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Versions: (draft-lonc-tls-certieee1609) 00 01

TLS Working Group                                              A. KAISER
Internet-Draft                                               IRT SystemX
Intended status: Informational                                 H. LABIOD
Expires: September 14, 2017                            Telecom Paristech
                                                                 B. LONC
                                                                 Renault
                                                               M. MSAHLI
                                                       Telecom Paristech
                                                          A. SERHROUCHNI
                                                       Telecom ParisTech
                                                          March 13, 2017


 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authentication using ITS ETSI and IEEE
                              certificates
               draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-01.txt


Abstract

   This document specifies the use of two new certificate types to
   authenticate TLS entities.  The first type enables the use of a
   certificate specified by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
   Engineers (IEEE) [IEEE-ITS] and the second by the European
   Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [ETSI103097].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.





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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Extension Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Message Flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.1.  Client Hello  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Certificate Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.1.  IEEE 1609.2 certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.2.  ETSI TS 103 097 certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix A.  Certificates comparison  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     A.1.  ETSI vs IEEE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     A.2.  ETSI vs X.509 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix B.  ETSI Encoding Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix C.  IEEE Encoding Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   At present, TLS protocol uses X509 [RFC5246] and OpenPGP digital
   certificates [RFC6091] in order to authenticate servers and clients.
   This document describes the use of certificates specified either by
   the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
   [IEEE-ITS] or the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
   (ETSI) [ETSI103097].  These standards were defined in order to secure
   communications in vehicular environments.  Existing certificates,
   such as X509 and OpenPGPG, are designed for Internet use,
   particularly for flexibility and extensibility, and are not optimized
   for bandwidth and processing time to support delay-sensitive
   applications.  This is why size-optimized certificates that meet the
   ITS requirements were designed and standardized.





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   In addition, the purpose of these certificates is to provide privacy
   relying on geographical and/or temporal validity criteria, and
   minimizing the exchange of private data.

   Two new values referring the previously mentioned certificated are
   added to the "cert_type" extension defined in [RFC6091].

2.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Extension Overview

   In order to negotiate the support of IEEE or ETSI certificate-based
   authentication, clients MAY include an extension of type "cert_type"
   in the extended client hello.  The "extension_data" field of this
   extension SHALL contain a list of supported certificate types
   proposed by the client, where:

            enum {
                X.509(0), OpenPGP(1), RawPublicKey(2),
                IEEE(TBD), ETSI(TBD), (255)
            }CertificateType;


   In case where the TLS server accepts the described extension, it
   selects one of the certificate types in the extension described here.
   The same extension type and structure will be used for the server's
   response to the extension described here.  Note that a server MAY
   send no certificate type if it either does not support it or wishes
   to authenticate the client using other authentication methods.  The
   client MAY at its discretion either continue the handshake, or
   respond with a fatal message alert.

   The end-entity certificate's public key has to be compatible with one
   of the certificate types listed in extension described here.

   Servers aware of the extension described here but not wishing to use
   it, SHOULD gracefully revert to a classical TLS handshake or decide
   not to proceed with the negotiation.









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4.  Security Considerations

   This section provides an overview of the basic security
   considerations which need to be taken into account before
   implementing the necessary security mechanisms.  The security
   considerations described throughout [RFC5246] apply here as well.

   For security considerations in a vehicular environment, the minimal
   use of any TLS extensions is recommended such as :

   o  The "cert_type" [IANA value 9] extension who's purpose was
      previously described in Section 3.

   o  The "elliptic_curves" [IANA value 10] extension which indicates
      the set of elliptic curves supported by the client.

   o  The "SessionTicket" [IANA value 35] extension for session
      resumption.

   In addition, servers SHOULD not support renegotiation [RFC5746] which
   presented Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) type attacks over the past years.

   The ETSI and IEEE Standards propose the use of secp256r1 (aka NIST
   P-256) recommended by the NIST FIPS 186-4 standard [FIPS186].

   Elliptic curve algorithms require significantly shorter public keys
   to achieve the same security strength.  ECC is the digital signature
   algorithm of choice in the IEEE 1609.2 standard that specifies
   security services and procedures designed for vehicle communications.
   The ECDSA is specified in American National Standard (ANS) X9.62 .
   NIST approved the use of ECDSA and specified additional requirements
   in the FIPS Publication 186-4.

   ECDSA also produces smaller signatures than RSA.  The smaller key
   sizes and signature sizes of ECDSA mean lower message overheads when
   transporting ECDSA public keys over wireless networks compared with
   transporting RSA or DSA public keys.  This is important in a large
   vehicle network where vehicles may often have to exchange their
   public keys over bandwidth - limited wireless channels.  The smaller
   ECDSA key lengths can also translate into savings on computing power,
   storage and memory space, and energy required to achieve the same
   security strength [KARGL] [SCHUTZE] [PETIT] [ICSI].  This makes ECDSA
   attractive for resource - constrained mobile devices, such as vehicle
   on-board communication units.

   The Standard defines ECIES as the encryption algorithm.  Seen that
   this RFC aims to client authentication, the use of this algorithm can
   be optional for future use but not required.



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   AES-CCM provides both authentication and confidentiality (encryption
   and decryption) and uses as its only primitive the AES encrypt block
   cipher operation.  This makes it amenable to compact implementations,
   which are advantageous in constrained envrionments.  Adoption outside
   of constrained environments is necessary to enable interoperability,
   such as that between web clients and embedded servers, or between
   embedded clients and web servers.

5.  IANA Considerations

   Existing IANA references have not been updated yet to point to this
   document.

   IANA is asked to register two new values in the "TLS Certificate
   Types" registry of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions [TLS-
   Certificate-Types-Registry], as follows:

   o  Value: TBD Description: IEEE Reference: [THIS RFC]

   o  Value: TBD Description: ETSI Reference: [THIS RFC]

6.  Message Flow

6.1.  Client Hello

   In order to indicate the support of IEEE or ETSI certificates,
   clients MUST include an extension of type "cert_type" to the extended
   client hello message.  The hello extension mechanism is described in
   Section 7.4.1.4 of TLS 1.2 [RFC5246].

   The extension 'cert_type' sent in the client hello MAY carry a list
   of supported certificate types, sorted by client preference.  It is a
   list in the case where the client supports multiple certificate
   types.

   In a vehicular environment, privacy is important.  In order to
   preserve anonymity, a client MUST include IEEE or ETSI certificate
   types in the "cert_type" extension.  certificates.

   A TLS client that proposes ECC algorithms in its ClientHello message
   SHOULD include "elliptic_curves" extension [RFC4492].

   Clients respond along with their certificates by sending a
   "Certificate" message immediately followed by the "ClientKeyExchange"
   message.  The premaster secret is generated according to the cipher
   algorithm selected by the server in the ServerHello.cipher_suite.





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7.  Certificate Verification

7.1.  IEEE 1609.2 certificates

   Verification of an IEEE 1609.2 certificate or certificate chain is
   described in section 5.5.2 of [IEEE-ITS].

7.2.  ETSI TS 103 097 certificates

   Verification of ETSI TS 103 097 certificate or certificate chain is
   described in annex F of [ETSI102941].

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [ETSI103097]
              ETSI, , "ETSI TS 103 097 v1.1.1 (2013-04): Intelligent
              Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Security header and
              certificate formats", April 2013.

   [IEEE-ITS]
              IEEE 1609.2, , "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in
              Vehicular Environments - Security Services for
              Applications and Management Messages", 2013.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", March 1997.

   [RFC4492]  Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
              Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
              for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", May 2006.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", August 2008.

   [RFC5746]  Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
              Extension"", February 2010.

   [RFC6091]  Mavrogiannopoulos, N. and D. Gillmor, "Using OpenPGP Keys
              for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authentication",
              February 2011.

   [RFC7251]  McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES-
              CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
              TLS", June 2014.




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   [ETSI102941]
              ETSI, , "ETSI TS 102 941 v1.1.9 (2016-04): Intelligent
              Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Trust and Privacy
              Management", April 2016.

8.2.  Informative References

   [FIPS186]  FIPS 186-4, , "Digital Signature Standard", July 2013.

   [KARGL]    Kargl, F., Papadimitratos, P., Buttyan, L., Muter, M.,
              Schoch, E., Wiedersheim, B., Thong, T.-V., Calandriello,
              G., Held, A., Kung, A., and J.-P. Hubaux, "Secure
              Vehicular Communications: Implementation, Performance, and
              Research Challenges", November 2008.

   [SCHUTZE]  Schutze, T., "Automotive security: Cryptography for Car2X
              communication", March 2011.

   [PETIT]    Petit, J., "Analysis of ECDSA authentication processing in
              VANETs", December 2009.

   [ICSI]     ICST project, , "Analysis of timeliness of communication
              for IEEE 1609.2", 2013.

   [X696]     ITU-T X.696, , "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding
              rules: Specification of Octet Encoding Rules (OER)",
              august 2014.

Appendix A.  Certificates comparison

A.1.  ETSI vs IEEE

   The ETSI and IEEE 1609.2 represent the active standardization groups
   in Europe and U.S those dealing with the security of vehicular
   communications.  Although defined for the same purpose, the different
   security requirements have led to the definition of different
   certificate formats.

   +-----------------------+-----------------------+
   |   ETSI Certificate    |   IEEE Certificate    |
   +-----------------------+-----------------------+
   |        Version        |        Version        |
   +-----------------------+-----------------------+
   |                       |         Type          |
   +-----------------------+-----------------------+
   |      Signer_info      |   IssuerIdentifier    |
   +-----------------------+-----------------------+
   |     Subject_info      |                       |



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   |  Subject_attributes   | ToBeSignedCertificate |
   | Validity_restrictions |                       |
   +-----------------------+-----------------------+
   |       Signature       |       Signature       |
   +-----------------------+-----------------------+

                     Figure 1: Certificates comparison

   As given in Figure 1, the IEEE certificate contains same data
   strucutres as the one defined by ETSI except "Type" field, which
   specifies the type of certificate if it is implicit or explicit.

   The main differences are listed below:

   o  The structure of US Security Credentials Management System (SCMS)
      is different from EU PKI

   o  Revocation distribution is not supported yet in ETSI TS 103 097

   o  SCMS provides high privacy for pseudonym resolution with 2 Linkage
      Authorities (LA1 and LA2): LA1/2 generate 2 linkage values that
      are added in the certificate.  This allow to connect all short-
      term certificates from a specific device for ease of revocation in
      the event of misbehavior.

   o  Certificate Encoding

      *  As described in the IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI standards, the
         internal representation of the certificate structure is encoded
         into a flat octet string in network byte order (i.e.  big-
         endian).

      *  IEEE 1609.2 is developing for future an ASN.1 version of the
         standard using X.696 (OER) [X696].

A.2.  ETSI vs X.509

   o  Distinguished Name: There is no Distinguished Name based on X.500
      in C-ITS certificates.  Instead, Subject Names are defined as a
      string of maximum 32 bytes.  There are no naming convention for
      Subject Names and the unicity of Subject Names for CAs and end-
      entities is not required.  Pseudonym certificates does not use
      Distinguished Names for pseudonymous authentication (Subject Name
      is empty): the digest of the certificate is used as unique
      identifier.  It is defined as a HashedID8 attribute which
      represents the 8 least significant bytes of the SHA-256 hash
      computation of the certificate.




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   o  Geographical attributes: The C-ITS certificates of CAs and end-
      entities may contain geographical validity attributes (location)
      which doesn't exist in x509.

   o  Trust Assurance Level (TAL): The C-ITS certificates of CAs and
      end-entities must contain a TAL:

      *  For the security of a V2X communication system, assurance about
         the in-vehicle security of participants is vital: the receiver
         of a message has to be able to rely on the fact that the sender
         has generated the message correctly (i.e.  the car sensors
         information is accurate and of integrity).  Hence, a security
         breach on the sender would have an impact on all the receivers
         of a message.

      *  Only vehicles with a reasonable "level of security" should be
         able to obtain certificates from the PKI.  The Car-to-Car
         Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) introduced different levels
         of trust, defined as Trust Assurance Levels and the
         authorization tickets (i.e.  pseudonym certificates) of the
         vehicle must include the value of the vehicle TAL.

   In order to authenticate end-entities in TLS with ETSI certificates
   the following issues still have to be addressed:

   o  No certificate profile for ITS-S Centre (i.e.  Internet Server) is
      defined yet in ETSI TS 103 097 specification.

   o  A field is required in certificates for ITS-S Centre to provide
      the server's FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name).  To this end,
      either the use of the Subject Name field is possible (although the
      size is limited to 32 bytes) or a new SubjectAttribute may be
      defined for this purpose.

Appendix B.  ETSI Encoding Example

   The hex sequence shown in Figure 2 presents an encoded secured
   message with signed payload as a generic encoded octet string.

        00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
      +---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--
   01 | 02 80 ba 80 02 02 01 53 88 de c6 40 c6 e1 9e 01
   02 | 00 52 00 00 04 d4 81 34 8a cd d1 d9 9c 1f fb a4
   03 | c7 0e 6d 2a 5d 13 ca b0 a1 e6 cf 63 22 9f 69 79
   04 | b4 53 c0 15 c7 da 3a 12 7c 8f 39 44 59 b1 2f 94
   05 | d4 cb 9a 12 ce e1 1d 87 40 8d 91 ac 95 6c 90 c8
   06 | b3 b2 9f 4c 22 02 e0 21 0b 24 03 01 00 00 25 04
   07 | 01 00 00 00 0b 01 15 04 39 83 15 4c bc 02 03 00



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   08 | 00 00 71 ff 9a 0d 80 16 ca cb cd d8 1c d1 4f 81
   09 | 94 3c dd c7 74 51 1e 2b f7 15 7b 33 e5 4f 7b 6b
   10 | 6e 5b 5d 07 94 70 be 40 a6 46 e0 55 9c 19 89 28
   11 | b5 b8 ed cf bd c2 29 70 53 95 1d bc 51 cb d6 a3
   12 | e1 d0 00 00 01 41 ae 0f 26 64 c0 05 24 01 55 20
   13 | 50 02 80 00 31 01 00 14 00 30 14 4a d9 f8 7e 59
   14 | 9e 09 2b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 00
   15 | 00 00 00 07 d1 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 02 09 2b 40
   16 | 56 b4 9d 20 0d 69 3a 40 1f ff ff fc 22 30 d4 1e
   17 | 40 00 0f c0 00 7e 02 76 ea 87 33 a9 d7 4f ff d0
   18 | 84 14 00 00 43 01 00 00 61 6d 42 37 dd 2c ea b7
   19 | 27 31 c2 3b cb 5d 61 8f 88 17 df 0d a8 7b d2 b8
   20 | d3 54 8f 71 09 8a f1 88 d2 43 04 a8 61 6a 95 bf
   21 | 5e 07 45 a1 06 e9 33 9f 9e 69 ba b3 3c bc 68 28
   22 | 93 5a 66 ea 11 a0 37 69

   Figure 2: Example of encoded ETSI secured message with signed payload

   In the parsed data structure, the contents are presented in the form:

   struct SecuredMessage {
     uint8 protocol_version: 2
     HeaderField<186> header_fields {
       struct HeaderField {
         HeaderFieldType type: signer_info (128)
         struct SignerInfo signer {
           SignerInfoType type: certificate (2)
           struct Certificate certificate {
             uint8 version: 2
             struct SignerInfo signer_info {
               SignerInfoType type: certificate_digest_with_sha256 (1)
               HashedId8 digest: 5388DEC640C6E19E
             }
             struct SubjectInfo subject_info {
               SubjectType subject_type: authorization_ticket (1)
               opaque<0> subject_name:
             }
             SubjectAttribute<82> subject_attributes {
               struct SubjectAttribute {
                 SubjectAttributeType type: verification_key (0)
                 struct PublicKey key {
                   PublicKeyAlgorithm algorithm: ecdsa_nistp256_with_
                                                 sha256 (0)
                   struct EccPoint public_key {
                     EccPointType type: uncompressed (4)
                     opaque[32] x: D481348ACDD1D99C1FFBA4C70E6D2A5D
                                   13CAB0A1E6CF63229F6979B453C015C7
                     opaque[32] y: DA3A127C8F394459B12F94D4CB9A12CE



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                                   E11D87408D91AC956C90C8B3B29F4C22
                   }
                 }
               }
               struct SubjectAttribute {
                 SubjectAttributeType type: assurance_level (2)
                 SubjectAssurance assurance_level: assurance level = 7,
                                                   confidence = 0
                                                   (bitmask = 11100000)
               }
               struct SubjectAttribute {
                 SubjectAttributeType type: its_aid_ssp_list (33)
                 ItsAidSsp<11> its_aid_ssp_list {
                   struct ItsAidSsp {
                     IntX its_aid: 36
                     opaque<3> service_specific_permissions: 010000
                   }
                   struct ItsAidSsp {
                     IntX its_aid: 37
                     opaque<4> service_specific_permissions: 01000000
                   }
                 }
               }
             }
             ValidityRestriction<11> validity_restrictions {
               struct ValidityRestriction {
                 ValidityRestrictionType type: time_start_and_end (1)
                 Time32 start_validity: 2015-03-05 00:00:00 UTC
                 Time32 end_validity: 2015-04-28 23:59:59 UTC
               }
               struct ValidityRestriction {
                 ValidityRestrictionType type: region (3)
                 struct GeographicRegion region {
                   RegionType region_type: none (0)
                 }
               }
             }
             struct Signature {
               PublicKeyAlgorithm algorithm: ecdsa_nistp256_with_sha256 (0)
               struct EcdsaSignature ecdsa_signature {
                 struct EccPoint R {
                   EccPointType type: x_coordinate_only (0)
                   opaque[32] x: 71FF9A0D8016CACBCDD81CD14F81943C
                                 DDC774511E2BF7157B33E54F7B6B6E5B
                 }
                 opaque[32] s: 5D079470BE40A646E0559C198928B5B8
                               EDCFBDC2297053951DBC51CBD6A3E1D0
               }



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             }
           }
         }
       }
       struct HeaderField {
         HeaderFieldType type: generation_time (0)
         Time64 generation_time: 2015-03-17 15:26:48.000 UTC
       }
       struct HeaderField {
         HeaderFieldType type: its_aid (5)
         IntX its_aid: 36
       }
     }
     struct Payload payload_field {
       PayloadType type: signed (1)
       opaque<85> data: 2050028000310100140030144AD9F87E
                        599E092B000000000000000080000000
                        0000000007D10000010200000002092B
                        4056B49D200D693A401FFFFFFC2230D4
                        1E40000FC0007E0276EA8733A9D74FFF
                        D084140000
     }
     TrailerField<67> trailer_fields {
       struct TrailerField {
         TrailerFieldType type: signature (1)
         struct Signature signature {
           PublicKeyAlgorithm algorithm: ecdsa_nistp256_with_sha256 (0)
           struct EcdsaSignature ecdsa_signature {
             struct EccPoint R {
               EccPointType type: x_coordinate_only (0)
               opaque[32] x: 616D4237DD2CEAB72731C23BCB5D618F
                             8817DF0DA87BD2B8D3548F71098AF188
             }
             opaque[32] s: D24304A8616A95BF5E0745A106E9339F
                           9E69BAB33CBC6828935A66EA11A03769
           }
         }
       }
     }
   }

   Figure 3: Example of parsed ETSI secured message with signed payload









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Appendix C.  IEEE Encoding Example

   The hex sequence shown in Figure 4 presents an encoded signed data
   structure as a flat encoded octet string.

        00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
      +---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--
   01 | 02 01 03 02 02 04 f3 db 4f 6f ca b6 49 65 01 09
   02 | 63 65 72 74 4e 61 6d 65 31 01 05 e0 00 00 01 00
   03 | 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 02 d4 a8 61 1d ce
   04 | d8 8c a7 a2 e9 6a 8d 7e 49 0f 3c 9a 46 27 c0 72
   05 | 26 ed 67 8d 04 74 41 02 00 03 9c b6 6f 87 4a 40
   06 | 7c 21 83 40 22 db 6d 0a 80 d0 14 cb df 24 fc a0
   07 | 83 f8 e2 00 81 b0 7c 14 b8 e7 02 19 90 d0 57 4b
   08 | 14 d2 80 29 1f c4 e6 a6 73 12 68 74 96 77 c2 52
   09 | 34 ae bb e4 29 da 16 60 61 19 74 c6 b3 53 98 0e
   10 | 70 e3 3d 4f b9 03 99 76 05 44 e9 74 70 d9 92 bb
   11 | 3c 37 92 c3 51 d4 7d 8e ea b1 03 0a e0 00 00 01
   12 | 0c 73 6f 6d 65 20 63 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 00 00 e7
   13 | 2a dc 3e dc 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   14 | 02 ca bf a2 0d 82 ae 3e 25 a3 8c 9c dd 2e cf 94
   15 | 9f cc 7c 7f d9 d8 83 89 f5 08 f7 aa bb 5b ef 21
   16 | bd 7a 2e 79 6c c7 de 01 af b1 93 35 5b e2 f5 88
   17 | 19 76 70 e4 ae 09 cf 3b ee

     Figure 4: Example of encoded IEEE 1609.2 v2 signed data structure

   In the parsed data structure, the contents are presented in the form:


      protocol_version (0, 1): 02
      type (1, 1): 01 (signed)
      signed_data (2, 263):
        signer (2, 169):
          type (2, 1): 03 (certificate)
          certificates (3, 168):
            version_and_type (3, 1): 02 (explicit)
            unsigned_certificate (4, 102):
              holder_type (4, 1): 02 (identified localized)
              cf (5, 1): 04 (encryption_key)
              signer_id (6, 8): f3 db 4f 6f ca b6 49 65
              signature_alg (14, 1): 01 (ECDSA NIST P256)
              scope (15, 18):
                id_scope (15, 18):
                  name_len (15, 1): 09
                  name (16, 9): 63 65 72 74 4e 61 6d 65 31
                  permissions (25, 7):
                    type (25, 1): 01 (specified)



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                    permissions_list_len (26, 1): 05
                    permissions_list (27, 5):
                      psid (27, 4): e0 00 00 01
                      service_specific_permissions_len (31, 1): 00
                  region (32, 1):
                    region_type (32, 1): 04 (none)
              expiration (33, 4): 00 00 00 00 (00:00:34 01 Jan 2004 UTC)
              crl_series (37, 4): 00 00 00 01
              verification_key (41, 30):
                algorithm (41, 1): 00 (ECDSA NIST P224)
                public_key (42, 29):
                  type (42, 1): 02 (compressed, lsb of y is 0)
                  x (43, 28):
                    d4 a8 61 1d ce d8 8c a7 a2 e9 6a 8d 7e 49 0f 3c
                    9a 46 27 c0 72 26 ed 67 8d 04 74 41
              encryption_key (71, 35):
                algorithm (71, 1): 02 (ECIES NIST P256)
                supported_symm_alg (72, 1): 00 (AES 128 CCM)
                public_key (73, 33):
                  type (73, 1): 03 (compressed, lsb of y is 1)
                  x (74, 32):
                    9c b6 6f 87 4a 40 7c 21 83 40 22 db 6d 0a 80 d0
                    14 cb df 24 fc a0 83 f8 e2 00 81 b0 7c 14 b8 e7
            signature (106, 65):
              ecdsa_signature (106, 65):
                R (106, 33):
                  type (106, 1): 02 (compressed, lsb of y is 0)
                  x (107, 32):
                    19 90 d0 57 4b 14 d2 80 29 1f c4 e6 a6 73 12 68
                    74 96 77 c2 52 34 ae bb e4 29 da 16 60 61 19 74
                  s (139, 32):
                    c6 b3 53 98 0e 70 e3 3d 4f b9 03 99 76 05 44 e9
                    74 70 d9 92 bb 3c 37 92 c3 51 d4 7d 8e ea b1 03
      unsigned_data (171, 37):
        tf (171, 1): 0a (use_generation_time, use_location)
        psid (172, 4): e0 00 00 01
        data_len (176, 1): 0c
        data (177, 12): 73 6f 6d 65 20 63 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74
        generation_time (189, 9):
          time (189, 8): 00 00 e7 2a dc 3e dc 09
               (19:08:23 20 Jan 2012 UTC)
          log_std_dev (197, 1): 00 (1.134666 ns or less)
        generation_location (198, 10):
          latitude (198, 4): 00 00 00 00
          longitude (202, 4): 00 00 00 00
          elevation (206, 2): 00 00
      signature (208, 57):
        ecdsa_signature (208, 57):



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          R (208, 29):
            type (208, 1): 02 (compressed, lsb of y is 0)
            x (209, 28):
              ca bf a2 0d 82 ae 3e 25 a3 8c 9c dd 2e cf 94 9f
              cc 7c 7f d9 d8 83 89 f5 08 f7 aa bb
            s (237, 28):
              5b ef 21 bd 7a 2e 79 6c c7 de 01 af b1 93 35 5b
              e2 f5 88 19 76 70 e4 ae 09 cf 3b ee


     Figure 5: Example of parsed IEEE 1609.2 v2 signed data structure

Authors' Addresses

   Arnaud Kaiser
   IRT SystemX
   8 avenue de la Vauve
   91120 Palaiseau
   France

   EMail: arnaud.kaiser@irt-systemx.fr


   Houda Labiod
   Telecom Paristech
   46 rue Barrault
   75634 Paris cedex 13
   France

   EMail: houda.labiod@telecom-paristech.fr


   Brigitte Lonc
   Renault
   France

   EMail: brigitte.lonc@renault.com


   Mounira Msahli
   Telecom Paristech
   46 rue Barrault
   Paris  75634
   France

   EMail: mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr





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   Ahmed Serhrouchni
   Telecom ParisTech
   46 rue Barrault
   Paris  75634
   France

   EMail: ahmed.serhrouchni@telecom-paristech.fr











































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