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ACE Working Group                                            G. Selander
Internet-Draft                                               J. Mattsson
Intended status: Standards Track                            F. Palombini
Expires: August 29, 2019                                     Ericsson AB
                                                       February 25, 2019


               Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)
                    draft-selander-ace-cose-ecdhe-12

Abstract

   This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a
   very compact, and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
   exchange with ephemeral keys.  EDHOC provides mutual authentication,
   perfect forward secrecy, and identity protection.  A main use case
   for EDHOC is to establish an OSCORE security context.  EDHOC uses
   COSE for cryptography, CBOR for encoding, and CoAP for transport.  By
   reusing existing libraries, the additional code footprint can be kept
   very low.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 29, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Rationale for EDHOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology and Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  EDHOC Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Ephemeral Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  EDHOC Authenticated with Asymmetric Keys  . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  EDHOC Message 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.3.  EDHOC Message 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.4.  EDHOC Message 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   5.  EDHOC Authenticated with Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.2.  EDHOC Message 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.3.  EDHOC Message 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.4.  EDHOC Message 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   6.  Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.1.  EDHOC Error Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   7.  Transferring EDHOC and Deriving Application Keys  . . . . . .  23
     7.1.  Transferring EDHOC in CoAP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     7.2.  Transferring EDHOC over Other Protocols . . . . . . . . .  26
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     8.1.  EDHOC Cipher Suites Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     8.2.  EDHOC Method Type Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     8.3.  The Well-Known URI Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     8.4.  Media Types Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     8.5.  CoAP Content-Formats Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     9.1.  Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     9.2.  Cryptographic Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     9.3.  Mandatory to Implement Cipher Suite . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     9.4.  Unprotected Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     9.5.  Denial-of-Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     9.6.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     9.7.  Other Documents Referencing EDHOC . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   Appendix A.  Use of CBOR, CDDL and COSE in EDHOC  . . . . . . . .  34



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     A.1.  CBOR and CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     A.2.  COSE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   Appendix B.  Example Messages and Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     B.1.  Message Sizes RPK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     B.2.  Message Sizes Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     B.3.  Message Sizes PSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     B.4.  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   Appendix C.  Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43

1.  Introduction

   Security at the application layer provides an attractive option for
   protecting Internet of Things (IoT) deployments, for example where
   transport layer security is not sufficient
   [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs] or where the protocol needs to
   work on a variety of underlying protocols.  IoT devices may be
   constrained in various ways, including memory, storage, processing
   capacity, and energy [RFC7228].  A method for protecting individual
   messages at the application layer suitable for constrained devices,
   is provided by CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152]),
   which builds on the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)
   [I-D.ietf-cbor-7049bis].  Object Security for Constrained RESTful
   Environments (OSCORE) [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] is a method for
   application-layer protection of the Constrained Application Protocol
   (CoAP), using COSE.

   In order for a communication session to provide forward secrecy, the
   communicating parties can run an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
   key exchange protocol with ephemeral keys, from which shared key
   material can be derived.  This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-
   Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a lightweight key exchange protocol
   providing perfect forward secrecy and identity protection.
   Authentication is based on credentials established out of band, e.g.
   from a trusted third party, such as an Authorization Server as
   specified by [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].  EDHOC supports
   authentication using pre-shared keys (PSK), raw public keys (RPK),
   and public key certificates.  After successful completion of the
   EDHOC protocol, application keys and other application specific data
   can be derived using the EDHOC-Exporter interface.  A main use case
   for EDHOC is to establish an OSCORE security context.  EDHOC uses
   COSE for cryptography, CBOR for encoding, and CoAP for transport.  By
   reusing existing libraries, the additional code footprint can be kept
   very low.  Note that this document focuses on authentication and key
   establishment: for integration with authorization of resource access,
   refer to [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile].




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   EDHOC is designed to work in highly constrained scenarios making it
   especially suitable for network technologies such as Cellular IoT,
   6TiSCH [I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join], LoRaWAN
   [LoRa1][LoRa2].  These network technologies are characterized by
   their low throughput, low power consumption, and small frame sizes.
   Compared to the DTLS 1.3 handshake [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] with ECDH
   and connection ID, the number of bytes in EDHOC is less than 1/4 when
   PSK authentication is used and less than 1/3 when RPK authentication
   is used, see Appendix B.

   The ECDH exchange and the key derivation follow [SIGMA], NIST SP-
   800-56A [SP-800-56A], and HKDF [RFC5869].  CBOR
   [I-D.ietf-cbor-7049bis] and COSE [RFC8152] are used to implement
   these standards.  The use of COSE enables use of future COSE
   algorithms and headers designed for constrained IoT.

   This document is organized as follows: Section 2 describes how EDHOC
   builds on SIGMA-I, Section 3 specifies general properties of EDHOC,
   including message flow, formatting of the ephemeral public keys, and
   key derivation, Section 4 specifies EDHOC with asymmetric key
   authentication, Section 5 specifies EDHOC with symmetric key
   authentication, Section 6 specifies the EDHOC error message, and
   Section 7 describes how EDHOC can be transferred in CoAP and used to
   establish an OSCORE security context.

1.1.  Rationale for EDHOC

   Many constrained IoT systems today do not use any security at all,
   and when they do, they often do not follow best practices.  One
   reason is that many current security protocols are not designed with
   constrained IoT in mind.  Constrained IoT systems often deals with
   personal information, valuable business data, and actuators
   interacting with the physical world.  Not only do such systems need
   security and privacy, they often need end-to-end protection with
   source authentication and perfect-forward secrecy.  EDHOC and OSCORE
   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] enables security following current
   best practices to devices and systems where current security
   protocols are impractical.

   EDHOC is optimized for small message sizes and can therefore be sent
   over a small number of radio frames.  The message size of a key
   exchange protocol may have a large impact on the performance of an
   IoT deployment, especially in noisy environments.  For example, in a
   network bootstrapping setting a large number of devices turned on in
   a short period of time may result in large latencies caused by
   parallel key exchanges.  Requirements on network formation time can
   in constrained environments be translated into key exchange overhead.




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   Power consumption for wireless devices is highly dependent on message
   transmission, listening, and reception.  For devices that only send a
   few bytes occasionally, the battery lifetime may be significantly
   reduced by a heavy key exchange protocol.  Moreover, a key exchange
   may need to be executed more than once, e.g. due to a device losing
   power or rebooting for other reasons.

   EDHOC is adapted to primitives and protocols designed for the
   Internet of Things: EDHOC is built on CBOR and COSE which enables
   small message overhead and efficient parsing in constrained devices.
   EDHOC is not bound to a particular transport layer, but it is
   recommended to transport the EDHOC message in CoAP payloads.  By
   reusing already existing IoT primitives in the device (CBOR, CoAP,
   and COSE encryption and signature formats) the additional code
   footprint can be kept very low.

   EDHOC is not bound to a particular communication security protocol
   but works off-the-shelf with OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
   providing the necessary input parameters with required properties.
   Since EDHOC builds on the same IoT primitives and protocols as OSCORE
   (CoAP, CBOR, COSE encryption and signature formats) the device
   footprint for EDHOC + OSCORE can be kept very low.  The use of
   compact native encoding formats reduces the need for a general-
   purpose compression algorithm with associated footprint.

1.2.  Terminology and Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   The word "encryption" without qualification always refers to
   authenticated encryption, in practice implemented with an
   Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) algorithm, see
   [RFC5116].

   Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in CBOR [I-D.ietf-cbor-7049bis], COSE [RFC8152], and CDDL
   [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl].  The Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) to
   express CBOR data structures [I-D.ietf-cbor-7049bis].  The use of the
   CDDL unwrap operator "~" is extended to unwrapping of byte strings.
   It is the inverse of "bstr .cbor" that wraps a data item in a bstr,
   i.e. ~ bstr .cbor T = T.  Examples of CBOR and CDDL are provided in
   Appendix A.1.





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2.  Background

   SIGMA (SIGn-and-MAc) is a family of theoretical protocols with a
   large number of variants [SIGMA].  Like IKEv2 and (D)TLS 1.3, EDHOC
   is built on a variant of the SIGMA protocol which provide identity
   protection of the initiator (SIGMA-I), and like (D)TLS 1.3, EDHOC
   implements the SIGMA-I variant as Sign-then-MAC.  The SIGMA-I
   protocol using an authenticated encryption algorithm is shown in
   Figure 1.

     Party U                                                   Party V
        |                          X_U                            |
        +-------------------------------------------------------->|
        |                                                         |
        |  X_V, AEAD( K_2; ID_CRED_V, Sig(V; CRED_V, X_U, X_V) )  |
        |<--------------------------------------------------------+
        |                                                         |
        |     AEAD( K_3; ID_CRED_U, Sig(U; CRED_U, X_V, X_U) )    |
        +-------------------------------------------------------->|
        |                                                         |

    Figure 1: Authenticated encryption variant of the SIGMA-I protocol.

   The parties exchanging messages are called "U" and "V".  They
   exchange identities and ephemeral public keys, compute the shared
   secret, and derive symmetric application keys.

   o  X_U and X_V are the ECDH ephemeral public keys of U and V,
      respectively.

   o  CRED_U and CRED_V are the credentials containing the public
      authentication keys of U and V, respectively.

   o  ID_CRED_U and ID_CRED_V are data enabling the recipient party to
      retrieve the credential of U and V, respectively

   o  Sig(U; . ) and S(V; . ) denote signatures made with the private
      authentication key of U and V, respectively.

   o  AEAD(K; . ) denotes authenticated encryption with additional data
      using the key K derived from the shared secret.  The authenticated
      encryption MUST NOT be replaced by plain encryption, see
      Section 9.

   In order to create a "full-fledged" protocol some additional protocol
   elements are needed.  EDHOC adds:





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   o  Explicit connection identifiers C_U, C_V chosen by U and V,
      respectively, enabling the recipient to find the protocol state.

   o  An Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) algorithm
      is used.

   o  Computationally independent keys derived from the ECDH shared
      secret and used for encryption of different messages.

   o  Verification of a common preferred cipher suite (AEAD algorithm,
      ECDH algorithm, ECDH curve, signature algorithm):

      *  U lists supported cipher suites in order of preference

      *  V verifies that the selected cipher suite is the first
         supported cipher suite

   o  Method types and error handling.

   o  Transport of opaque application defined data.

   EDHOC is designed to encrypt and integrity protect as much
   information as possible, and all symmetric keys are derived using as
   much previous information as possible.  EDHOC is furthermore designed
   to be as compact and lightweight as possible, in terms of message
   sizes, processing, and the ability to reuse already existing CBOR,
   COSE, and CoAP libraries.

   To simplify for implementors, the use of CBOR and COSE in EDHOC is
   summarized in Appendix A and example messages in CBOR diagnostic
   notation are given in Appendix B.

3.  EDHOC Overview

   EDHOC consists of three flights (message_1, message_2, message_3)
   that maps directly to the three messages in SIGMA-I, plus an EDHOC
   error message.  All EDHOC messages consists of a sequence of CBOR
   encoded data items, where the first data item of message_1 is an int
   specifying the method type (asymmetric, symmetric, error).  The
   messages may be viewed as a CBOR encoding of an indefinite-length
   array without the first and last byte, see Appendix A.1.

   While EDHOC uses the COSE_Key, COSE_Sign1, and COSE_Encrypt0
   structures, only a subset of the parameters is included in the EDHOC
   messages.  After creating EDHOC message_3, Party U can derive
   symmetric application keys, and application protected data can
   therefore be sent in parallel with EDHOC message_3.  The application
   may protect data using the algorithms (AEAD, HKDF, etc.) in the



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   selected cipher suite and the connection identifiers (C_U, C_V).
   EDHOC may be used with the media type application/edhoc defined in
   Section 8.

      Party U                                                 Party V
         |                                                       |
         | ------------------ EDHOC message_1 -----------------> |
         |                                                       |
         | <----------------- EDHOC message_2 ------------------ |
         |                                                       |
         | ------------------ EDHOC message_3 -----------------> |
         |                                                       |
         | <----------- Application Protected Data ------------> |
         |                                                       |

                       Figure 2: EDHOC message flow

   The EDHOC message exchange may be authenticated using pre-shared keys
   (PSK), raw public keys (RPK), or public key certificates.  EDHOC
   assumes the existence of mechanisms (certification authority, manual
   distribution, etc.) for binding identities with authentication keys
   (public or pre-shared).  When a public key infrastructure is used,
   the identity is included in the certificate and bound to the
   authentication key by trust in the certification authority.  When the
   credential is manually distributed (PSK, RPK, self-signed
   certificate), the identity and authentication key is distributed out-
   of-band and bound together by trust in the distribution method.
   EDHOC with symmetric key authentication is very similar to EDHOC with
   asymmetric key authentication, the difference being that information
   is only MACed, not signed.

   EDHOC allows opaque application data (UAD and PAD) to be sent in the
   EDHOC messages.  Unprotected Application Data (UAD_1, UAD_2) may be
   sent in message_1 and message_2 and can be e.g. be used to transfer
   access tokens that are protected outside of EDHOC.  Protected
   application data (PAD_3) may be used to transfer any application data
   in message_3.

   Cryptographically, EDHOC does not put requirement on the lower
   layers.  EDHOC is not bound to a particular transport layer, and can
   be used in environments without IP.  It is recommended is to
   transport the EDHOC message in CoAP payloads, see Section 7.  An
   implementation may support only Party U or only Party V.








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3.1.  Cipher Suites

   EDHOC cipher suites consists of a set of COSE algorithms: an AEAD
   algorithm, an ECDH algorithm (including HKDF algorithm), an ECDH
   curve, and a signature algorithm.  The signature algorithm is not
   used when EDHOC is authenticated with symmetric keys.  Each cipher
   suite is associated with an integer value.  Currently two cipher
   suites are defined.

      0. AES-CCM-64-64-128, ECDH-SS + HKDF-256, X25519, and Ed25519
      1. AES-CCM-64-64-128, ECDH-SS + HKDF-256, P-256, and ES256

   Two additional numbers are registered for application defined cipher
   suites.  Application defined cipher suites MUST only use algorithms
   specified for COSE, are not interoperable with other deployments and
   can therefore only be used in local networks.

      -24. First application defined cipher suite.
      -23. Second application defined cipher suite.

3.2.  Ephemeral Public Keys

   The ECDH ephemeral public keys are formatted as a COSE_Key of type
   EC2 or OKP according to Sections 13.1 and 13.2 of [RFC8152], but only
   a subset of the parameters is included in the EDHOC messages.  For
   Elliptic Curve Keys of type EC2, compact representation as per
   [RFC6090] MAY be used also in the COSE_Key.  If the COSE
   implementation requires an y-coordinate, any of the possible values
   of the y-coordinate can be used, see Appendix C of [RFC6090].  COSE
   [RFC8152] always use compact output for Elliptic Curve Keys of type
   EC2.

3.3.  Key Derivation

   Key and IV derivation SHALL be performed as specified in Section 11
   of [RFC8152] with the following input:

   o  The KDF SHALL be the HKDF [RFC5869] in the in the selected cipher
      suite (SUITE).

   o  The secret (Section 11.1 of [RFC8152]) SHALL be the ECDH shared
      secret as defined in Section 12.4.1 of [RFC8152].

   o  The salt (Section 11.1 of [RFC8152]) SHALL be the PSK when EDHOC
      is authenticated with symmetric keys, and the empty byte string
      when EDHOC is authenticated with asymmetric keys.  Note that
      [RFC5869] specifies that if the salt is not provided, it is set to
      a string of zeros (see Section 2.2 of [RFC5869]).  For



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      implementation purposes, not providing the salt is the same as
      setting the salt to the empty byte string.

   o  The fields in the context information COSE_KDF_Context
      (Section 11.2 of [RFC8152]) SHALL have the following values:

      *  AlgorithmID is an int or tstr, see below

      *  PartyUInfo = PartyVInfo = ( null, null, null )

      *  keyDataLength is a uint, see below

      *  protected SHALL be a zero length bstr

      *  other is a bstr and SHALL be aad_2, aad_3, or exchange_hash;
         see below

      *  SuppPrivInfo is omitted

   where exchange_hash, in non-CDDL notation, is:

      exchange_hash = H( bstr .cborseq [ aad_3, CIPHERTEXT_3 ] )

   and where aad_2 and aad_3 are hashes of previous messages and data,
   defined in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1.  H() is the hash function in the
   HKDF, which takes a CBOR byte string (bstr) as input and produces a
   CBOR byte string as output.  The use of '.cborseq' is exemplified in
   Appendix A.1.

   We define EDHOC-Key-Derivation to be the function which produces the
   output as described in [RFC5869] and [RFC8152] depending on the
   variable input AlgorithmID, keyDataLength, and other:

      output = EDHOC-Key-Derivation(AlgorithmID, keyDataLength, other)

   For message_i the key, called K_i, SHALL be derived using other =
   aad_i, where i = 2 or 3.  The key SHALL be derived using AlgorithmID
   set to the integer value of the AEAD in the selected cipher suite
   (SUITE), and keyDataLength equal to the key length of the AEAD.

   If the AEAD algorithm uses an IV, then IV_i for message_i SHALL be
   derived using other = aad_i, where i = 2 or 3.  The IV SHALL be
   derived using AlgorithmID = "IV-GENERATION" as specified in
   Section 12.1.2. of [RFC8152], and keyDataLength equal to the IV
   length of the AEAD.






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3.3.1.  EDHOC-Exporter Interface

   Application keys and other application specific data can be derived
   using the EDHOC-Exporter interface defined as:

      EDHOC-Exporter(label, length) =
         EDHOC-Key-Derivation(label, 8 * length, exchange_hash)

   The output of the EDHOC-Exporter function SHALL be derived using
   other = exchange_hash, AlgorithmID = label, and keyDataLength = 8 *
   length, where label is a tstr defined by the application and length
   is a uint defined by the application.  The label SHALL be different
   for each different exporter value.  An example use of the EDHOC-
   Exporter is given in Section 7.1.1).

3.3.2.  EDHOC PSK Chaining

   An application using EDHOC may want to derive new PSKs to use for
   authentication in future EDHOC exchanges.  In this case, the new PSK
   and KID SHOULD be derived as follows where length is the key length
   (in bytes) of the AEAD Algorithm.

   PSK = EDHOC-Exporter("EDHOC Chaining PSK", length)
   KID = EDHOC-Exporter("EDHOC Chaining KID", 4)

4.  EDHOC Authenticated with Asymmetric Keys

4.1.  Overview

   EDHOC supports authentication with raw public keys (RPK) and public
   key certificates with the requirements that:

   o  Party U SHALL be able to retrieve Party V's public authentication
      key using ID_CRED_V,

   o  Party V SHALL be able to retrieve Party U's public authentication
      key using ID_CRED_U,

   where ID_CRED_x, for x = U or V, is encoded in a COSE map, see
   Appendix A.2.  In the following we give some examples of possible
   COSE map labels.

   Raw public keys are most optimally stored as COSE_Key objects and
   identified with a 'kid' value (see [RFC8152]):

   o  kid : ID_CRED_x, for x = U or V.





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   Public key certificates can be identified in different ways, for
   example (see [I-D.schaad-cose-x509]):

   o  by a hash value;

      *  x5t : ID_CRED_x, for x = U or V,

   o  by a URL;

      *  x5u : ID_CRED_x, for x = U or V,

   o  by a certificate chain;

      *  x5chain : ID_CRED_x, for x = U or V,

   o  or by a bag of certificates.

      *  x5bag : ID_CRED_x, for x = U or V.

   In the latter two examples, ID_CRED_U and ID_CRED_V contains the
   actual credential used for authentication.  ID_CRED_U and ID_CRED_V
   do not need to uniquely identify the public authentication key, but
   doing so is recommended as the recipient may otherwise have to try
   several public keys.  ID_CRED_U and ID_CRED_V are transported in the
   ciphertext, see Section 4.3.2 and Section 4.4.2.

   The actual credentials CRED_U and CRED_V (e.g. a COSE_Key or a single
   X.509 certificate) are signed by party U and V, respectively, see
   Section 4.4.1 and Section 4.3.1.  Party U and Party V MAY use
   different type of credentials, e.g. one uses RPK and the other uses
   certificate.

   EDHOC with asymmetric key authentication is illustrated in Figure 3.

   Party U                                                       Party V
   |              TYPE, C_U, SUITES_U, SUITE, X_U, UAD_1               |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
   |                             message_1                             |
   |                                                                   |
   | C_U, C_V, X_V, AEAD(K_2; ID_CRED_V, Sig(V; CRED_V, aad_2), UAD_2) |
   |<------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                             message_2                             |
   |                                                                   |
   |      C_V, AEAD(K_3; ID_CRED_U, Sig(U; CRED_U, aad_3), PAD_3)      |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
   |                             message_3                             |

      Figure 3: Overview of EDHOC with asymmetric key authentication.



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4.2.  EDHOC Message 1

4.2.1.  Formatting of Message 1

   message_1 SHALL be a sequence of CBOR data items (see Appendix A.1)
   as defined below

   message_1 = (
     TYPE : int,
     C_U : bstr,
     SUITES_U : suites,
     SUITE : uint,
     X_U : bstr,
     ? UAD_1 : bstr,
   )

   suites : int / [ 2* int ]

   where:

   o  TYPE = 1

   o  C_U - variable length connection identifier

   o  SUITES_U - cipher suites which Party U supports, in order of
      decreasing preference.  If a single cipher suite is conveyed, an
      int is used, if multiple cipher suites are conveyed, an array of
      ints is used.

   o  SUITE - a single chosen cipher suite from SUITES_U (zero-based
      index, i.e. 0 for the first or only, 1 for the second, etc.)

   o  X_U - the x-coordinate of the ephemeral public key of Party U

   o  UAD_1 - bstr containing unprotected opaque application data

4.2.2.  Party U Processing of Message 1

   Party U SHALL compose message_1 as follows:

   o  The supported cipher suites and the order of preference MUST NOT
      be changed based on previous error messages.  However, the list
      SUITES_U sent to Party V MAY be truncated such that cipher suites
      which are the least preferred are omitted.  The amount of
      truncation MAY be changed between sessions, e.g. based on previous
      error messages (see next bullet), but all cipher suites which are
      more preferred than the least preferred cipher suite in the list
      MUST be included in the list.



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   o  Determine the cipher suite SUITE to use with Party V in message_1.
      If Party U previously received from Party V an error message to
      message_1 with diagnostic payload identifying a cipher suite that
      U supports, then U SHALL use that cipher suite.  Otherwise the
      first cipher suite in SUITES_U MUST be used.

   o  Generate an ephemeral ECDH key pair as specified in Section 5 of
      [SP-800-56A] using the curve in the cipher suite SUITE.  Let X_U
      be the x-coordinate of the ephemeral public key.

   o  Choose a connection identifier C_U and store it for the length of
      the protocol.  Party U MUST be able to retrieve the protocol state
      using the connection identifier C_U and optionally other
      information such as the 5-tuple.  The connection identifier MAY be
      used with a protocol for which EDHOC establishes application keys,
      in which case C_U SHALL adhere to the requirements for that
      protocol.

   o  Format message_1 as the sequence of CBOR data items specified in
      Section 4.2.1 and encode it to a byte string (see Appendix A.1).

4.2.3.  Party V Processing of Message 1

   Party V SHALL process message_1 as follows:

   o  Decode message_1 (see Appendix A.1).

   o  Verify that the cipher suite SUITE is supported and that no prior
      cipher suites in SUITES_U are supported.

   o  Validate that there is a solution to the curve definition for the
      given x-coordinate X_U.

   o  Pass UAD_1 to the application.

   If any verification step fails, Party V MUST send an EDHOC error
   message back, formatted as defined in Section 6, and the protocol
   MUST be discontinued.  If V does not support the cipher suite SUITE,
   then SUITES_V MUST include one or more supported cipher suites.  If V
   does not support the cipher suite SUITE, but supports another cipher
   suite in SUITES_U, then SUITES_V MUST include the first supported
   cipher suite in SUITES_U.

4.3.  EDHOC Message 2







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4.3.1.  Formatting of Message 2

   message_2 SHALL be a sequence of CBOR data items (see Appendix A.1)
   as defined below

   message_2 = (
     data_2,
     CIPHERTEXT_2 : bstr,
   )

   data_2 = (
     C_U : bstr / nil,
     C_V : bstr,
     X_V : bstr,
   )

   aad_2 : bstr

   where aad_2, in non-CDDL notation, is:

   aad_2 = H( bstr .cborseq [ message_1, data_2 ] )

   where:

   o  C_V - variable length connection identifier

   o  X_V - the x-coordinate of the ephemeral public key of Party V

   o  H() - the hash function in the HKDF, which takes a CBOR byte
      string (bstr) as input and produces a CBOR byte string as output.
      The use of '.cborseq' is exemplified in Appendix A.1.

4.3.2.  Party V Processing of Message 2

   Party V SHALL compose message_2 as follows:

   o  Generate an ephemeral ECDH key pair as specified in Section 5 of
      [SP-800-56A] using the curve in the cipher suite SUITE.  Let X_V
      be the x-coordinate of the ephemeral public key.

   o  Choose a connection identifier C_V and store it for the length of
      the protocol.  Party V MUST be able to retrieve the protocol state
      using the connection identifier C_V and optionally other
      information such as the 5-tuple.  The connection identifier MAY be
      used with a protocol for which EDHOC establishes application keys,
      in which case C_V SHALL adhere to the requirements for that
      protocol.  To reduce message overhead, party V can set the message
      field C_U in message_2 to null (still storing the actual value of



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      C_U) if there is an external correlation mechanism (e.g. the Token
      in CoAP) that enables Party U to correlate message_1 and
      message_2.

   o  Compute COSE_Sign1 as defined in Section 4.4 of [RFC8152], using
      the signature algorithm in the cipher suite SUITE, the private
      authentication key of Party V, and the following parameters
      (further clarifications in Appendix A.2.2).  The unprotected
      header MAY contain parameters (e.g. 'alg').

      *  protected = bstr .cbor { abc : ID_CRED_V }

      *  payload = CRED_V

      *  external_aad = aad_2

      *  abc - any COSE map label that can identify a public
         authentication key, see Section 4.1

      *  ID_CRED_V - a CBOR type that can be used with the COSE map
         label.  Enables the retrieval of the public authentication key
         of Party V, see Section 4.1

      *  CRED_V - bstr credential containing the public authentication
         key of Party V, see Section 4.1

      Note that only 'protected' and 'signature' of the COSE_Sign1
      object are used in message_2, see next bullet.

   o  Compute COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Section 5.3 of [RFC8152], with
      the AEAD algorithm in the cipher suite SUITE, K_2, IV_2, and the
      following parameters (further clarifications in Appendix A.2.2).
      The protected header SHALL be empty.  The unprotected header MAY
      contain parameters (e.g. 'alg').

      *  plaintext = bstr .cborseq [ ~protected, signature, ? UAD_2 ]

      *  external_aad = aad_2

      *  UAD_2 = bstr containing opaque unprotected application data

      Note that protected and signature in the plaintext are taken from
      the COSE_Sign1 object, and that that only 'ciphertext' of the
      COSE_Encrypt0 object are used in message_2, see next bullet.

   o  Format message_2 as the sequence of CBOR data items specified in
      Section 4.3.1 and encode it to a byte string (see Appendix A.1).
      CIPHERTEXT_2 is the COSE_Encrypt0 ciphertext.



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4.3.3.  Party U Processing of Message 2

   Party U SHALL process message_2 as follows:

   o  Decode message_2 (see Appendix A.1).

   o  Retrieve the protocol state using the connection identifier C_U
      and optionally other information such as the 5-tuple.

   o  Validate that there is a solution to the curve definition for the
      given x-coordinate X_V.

   o  Decrypt and verify COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Section 5.3 of
      [RFC8152], with the AEAD algorithm in the cipher suite SUITE, K_2,
      and IV_2.

   o  Verify COSE_Sign1 as defined in Section 4.4 of [RFC8152], using
      the signature algorithm in the cipher suite SUITE and the public
      authentication key of Party V.

   If any verification step fails, Party U MUST send an EDHOC error
   message back, formatted as defined in Section 6, and the protocol
   MUST be discontinued.

4.4.  EDHOC Message 3

4.4.1.  Formatting of Message 3

   message_3 SHALL be a sequence of CBOR data items (see Appendix A.1)
   as defined below

   message_3 = (
     data_3,
     CIPHERTEXT_3 : bstr,
   )

   data_3 = (
     C_V : bstr / nil,
   )

   aad_3 : bstr

   where aad_3, in non-CDDL notation, is:

   aad_3 = H( bstr .cborseq [ aad_2, CIPHERTEXT_2, data_3 ] )






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4.4.2.  Party U Processing of Message 3

   Party U SHALL compose message_3 as follows:

   o  To reduce message overhead, party U can set the message field C_V
      in message_3 to null (still storing the actual value of C_V) if
      there is an external correlation mechanism (e.g. the Token in
      CoAP) that enables Party V to correlate message_2 and message_3.

   o  Compute COSE_Sign1 as defined in Section 4.4 of [RFC8152], using
      the signature algorithm in the cipher suite SUITE, the private
      authentication key of Party U, and the following parameters.  The
      unprotected header MAY contain parameters (e.g. 'alg').

      *  protected = bstr .cbor { abc : ID_CRED_U }

      *  payload = CRED_U

      *  external_aad = aad_3

      *  abc - any COSE map label that can identify a public
         authentication key, see Section 4.1

      *  ID_CRED_U - a CBOR type that can be used with the COSE map
         label.  Enables the retrieval of the public authentication key
         of Party U, see Section 4.1

      *  CRED_U - bstr credential containing the public authentication
         key of Party U, see Section 4.1

      Note that only 'protected' and 'signature' of the COSE_Sign1
      object are used in message_3, see next bullet.

   o  Compute COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Section 5.3 of [RFC8152], with
      the AEAD algorithm in the cipher suite SUITE, K_3, and IV_3 and
      the following parameters.  The protected header SHALL be empty.
      The unprotected header MAY contain parameters (e.g. 'alg').

      *  plaintext = bstr .cborseq [ ~protected, signature, ? PAD_3 ]

      *  external_aad = aad_3

      *  PAD_3 = bstr containing opaque protected application data

      Note that protected and signature in the plaintext are taken from
      the COSE_Sign1 object, and that only 'ciphertext' of the
      COSE_Encrypt0 object are used in message_3, see next bullet.




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   o  Format message_3 as the sequence of CBOR data items specified in
      Section 4.4.1 and encode it to a byte string (see Appendix A.1).
      CIPHERTEXT_3 is the COSE_Encrypt0 ciphertext.

   o  Pass the connection identifiers (C_U, C_V) and the negotiated
      cipher suite SUITE to the application.  The application can now
      derive application keys using the EDHOC-Exporter interface.

4.4.3.  Party V Processing of Message 3

   Party V SHALL process message_3 as follows:

   o  Decode message_3 (see Appendix A.1).

   o  Retrieve the protocol state using the connection identifier C_V
      and optionally other information such as the 5-tuple.

   o  Decrypt and verify COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Section 5.3 of
      [RFC8152], with the AEAD algorithm in the cipher suite SUITE, K_3,
      and IV_3.

   o  Verify COSE_Sign1 as defined in Section 4.4 of [RFC8152], using
      the signature algorithm in the cipher suite SUITE and the public
      authentication key of Party U.

   If any verification step fails, Party V MUST send an EDHOC error
   message back, formatted as defined in Section 6, and the protocol
   MUST be discontinued.

   o  Pass PAD_3, the connection identifiers (C_U, C_V), and the
      negotiated cipher suite SUITE to the application.  The application
      can now derive application keys using the EDHOC-Exporter
      interface.

5.  EDHOC Authenticated with Symmetric Keys

5.1.  Overview

   EDHOC supports authentication with pre-shared keys.  Party U and V
   are assumed to have a pre-shared key (PSK) with a good amount of
   randomness and the requirement that:

   o  Party V SHALL be able to retrieve the PSK using KID.

   KID may optionally contain information about how to retrieve the PSK.
   KID does not need to uniquely identify the PSK, but doing so is
   recommended as the recipient may otherwise have to try several PSKs.




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   EDHOC with symmetric key authentication is illustrated in Figure 4.

   Party U                                                       Party V
   |            TYPE, C_U, SUITES_U, SUITE, X_U, KID, UAD_1            |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
   |                             message_1                             |
   |                                                                   |
   |               C_U, C_V, X_V, AEAD(K_2; aad_2, UAD_2)              |
   |<------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                             message_2                             |
   |                                                                   |
   |                   C_V, AEAD(K_3; aad_3, PAD_3)                    |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
   |                             message_3                             |

      Figure 4: Overview of EDHOC with symmetric key authentication.

   EDHOC with symmetric key authentication is very similar to EDHOC with
   asymmetric key authentication.  In the following subsections the
   differences compared to EDHOC with asymmetric key authentication are
   described.

5.2.  EDHOC Message 1

5.2.1.  Formatting of Message 1

   message_1 SHALL be a sequence of CBOR data items (see Appendix A.1)
   as defined below

   message_1 = (
     TYPE : int,
     C_U : bstr,
     SUITES_U : suites,
     SUITE : uint,
     X_U : bstr,
     KID : bstr,
     ? UAD_1 : bstr,
   )

   where:

   o  TYPE = 2

   o  KID - bstr enabling the retrieval of the pre-shared key







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5.3.  EDHOC Message 2

5.3.1.  Processing of Message 2

   o  COSE_Sign1 is not used.

   o  COSE_Encrypt0 is computed as defined in Section 5.3 of [RFC8152],
      with the AEAD algorithm in the cipher suite SUITE, K_2, IV_2, and
      the following parameters.  The protected header SHALL be empty.
      The unprotected header MAY contain parameters (e.g. 'alg').

      *  external_aad = aad_2

      *  plaintext = h'' / UAD_2

      *  UAD_2 = bstr containing opaque unprotected application data

5.4.  EDHOC Message 3

5.4.1.  Processing of Message 3

   o  COSE_Sign1 is not used.

   o  COSE_Encrypt0 is computed as defined in Section 5.3 of [RFC8152],
      with the AEAD algorithm in the cipher suite SUITE, K_3, IV_3, and
      the following parameters.  The protected header SHALL be empty.
      The unprotected header MAY contain parameters (e.g. 'alg').

      *  external_aad = aad_3

      *  plaintext = h'' / PAD_3

      *  PAD_3 = bstr containing opaque protected application data

6.  Error Handling

6.1.  EDHOC Error Message

   This section defines a message format for the EDHOC error message,
   used during the protocol.  An EDHOC error message can be send by both
   parties as a response to any non-error EDHOC message.  After sending
   an error message, the protocol MUST be discontinued.  Errors at the
   EDHOC layer are sent as normal successful messages in the lower
   layers (e.g.  CoAP POST and 2.04 Changed).  An advantage of using
   such a construction is to avoid issues created by usage of cross
   protocol proxies (e.g.  UDP to TCP).





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   error SHALL be a sequence of CBOR data items (see Appendix A.1) as
   defined below

   error = (
     TYPE : int,
     ERR_MSG : tstr,
     ? SUITES_V : suites,
   )

   suites : int / [ 2* int ]

   where:

   o  TYPE = 0

   o  ERR_MSG - text string containing the diagnostic payload, defined
      in the same way as in Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252]

   o  SUITES_V - cipher suites from SUITES_U or the EDHOC cipher suites
      registry that V supports.  Note that SUITEs_V contains the values
      from the EDHOC cipher suites registry and not indexes.

6.1.1.  Example Use of EDHOC Error Message with SUITES_V

   Assuming that Party U supports the five cipher suites {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
   in decreasing order of preference, Figures 5 and 6 show examples of
   how Party U can truncate SUITES_U and how SUITES_V is used by Party V
   to give Party U information about the cipher suites that Party V
   supports.  In Figure 5, Party V supports cipher suite 1 but not
   cipher suite 0.

   Party U                                                       Party V
   |        TYPE, C_U, SUITES_U {0, 1, 2}, SUITE {0}, X_U, UAD_1       |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
   |                             message_1                             |
   |                                                                   |
   |                    TYPE, ERR_MSG, SUITES_V {1}                    |
   |<------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                               error                               |
   |                                                                   |
   |         TYPE, C_U, SUITES_U {0, 1}, SUITE {1}, X_U, UAD_1         |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
   |                             message_1                             |

           Figure 5: Example use of error message with SUITES_V.

   In Figure 6, Party V supports cipher suite 2 but not cipher suites 0
   and 1.



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   Party U                                                       Party V
   |         TYPE, C_U, SUITES_U {0, 1}, SUITE {0}, X_U, UAD_1         |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
   |                             message_1                             |
   |                                                                   |
   |                   TYPE, ERR_MSG, SUITES_V {2, 4}                  |
   |<------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                               error                               |
   |                                                                   |
   |        TYPE, C_U, SUITES_U {0, 1, 2}, SUITE {2}, X_U, UAD_1       |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
   |                             message_1                             |

           Figure 6: Example use of error message with SUITES_V.

   As Party U's list of supported cipher suites and order of preference
   is fixed, and Party V only accepts message_1 if the selected cipher
   suite SUITE is the first cipher suite in SUITES_U that Party V
   supports, the parties can verify that the selected cipher suite SUITE
   is the most preferred (by Party U) cipher suite supported by both
   parties.  If SUITE is not the first cipher suite in SUITES_U that
   Party V supports, Party V will discontinue the protocol.

7.  Transferring EDHOC and Deriving Application Keys

7.1.  Transferring EDHOC in CoAP

   It is recommended is to transport EDHOC as an exchange of CoAP
   [RFC7252] messages.  CoAP is a reliable transport that can preserve
   packet ordering and handle message duplication.  CoAP can also
   perform fragmentation and protect against denial of service attacks.
   It is recommended to carry the EDHOC flights in Confirmable messages,
   especially if fragmentation is used.

   By default, the CoAP client is Party U and the CoAP server is Party
   V, but the roles SHOULD be chosen to protect the most sensitive
   identity, see Section 9.  By default, EDHOC is transferred in POST
   requests and 2.04 (Changed) responses to the Uri-Path: "/.well-known/
   edhoc", but an application may define its own path that can be
   discovered e.g. using resource directory
   [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

   By default, the message flow is as follows: EDHOC message_1 is sent
   in the payload of a POST request from the client to the server's
   resource for EDHOC.  EDHOC message_2 or the EDHOC error message is
   sent from the server to the client in the payload of a 2.04 (Changed)
   response.  EDHOC message_3 or the EDHOC error message is sent from
   the client to the server's resource in the payload of a POST request.



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   If needed, an EDHOC error message is sent from the server to the
   client in the payload of a 2.04 (Changed) response.

   An example of a successful EDHOC exchange using CoAP is shown in
   Figure 7.

             Client    Server
               |          |
               +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
               |   POST   | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc"
               |          | Content-Format: application/edhoc
               |          | Payload: EDHOC message_1
               |          |
               |<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
               |   2.04   | Content-Format: application/edhoc
               |          | Payload: EDHOC message_2
               |          |
               +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
               |   POST   | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc"
               |          | Content-Format: application/edhoc
               |          | Payload: EDHOC message_3
               |          |
               |<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
               |   2.04   |
               |          |

                   Figure 7: Transferring EDHOC in CoAP

   The exchange in Figure 7 protects the client identity against active
   attackers and the server identity against passive attackers.  An
   alternative exchange that protects the server identity against active
   attackers and the client identity against passive attackers is shown
   in Figure 8.


















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             Client    Server
               |          |
               +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
               |   POST   | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc"
               |          |
               |<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
               |   2.04   | Content-Format: application/edhoc
               |          | Payload: EDHOC message_1
               |          |
               +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
               |   POST   | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc"
               |          | Content-Format: application/edhoc
               |          | Payload: EDHOC message_2
               |          |
               |<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
               |   2.04   | Content-Format: application/edhoc
               |          | Payload: EDHOC message_3
               |          |

                   Figure 8: Transferring EDHOC in CoAP

   To protect against denial-of-service attacks, the CoAP server MAY
   respond to the first POST request with a 4.01 (Unauthorized)
   containing an Echo option [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag].  This
   forces the initiator to demonstrate its reachability at its apparent
   network address.  If message fragmentation is needed, the EDHOC
   messages may be fragmented using the CoAP Block-Wise Transfer
   mechanism [RFC7959].

7.1.1.  Deriving an OSCORE Context from EDHOC

   When EDHOC is used to derive parameters for OSCORE
   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], the parties must make sure that the
   EDHOC connection identifiers are unique, i.e. C_V MUST NOT be equal
   to C_U.  The CoAP client and server MUST be able to retrieve the
   OCORE protocol state using its chosen connection identifier and
   optionally other information such as the 5-tuple.  In case that the
   CoAP client is party U and the CoAP server is party V:

   o  The client's OSCORE Sender ID is C_V and the server's OSCORE
      Sender ID is C_U, as defined in this document

   o  The AEAD Algorithm and the HMAC-based Key Derivation Function
      (HKDF) are the AEAD and HKDF algorithms in the cipher suite SUITE.

   o  The Master Secret and Master Salt are derived as follows where
      length is the key length (in bytes) of the AEAD Algorithm.




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      Master Secret = EDHOC-Exporter("OSCORE Master Secret", length)
      Master Salt   = EDHOC-Exporter("OSCORE Master Salt", 8)

7.2.  Transferring EDHOC over Other Protocols

   EDHOC may be transported over a different transport than CoAP.  In
   this case the lower layers need to handle message loss, reordering,
   message duplication, fragmentation, and denial of service protection.

8.  IANA Considerations

8.1.  EDHOC Cipher Suites Registry

   IANA has created a new registry titled "EDHOC Cipher Suites".

   TODO

8.2.  EDHOC Method Type Registry

   IANA has created a new registry titled "EDHOC Method Type".

   TODO

8.3.  The Well-Known URI Registry

   IANA has added the well-known URI 'edhoc' to the Well-Known URIs
   registry.

   o  URI suffix: edhoc

   o  Change controller: IETF

   o  Specification document(s): [[this document]]

   o  Related information: None

8.4.  Media Types Registry

   IANA has added the media type 'application/edhoc' to the Media Types
   registry.

   o  Type name: application

   o  Subtype name: edhoc

   o  Required parameters: N/A

   o  Optional parameters: N/A



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   o  Encoding considerations: binary

   o  Security considerations: See Section 7 of this document.

   o  Interoperability considerations: N/A

   o  Published specification: [[this document]] (this document)

   o  Applications that use this media type: To be identified

   o  Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

   o  Additional information:

      *  Magic number(s): N/A

      *  File extension(s): N/A

      *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

   o  Person & email address to contact for further information: See
      "Authors' Addresses" section.

   o  Intended usage: COMMON

   o  Restrictions on usage: N/A

   o  Author: See "Authors' Addresses" section.

   o  Change Controller: IESG

8.5.  CoAP Content-Formats Registry

   IANA has added the media type 'application/edhoc' to the CoAP
   Content-Formats registry.

   o  Media Type: application/edhoc

   o  Encoding:

   o  ID: TBD42

   o  Reference: [[this document]]








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9.  Security Considerations

9.1.  Security Properties

   EDHOC inherits its security properties from the theoretical SIGMA-I
   protocol [SIGMA].  Using the terminology from [SIGMA], EDHOC provides
   perfect forward secrecy, mutual authentication with aliveness,
   consistency, peer awareness, and identity protection.  As described
   in [SIGMA], peer awareness is provided to Party V, but not to Party
   U.

   EDHOC with asymmetric authentication offers identity protection of
   Party U against active attacks and identity protection of Party V
   against passive attacks.  The roles should be assigned to protect the
   most sensitive identity, typically that which is not possible to
   infer from routing information in the lower layers.

   Compared to [SIGMA], EDHOC adds an explicit method type and expands
   the message authentication coverage to additional elements such as
   algorithms, application data, and previous messages.  This protects
   against an attacker replaying messages or injecting messages from
   another session.

   EDHOC also adds negotiation of connection identifiers and downgrade
   protected negotiation of cryptographic parameters, i.e. an attacker
   cannot affect the negotiated parameters.  A single session of EDHOC
   does not include negotiation of cipher suites, but it enables Party V
   to verify that the selected cipher suite is the most preferred cipher
   suite by U which is supported by both U and V.

   As required by [RFC7258], IETF protocols need to mitigate pervasive
   monitoring when possible.  One way to mitigate pervasive monitoring
   is to use a key exchange that provides perfect forward secrecy.
   EDHOC therefore only supports methods with perfect forward secrecy.
   To limit the effect of breaches, it is important to limit the use of
   symmetrical group keys for bootstrapping.  EDHOC therefore strives to
   make the additional cost of using raw-public keys and self-signed
   certificates as small as possible.  Raw-public keys and self-signed
   certificates are not a replacement for a public key infrastructure,
   but SHOULD be used instead of symmetrical group keys for
   bootstrapping.

9.2.  Cryptographic Considerations

   The security of the SIGMA protocol requires the MAC to be bound to
   the identity of the signer.  Hence the message authenticating
   functionality of the authenticated encryption in EDHOC is critical:
   authenticated encryption MUST NOT be replaced by plain encryption



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   only, even if authentication is provided at another level or through
   a different mechanism.  EDHOC implements SIGMA-I using the same Sign-
   then-MAC approach as TLS 1.3.

   To reduce message overhead EDHOC does not use explicit nonces and
   instead rely on the ephemeral public keys to provide randomness to
   each session.  A good amount of randomness is important for the key
   generation, to provide aliveness, and to protect against interleaving
   attacks.  For this reason, the ephemeral keys MUST NOT be reused, and
   both parties SHALL generate fresh random ephemeral key pairs.

   The choice of key length used in the different algorithms needs to be
   harmonized, so that a sufficient security level is maintained for
   certificates, EDHOC, and the protection of application data.  Party U
   and V should enforce a minimum security level.

   The data rates in many IoT deployments are very limited.  Given that
   the application keys are protected as well as the long-term
   authentication keys they can often be used for years or even decades
   before the cryptographic limits are reached.  If the application keys
   established through EDHOC need to be renewed, the communicating
   parties can derive application keys with other labels or run EDHOC
   again.

9.3.  Mandatory to Implement Cipher Suite

   Cipher suite number 1 (AES-CCM-64-64-128, ECDH-SS + HKDF-256, X25519,
   Ed25519) is mandatory to implement.  For many constrained IoT devices
   it is problematic to support more than one cipher suites, so some
   deployments with P-256 may not support the mandatory cipher suite.
   This is not a problem for local deployments.

9.4.  Unprotected Data

   Party U and V must make sure that unprotected data and metadata do
   not reveal any sensitive information.  This also applies for
   encrypted data sent to an unauthenticated party.  In particular, it
   applies to UAD_1, ID_CRED_V, UAD_2, and ERR_MSG in the asymmetric
   case, and KID, UAD_1, and ERR_MSG in the symmetric case.  Using the
   same KID or UAD_1 in several EDHOC sessions allows passive
   eavesdroppers to correlate the different sessions.  The communicating
   parties may therefore anonymize KID.  Another consideration is that
   the list of supported cipher suites may be used to identify the
   application.

   Party U and V must also make sure that unauthenticated data does not
   trigger any harmful actions.  In particular, this applies to UAD_1




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   and ERR_MSG in the asymmetric case, and KID, UAD_1, and ERR_MSG in
   the symmetric case.

9.5.  Denial-of-Service

   EDHOC itself does not provide countermeasures against Denial-of-
   Service attacks.  By sending a number of new or replayed message_1 an
   attacker may cause Party V to allocate state, perform cryptographic
   operations, and amplify messages.  To mitigate such attacks, an
   implementation SHOULD rely on lower layer mechanisms such as the Echo
   option in CoAP [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag] that forces the
   initiator to demonstrate reachability at its apparent network
   address.

9.6.  Implementation Considerations

   The availability of a secure pseudorandom number generator and truly
   random seeds are essential for the security of EDHOC.  If no true
   random number generator is available, a truly random seed must be
   provided from an external source.  If ECDSA is supported,
   "deterministic ECDSA" as specified in [RFC6979] is RECOMMENDED.

   The referenced processing instructions in [SP-800-56A] must be
   complied with, including deleting the intermediate computed values
   along with any ephemeral ECDH secrets after the key derivation is
   completed.  The ECDH shared secret, keys (K_2, K_3), and IVs (IV_2,
   IV_3) MUST be secret.  Implementations should provide countermeasures
   to side-channel attacks such as timing attacks.

   Party U and V are responsible for verifying the integrity of
   certificates.  The selection of trusted CAs should be done very
   carefully and certificate revocation should be supported.  The
   private authentication keys MUST be kept secret.

   Party U and V are allowed to select the connection identifiers C_U
   and C_V, respectively, for the other party to use in the ongoing
   EDHOC protocol as well as in a subsequent application protocol (e.g.
   OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]).  The choice of connection
   identifier is not security critical in EDHOC but intended to simplify
   the retrieval of the right security context in combination with using
   short identifiers.  If the wrong connection identifier of the other
   party is used in a protocol message it will result in the receiving
   party not being able to retrieve a security context (which will
   terminate the protocol) or retrieve the wrong security context (which
   also terminates the protocol as the message cannot be verified).






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9.7.  Other Documents Referencing EDHOC

   EDHOC has been analyzed in several other documents.  A formal
   verification of EDHOC was done in [SSR18], an analysis of EDHOC for
   certificate enrollment was done in [Kron18], the use of EDHOC in
   LoRaWAN is analyzed in [LoRa1] and [LoRa2], the use of EDHOC in IoT
   bootstrapping is analyzed in [Perez18], and the use of EDHOC in
   6TiSCH is described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join].

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-cbor-7049bis]
              Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", draft-ietf-cbor-7049bis-05 (work
              in progress), January 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]
              Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise data
              definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to
              express CBOR and JSON data structures", draft-ietf-cbor-
              cddl-07 (work in progress), February 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]
              Amsuess, C., Mattsson, J., and G. Selander, "Echo and
              Request-Tag", draft-ietf-core-echo-request-tag-03 (work in
              progress), October 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
              Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
              "Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
              (OSCORE)", draft-ietf-core-object-security-15 (work in
              progress), August 2018.

   [I-D.schaad-cose-x509]
              Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Headers for carrying and referencing X.509 certificates",
              draft-schaad-cose-x509-03 (work in progress), December
              2018.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.






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   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.

   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.

   [RFC6090]  McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
              Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>.

   [RFC6979]  Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
              Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
              Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
              2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

   [RFC7959]  Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
              the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.

   [RFC8152]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [SIGMA]    Krawczyk, H., "SIGMA - The 'SIGn-and-MAc' Approach to
              Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE-
              Protocols (Long version)", June 2003,
              <http://webee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/sigma-pdf.pdf>.

   [SP-800-56A]
              Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R.
              Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
              Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography",
              NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, April 2018,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3>.



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10.2.  Informative References

   [CborMe]   Bormann, C., "CBOR Playground", May 2018,
              <http://cbor.me/>.

   [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]
              Selander, G., Palombini, F., and K. Hartke, "Requirements
              for CoAP End-To-End Security", draft-hartke-core-e2e-
              security-reqs-03 (work in progress), July 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join]
              Richardson, M., "6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol",
              draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-03 (work in
              progress), October 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
              Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
              H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
              Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
              Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-21
              (work in progress), February 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]
              Palombini, F., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and M. Gunnarsson,
              "OSCORE profile of the Authentication and Authorization
              for Constrained Environments Framework", draft-ietf-ace-
              oscore-profile-07 (work in progress), February 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]
              Shelby, Z., Koster, M., Bormann, C., Stok, P., and C.
              Amsuess, "CoRE Resource Directory", draft-ietf-core-
              resource-directory-19 (work in progress), January 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
              Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-30 (work in progress),
              November 2018.

   [Kron18]   Krontiris, A., "Evaluation of Certificate Enrollment over
              Application Layer Security", May 2018,
              <https://www.nada.kth.se/~ann/exjobb/
              alexandros_krontiris.pdf>.








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   [LoRa1]    Sanchez-Iborra, R., Sanchez-Gomez, J., Perez, S.,
              Fernandez, P., Santa, J., Hernandez-Ramos, J., and A.
              Skarmeta, "Enhancing LoRaWAN Security through a
              Lightweight and Authenticated Key Management Approach",
              June 2018,
              <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6021899/pdf/
              sensors-18-01833.pdf>.

   [LoRa2]    Sanchez-Iborra, R., Sanchez-Gomez, J., Perez, S.,
              Fernandez, P., Santa, J., Hernandez-Ramos, J., and A.
              Skarmeta, "Internet Access for LoRaWAN Devices Considering
              Security Issues", June 2018,
              <https://ants.inf.um.es/~josesanta/doc/GIoTS1.pdf>.

   [Perez18]  Perez, S., Garcia-Carrillo, D., Marin-Lopez, R.,
              Hernandez-Ramos, J., Marin-Perez, R., and A. Skarmeta,
              "Architecture of security association establishment based
              on bootstrapping technologies for enabling critical IoT
              infrastructures", October 2018, <http://www.anastacia-
              h2020.eu/publications/Architecture_of_security_association
              _establishment_based_on_bootstrapping_technologies_for_ena
              bling_critical_IoT_infrastructures.pdf>.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [SSR18]    Bruni, A., Sahl Joergensen, T., Groenbech Petersen, T.,
              and C. Schuermann, "Formal Verification of Ephemeral
              Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", November 2018,
              <https://www.springerprofessional.de/en/formal-
              verification-of-ephemeral-diffie-hellman-over-cose-
              edhoc/16284348>.

Appendix A.  Use of CBOR, CDDL and COSE in EDHOC

   This Appendix is intended to simplify for implementors not familiar
   with CBOR [I-D.ietf-cbor-7049bis], CDDL [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl], COSE
   [RFC8152], and HKDF [RFC5869].



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A.1.  CBOR and CDDL

   The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)
   [I-D.ietf-cbor-7049bis] is a data format designed for small code size
   and small message size.  CBOR builds on the JSON data model but
   extends it by e.g. encoding binary data directly without base64
   conversion.  In addition to the binary CBOR encoding, CBOR also has a
   diagnostic notation that is readable and editable by humans.  The
   Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] provides
   a way to express structures for protocol messages and APIs that use
   CBOR.  [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] also extends the diagnostic notation.

   CBOR data items are encoded to or decoded from byte strings using a
   type-length-value encoding scheme, where the three highest order bits
   of the initial byte contain information about the major type.  CBOR
   supports several different types of data items, in addition to
   integers (int, uint), simple values (e.g. null), byte strings (bstr),
   and text strings (tstr), CBOR also supports arrays [] of data items
   and maps {} of pairs of data items.  Some examples are given below.
   For a complete specification and more examples, see
   [I-D.ietf-cbor-7049bis] and [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl].  We recommend
   implementors to get used to CBOR by using the CBOR playground
   [CborMe].

    Diagnostic          Encoded              Type
    ------------------------------------------------------------------
    1                   0x01                 unsigned integer
    24                  0x1818               unsigned integer
    -24                 0x37                 negative integer
    -25                 0x3818               negative integer
    null                0xf6                 simple value
    h'12cd'             0x4212cd             byte string
    '12cd'              0x4431326364         byte string
    "12cd"              0x6431326364         text string
    << 1, 2, null >>    0x430102f6           byte string
    [ 1, 2, null ]      0x830102f6           array
    [_ 1, 2, null ]     0x9f0102f6ff         array (indefinite-length)
    ( 1, 2, null )      0x0102f6             group
    { 4: h'cd' }        0xa10441cd           map
    ------------------------------------------------------------------

   All EDHOC messages consist of a sequence of CBOR encoded data items.
   While an EDHOC message in itself is not a CBOR data item, it may be
   viewed as the CBOR encoding of an indefinite-length array [_
   message_i ] without the first byte (0x9f) and the last byte (0xff),
   for i = 1, 2 and 3.  The same applies to the EDHOC error message.





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   The message format specification uses the constructs '.cbor',
   '.cborseq' and '~' enabling conversion between different CDDL types
   matching different CBOR items with different encodings.  Some
   examples are given below.

   A type (e.g. an uint) may be wrapped in a byte string (bstr), and
   back again:

    CDDL Type                       Diagnostic                Encoded
    ------------------------------------------------------------------
    uint                            24                        0x1818
    bstr .cbor uint                 << 24 >>                  0x421818
    ~ bstr .cbor uint               24                        0x1818
    ------------------------------------------------------------------

   An array, say of an uint and a byte string, may be converted into a
   byte string (bstr):

   CDDL Type                       Diagnostic              Encoded
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   bstr                            h'cd'                   0x41cd
   [ uint, bstr ]                  [ 24, h'cd' ]           0x82181841cd
   bstr .cborseq [ uint, bstr ]    << 24, h'cd' >>         0x44181841cd
   --------------------------------------------------------------------

A.2.  COSE

   CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152] describes how to
   create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and
   encryption using CBOR.  COSE builds on JOSE, but is adapted to allow
   more efficient processing in constrained devices.  EDHOC makes use of
   COSE_Key, COSE_Encrypt0, COSE_Sign1, and COSE_KDF_Context objects.

A.2.1.  Encryption and Decryption

   The COSE parameters used in COSE_Encrypt0 (see Section 5.2 of
   [RFC8152]) are constructed as described below.  Note that "i" in
   "K_i", "IV_i" and "aad_i" is a variable with value i = 2 or 3,
   depending on whether the calculation is made over message_2 or
   message_3.

   o  The secret key K_i is a CBOR bstr, generated with the EDHOC-Key-
      Derivation function as defined in Section 3.3.

   o  The initialization vector IV_i is a CBOR bstr, also generated with
      the EDHOC-Key-Derivation function as defined in Section 3.3.





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   o  The plaintext is a CBOR bstr.  If the application data (UAD and
      PAD) is omitted, then plaintext = h'' in the symmetric case, and
      plaintext = << ~protected, signature >> in the asymmetric case.
      For instance, if protected = h'a10140' and signature = h'050607'
      (CBOR encoding 0x43050607), then plaintext = h'a1014043050607'.

   o  The external_aad is a CBOR bstr.  It is always set to aad_i.

   COSE constructs the input to the AEAD [RFC5116] as follows:

   o  The key K is the value of the key K_i.

   o  The nonce N is the value of the initialization vector IV_i.

   o  The plaintext P is the value of the COSE plaintext.  E.g. if the
      COSE plaintext = h'010203', then P = 0x010203.

   o  The associated data A is the CBOR encoding of:

      [ "Encrypt0", h'', aad_i ]

      This equals the concatenation of 0x8368456e63727970743040 and the
      CBOR encoding of aad_i.  For instance if aad_2 = h'010203' (CBOR
      encoding 0x43010203), then A = 0x8368456e6372797074304043010203.

A.2.2.  Signing and Verification

   The COSE parameters used in COSE_Sign1 (see Section 4.2 of [RFC8152])
   are constructed as described below.  Note that "i" in "aad_i" is a
   variable with values i = 2 or 3, depending on whether the calculation
   is made over message_2 or message_3.  Note also that "x" in
   "ID_CRED_x" and "CRED_x" is a variable with values x = U or V,
   depending on whether it is the credential of U or of V that is used
   in the relevant protocol message.

   o  The key is the private authentication key of U or V.  This may be
      stored as a COSE_KEY object or as a certificate.

   o  The protected parameter is a map { abc : ID_CRED_x } wrapped in a
      byte string.

   o  The payload is a bstr containing the CBOR encoding of a COSE_KEY
      or a single certificate.

   o  external_aad = aad_i.

   COSE constructs the input to the Signature Algorithm as follows:




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   o  The key is the private authentication key of U or V.

   o  The message to be signed M is the CBOR encoding of:

      [ "Signature1", << { abc : ID_CRED_x } >>, aad_i, CRED_x ]

      For instance, if abc = 4 (CBOR encoding 0x04), ID_CRED_U = h'1111'
      (CBOR encoding 0x421111), aad_3 = h'222222' (CBOR encoding
      0x43222222), and CRED_U = h'55555555' (CBOR encoding
      0x4455555555), then M =
      0x846a5369676e61747572653145A104421111432222224455555555.

A.2.3.  Key Derivation

   Assuming use of the mandatory-to-implement algorithms HKDF SHA-256
   and AES-CCM-16-64-128, the extract phase of HKDF produces a
   pseudorandom key (PRK) as follows:

   PRK = HMAC-SHA-256( salt, ECDH shared secret )

   where salt = 0x in the asymmetric case and salt = PSK in the
   symmetric case.  As the output length L is smaller than the hash
   function output size, the expand phase of HKDF consists of a single
   HMAC invocation, and K_i and IV_i are therefore the first 16 and 13
   bytes, respectively, of

   output parameter = HMAC-SHA-256( PRK, info || 0x01 )

   where || means byte string concatenation, and info is the CBOR
   encoding of

   COSE_KDF_Context = [
     AlgorithmID,
     [ null, null, null ],
     [ null, null, null ],
     [ keyDataLength, h'', aad_i ]
   ]

   If AES-CCM-16-64-128 then AlgorithmID = 10 and keyDataLength = 128
   for K_i, and AlgorithmID = "IV-GENERATION" (CBOR encoding
   0x6d49562d47454e45524154494f4e) and keyDataLength = 104 for IV_i.
   Hence, if aad_2 = h'aaaa' then

   K_2  = HMAC-SHA-256( PRK, 0x840a83f6f6f683f6f6f68318804042aaaa01 )
   IV_2 = HMAC-SHA-256( PRK, 0x846d49562d47454e45524154494f4e
                                   83f6f6f683f6f6f68318804042aaaa01 )





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Appendix B.  Example Messages and Sizes

   This appendix gives an estimate of the message sizes of EDHOC with
   different authentication methods.  It also gives examples of messages
   and plaintexts in CBOR diagnostic notation and hexadecimal to help
   implementors.  Note that the examples in this appendix are not test
   vectors, the cryptographic parts are just replaced with byte strings
   of the same length.

B.1.  Message Sizes RPK

B.1.1.  message_1

   message_1 = (
     1,
     h'c3',
     0,
     0,
     h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d
       1e1f'
   )

   message_1 (39 bytes):
   01 41 C3 00 00 58 20 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C
   0D 0E 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F

B.1.2.  message_2

   plaintext = <<
     { 4 : 'acdc' },
     h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d
       1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b
       3c3d3e3f'
   >>

   The protected header map is 7 bytes.  The length of plaintext is 73
   bytes so assuming a 64-bit MAC value the length of ciphertext is 81
   bytes.

   message_2 = (
     null,
     h'c4',
     h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d
       1e1f',
     h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d
       1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b
       3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f50'
   )



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   message_2 (120 bytes):
   F6 41 C4 58 20 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E
   0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 58 51 00
   01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10 11 12 13 14
   15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
   29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3A 3B 3C
   3D 3E 3F 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E 4F 50

B.1.3.  message_3

   The plaintext and ciphertext in message_3 are assumed to be of equal
   sizes as in message_2.

   message_3 = (
     h'c4',
     h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d
       1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b
       3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f50'
   )

   message_3 (85 bytes):
   41 C4 58 51 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
   10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20 21 22 23
   24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
   38 39 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 3F 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4A 4B
   4C 4D 4E 4F 50

B.2.  Message Sizes Certificates

   When the certificates are distributed out-of-band and identified with
   the x5t header and a SHA256/64 hash value, the protected header map
   will be 13 bytes instead of 7 bytes (assuming labels in the range
   -24...23).

   protected = << { TDB1 : [ TDB6, h'0001020304050607' ] } >>

   When the certificates are identified with the x5chain header, the
   message sizes depends on the size of the (truncated) certificate
   chains.  The protected header map will be 3 bytes + the size of the
   certificate chain (assuming a label in the range -24...23).

   protected = << { TDB3 : h'0001020304050607...' } >>

B.3.  Message Sizes PSK







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B.3.1.  message_1

   message_1 = (
     2,
     h'c3',
     0,
     0,
     h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d
       1e1f',
     'abba'
   )

   message_1 (44 bytes):
   02 41 C3 00 00 58 20 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C
   0D 0E 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F
   44 61 63 64 63

B.3.2.  message_2

   Assuming a 0 byte plaintext and a 64-bit MAC value the ciphertext is
   8 bytes

   message_2 = (
     null,
     h'c4',
     h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d
       1e1f',
     h'0001020304050607'
   )

   message_2 (46 bytes):
   F6 41 C4 58 20 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E
   0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 48 61 62
   63 64 65 66 67 68

B.3.3.  message_3

   The plaintext and ciphertext in message_3 are assumed to be of equal
   sizes as in message_2.

   message_3 = (
     h'c4',
     h'0001020304050607'
   )

   message_3 (11 bytes):
   41 C4 48 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07




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B.4.  Summary

   The previous estimates of typical message sizes are summarized in
   Figure 9.

   =====================================================================
                  PSK       RPK       x5t     x5chain
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   message_1       44        39        39        39
   message_2       46       120       126       116 + Certificate chain
   message_3       11        85        91        81 + Certificate chain
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   Total          101       244       256       236 + Certificate chains
   =====================================================================

                 Figure 9: Typical message sizes in bytes

   In practice, most devices only have a few keys, so in deployments
   where assignment of key identifiers (KID, ID_CRED_V, ID_CRED_U) can
   be coordinated, the key identifiers can typically be much smaller
   (e.g. 1 byte).

   Figure 10 compares the message sizes of EDHOC with the DTLS 1.3
   handshake [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] with connection ID.  The comparison
   uses a minimum number of extensions and offered algorithms/cipher
   suites, 4 bytes key identifiers, 1 byte connection IDs, no DTLS
   message fragmentation, and DTLS RPK SubjectPublicKeyInfo with point
   compression.

   =====================================================================
   Flight                             #1         #2        #3      Total
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   DTLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE              150        373       213        736
   DTLS 1.3 PSK + ECDHE              187        190        57        434
   DTLS 1.3 PSK                      137        150        57        344
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   EDHOC RPK + ECDHE                  39        120        85        244
   EDHOC PSK + ECDHE                  44         46        11        101
   =====================================================================

    Figure 10: Comparison of message sizes in bytes with Connection ID

   In reality the total overhead will be larger due to mechanisms for
   fragmentation, retransmission, and packet ordering.  The overhead of
   fragmentation is roughly proportional to the number of fragments,
   while the expected overhead due to retransmission in noisy
   environments is a superlinear function of the flight sizes.




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   Connection ID is not supported with TLS 1.3.  Figure 11 compares the
   message sizes of EDHOC with the DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] and
   TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] handshakes without connection ID.

   =====================================================================
   Flight                             #1         #2        #3      Total
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   DTLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE              144        364       212        722
   DTLS 1.3 PSK + ECDHE              181        183        56        420
   DTLS 1.3 PSK                      131        143        56        330
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   TLS 1.3  RPK + ECDHE              129        322       194        645
   TLS 1.3  PSK + ECDHE              166        157        50        373
   TLS 1.3  PSK                      116        117        50        283
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   EDHOC RPK + ECDHE                  38        119        84        241
   EDHOC PSK + ECDHE                  44         45        10         98
   =====================================================================

   Figure 11: Comparison of message sizes in bytes without Connection ID

Appendix C.  Test Vectors

   This appendix provides a wealth of test vectors to ease
   implementation and ensure interoperability.

   TODO: This section needs to be updated.

Acknowledgments

   The authors want to thank Alessandro Bruni, Theis Groenbech Petersen,
   Dan Harkins, Klaus Hartke, Alexandros Krontiris, Ilari Liusvaara,
   Karl Norrman, Salvador Perez, Michael Richardson, Thorvald Sahl
   Joergensen, Jim Schaad, Carsten Schuermann, Ludwig Seitz, Valery
   Smyslov, and Rene Struik for reviewing and commenting on intermediate
   versions of the draft.  We are especially indebted to Jim Schaad for
   his continuous reviewing and implementation of different versions of
   the draft.

Authors' Addresses

   Goeran Selander
   Ericsson AB

   Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com






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   John Mattsson
   Ericsson AB

   Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com


   Francesca Palombini
   Ericsson AB

   Email: francesca.palombini@ericsson.com









































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