.  Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       C.1.2.  Token Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     C.2.  CoAP Profile for OAuth Introspection  . . . . . . . . . .  38
       C.2.1.  Introspection Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
       C.2.2.  Introspection Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   Appendix D.  CBOR Web Token (CWT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     D.1.  Claim Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
       D.1.1.  iss (Issuer) Claim  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
       D.1.2.  sub (Subject) Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42



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       D.1.3.  aud (Audience) Claim  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       D.1.4.  exp (Expiration Time) Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       D.1.5.  nbf (Not Before) Claim  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       D.1.6.  iat (Issued At) Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       D.1.7.  cti (CWT ID) Claim  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       D.1.8.  cnf (Confirmation) Claim  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       D.1.9.  cks (COSE Key Structure) Claim  . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       D.1.10. aif (Authorization Information Format) Claim  . . . .  43
     D.2.  CBOR major types for Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     D.3.  CBOR Web Token Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44

1.  Introduction

   Authorization is the process of deciding what an entity ought to be
   allowed to do.  Managing authorization information for a large number
   of devices and users is often a complex task where dedicated servers
   are used.

   Managing authorization of users, services and their devices with the
   help of dedicated authorization servers (AS) is a common task, found
   in enterprise networks as well as on the Web.  In its simplest form
   the authorization task can be described as granting access to a
   resource hosted on a device, the resource server (RS).  This exchange
   is mediated by one or multiple authorization servers.

   We envision that end consumers and enterprises will want to manage
   their Internet of Things (IoT) devices in the same style and this
   desire will increase with the number of devices that need to be
   managed and controlled.  The IoT devices may be constrained in
   various ways including processing, memory, code, energy, etc., as
   defined in [RFC7228], and the different IoT deployments present a
   continuous range of device and network capabilities.  Taking energy
   consumption as an example: At one end there are energy-harvesting or
   battery powered devices which have a tight power budget, on the other
   end there are mains-connected devices which are not constrained in
   terms of power, and all levels in between.  Thus IoT devices are very
   different in terms of available processing and message exchange
   capabilities.

   This memo describes how to re-use OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] to extend
   authorization to Internet of Things devices with different kinds of
   constrainedness.  At the time of writing OAuth 2.0 is already used
   with certain types of IoT devices and this document will provide
   implementers additional guidance for using it in a secure and
   privacy-friendly way.  Where possible the basic OAuth 2.0 mechanisms
   are used; in some circumstances profiles are defined, for example to
   support lower the over-the-wire message size and smaller code size.



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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   Certain security-related terms such as "authentication",
   "authorization", "confidentiality", "(data) integrity", "message
   authentication code", and "verify" are taken from [RFC4949].

   Since we describe exchanges as RESTful protocol interactions HTTP
   [RFC7231] offers useful terminology.

   Terminology for entities in the architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0
   [RFC6749] and [I-D.ietf-ace-actors], such as client (C), resource
   server (RS), and authorization server (AS).  OAuth 2.0 uses the term
   "endpoint" to denote HTTP resources such as /token and /authorize at
   the AS, but we will use the term "resource" in this memo to avoid
   confusion with the CoAP [RFC7252] term "endpoint".

   Since this draft focuses on the problem of access control to
   resources, we simplify the actors by assuming that the client
   authorization server (CAS) functionality is not stand-alone but
   subsumed by either the authorization server or the client (see
   section 2.2 in [I-D.ietf-ace-actors]).

3.  Overview

   This specification describes a framework for authorization in the
   Internet of Things consisting of a set of building blocks.

   The basic block is the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] framework, which enjoys
   widespread deployment.  Many IoT devices can support OAuth 2.0
   without any additional extensions, but for certain constrained
   settings additional profiling is needed.

   Another building block is the lightweight web transfer protocol CoAP
   [RFC7252] for those communication environments where HTTP is not
   appropriate.  CoAP typically runs on top of UDP which further reduces
   overhead and message exchanges.  When CoAP is used over UDP,
   transport layer security is provided by DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] instead of
   TLS 1.2 [RFC5246].









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   A third building block is CBOR [RFC7049] for encodings where JSON
   [RFC7159] is not sufficiently compact.  CBOR is a binary encoding
   designed for extremely small code size and fairly small message size.
   OAuth 2.0 allows access tokens to use different encodings and this
   document defines such an alternative encoding.  The COSE message
   format [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] is also based on CBOR.

   A fourth building block is application layer security, which is used
   where transport layer security is insufficient.  At the time of
   writing the preferred approach for securing CoAP at the application
   layer is via the use of COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-msg], which adds object
   security to CBOR-encoded data.  More details about applying COSE to
   CoAP can be found in OSCOAP [I-D.selander-ace-object-security].

   With the building blocks listed above, solutions satisfying various
   IoT device and network constraints are possible.  A list of
   constraints is described in detail in RFC 7228 [RFC7228] and a
   description of how the building blocks mentioned above relate to the
   various constraints can be found in Appendix A.

   Luckily, not every IoT device suffers from all constraints.  The
   described framework does, however, takes all these aspects into
   account and allows several different deployment variants to co-exist
   rather than mandating a one-size-fits-all solution.  We believe this
   is important to cover the wide range of possible interworking use
   cases and the different requirements from a security point of view.
   Once IoT deployments mature, popular deployment variants will be
   documented in form of profiles.

   In the subsections below we provide further details about the
   different building blocks.

3.1.  OAuth 2.0

   The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a client to obtain
   limited access to a resource with the permission of a resource owner.
   Authorization related information is passed between the nodes using
   access tokens.  These access tokens are issued to clients by an
   authorization server with the approval of the resource owner.  The
   client uses the access token to access the protected resources hosted
   by the resource server.

   A number of OAuth 2.0 terms are used within this memo:

   Access Tokens:

      Access tokens are credentials used to access protected resources.
      An access token is a data structure representing authorization



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      permissions issued to the client.  Access tokens are generated by
      the authorization server and consumed by the resource server.  The
      access token is opaque to the client.

      Access tokens can have different formats, and various methods of
      utilization (e.g., cryptographic properties) based on the security
      requirements of the given deployment.

   Proof of Possession Tokens:

      An access token may be bound to a cryptographic key, which is then
      used by an RS to authenticate requests from a client.  Such tokens
      are called proof-of-possession tokens (or PoP tokens)
      [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].

      The proof-of-possession (PoP) security concept assumes that the AS
      acts as a trusted third party that binds keys to access tokens.
      These so called PoP keys are then used by the client to
      demonstrate the possession of the secret to the RS when accessing
      the resource.  The RS, when receiving an access token, needs to
      verify that the key used by the client matches the one included in
      the access token.  When this memo uses the term "access token" it
      is assumed to be a PoP token unless specifically stated otherwise.

      The key bound to the access token (aka PoP key) may be based on
      symmetric as well as on asymmetrical cryptography.  The
      appropriate choice of security depends on the constraints of the
      IoT devices as well as on the security requirements of the use
      case.

      Symmetric PoP key:

            The AS generates a random symmetric PoP key, encrypts it for
            the RS and includes it inside an access token.  The PoP key
            is also encrypted for the client and sent together with the
            access token to the client.

      Asymmetric PoP key:

            An asymmetric key pair is generated on the client and the
            public key is sent to the AS (if it does not already have
            knowledge of the client's public key).  Information about
            the public key, which is the PoP key in this case, is then
            included inside the access token and sent back to the
            requesting client.

      The access token is protected against modifications using a MAC or
      a digital signature of the AS.  The choice of PoP key does not



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      necessarily imply a specific credential type for the integrity
      protection of the token.  More information about PoP tokens can be
      found in [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].

   Scopes and Permissions:

      In OAuth 2.0, the client specifies the type of permissions it is
      seeking to obtain (via the scope parameter) in the access request.
      In turn, the AS may use the "scope" response parameter to inform
      the client of the scope of the access token issued.  This memo
      uses CBOR encoded messages defined in Appendix C to request scopes
      and to be informed what scopes the access token was actually
      authorized for by the AS.

      The values of the scope parameter are expressed as a list of
      space- delimited, case-sensitive strings, with a semantic that is
      well-known to the AS and the RS.  More details about the concept
      of scopes is found under Section 3.3 in [RFC6749].

   Claims:

      The information carried in the access token in the form of type-
      value pairs is called claims.  An access token may for example
      include a claim about the AS that issued the token (the "iss"
      claim) and what audience the access token is intended for (the
      "aud" claim).  The audience of an access token can be a specific
      resource or one or many resource servers.  The resource owner
      policies influence the what claims are put into the access token
      by the authorization server.

      While the structure and encoding of the access token varies
      throughout deployments, a standardized format has been defined
      with the JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] where claims are encoded
      as a JSON object.  In Appendix D we define a CBOR version of JWT
      that we call CBOR Web Token (CWT).

   Introspection:

      Introspection is a method for a resource server to query the
      authorization server for the active state and content of a
      received access token.  This is particularly useful in those cases
      where the authorization decisions are very dynamic and/or where
      the received access token itself is a reference rather than a
      self-contained token.  More information about introspection in
      OAuth 2.0 can be found in [I-D.ietf-oauth-introspection].

3.2.  CoAP




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   CoAP is an application layer protocol similar to HTTP, but
   specifically designed for constrained environments.  CoAP typically
   uses datagram-oriented transport, such as UDP.

   Where HTTP uses headers and query-strings to convey additional
   information about a request, CoAP encodes such information in so-
   called 'options'.

   CoAP supports application-layer fragmentation of the CoAP payloads
   through blockwise transfers [I-D.ietf-core-block].  However, this
   method does not allow the fragmentation of large CoAP options,
   therefore data encoded in options has to be kept small.

3.3.  Object Security

   Transport layer security is not always sufficient and application
   layer security has to be provided.  COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] defines
   a message format for cryptographic protection of data using CBOR
   encoding.  There are two main approaches for application layer
   security:

   Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)

      OSCOAP [I-D.selander-ace-object-security] is a method for
      protecting CoAP request/response message exchanges, including CoAP
      payloads, CoAP header fields as well as CoAP options.  OSCOAP
      provides end-to-end confidentiality, integrity and replay
      protection, and a secure binding between CoAP request and response
      messages.

      A CoAP message protected with OSCOAP contains the CoAP option
      "Object-Security" which signals that the CoAP message carries a
      COSE message ([I-D.ietf-cose-msg]).  OSCOAP defines a profile of
      COSE which includes replay protection.

   Object Security of Content (OSCON)

      For the case of wrapping of application layer payload data
      ("content") only, such as resource representations or claims of
      access tokens, the same COSE profile can be applied to obtain end-
      to-end confidentiality, integrity and replay protection.
      [I-D.selander-ace-object-security] defines this functionality as
      Object Security of Content (OSCON).

      In this case, the message is not bound to the underlying
      application layer protocol and can therefore be used with HTTP,
      CoAP, Bluetooth Smart, etc.  Whereas OSCOAP integrity protects
      specific CoAP message meta-data like request/response code, and



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      binds a response to a specific request, since OSCON protects only
      payload/content, those security features are lost.  The advantages
      are that an OSCON message can be passed across different
      protocols, from request to response, and used to secure group
      communications.

4.  Protocol Interactions

   This framework is based on the same protocol interactions as OAuth
   2.0: A client obtains an access token from an AS and presents the
   token to an RS to gain access to a protected resource.  These
   interactions are shown in Figure 1.  An overview of various OAuth
   concepts is provided in Section 3.1.

   The consent of the resource owner, for giving a client access to a
   protected resource, can be pre-configured authorization policies or
   dynamically at the time when the request is sent.  The resource owner
   and the requesting party (= client owner) are not shown in Figure 1.

   For the description in this document we assume that the client has
   been registered to an AS.  Registration means that the two share
   credentials, configuration parameters and that some form of
   authorization has taken place.  These credentials are used to protect
   the token request by the client and the transport of access tokens
   and client information from AS to the client.

   It is also assumed that the RS has been registered with the AS.
   Established keying material between the AS and the RS allows the AS
   to apply cryptographic protection to the access token to ensure that
   the content cannot be modified, and if needed, that the content is
   confidentiality protected.

   The keying material necessary for establishing communication security
   between C and RS is dynamically established as part of the protocol
   described in this document.

   At the start of the protocol there is an optional discovery step
   where the client discovers the resource server and the resources this
   server hosts.  In this step the client might also determine what
   permissions are needed to access the protected resource.  The exact
   procedure depends on the protocols being used and the specific
   deployment environment.  In Bluetooth Smart, for example,
   advertisements are broadcasted by a peripheral, including information
   about the supported services.  In CoAP, as a second example, a client
   can makes a request to "/.well-known/core" to obtain information
   about available resources, which are returned in a standardized
   format as described in [RFC6690].




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     +--------+                                     +---------------+
     |        |---(A)-- Token Request ------------->|               |
     |        |                                     | Authorization |
     |        |<--(B)-- Access Token ---------------|    Server     |
     |        |       + Client Information          |               |
     |        |                                     +---------------+
     |        |                                            ^ |
     |        |        Introspection Request & Response (D)| |(E)
     | Client |                                            | v
     |        |                                     +--------------+
     |        |---(C)-- Token + Request ----------->|              |
     |        |                                     |   Resource   |
     |        |<--(F)-- Protected Resource ---------|    Server    |
     |        |                                     |              |
     +--------+                                     +--------------+

               Figure 1: Overview of the basic protocol flow

   Requesting an Access Token (A):

      The client makes an access token request to the AS.  This memo
      assumes the use of PoP tokens (see Section 3.1 for a short
      description) wherein the AS binds a key to an access token.  The
      client may include permissions it seeks to obtain, and information
      about the type of credentials it wants to use (i.e., symmetric or
      asymmetric cryptography).

   Access Token Response (B):

      If the AS successfully processes the request from the client, it
      returns an access token.  It also includes various parameters,
      which we call "Client Information".  In addition to the response
      parameters defined by OAuth 2.0 and the PoP token extension, we
      consider new kinds of response parameters in Section 5, including
      information on which security protocol the client should use with
      the resource server(s) that it has just been authorized to access.
      Communication security between client and RS may be based on pre-
      provisioned keys/security contexts or dynamically established to
      the RS via the PoP token; and to the client via the client
      information as described in Section 5.1.

   Resource Request (C):

      The client interacts with the RS to request access to the
      protected resource and provides the access token.  The protocol to
      use between the client and the RS is not restricted to CoAP; HTTP,
      HTTP/2, Bluetooth Smart etc., are also possible candidates.




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      Depending on the device limitations and the selected protocol this
      exchange may be split up into two phases:

         (1) the client sends the access token to a newly defined
         authorization endpoint at the RS (see Section 5.2) , which
         conveys authorization information to the RS that may be used
         for subsequent resource requests, and

         (2) the client makes the resource access request, using the
         communication security protocol and other client information
         obtained from the AS.

      The RS verifies that the token is integrity protected by the AS
      and compares the claims contained in the access token with the
      resource request.  If the RS is online, validation can be handed
      over to the AS using token introspection (see messages D and E)
      over HTTP or CoAP, in which case the different parts of step C may
      be interleaved with introspection.

   Token Introspection Request (D):

      A resource server may be configured to use token introspection to
      interact with the AS to obtain the most recent claims, such as
      scope, audience, validity etc.  associated with a specific access
      token.  Token introspection over CoAP is defined in
      [I-D.wahlstroem-ace-oauth-introspection] and for HTTP in
      [I-D.ietf-oauth-introspection].

      Note that token introspection is an optional step and can be
      omitted if the token is self-contained and the resource server is
      prepared to perform the token validation on its own.

   Token Introspection Response (E):

      The AS validates the token and returns the claims associated with
      it back to the RS.  The RS then uses the received claims to
      process the request to either accept or to deny it.

   Protected Resource (F):

      If the request from the client is authorized, the RS fulfills the
      request and returns a response with the appropriate response code.
      The RS uses the dynamically established keys to protect the
      response, according to used communication security protocol.

5.  OAuth 2.0 Profiling





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   This section describes profiles of OAuth 2.0 adjusting it to
   constrained environments for use cases where this is necessary.

5.1.  Communication Security Protocol

   OAuth 2.0 using bearer tokens, as described in RFC 6749 and in RFC
   6750, requires TLS for all communication interactions between client,
   authorization server, and resource server.  This is possible in the
   scope where OAuth 2.0 was originally developed, web and mobile
   applications.  In these environments resources like computational
   power and bandwidth are not scarce and operating systems as well as
   browser platforms are pre-provisioned with trust anchors that enable
   clients to authenticate servers based on the Web PKI.  In a more
   heterogeneous IoT environment a wider range of use cases needs to be
   supported.  Therefore, this document suggests extensions to OAuth 2.0
   that enable the AS to inform the client on how to communicate
   securely with a RS.

   The client and the RS might not have any prior knowledge about each
   other, therefore the AS needs to help them to establish a security
   context or at least a key.  The AS does this by indicating
   communication security protocol ("csp") and additional key parameters
   in the client information.

   The "csp" parameter specifies how client and RS communication is
   going to be secured based on returned keys.  Currently defined values
   are "TLS", "DTLS", "OSCOAP" and "OSCON".  Depending on the value
   different additional parameters become mandatory.

   TLS with certificates may make use of pre-established trust anchors
   or configured more tightly with additional client information
   parameters, like x5c, x5t or x5t#S256.

   CoAP specifies three security "modes" of DTLS: PreSharedKey,
   RawPublicKey and Certificate.  In case of PreSharedKey and
   RawPublicKey DTLS is based on the use keys distributed in the PoP
   token and via the client information.  Additional certificate
   information may also be added, for example using the parameter x5c,
   x5t or x5t#S256.

   To use OSCOAP and OSCON requires security context to be established,
   which can be provisioned with PoP token and client information, or
   derived from keys provisioned in this way.

5.2.  Authorization Information Resource at the Resource Server

   A consequence of allowing the use of CoAP as web transfer protocol is
   that we cannot rely on HTTP specific mechanisms, such as transferring



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   information elements in HTTP headers since those are not necessarily
   gracefully mapped to CoAP.  In case the access token is larger then
   255 bytes it should not be sent as a CoAP option.

   For conveying authorization information to the RS we therefore
   introduce a new resource to which the PoP tokens can be sent to
   convey authorization information before the first resource request is
   made by the client.  This specification calls this resource "/authz-
   info"; the URI may, however, vary in deployments.

5.3.  Authorization Information Format

   We introduce a new claim for describing access rights with a specific
   format, the "aif" claim.  In this memo we propose to use the compact
   format provided by AIF [I-D.bormann-core-ace-aif].  Access rights may
   be specified as a list of URIs of resources together with allowed
   actions (GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, or DELETE).

5.4.  CBOR Data Formats

   The /token resource (called "endpoint" in OAuth 2.0), defined in
   Section 3.2 of [RFC6749], is used by the client to obtain an access
   token.  Requests sent to the /token resource use the HTTP POST method
   and the payload includes a query component, which is formatted as
   application/x-www-form-urlencoded.  CoAP payloads cannot be formatted
   in the same way which requires the /token resource on the AS to be
   profiled.  Appendix C defines a CBOR-based format for sending
   parameters to the /token resource.

5.5.  CBOR Web Token

   CBOR Web Tokens (CWT) are defined in Appendix D as compact analogs of
   JSON Web Tokens (JWT) [RFC7519].  CWTs uses COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]
   to offer similar, but more compact security services.  CWT supports
   PoP token functionality.

6.  Deployment Scenarios

   There is a large variety of IoT deployments, as is indicated in
   Appendix A, and this section highlights common variants.  This
   section is not normative but illustrates how the framework can be
   applied.









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   For each of the deployment variants there are a number of possible
   security setups between clients, resource servers and authorization
   servers.  The main focus in the following subsections is on how
   authorization of a client request for a resource hosted by a RS is
   performed.  This requires us to also consider how these requests and
   responses between the clients and the resource servers are secured.

   The security protocols between other pairs of nodes in the
   architecture, namely client-to-AS and RS-to-AS, are not detailed in
   these examples.  Different security protocols may be used on
   transport or application layer.

   Note: We use the CBOR diagnostic notation for examples of requests
   and responses.

6.1.  Client and Resource Server are Offline

   In this scenario we consider the case where both the resource server
   and the client are offline, i.e., they are not connected to the AS at
   the time of the resource request.  This access procedure involves
   steps A, B, C, and F of Figure 1, but assumes that step A and B have
   been carried out during a phase when the client had connectivity to
   AS.

   Since the resource server must be able to verify the access token
   locally, self-contained access tokens must be used.

   This example shows the interactions between a client, the
   authorization server and a temperature sensor acting as a resource
   server.  Message exchanges A and B are shown in Figure 2.

      A: The client first generates a public-private key pair used for
      communication security with the RS.

      The client sends the POST request to /token at AS.  The request
      contains the public key of the client and the Audience parameter
      set to "tempSensorInLivingRoom", a value the that the temperature
      sensor identifies itself with.  The AS evaluates the request and
      authorizes the client to access the resource.

      B: The AS responds with a PoP token and client information.  The
      PoP token contains the public key of the client, while the client
      information contains the public key of the RS.  For communication
      security this example uses DTLS with raw public keys between the
      client and the RS.






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      Note: In this example we assume that the client knows what
      resource it wants to access, and is therefore able to request
      specific audience and scope claims for the access token.

                       Authorization
                Client    Server
                  |         |
                  |         |
              A:  +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
                  | POST    | Uri-Path:"token"
                  |         | Payload: <Request-Payload>
                  |         |
              B:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
                  |         | Content-Type: application/cbor
                  | 2.05    | Payload: <Response-Payload>
                  |         |

      Figure 2: Token Request and Response Using Client Credentials.

   The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-
   Payload is shown in Figure 3.

                  Request-Payload :
                  {
                    "grant_type" : "client_credentials",
                    "aud" : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
                    "client_id" : "myclient",
                    "client_secret" : "qwerty"
                  }

                  Response-Payload :
                  {
                    "access_token" : b64'SlAV32hkKG ...',
                    "token_type" : "pop",
                    "csp" : "DTLS",
                    "key" : b64'eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUi ...'
                  }

              Figure 3: Request and Response Payload Details.

   The content of the "key" parameter and the access token are shown in
   Figure 4 and Figure 5.

        {
          "kid" : b64'c29tZSBwdWJsaWMga2V5IGlk',
          "kty" : "EC",
          "crv" : "P-256",
          "x"   : b64'MKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4',



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          "y"   : b64'4Etl6SRW2YiLUrN5vfvVHuhp7x8PxltmWWlbbM4IFyM'
        }

                      Figure 4: Public Key of the RS.

       {
         "aud" : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
         "iat" : "1360189224",
         "cnf" : {
           "jwk" : {
             "kid" : b64'1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8',
             "kty" : "EC",
             "crv" : "P-256",
             "x" : b64'f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU',
             "y" : b64'x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0'
           }
         }
       }

        Figure 5: Access Token including Public Key of the Client.

   Messages C and F are shown in Figure 6 - Figure 7.

      C: The client then sends the PoP token to the /authz-info resource
      at the RS.  This is a plain CoAP request, i.e. no DTLS/OSCOAP
      between client and RS, since the token is integrity protected
      between AS and RS.  The RS verifies that the PoP token was created
      by a known and trusted AS, is valid, and responds to the client.
      The RS caches the security context together with authorization
      information about this client contained in the PoP token.

      The client and resource server run the DTLS handshake using the
      raw public keys established in step B and C.

      The client sends the CoAP request GET to /temperature on RS over
      DTLS.  The RS verifies that the request is authorized.

      F: The RS responds with a resource representation over DTLS.

                            Resource
                  Client     Server
                     |         |
                 C:  +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
                     | POST    | Uri-Path:"authz-info"
                     |         | Payload: SlAV32hkKG ...
                     |         |   (access token)
                     |         |
                     |<--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed



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                     | 2.04    |
                     |         |

                 Figure 6: Access Token provisioning to RS

                          Resource
                Client     Server
                   |         |
                   |<=======>| DTLS Connection Establishment
                   |         |   using Raw Public Keys
                   |         |
                   |         |
                   +-------->| Header: GET (Code=0.01)
                   | GET     | Uri-Path: "temperature"
                   |         |
                   |         |
                   |         |
               F:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
                   | 2.05    | Payload: {"t":"22.7"}
                   |         |

        Figure 7: Resource Request and Response protected by DTLS.

6.2.  Resource Server Offline

   In this deployment scenario we consider the case of an RS that may
   not be able to access the AS at the time it receives an access
   request from a client.  We denote this case "RS offline", it involves
   steps A, B, C and F of Figure 1.

   If the RS is offline, then it must be possible for the RS to locally
   validate the access token.  This requires self-contained tokens to be
   used.

   The validity time for the token should always be chosen as short as
   possible to reduce the possibility that a token contains out-of-date
   authorization information.  Therefore the value for the Expiration
   Time claim ("exp") should be set only slightly larger than the value
   for the Issuing Time claim ("iss").  A constrained RS with means to
   reliably measure time must validate the expiration time of the access
   token.

   The following example shows interactions between a client (AC control
   unit), an offline resource server (temperature sensor) and an
   authorization server.  The message exchanges A and B are shown in
   Figure 8.





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      A: The client sends the request POST to /token at AS.  The request
      contains the Audience parameter set to "tempSensor109797", a value
      that the temperature sensor identifies itself with.  The scope the
      client want's the AS to authorize the access token for is "owner",
      which means that the token can be used to both read temperature
      data and upgrade the firmware on the RS.  The AS evaluates the
      request and authorizes the client to access the resource.

      B: The AS responds with a PoP token and client information.  The
      PoP token is wrapped in a COSE message, object secured content
      from AS to RS.  The client information contains a symmetric key.
      In this case communication security between C and RS is OSCOAP
      with an authenticated encryption algorithm.  The client derives
      two unidirectional security contexts to use with the resource
      request and response messages.  The access token includes the
      claim "aif" with the authorized access that an owner of the
      temperature device can enjoy.  The "aif" claim, issued by the AS,
      informs the RS that the owner of the access token, that can prove
      the possession of a key is authorized to make a GET request
      against the /tempC resource and a POST request on the /firmware
      resource.


                       Authorization
               Client     Server
                  |         |
                  |         |
              A:  +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
                  | POST    | Uri-Path: "token"
                  |         | Payload: <Request-Payload>
                  |         |
              B:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
                  |         | Content-Type: application/cbor
                  | 2.05    | Payload: <Response-Payload>
                  |         |
                  |         |


                   Figure 8: Token Request and Response

   The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-
   Payload is shown in Figure 9.


                  Request-Payload:
                  {
                    "grant_type" : "client_credentials",
                    "client_id" : "myclient",



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                    "client_secret" : "qwerty",
                    "aud" : "tempSensor109797",
                    "scope" : "owner"
                  }

                  Response-Payload:
                  {
                    "access_token": b64'SlAV32hkKG ...',
                    "token_type" : "pop",
                    "csp" : "OSCOAP",
                    "key" : b64'eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUi ...'
                  }

           Figure 9: Request and Response Payload for RS offline

   Figure 10 shows examples of the key and the access_token parameters
   of the Response-Payload, decoded to CBOR.

         access_token:
         {
           "aud" : "tempSensor109797",
           "exp" : 1311281970,
           "iat" : 1311280970,
           "aif" :  [["/tempC", 0], ["/firmware", 2]],
           "cnf" : {
             "ck":b64'JDLUhTMjU2IiwiY3R5Ijoi ...'
             }
          }

         key:
         {
           "alg" : "AES_128_CCM_8",
           "kid" : b64'U29tZSBLZXkgSWQ',
           "k" : b64'ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE'
         }

    Figure 10: Access Token and symmetric key from the Response-Payload

   Message exchanges C and F are shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12.

      C: The client then sends the PoP token to the /authz-info resource
      in the RS.  This is a plain CoAP request, i.e. no DTLS/OSCOAP
      between client and RS, since the token is integrity protected
      between AS and RS.  The RS verifies that the PoP token was created
      by a known and trusted AS, is valid, and responds to the client.
      The RS derives and caches the security contexts together with
      authorization information about this client contained in the PoP
      token.



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      The client sends the CoAP requests GET to /tempC on the RS using
      OSCOAP.  The RS verifies the request and that it is authorized.

      F: The RS responds with a protected status code using OSCOAP.  The
      client verifies the response.

                            Resource
                   Client    Server
                     |         |
                 C:  +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
                     | POST    | Uri-Path:"authz-info"
                     |         | Payload: <Access Token>
                     |         |
                     |         |
                     |<--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
                     | 2.04    |
                     |         |
                     |         |

                Figure 11: Access Token provisioning to RS

                     Resource
           Client     Server
             |         |
             +-------->| Header: GET (Code=0.01)
             | GET     | Object-Security:
             |         |   (<seq>,<cid>,[Uri-Path:"tempC"],<tag>)
             |         |
         F:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
             | 2.05    | Object-Security:
             |         |   (<seq>,<cid>,[22.7 C],<tag>)
             |         |

       Figure 12: Resource request and response protected by OSCOAP

   In Figure 12 the GET request contains an Object-Security option and
   an indication of the content of the COSE object: a sequence number
   ("seq", starting from 0), a context identifier ("cid") indicating the
   security context, the ciphertext containing the encrypted CoAP option
   identifying the resource, and the Message Authentication Code ("tag")
   which also covers the Code in the CoAP header.

   The Object-Security ciphertext in the response [22.7 C] represents an
   encrypted temperature reading.  (The COSE object is actually carried
   in the CoAP payload when possible but that is omitted to simplify
   notation.)





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6.3.  Token Introspection with an Offline Client

   In this deployment scenario we assume that a client is not be able to
   access the AS at the time of the access request.  Since the RS is,
   however, connected to the back-end infrastructure it can make use of
   token introspection.  This access procedure involves steps A-F of
   Figure 1, but assumes steps A and B have been carried out during a
   phase when the client had connectivity to AS.

   Since the client is assumed to be offline, at least for a certain
   period of time, a pre-provisioned access token has to be long-lived.
   The resource server may use its online connectivity to validate the
   access token with the authorization server, which is shown in the
   example below.

   In the example we show the interactions between an offline client
   (key fob), a resource server (online lock), and an authorization
   server.  We assume that there is a provisioning step where the client
   has access to the AS.  This corresponds to message exchanges A and B
   which are shown in Figure 13.

      A: The client sends the request using POST to /token at AS.  The
      request contains the Audience parameter set to "lockOfDoor4711", a
      value the that the online door in question identifies itself with.
      The AS generates an access token as on opaque string, which it can
      match to the specific client, a targeted audience and a symmetric
      key security context.

      B: The AS responds with the an access token and client
      information, the latter containing a symmetric key.  Communication
      security between C and RS will be OSCOAP with authenticated
      encryption.


                       Authorization
               Client     Server
                  |         |
                  |         |
              A:  +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
                  | POST    | Uri-Path:"token"
                  |         | Payload: <Request-Payload>
                  |         |
              B:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
                  |         | Content-Type: application/cbor
                  | 2.05    | Payload: <Response-Payload>
                  |         |

      Figure 13: Token Request and Response using Client Credentials.



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   Authorization consent from the resource owner can be pre-configured,
   but it can also be provided via an interactive flow with the resource
   owner.  An example of this for the key fob case could be that the
   resource owner has a connected car, he buys a generic key that he
   wants to use with the car.  To authorize the key fob he connects it
   to his computer that then provides the UI for the device.  After that
   OAuth 2.0 implicit flow is used to authorize the key for his car at
   the the car manufacturers AS.

   The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-
   Payload is shown in Figure 14.

                  Request-Payload:
                  {
                    "grant_type" : "token",
                    "aud" : "lockOfDoor4711",
                    "client_id" : "myclient",
                  }

                  Response-Payload:
                  {
                    "access_token" : b64'SlAV32hkKG ...'
                    "token_type" : "pop",
                    "csp" : "OSCOAP",
                    "key" : b64'eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUi ...'
                  }

           Figure 14: Request and Response Payload for C offline

   The access token in this case is just an opaque string referencing
   the authorization information at the AS.

      C: Next, the client POSTs the access token to the /authz-info
      resource in the RS.  This is a plain CoAP request, i.e. no DTLS/
      OSCOAP between client and RS.  Since the token is an opaque
      string, the RS cannot verify it on its own, and thus defers to
      respond the client with a status code until step E and only
      acknowledges on the CoAP message layer (indicated with a dashed
      line).

                          Resource
                Client     Server
                  |         |
              C:  +-------->| Header: POST (T=CON, Code=0.02
                  | POST    | Token 0x2a12)
                  |         | Uri-Path:"authz-info"
                  |         | Payload: SlAV32hkKG ...
                  |         |   (access token)



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                  |         |
                  |<- - - - + Header: T=ACK
                  |         |

                Figure 15: Access Token provisioning to RS

      D: The RS forwards the token to the /introspect resource on the
      AS.  Introspection assumes a secure connection between the AS and
      the RS, e.g. using DTLS or OSCOAP, which is not detailed in this
      example.

      E: The AS provides the introspection response containing claims
      about the token.  This includes the confirmation key (cnf) claim
      that allows the RS to verify the client's proof of possession in
      step F.

      After receiving message E, the RS responds to the client's POST in
      step C with Code 2.04 (Changed), using CoAP Token 0x2a12.  This
      step is not shown in the figures.



             Resource Authorization
              Server     Server
                 |          |
             D:  +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
                 |  POST    | Uri-Path: "introspect"
                 |          | Payload: <Request-Payload>
                 |          |
             E:  |<---------+ Header: 2.05 Content
                 |  2.05    | Content-Type: application/cbor)
                 |          | Payload: <Response-Payload>
                 |          |

               Figure 16: Token Introspection for C offline

      The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-
      Payload is shown in Figure 17.

                Request-Payload:
                {
                  "token" : b64'SlAV32hkKG...',
                  "client_id" : "myRS",
                  "client_secret" : "ytrewq"
                }

                Response-Payload:
                {



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                  "active" : true,
                  "aud" : "lockOfDoor4711",
                  "scope" : "open, close",
                  "iat" : 1311280970,
                  "cnf" : {
                    "ck" : b64'JDLUhTMjU2IiwiY3R5Ijoi ...'
                  }
                }

         Figure 17: Request and Response Payload for Introspection

      The client sends the CoAP requests PUT 1 (= "close the lock") to /
      lock on RS using OSCOAP with a security context derived from the
      key supplied in step B.  The RS verifies the request with the key
      supplied in step E and that it is authorized by the token supplied
      in step C.

      F: The RS responds with a protected status code using OSCOAP.  The
      client verifies the response.

                   Resource
          Client    Server
            |         |
            +-------->| Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
            | PUT     | Object-Security:
            |         |    (<seq>,<cid>,[Uri-Path:"lock", 1],<tag>)
            |         |
        F:  |<--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
            | 2.04    | Object-Security:
            |         |    (<seq>,<cid>,,<tag>)
            |         |

       Figure 18: Resource request and response protected by OSCOAP

   The Object-Security ciphertext [...] of the PUT request contains CoAP
   options that are encrypted, as well as the payload value '1' which is
   the value of PUT to the door lock.

   In this example there is no ciphertext of the PUT response, but "tag"
   contains a MAC which covers the request sequence number and context
   identifier as well as the Code which allows the Client to verify that
   this actuator command was well received (door is locked).









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6.4.  Always-On Connectivity

   A popular deployment scenario for IoT devices is to have them always
   be connected to the Internet so that they can be reachable to receive
   commands.  As a continuation from the previous scenarios we assume
   that both the client and the RS are online at the time of the access
   request.

   If the client and the resource server are online then the AS should
   be configured to issue short-lived access tokens for the resource to
   the client.  The resource server must then validate self-contained
   access tokens or otherwise must use token introspection to obtain the
   up-to-date claim information.  If transmission costs are high or the
   channel is lossy, the CWT token format may be used instead of a JWT
   to reduce the volume of network traffic.  In terms of messaging this
   deployment scenario uses the patterns described in the previous sub-
   sections.

   Note that despite the lack of connectivity constraints there may
   still be other restrictions a deployment may face.

6.5.  Token-less Authorization

   In this deployment scenario we consider the case of an RS which is
   severely energy constrained, sleeps most of the time and need to have
   a tight messaging budget.  It is not only infeasible to access the AS
   at the time of the access request, as in the "RS offline" case
   Section 6.2, it must be offloaded as much message communication as
   possible.

   OAuth 2.0 is already an efficient protocol in terms of message
   exchanges and can be further optimized by compact encodings of
   tokens.  The scenario illustrated in this section goes beyond that
   and removes the access tokens from the protocol.  This may be
   considered a degenerate case of OAuth 2.0 but it allows us to do two
   things:

   1.  The common case where authorization is performed by means of
       authentication fits into the same protocol framework.
       Authentication protocol and key is specified by client
       information, and access token is omitted.

   2.  Authentication, and thereby authorization, may even be implicit,
       i.e. anyone with access to the right key is authorized to access
       the protected resource.

   In case 2., the RS does not need to receive any message from the
   client, and therefore enables offloading recurring resource request



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   and response processing to a third party, such as a Message Broker
   (MB) in a publish-subscribe setting.

   This scenario involves steps A, B, C and F of Figure 1 and four
   parties: a client (subscriber), an offline RS (publisher), a trusted
   AS, and a MB, not necessarily trusted with access to the plain text
   publications.  Message exchange A, B is shown in Figure 19.

      A: The client sends the request POST to /token at AS.  The request
      contains the Audience parameter set to "birchPollenSensor301", a
      value that characterizes a certain pollen sensor resource.  The AS
      evaluates the request and authorizes the client to access the
      resource.

      B: The AS responds with an empty token and client information with
      a security context to be used by the client.  The empty token
      signifies that authorization is performed by means of
      authentication using the communication security protocol indicated
      with "csp".  In this case it is object security of content (OSCON)
      i.e. protection of CoAP payload only.  The security context
      contains the symmetric decryption key and a public signature
      verification key of the RS.

                      Authorization
                Client   Server
                  |         |
                  |         |
              A:  +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
                  | POST    | Uri-Path:"token"
                  |         | Payload: <Request-Payload>
                  |         |
              B:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
                  |         | Content-Type: application/cbor
                  | 2.05    | Payload: <Response-Payload>
                  |         |
                  |         |


                   Figure 19: Token Request and Response

   The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-
   Payload is shown in Figure 20.

                  Request-Payload :
                  {
                    "grant_type" : "client_credentials",
                    "aud" : "birchPollenSensor301",
                    "client_id" : "myclient",



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                    "client_secret" : "qwerty"
                  }

                  Response-Payload :
                  {
                    "access_token" : NULL,
                    "token_type" : "none",
                    "csp" : "OSCON",
                    "key" : b64'eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUi ...'
                  }


    Figure 20: Request and Response Payload for RS severely constrained

   The content of the "key" parameter is shown in Figure 21.

        key :
        {
          "alg" : "AES_128_CTR_ECDSA",
          "kid" : b64'c29tZSBvdGhlciBrZXkgaWQ';
          "k"   : b64'ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE',
          "crv" : "P-256",
          "x"   : b64'MKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4',
          "y"   : b64'4Etl6SRW2YiLUrN5vfvVHuhp7x8PxltmWWlbbM4IFyM'
        }

                      Figure 21: The 'key' Parameter

   The RS, which sleeps most of the time, occasionally wakes up,
   measures the number birch pollens per cubic meters, publishes the
   measurements to the MB, and then returns to sleep.  See Figure 22.

   In this case the birch pollen count stopped at 270, which is
   encrypted with the symmetric key and signed with the private key of
   the RS.  The MB verifies that the message originates from RS using
   the public key of RS, that it is not a replay of an old measurement
   using the sequence number of the OSCON COSE profile, and caches the
   object secured content.  The MB does not have the secret key so is
   unable to read the plain text measurement.

   Message exchanges C and F are shown in Figure 22.

      C: Since there is no access token, the client does not address the
      /authz-info resource in the RS.  The client sends the CoAP request
      GET to /birchPollen on MB which is a plain CoAP request.

      F: The MB responds with the cached object secured content.




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                 Message   Resource
        Client    Broker    Server
          |         |         |
          |         |<--------| Header: PUT (Code=0.02)
          |         |  PUT    | Uri-Path: "birchPollen"
          |         |         | Payload: (<seq>,<cid>,["270"],<tag>)
          |         |         |
          |         |-------->| Header: 2.04 Changed
          |         | 2.04    |
          |         |
          |         |
      C:  +-------->| Header: GET (Code=0.01)
          | GET     | Uri-Path: "birchPollen"
          |         |
          |         |
      F:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
          | 2.05    | Payload: (<seq>,<cid>,["270"],<tag>)
          |         |


              Figure 22: Sensor measurement protected by COSE

   The payload is a COSE message consisting of sequence number 'seq'
   stepped by the RS for each publication, the context identifier 'cid'
   in this case coinciding with the key identifier 'kid' of Figure 21,
   the encrypted measurement and the signature by the RS.

   Note that the same COSE message format may be used as in OSCOAP but
   that only CoAP payload is protected in this case.

   The authorization step is implicit, so while any client could request
   access the COSE object, only authorized clients have access to the
   symmetric key needed to decrypt the content.

   Note that in this case the order of the message exchanges A,B and C,F
   could in principle be interchanged, i.e. the client could first
   request and obtain the protected resource in steps C,F; and after
   that request client information containing the keys decrypt and
   verify the message.

6.6.  Securing Group Communication










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   There are use cases that require securing communication between a
   (group of) senders and a group of receivers.  One prominent example
   is lighting.  Often, a set of lighting nodes (e.g., luminaires, wall-
   switches, sensors) are grouped together and only authorized members
   of the group must be able read and process messages.  Additionally,
   receivers of group messages must be able to verify the integrity of
   received messages as being generated within the group.

   The requirements for securely communicating in such group use cases
   efficiently is outlined in [I-D.somaraju-ace-multicast] along with an
   architectural description that aligns with the content of this
   document.  The requirements for conveying the necessary identifiers
   to reference groups and also the process of commissioning devices can
   be accomplished using the protocol described in this document.  For
   details about the lighting-unique use case aspects, the architecture,
   as well as other multicast-specific considerations we refer the
   reader to [I-D.somaraju-ace-multicast].

7.  Security Considerations

   The entire document is about security.  Security considerations
   applicable to authentication and authorization in RESTful
   environments provided in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] apply to this work, as
   well as the security considerations from [I-D.ietf-ace-actors].
   Furthermore [RFC6819] provides additional security considerations for
   OAuth which apply to IoT deployments as well.  Finally
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture] discusses security and privacy
   threats as well as mitigation measures for Proof-of-Possession
   tokens.

8.  IANA Considerations

   TBD

9.  Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank Eve Maler for her contributions to the use of
   OAuth 2.0 and UMA in IoT scenarios, Robert Taylor for his discussion
   input, and Malisa Vucinic for his input on the ACRE proposal
   FIXME:REF which was one source of inspiration for this work.
   Finally, we would like to thank the ACE working group in general for
   their feedback.









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10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.bormann-core-ace-aif]
              Bormann, C., "An Authorization Information Format (AIF)
              for ACE", draft-bormann-core-ace-aif-02 (work in
              progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]
              Schaad, J. and B. Campbell, "CBOR Encoded Message Syntax",
              draft-ietf-cose-msg-05 (work in progress), September 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-introspection]
              Richer, J., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", draft-ietf-
              oauth-introspection-09 (work in progress), May 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture]
              Hunt, P., Richer, J., Mills, W., Mishra, P., and H.
              Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security
              Architecture", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-02 (work
              in progress), July 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution]
              Bradley, J., Hunt, P., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
              "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to
              Client Key Distribution", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-
              distribution-01 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.selander-ace-object-security]
              Selander, G., Mattsson, J., and L. Seitz, "March 9, 2015",
              draft-selander-ace-object-security-01 (work in progress),
              March 2015.

   [I-D.wahlstroem-ace-oauth-introspection]
              Wahlstroem, E., "OAuth 2.0 Introspection over the
              Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", draft-
              wahlstroem-ace-oauth-introspection-01 (work in progress),
              March 2015.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, June 2014.



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10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-ace-actors]
              Gerdes, S., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and C. Bormann, "An
              architecture for authorization in constrained
              environments", draft-ietf-ace-actors-00 (work in
              progress), August 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-core-block]
              Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, "Block-wise transfers in CoAP",
              draft-ietf-core-block-18 (work in progress), September
              2015.

   [I-D.somaraju-ace-multicast]
              Somaraju, A., Kumar, S., and H. Tschofenig, "Multicast
              Security for the Lighting Domain", draft-somaraju-ace-
              multicast-00 (work in progress), July 2015.

   [RFC4680]  Santesson, S., "TLS Handshake Message for Supplemental
              Data", RFC 4680, October 2006.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
              4949, August 2007.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC5246, August 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC6690]  Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
              Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
              6749, October 2012.

   [RFC6819]  Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
              Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819, DOI
              10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, October 2013.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014.





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   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228, May 2014.

   [RFC7231]  Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
              (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, June 2014.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

Appendix A.  Design Justification

   This section provides further insight into the design decisions of
   the solution documented in this document.  Section 3 lists several
   building blocks and briefly summarizes their importance.  The
   justification for offering some of those building blocks, as opposed
   to using OAuth 2.0 as is, is given below.

   Common IoT constraints are:

   Low Power Radio:

      Many IoT devices are equipped with a small battery which needs to
      last for a long time.  For many constrained wireless devices the
      highest energy cost is associated to transmitting or receiving
      messages.  It is therefore important to keep the total
      communication overhead low, including minimizing the number and
      size of messages sent and received, which has an impact of choice
      of message format and protocol.  By using CoAP over UDP, and CBOR
      encoded messages some of these aspects are addressed.  Security
      protocols contribute to the communication overhead and can in some
      cases can be optimized.  For example authentication and key
      establishment may in certain cases where security requirements so
      allows be replaced by provisioning of security context by a
      trusted third party, using transport or application layer
      security.

   Low CPU Speed:













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      Some IoT devices are equipped with processors that are
      significantly slower than those found in most current devices on
      the Internet.  This typically has implications on what timely
      cryptographic operations a device is capable to perform, which in
      turn impacts e.g. protocol latency.  Symmetric key cryptography
      may be used instead of the computationally more expensive public
      key cryptography where the security requirements so allows, but
      this may also require support for trusted third party assisted
      secret key establishment using transport or application layer
      security.

   Small Amount of Memory:

      Microcontrollers embedded in IoT devices are often equipped with
      small amount of RAM and flash memory, which places limitations
      what kind of processing can be performed and how much code can be
      put on those devices.  To reduce code size fewer and smaller
      protocol implementations can be put on the firmware of such a
      device.  In this case, CoAP may be used instead of HTTP, symmetric
      key cryptography instead of public key cryptography, and CBOR
      instead of JSON.  Authentication and key establishment protocol,
      e.g. the DTLS handshake, in comparison with assisted key
      establishment also has an impact on memory and code.

   User Interface Limitations:

      Protecting access to resources is both an important security as
      well as privacy feature.  End users and enterprise customers do
      not want to give access to the data collected by their IoT device
      or to functions it may offer to third parties.  Since the
      classical approach of requesting permissions from end users via a
      rich user interface does not work in many IoT deployment scenarios
      these functions need to be delegated to user controlled devices
      that are better suitable for such tasks, such as smart phones and
      tablets.

   Communication Constraints:

      In certain constrained settings an IoT device may not be able to
      communicate with a given device at all times.  Devices may be
      sleeping, or just disconnected from the Internet because of
      general lack of connectivity in the area, for cost reasons, or for
      security reasons, e.g. to avoid an entry point for Denial-of-
      Service attacks.

      The communication interactions this framework builds upon (as
      shown graphically in Figure 1) may be accomplished using a variety
      of different protocols, and not all parts of the message flow are



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      used in all applications due to the communication constraints.
      While we envision deployments to make use of CoAP we explicitly
      want to support HTTP, HTTP/2 or specific protocols, such as
      Bluetooth Smart communication, which does not necessarily use IP.
      The latter raises the need for application layer security over the
      various interfaces.

Appendix B.  Optimizations

   This section sketches some potential optimizations to the presented
   solution.

   Access token in DTLS handshake

      In the case of CSP=DTLS/TLS, the access token provisoning exchange
      in step C of the protocol may be embedded in the security
      handshake.  Different solutions are possible, where one
      standardized method would be the use of the TLS supplemental data
      extension [RFC4680] for transferring the access token.

   Reference token and introspection

      In case of introspection it may be useful with access tokens which
      are not self-contained (also known as "reference tokens") that are
      used to lookup detailed information about the authorization.  The
      RS uses the introspection message exchange not only for validating
      token claims, but also for obtaining claims that potentially were
      not known at the time when the access token was issued.

      A reference token can be made much more compact than a CWT, since
      it does not need to contain any of claims that it represents.
      This could be very useful in particular if the client is
      constrained and offline most of the time.

   Reference token in CoAP option

      While large access tokens must be sent in CoAP payload, if the
      access token is known to be of a certain limited size, for example
      in the case of a reference token, then it would be favorable to
      combine the access token provisioning request with the resource
      request to the RS.

      One way to achieve this is to define a new CoAP option for
      carrying reference tokens, called "Ref-Token" as shown in the
      example in Figure 23.






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                   Resource
          Client    Server
            |         |
        C:  +-------->| Header: PUT (Code=0.02)
            | PUT     | Ref-Token:SlAV32hkKG
            |         | Object-Security:
            |         |    <seq>,<cid>,[Uri-Path:"lock", 1],<tag>)
            |         |
            .         .
            .         .
            .         .
            |         |
        F:  |<--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
            | 2.04    | Object-Security:
            |         |    (<seq>,<cid>,,<tag>)
            |         |

                 Figure 23: Reference Token in CoAP Option

Appendix C.  CoAP and CBOR profiles for OAuth 2.0

   Many IoT devices can support OAuth 2.0 without any additional
   extensions, but for certain constrained settings additional profiling
   is needed.  In this appendix we define CoAP resources for the HTTP
   based token and introspection endpoints used in vanilla OAuth 2.0.
   We also define a CBOR alternative to the JSON and form based POST
   structures used in HTTP.

C.1.  Profile for Token resource

   The token resource is used by the client to obtain an access token by
   presenting its authorization grant or client credentials to the /
   token resource the AS.

C.1.1.  Token Request

   The client makes a request to the token resource by sending a CBOR
   structure with the following attributes.

   grant_type:

      REQUIRED.  The grant type, "code", "client_credentials",
      "password" or others.

   client_id:

      OPTIONAL.  The client identifier issued to the holder of the token
      (client or RS) during the registration process.



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   client_secret:

      OPTIONAL.  The client secret.

   scope:

      OPTIONAL.  The scope of the access request as described by
      Section 3.1.

   aud:

      OPTIONAL.  Service-specific string identifier or list of string
      identifiers representing the intended audience for this token, as
      defined in CWT Appendix D.

   alg:

      OPTIONAL.  The value in the 'alg' parameter together with value
      from the 'token_type' parameter allow the client to indicate the
      supported algorithms for a given token type.

   key:

      OPTIONAL.  This field contains information about the public key
      the client would like to bind to the access token in the COSE Key
      Structure format.

   The parameters defined above use the following CBOR major types.

              /-----------+--------------+-----------------------\
              | Value     | Major Type   | Key                   |
              |-----------+--------------+-----------------------|
              | 0         | 0            | grant_type            |
              | 1         | 0            | client_id             |
              | 2         | 0            | client_secret         |
              | 3         | 0            | scope                 |
              | 4         | 0            | aud                   |
              | 5         | 0            | alg                   |
              | 6         | 0            | key                   |
              \-----------+--------------+-----------------------/

              Figure 24: CBOR mappings used in token requests









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C.1.2.  Token Response

   The AS responds by sending a CBOR structure with the following
   attributes.

   access_token:

      REQUIRED.  The access token issued by the authorization server.

   token_type:

      REQUIRED.  The type of the token issued. "pop" is recommended.

   key:

      REQUIRED, if symmetric key cryptography is used.  A COSE Key
      Structure containing the symmetric proof of possession key.  The
      members of the structure can be found in section 7.1 of
      [I-D.ietf-cose-msg].

   csp:

      REQUIRED.  Information on what communication protocol to use in
      the communication between the client and the RS.  Details on
      possible values can be found in Section 5.1.

   scope:

      OPTIONAL, if identical to the scope requested by the client;
      otherwise, REQUIRED.

   alg:

      OPTIONAL.  The 'alg' parameter provides further information about
      the algorithm, such as whether a symmetric or an asymmetric
      crypto-system is used.

   The parameters defined above use the following CBOR major types.

              /-----------+--------------+-----------------------\
              | Value     | Major Type   | Key                   |
              |-----------+--------------+-----------------------|
              | 0         | 0            | access_token          |
              | 1         | 0            | token_type            |
              | 2         | 0            | key                   |
              | 3         | 0            | csp                   |
              | 4         | 0            | scope                 |
              | 5         | 0            | alg                   |



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              \-----------+--------------+-----------------------/

             Figure 25: CBOR mappings used in token responses

C.2.  CoAP Profile for OAuth Introspection

   This section defines a way for a holder of access tokens, mainly
   clients and RS's, to get metadata like validity status, claims and
   scopes found in access token.  The OAuth Token Introspection
   specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-introspection] defines a way to
   validate the token using HTTP POST or HTTP GET.  This document reuses
   the work done in the OAuth Token Introspection and defines a mapping
   of the request and response to CoAP [RFC7252] to be used by
   constrained devices.

C.2.1.  Introspection Request

   The token holder makes a request to the Introspection CoAP resource
   by sending a CBOR structure with the following attributes.

   token:

      REQUIRED.  The string value of the token.

   resource_id:

      OPTIONAL.  A service-specific string identifying the resource that
      the client doing the introspection is asking about.

   client_id:

      OPTIONAL.  The client identifier issued to the holder of the token
      (client or RS) during the registration process.

   client_secret:

      OPTIONAL.  The client secret.

   The parameters defined above use the following CBOR major types:

               /-----------+--------------+-----------------------\
               | Value     | Major Type   | Key                   |
               |-----------+--------------+-----------------------|
               | 0         | 0            | token                 |
               | 1         | 0            | resource_id           |
               | 2         | 0            | client_id             |
               | 3         | 0            | client_secret         |
               \-----------+--------------+-----------------------/



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    Figure 26: CBOR Mappings to Token Introspection Request Parameters.

C.2.2.  Introspection Response

   If the introspection request is valid and authorized, the
   authorization server returns a CoAP message with the response encoded
   as a CBOR structure in the payload of the message.  If the request
   failed client authentication or is invalid, the authorization server
   returns an error response using the CoAP 4.00 'Bad Request' response
   code.

   The JSON structure in the payload response includes the top-level
   members defined in Section 2.2 in the OAuth Token Introspection
   specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-introspection].  It is RECOMMENDED to
   only return the 'active' attribute considering constrained nature of
   CoAP client and server networks.

   Introspection responses in CBOR use the following mappings:

   active:

      REQUIRED.  The active key is an indicator of whether or not the
      presented token is currently active.  The specifics of a token's
      "active" state will vary depending on the implementation of the
      authorization server, and the information it keeps about its
      tokens, but a "true" value return for the "active" property will
      generally indicate that a given token has been issued by this
      authorization server, has not been revoked by the resource owner,
      and is within its given time window of validity (e.g., after its
      issuance time and before its expiration time).

   scope:

      OPTIONAL.  A string containing a space-separated list of scopes
      associated with this token, in the format described in Section 3.3
      of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].

   client_id:

      OPTIONAL.  Client identifier for the client that requested this
      token.

   username:

      OPTIONAL.  Human-readable identifier for the resource owner who
      authorized this token.

   token_type:



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      OPTIONAL.  Type of the token as defined in Section 5.1 of OAuth
      2.0 [RFC6749] or PoP token.

   exp:

      OPTIONAL.  Integer timestamp, measured in the number of seconds
      since January 1 1970 UTC, indicating when this token will expire,
      as defined in CWT Appendix D.

   iat:

      OPTIONAL.  Integer timestamp, measured in the number of seconds
      since January 1 1970 UTC, indicating when this token will expire,
      as defined in CWT Appendix D.

   nbf:

      OPTIONAL.  Integer timestamp, measured in the number of seconds
      since January 1 1970 UTC, indicating when this token will expire,
      as defined in CWT Appendix D.

   sub:

      OPTIONAL.  Subject of the token, as defined in CWT Appendix D.
      Usually a machine-readable identifier of the resource owner who
      authorized this token.

   aud:

      OPTIONAL.  Service-specific string identifier or list of string
      identifiers representing the intended audience for this token, as
      defined in CWT Appendix D.

   iss:

      OPTIONAL.  String representing the issuer of this token, as
      defined in CWT Appendix D.

   cti:

      OPTIONAL.  String identifier for the token, as defined in CWT
      Appendix D

   The parameters defined above use the following CBOR major types:

           /-----------+--------------+-----------------------\
           | Value     | Major Type   | Key                   |
           |-----------+--------------+-----------------------|



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           | 0         | 0            | active                |
           | 1         | 0            | scopes                |
           | 2         | 0            | client_id             |
           | 3         | 0            | username              |
           | 4         | 0            | token_type            |
           | 5         | 0            | exp                   |
           | 6         | 0            | iat                   |
           | 7         | 0            | nbf                   |
           | 8         | 0            | sub                   |
           | 9         | 0            | aud                   |
           | 10        | 0            | iss                   |
           | 11        | 0            | cti                   |
           \-----------+--------------+-----------------------/

   Figure 27: CBOR Mappings to Token Introspection Response Parameters.

Appendix D.  CBOR Web Token (CWT)

   CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be
   transferred between two parties.  CWT is a profile of JSON Web Tokens
   that is optimized for constrained devices.  The claims in a CWT are
   encoded in CBOR and COSE is used for signature and encryption.  A
   claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject.  A claim is
   represented as a name/value pair consisting of a Claim Name and a
   Claim Value.

   The suggested pronunciation of CWT is the same as the English word
   "cot".

   The set of claims that a CWT must contain to be considered valid is
   context dependent and is outside the scope of this specification.
   Specific applications of CWTs will require implementations to
   understand and process some claims in particular ways.  However, in
   the absence of such requirements, all claims that are not understood
   by implementations MUST be ignored.

D.1.  Claim Names

   The following Claim Names are asserted by the AS and interpreted by
   the RS.  None of the claims defined below are intended to be
   mandatory to use or implement in all cases, but rather they provide a
   starting point for a set of useful, interoperable claims.
   Applications using CWTs should define which specific claims they use
   and when they are required or optional.

D.1.1.  iss (Issuer) Claim





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   The "iss" (issuer) claim identifies the principal that issued the
   CWT.  The processing of this claim is generally application specific.
   The "iss" value is a case-sensitive string containing a StringOrURI
   value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.

D.1.2.  sub (Subject) Claim

   The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that is the
   subject of the CWT.  The claims in a CWT are normally statements
   about the subject.  The subject value MUST either be scoped to be
   locally unique in the context of the issuer or be globally unique.
   The processing of this claim is generally application specific.  The
   "sub" value is a case-sensitive string containing a StringOrURI
   value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.

D.1.3.  aud (Audience) Claim

   The "aud" (audience) claim identifies the recipients that the CWT is
   intended for.  Each principal intended to process the CWT MUST
   identify itself with a value in the audience claim.  If the principal
   processing the claim does not identify itself with a value in the
   "aud" claim when this claim is present, then the CWT MUST be
   rejected.  In the general case, the "aud" value is an array of case-
   sensitive strings, each containing a StringOrURI value.  In the
   special case when the CWT has one audience, the "aud" value MAY be a
   single case-sensitive string containing a StringOrURI value.  The
   interpretation of audience values is generally application specific.
   Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.

D.1.4.  exp (Expiration Time) Claim

   The "exp" (expiration time) claim identifies the expiration time on
   or after which the CWT MUST NOT be accepted for processing.  The
   processing of the "exp" claim requires that the current date/time
   MUST be before the expiration date/time listed in the "exp" claim.
   Implementers MAY provide for some small leeway, usually no more than
   a few minutes, to account for clock skew.  Its value MUST be a number
   containing a NumericDate value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.

D.1.5.  nbf (Not Before) Claim

   The "nbf" (not before) claim identifies the time before which the CWT
   MUST NOT be accepted for processing.  The processing of the "nbf"
   claim requires that the current date/time MUST be after or equal to
   the not-before date/time listed in the "nbf" claim.  Implementers MAY
   provide for some small leeway, usually no more than a few minutes, to
   account for clock skew.  Its value MUST be a number containing a
   NumericDate value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.



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D.1.6.  iat (Issued At) Claim

   The "iat" (issued at) claim identifies the time at which the CWT was
   issued.  This claim can be used to determine the age of the CWT.  Its
   value MUST be a number containing a NumericDate value.  Use of this
   claim is OPTIONAL.

D.1.7.  cti (CWT ID) Claim

   The "cti" (CWT ID) claim provides a unique identifier for the CWT.
   The identifier value MUST be assigned in a manner that ensures that
   there is a negligible probability that the same value will be
   accidentally assigned to a different data object; if the application
   uses multiple issuers, collisions MUST be prevented among values
   produced by different issuers as well.  The "cti" claim can be used
   to prevent the CWT from being replayed.  The "cti" value is a case-
   sensitive string.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.

D.1.8.  cnf (Confirmation) Claim

   The "cnf" (confirmation) claim is used in the CWT to contain members
   used to identify a proof-of-possession key.  The "cnf" claim is used
   to express a declaration in a CWT that a Client of the CWT possesses
   a particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
   proof-of-possession of the key by the client.

D.1.9.  cks (COSE Key Structure) Claim

   The "cks" (COSE Key Structure) claim holds members representing a
   COSE Key Structure.  The members of the structure can be found in
   Section 7.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg].

D.1.10.  aif (Authorization Information Format) Claim

   The "aif" (Authorization Information Format) claim uses the AIF
   format defined in [I-D.bormann-core-ace-aif] to transfer information
   about the authorization from the AS to the RS.

D.2.  CBOR major types for Claims

            /-----------+--------------+-----------------------\
            | Value     | Major Type   | Key                   |
            |-----------+--------------+-----------------------|
            | 0         | 0            | iss                   |
            | 1         | 0            | sub                   |
            | 2         | 0            | aud                   |
            | 3         | 0            | nonce                 |
            | 4         | 0            | exp                   |



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            | 5         | 0            | iat                   |
            | 6         | 4            | cnf                   |
            | 7         | 0            | ck                    |
            | 8         | 4            | aif                   |
            \-----------+--------------+-----------------------/

            Figure 28: CBOR Mappings used in CWT Access Tokens.

   Note: Claims defined by the OpenID Foundation have not yet been
   included in the table above.

D.3.  CBOR Web Token Example

   This section illustrates a CWT in the CBOR diagnostic notation.  This
   example CWT was issued by the AS identified as "coap://
   as.example.com" in the "iss" (issuer) claim.  The CWT is only valid
   at a resource server at "coap://light.example.com".  It's validity is
   2 minutes and it includes a symmetric key that will be used to secure
   the communication, either using object security, or transport
   security, between the client and the resource server.  The "aif"
   claim includes AIF objects that assert that subject is authorized to
   make a PUT request against the "/s/light" resource, a PUT and a GET
   against the "/a/led" resource and a POST against the "/dlts"
   resource.

          {
            "iss" : "coap://as.example.com",
            "aud" : "coap://light.example.com",
            "exp" : 1444064944,
            "iat" : 1443944944,
            "aif" : [["/s/light", 1], ["/a/led", 5], ["/dtls", 2]],
            "cnf" : {
              "jwk" : b64'JDLUhTMjU2IiwiY3R5Ijoi ...'
            }
          }

          Figure 29: CWT Example in the CBOR Diagnostic Notation.

Authors' Addresses

   Ludwig Seitz
   SICS
   Scheelevaegen 17
   Lund  223 70
   SWEDEN

   Email: ludwig@sics.se




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   Goeran Selander
   Ericsson
   Faroegatan 6
   Kista  164 80
   SWEDEN

   Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com


   Erik Wahlstroem
   Nexus Technology
   Telefonvagen 26
   Hagersten  126 26
   Sweden

   Email: erik.wahlstrom@nexusgroup.com


   Samuel Erdtman
   Nexus Technology
   Telefonvagen 26
   Hagersten  126 26
   Sweden

   Email: samuel.erdtman@nexusgroup.com


   Hannes Tschofenig
   ARM Ltd.
   Hall in Tirol  6060
   Austria

   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com


















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