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12
Network Working Group Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft Intuit
Intended status: Standards Track February 06, 2016
Expires: August 9, 2016
TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01
Abstract
Fake public-key certificates are an ongoing problem for users of TLS.
Several solutions have been proposed, but none is currently in wide
use. This document proposes to extend TLS with opaque tickets,
similar to those being used for TLS session resumption, as a way to
pin the server's identity. That is, to ensure the client that it is
connecting to the right server even in the presence of corrupt
certificate authorities and fake certificates. The main advantage of
this solution is that no manual management actions are required.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 9, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Initial Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Subsequent Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Indexing the Pins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Message Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Cryptographic Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Pinning Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Pinning Ticket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Pinning Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Protection Key Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Certificate Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3. Certificate Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.4. Disabling Pinning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.5. Server Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.6. Disaster Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Previous Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Comparison: HPKP Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Comparison: TACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Trust on First Use (TOFU) and MITM Attacks . . . . . . . 12
7.2. Pervasive Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.3. Server-Side Error Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.4. Client Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.5. Client-Side Error Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.6. Client Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.1. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01 . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.2. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-00 . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
The weaknesses of the global PKI system are by now widely known.
Essentially, any valid CA may issue a certificate for any
organization without the organization's approval (a misissued or
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"fake" certificate), and use the certificate to impersonate the
organization. There are many attempts to resolve these weaknesses,
including Certificate Transparency (CT) [RFC6962], HTTP Public Key
Pinning (HPKP) [RFC7469], and TACK [I-D.perrin-tls-tack]. CT
requires cooperation of a large portion of the hundreds of extant
certificate authorities (CAs) before it can be used "for real", in
enforcing mode. It is noted that the relevant industry forum (CA/
Browser Forum) is indeed pushing for such extensive adoption. TACK
has some similarities to the current proposal, but work on it seems
to have stalled. Section 6.2 compares our proposal to TACK. HPKP is
a standard, but so far has proven hard to deploy (see Section 6.1).
This proposal augments these mechanisms with a much easier to
implement and deploy solution for server identity pinning, by reusing
some of the mechanisms behind TLS session resumption.
When a client first connects to a server, the server responds with a
ticket and a committed lifetime. The ticket is modeled on the
session resumption ticket, but is distinct from it. Specifically,
the ticket acts as a "second factor" for proving the server's
identity; the ticket does not authenticate the client. The committed
lifetime indicates for how long the server promises to retain the
server-side ticket-encryption key, which allows it to complete the
protocol exchange correctly and prove its identity. The committed
lifetime is typically on the order of weeks or months. We follow the
Trust On First Use (TOFU) model, in that the first server
authentication is only based on PKI certificate validation, but for
any follow-on sessions, the client is further ensuring the server's
identity based on the server's ability to decrypt the ticket and
complete the handshake correctly.
This version of the draft only discusses TLS 1.3. We believe that
the idea can also be back-fitted into earlier versions of the
protocol.
The main advantages of this protocol over earlier pinning solutions
are:
- The protocol is at the TLS level, and as a result is not
restricted to HTTP at the application level.
- Once a single parameter is configured (the ticket secret's
lifetime), operation is fully automated. The server administrator
need not bother with the management of backup certificates or
explicit pins.
- For server clusters, we reuse the existing [RFC5077]
infrastructure where it exists.
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- Pinning errors, presumably resulting from MITM attacks, can be
detected both by the client and the server. This allows for
server-side detection of MITM attacks using large-scale analytics.
A note on terminology: unlike other solutions in this space, we do
not do "certificate pinning" (or "public key pinning"), since the
protocol is oblivious to the server's certificate. We prefer the
term "server identity pinning" for this new solution.
1.1. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Protocol Overview
The protocol consists of two phases: the first time a particular
client connects to a server, and subsequent connections.
This protocol supports full TLS handshakes, as well as 0-RTT
handshakes. Below we present it in the context of a full handshake,
but behavior in 0-RTT handshakes should be identical.
The preshared key (PSK) variant of TLS 1.3 is orthogonal to this
protocol. A TLS session can be established using PKI and a pinning
ticket, and later resumed with PSK. The PSK handshake MUST NOT
include the extension defined here.
2.1. Initial Connection
When a client first connects to a server, it requests a pinning
ticket by sending an empty PinningTicket extension, and receives it
as part of the server's first response, in the returned PinningTicket
extension.
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Client Server
ClientHello
+ key_share
+ PinningTicket -------->
ServerHello
+ key_share
{EncryptedExtensions
+ PinningTicket}
{ServerConfiguration*}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateRequest*}
{CertificateVerify*}
<-------- {Finished}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
* Indicates optional or situation-dependent
messages that are not always sent.
{} Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from the ephemeral secret.
[] Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from the master secret.
The server computes a pinning_secret value (Section 4.1) in order to
generate the ticket. When the connection setup is complete, the
client computes the same pinning_secret value and saves it locally,
together with the received ticket.
The client SHOULD cache the ticket and the pinning_secret for the
lifetime received from the server. The client MUST forget these
values at the end of this duration.
The returned ticket is sent as a ServerHello protected extension, and
MUST NOT be sent as part of a HelloRetryRequest.
2.2. Subsequent Connections
When the client initiates a connection to a server it has previously
seen (see Section 2.3 on identifying servers and origins), it SHOULD
send the pinning ticket for that server.
The server MUST extract the original pinning_secret from the ticket
and MUST respond with a PinningTicket extension, which includes:
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- A proof that the server can understand the ticket that was sent by
the client; this proof also binds the pinning ticket to the
server's (current) public key. The proof is MANDATORY if a ticket
was sent by the client.
- A fresh pinning ticket. The main reason for refreshing the ticket
on each connection is privacy: to avoid the ticket serving as a
fixed client identifier. It is RECOMMENDED to include a fresh
ticket with each response.
If the server cannot validate the ticket, that might indicate an
earlier MITM attack on this client. The server MUST then abort the
connection with a handshake_failure alert, and SHOULD log this
failure.
The client MUST verify the proof, and if it fails to do so, MUST
issue a handshake_failure alert and abort the connection (see also
Section 7.5). When the connection is successfully set up, the client
SHOULD store the new ticket along with the corresponding
pinning_secret.
Although this is an extension, if the client already has a ticket for
a server, the client MUST interpret a missing PinningTicket extension
in the server's response as an attack, because of the server's prior
commitment to respect the ticket. The client MUST abort the
connection in this case. See also Section 5.4 on ramping down
support for this extension.
2.3. Indexing the Pins
Each pin is associated with a host name, protocol (TLS or DTLS) and
port number. In other words, the pin for port TCP/443 may be
different from that for DTLS or from the pin for port TCP/8443. The
host name MUST be the value sent inside the Server Name Indication
(SNI) extension. This definition is similar to a Web Origin
[RFC6454], but does not assume the existence of a URL.
IP addresses are ephemeral and forbidden in SNI and therefore Pins
MUST NOT be associated with IP addresses.
3. Message Definitions
This section defines the format of the PinningTicket extension. We
follow the message notation of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].
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opaque pinning_ticket<0..2^16-1>;
opaque pinning_proof<0..2^8-1>;
struct {
select (Role) {
case client:
pinning_ticket ticket<0..2^16-1>; //omitted on 1st connection
case server:
pinning_proof proof<0..2^8-1>; //no proof on 1st connection
pinning_ticket ticket<0..2^16-1>; //omitted on ramp down
uint32 lifetime;
}
} PinningTicketExtension;
ticket a pinning ticket sent by the client or returned by the
server. The ticket is opaque to the client. The extension MUST
contain exactly 0 or 1 tickets.
proof a demonstration by the server that it understands the ticket
and therefore that it is in possession of the secret that was used
to generate it originally. The proof is further bound to the
server's public key to prevent some MITM attacks. The extension
MUST contain exactly 0 or 1 proofs.
lifetime the duration (in seconds) that the server commits to accept
the newly offered ticket in the future. This period MUST be at
least 604800 (one week).
4. Cryptographic Operations
This section provides details on the cryptographic operations
performed by the protocol peers.
4.1. Pinning Secret
On each connection that includes the PinningTicket extension, both
peers derive the the value pinning_secret from the shared Diffie
Hellman secret. They compute:
pinning_secret = HKDF(xSS, xES, "pinning secret", L)
using the notation of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], sec. Key Schedule. This
secret is used by the server to generate the new ticket that it
returns to the client.
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4.2. Pinning Ticket
The pinning ticket's format is not specified by this document, but it
MUST be encrypted and integrity-protected using a long-term pinning-
ticket protection key. The server MUST rotate the protection key
periodically, and therefore the ticket MUST contain a protection key
ID or serial number. The ticket MUST allow the server to recover the
pinning_secret value, and MAY include additional information.
As noted in Section 5.1, if the server is actually a cluster of
machines, the protection key MUST be synchronized between them. An
easy way to do it is to derive it from the session-ticket protection
key, which is already synchronized. For example:
pinning_protection_key = HKDF(0, resumption_protection_key,
"pinning protection", L)
4.3. Pinning Proof
The proof sent by the server consists of this value:
proof = HMAC(original_pinning_secret, "pinning proof" + '\0' +
client.random + server.random + Hash(server_public_key))
where HMAC [RFC2104] uses the Hash algorithm for the handshake, and
the same hash is also used over the server's public key.
5. Operational Considerations
The main motivation behind the current protocol is to enable identity
pinning without the need for manual operations. Manual operations
are susceptible to human error and in the case of public key pinning,
can easily result in "server bricking": the server becoming
inaccessible to some or all of its users.
5.1. Protection Key Synchronization
The only operational requirement when deploying this protocol is that
if the server is part of a cluster, protection keys (the keys used to
encrypt tickets) MUST be synchronized between all cluster members.
The protocol is designed so that if resumption ticket protection keys
[RFC5077] are already synchronized between cluster members, nothing
more needs to be done.
Moreover, synchronization does not need to be instantaneous, e.g.
protection keys can be distributed a few minutes or hours in advance
of their rollover.
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5.2. Certificate Renewal
The protocol ensures that the client will continue speaking to the
correct server even when the server's certificate is renewed. In
this sense, we are not "pinning certificates" and the protocol should
more precisely be called "server identity pinning".
5.3. Certificate Revocation
The protocol is orthogonal to certificate validation, in the sense
that, if the server's certificate has been revoked or is invalid for
some other reason, the client MUST refuse to connect to it.
5.4. Disabling Pinning
A server implementing this protocol MUST have a "ramp down" mode of
operation where:
- The server continues to accept valid pinning tickets and responds
correctly with a proof.
- The server does not send back a new pinning ticket.
After a while no clients will hold valid tickets any more and the
feature may be disabled.
5.5. Server Compromise
If a server compromise is detected, the pinning secret MUST be
rotated immediately, but the server MUST still accept valid tickets
that use the old, compromised key. Clients who still hold old
pinning tickets will remain vulnerable to MITM attacks, but those
that connect to the correct server will immediately receive new
tickets.
5.6. Disaster Recovery
All web servers in production need to be backed up, so that they can
be recovered if a disaster (including a malicious activity) ever
wipes them out. Backup typically includes the certificate and its
private key, which must be backed up securely. The pinning secret,
including earlier versions that are still being accepted, must be
backed up regularly. However since it is only used as an
authentication second factor, it does not require the same level of
confidentiality as the server's private key.
Readers should note that [RFC5077] session resumption keys are more
security sensitive, and should normally not be backed up but rather
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treated as ephemeral keys. Even when servers derive pinning secrets
from resumption keys (Section 4.1), they MUST NOT back up resumption
keys.
6. Previous Work
This section compares ticket pinning to two earlier proposals, HPKP
and TACK.
6.1. Comparison: HPKP Deployment
The current IETF standard for pinning the identity of web servers is
the Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP, or HPKP [RFC7469].
Unfortunately HPKP has not seen wide deployment yet. This may simply
be due to inertia, but we believe the main reason is the onerous
manual certificate management which is needed to implement HPKP for
enterprise servers. The penalty for making mistakes (e.g. being too
early or too late to deploy new pins) is often bricking the server
for some clients.
To demonstrate this point, we present an analysis of what it would
take to deploy HPKP for a security-sensitive Web server.
1. Pin only end-entity certificates. Pinning an intermediate
certificate means that the enterprise is at risk if the CA makes
sudden operational changes. Pinning the root certificate is
useless: it still allows every "brand" (sub-CA) to issue a fake
certificate for the servers.
2. Make sure the default reminder period from the certificate
management system is long, e.g. 3 months. This is assuming a pin
period ("max age") of 1 month.
3. Issue two certificates with the same validity period, the main
and a backup one.
4. Once we get the expiration reminder, issue two new certificates
and install the new "main" certificate on servers. Change the
HPKP header to send the old main certificate as the main pin
(actually, what is sent is the certificate's SPKI), the new main
certificate as the backup, and the new backup certificate as a
secondary backup (in case the new main certificate gets
compromised). This transition period must be at least one month,
so as not to break clients who still pin to the old main
certificate.
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5. Shortly before expiration, change the HPKP header again to send
the new main certificate's SPKI as the main pin and the new
backup certificate as the backup pin.
To summarize:
+-------------------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| Period | Main server | Backup pin | Secondary |
| | certificate | | backup pin |
+-------------------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| Regular operation: | Old main | Old backup | |
| before rotation | certificate | certificate | |
| | | | |
| >1 month before | Old main | New main | New backup |
| expiration of old | certificate | certificate | certificate |
| certificates | | | |
| | | | |
| Shortly before | New main | New backup | |
| expiration but not | certificate | certificate | |
| earlier than the | | | |
| previous change + 1 | | | |
| month | | | |
| | | | |
| Regular operation: | New main | New backup | |
| after rotation | certificate | certificate | |
+-------------------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
The above assumes that public keys are normally associated with
certificates, that is, the certificate is issued shortly after the
public key is generated. This is true for many enterprise
deployment, where certificates are managed by certificate management
applications or directly with the CA, and there is no facility for
secure and resilient long-term storage of public (and private) keys.
HPKP is easier to deploy securely where such facilities do exist.
6.2. Comparison: TACK
Compared with HPKP, TACK [I-D.perrin-tls-tack] is a lot more similar
to the current draft. It can even be argued that this document is a
symmetric-cryptography variant of TACK. That said, there are still a
few significant differences:
- Probably the most important difference is that with TACK,
validation of the server certificate is no longer required, and in
fact TACK specifies it as a "MAY" requirement (Sec. 5.3). With
ticket pinning, certificate validation by the client remains a
MUST requirement, and the ticket acts only as a second factor. If
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the pinning secret is compromised, the server's security is not
immediately at risk.
- Both TACK and the current draft are mostly orthogonal to the
server certificate as far as their life cycle, and so both can be
deployed with no manual steps.
- TACK uses ECDSA to sign the server's public key. This allows
cooperating clients to share server assertions between themselves.
This is an optional TACK feature, one that cannot be done with
pinning tickets.
- TACK allows multiple servers to share its public keys. Such
sharing is disallowed by the current document.
- TACK does not allow the server to track a particular client, and
so has better privacy properties than the current draft.
- TACK has an interesting way to determine the pin's lifetime,
setting it to the time period since the pin was first observed,
with a hard upper bound of 30 days. The current draft makes the
lifetime explicit, which may be more flexible to deploy. For
example, Web sites which are only visited rarely by users may opt
for a longer period than other sites that expect users to visit on
a daily basis.
7. Security Considerations
This section reviews several security aspects related to the proposed
extension.
7.1. Trust on First Use (TOFU) and MITM Attacks
This protocol is a "trust on first use" protocol. If a client
initially connects to the "right" server, it will be protected
against MITM attackers for the lifetime of each received ticket. If
it connects regularly (depending of course on the server-selected
lifetime), it will stay constantly protected against fake
certificates.
However if it initially connects to an attacker, subsequent
connections to the "right" server will fail. Server operators might
want to advise clients on how to remove corrupted pins, once such
large scale attacks are detected and remediated.
The protocol is designed so that it is not vulnerable to an active
MITM attacker who has real-time access to the original server. The
pinning proof includes a hash of the server's public key, to ensure
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the client that the proof was in fact generated by the server with
which it is initiating the connection.
7.2. Pervasive Monitoring
Some organizations, and even some countries perform pervasive
monitoring on their constituents [RFC7258]. This often takes the
form of SSL proxies. Because of the TOFU property, this protocol
does not provide any security in such cases.
7.3. Server-Side Error Detection
Uniquely, this protocol allows the server to detect clients that
present incorrect tickets and therefore can be assumed to be victims
of a MITM attack. Server operators can use such cases as indications
of ongoing attacks, similarly to fake certificate attacks that took
place in a few countries in the past.
7.4. Client Policy
Like it or not, some clients are normally deployed behind an SSL
proxy. Similarly to [RFC7469], it is acceptable to allow pinning to
be disabled for some hosts according to local policy. For example, a
UA MAY disable pinning for hosts whose validated certificate chain
terminates at a user-defined trust anchor, rather than a trust anchor
built-in to the UA (or underlying platform). Moreover, a client MAY
accept an empty PinningTicket extension from such hosts as a valid
response.
7.5. Client-Side Error Behavior
When a client receives an incorrect or empty PinningTicket from a
pinned server, it MUST abort the handshake and MUST NOT retry with no
PinningTicket in the request. Doing otherwise would expose the
client to trivial fallback attacks, similar to those described in
[RFC7507].
This rule can however have negative affects on clients that move from
behind SSL proxies into the open Internet. Therefore, browser and
library vendors MUST provide a documented way to remove stored pins.
7.6. Client Privacy
This protocol is designed so that an external attacker cannot
correlate between different requests of a single client, provided the
client requests and receives a fresh ticket upon each connection.
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On the other hand, the server to which the client is connecting can
easily track the client. This may be an issue when the client
expects to connect to the server (e.g., a mail server) with multiple
identities. Implementations SHOULD allow the user to opt out of
pinning, either in general or for particular servers.
8. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to allocate a TicketPinning extension value in the
TLS ExtensionType Registry.
No registries are defined by this document.
9. Acknowledgements
The original idea behind this proposal was published in [Oreo] by
Moty Yung, Benny Pinkas and Omer Berkman. The current protocol is
but a distant relative of the original Oreo protocol, and any errors
are the draft author's alone.
I would like to thank Dave Garrett, Daniel Kahn Gillmor and Yoav Nir
for their comments on this draft.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11 (work in progress),
December 2015.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI
10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
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10.2. Informative References
[I-D.perrin-tls-tack]
Marlinspike, M., "Trust Assertions for Certificate Keys",
draft-perrin-tls-tack-02 (work in progress), January 2013.
[Oreo] Berkman, O., Pinkas, B., and M. Yung, "Firm Grip
Handshakes: A Tool for Bidirectional Vouching", Cryptology
and Network Security, pp. 142-157 , 2012.
[RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454, DOI
10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>.
[RFC6962] Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962>.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
[RFC7469] Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning
Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469, April
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7469>.
[RFC7507] Moeller, B. and A. Langley, "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher
Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
Attacks", RFC 7507, DOI 10.17487/RFC7507, April 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7507>.
Sheffer Expires August 9, 2016 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Pinning Tickets February 2016
Appendix A. Document History
A.1. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01
- Corrected the notation for variable-sized vectors.
- Added a section on disaster recovery and backup.
- Added a section on privacy.
- Clarified the assumptions behind the HPKP procedure in the
comparison section.
- Added a definition of pin indexing (origin).
- Adjusted to the latest TLS 1.3 notation.
A.2. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-00
Initial version.
Author's Address
Yaron Sheffer
Intuit
EMail: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com
Sheffer Expires August 9, 2016 [Page 16]
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