[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

Network Working Group                                         Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft                                                    Intuit
Intended status: Standards Track                           July 08, 2016
Expires: January 9, 2017


                TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
                  draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-02

Abstract

   Fake public-key certificates are an ongoing problem for users of TLS.
   Several solutions have been proposed, but none is currently in wide
   use.  This document proposes to extend TLS with opaque tickets,
   similar to those being used for TLS session resumption, as a way to
   pin the server's identity.  That is, to ensure the client that it is
   connecting to the right server even in the presence of corrupt
   certificate authorities and fake certificates.  The main advantage of
   this solution is that no manual management actions are required.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Initial Connection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Subsequent Connections  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Indexing the Pins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Message Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Cryptographic Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Pinning Secret  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Pinning Ticket  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Pinning Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Protection Key Synchronization  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  Ticket Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  Certificate Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.4.  Certificate Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.5.  Disabling Pinning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.6.  Server Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.7.  Disaster Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Previous Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.1.  Comparison: HPKP Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.2.  Comparison: TACK  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.1.  Mint Fork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       7.1.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       7.1.2.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       7.1.3.  Level of Maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       7.1.4.  Coverage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       7.1.5.  Licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       7.1.6.  Contact Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.1.  Trust on First Use (TOFU) and MITM Attacks  . . . . . . .  14
     8.2.  Pervasive Monitoring  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.3.  Server-Side Error Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     8.4.  Client Policy and SSL Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     8.5.  Client-Side Error Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     8.6.  Client Privacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16



Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


   Appendix A.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     A.1.  draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-02 . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     A.2.  draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01 . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     A.3.  draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-00 . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

   The weaknesses of the global PKI system are by now widely known.
   Essentially, any valid CA may issue a certificate for any
   organization without the organization's approval (a misissued or
   "fake" certificate), and use the certificate to impersonate the
   organization.  There are many attempts to resolve these weaknesses,
   including Certificate Transparency (CT) [RFC6962], HTTP Public Key
   Pinning (HPKP) [RFC7469], and TACK [I-D.perrin-tls-tack].  CT
   requires cooperation of a large portion of the hundreds of extant
   certificate authorities (CAs) before it can be used "for real", in
   enforcing mode.  It is noted that the relevant industry forum (CA/
   Browser Forum) is indeed pushing for such extensive adoption.  TACK
   has some similarities to the current proposal, but work on it seems
   to have stalled.  Section 6.2 compares our proposal to TACK.  HPKP is
   a standard, but so far has proven hard to deploy (see Section 6.1).
   This proposal augments these mechanisms with a much easier to
   implement and deploy solution for server identity pinning, by reusing
   some of the mechanisms behind TLS session resumption.

   When a client first connects to a server, the server responds with a
   ticket and a committed lifetime.  The ticket is modeled on the
   session resumption ticket, but is distinct from it.  Specifically,
   the ticket acts as a "second factor" for proving the server's
   identity; the ticket does not authenticate the client.  The committed
   lifetime indicates for how long the server promises to retain the
   server-side ticket-encryption key, which allows it to complete the
   protocol exchange correctly and prove its identity.  The committed
   lifetime is typically on the order of weeks or months.  We follow the
   Trust On First Use (TOFU) model, in that the first server
   authentication is only based on PKI certificate validation, but for
   any follow-on sessions, the client is further ensuring the server's
   identity based on the server's ability to decrypt the ticket and
   complete the handshake correctly.

   This version of the draft only discusses TLS 1.3.  We believe that
   the idea can also be back-fitted into earlier versions of the
   protocol.

   The main advantages of this protocol over earlier pinning solutions
   are:




Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


   -  The protocol is at the TLS level, and as a result is not
      restricted to HTTP at the application level.

   -  Once a single parameter is configured (the ticket secret's
      lifetime), operation is fully automated.  The server administrator
      need not bother with the management of backup certificates or
      explicit pins.

   -  For server clusters, we reuse the existing [RFC5077]
      infrastructure where it exists.

   -  Pinning errors, presumably resulting from MITM attacks, can be
      detected both by the client and the server.  This allows for
      server-side detection of MITM attacks using large-scale analytics.

   A note on terminology: unlike other solutions in this space, we do
   not do "certificate pinning" (or "public key pinning"), since the
   protocol is oblivious to the server's certificate.  We prefer the
   term "server identity pinning" for this new solution.

1.1.  Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Protocol Overview

   The protocol consists of two phases: the first time a particular
   client connects to a server, and subsequent connections.

   This protocol supports full TLS handshakes, as well as 0-RTT
   handshakes.  Below we present it in the context of a full handshake,
   but behavior in 0-RTT handshakes should be identical.

   The preshared key (PSK) variant of TLS 1.3 is orthogonal to this
   protocol.  A TLS session can be established using PKI and a pinning
   ticket, and later resumed with PSK.  The PSK handshake MUST NOT
   include the extension defined here.

2.1.  Initial Connection

   When a client first connects to a server, it requests a pinning
   ticket by sending an empty PinningTicket extension, and receives it
   as part of the server's first response, in the returned PinningTicket
   extension.





Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


    Client                                               Server

    ClientHello
      + key_share
      + PinningTicket         -------->
                                                    ServerHello
                                                    + key_share
                                          {EncryptedExtensions
                                               + PinningTicket}
                                         {ServerConfiguration*}
                                                 {Certificate*}
                                          {CertificateRequest*}
                                           {CertificateVerify*}
                              <--------              {Finished}
    {Certificate*}
    {CertificateVerify*}
    {Finished}                -------->
    [Application Data]        <------->      [Application Data]

           *  Indicates optional or situation-dependent
              messages that are not always sent.

           {} Indicates messages protected using keys
              derived from the ephemeral secret.

           [] Indicates messages protected using keys
              derived from the master secret.

   The server computes a pinning_secret value (Section 4.1) in order to
   generate the ticket.  When the connection setup is complete, the
   client computes the same pinning_secret value and saves it locally,
   together with the received ticket.

   The client SHOULD cache the ticket and the pinning_secret for the
   lifetime received from the server.  The client MUST forget these
   values at the end of this duration.

   The returned ticket is sent as part of the ServerHello encrypted
   extensions, and MUST NOT be sent as part of a HelloRetryRequest.

2.2.  Subsequent Connections

   When the client initiates a connection to a server it has previously
   seen (see Section 2.3 on identifying servers), it SHOULD send the
   pinning ticket for that server.

   The server MUST extract the original pinning_secret from the ticket
   and MUST respond with a PinningTicket extension, which includes:



Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


   -  A proof that the server can understand the ticket that was sent by
      the client; this proof also binds the pinning ticket to the
      server's (current) public key.  The proof is MANDATORY if a ticket
      was sent by the client.

   -  A fresh pinning ticket.  The main reason for refreshing the ticket
      on each connection is privacy: to avoid the ticket serving as a
      fixed client identifier.  It is RECOMMENDED to include a fresh
      ticket with each response.

   If the server cannot validate the ticket, that might indicate an
   earlier MITM attack on this client.  The server MUST then abort the
   connection with a handshake_failure alert, and SHOULD log this
   failure.

   The client MUST verify the proof, and if it fails to do so, MUST
   issue a handshake_failure alert and abort the connection (see also
   Section 8.5).  When the connection is successfully set up, i.e. after
   the Finished message is verified, the client SHOULD store the new
   ticket along with the corresponding pinning_secret.

   Although this is an extension, if the client already has a ticket for
   a server, the client MUST interpret a missing PinningTicket extension
   in the server's response as an attack, because of the server's prior
   commitment to respect the ticket.  The client MUST abort the
   connection in this case.  See also Section 5.5 on ramping down
   support for this extension.

2.3.  Indexing the Pins

   Each pin is associated with a host name, protocol (TLS or DTLS) and
   port number.  In other words, the pin for port TCP/443 may be
   different from that for DTLS or from the pin for port TCP/8443.  The
   host name MUST be the value sent inside the Server Name Indication
   (SNI) extension.  This definition is similar to a Web Origin
   [RFC6454], but does not assume the existence of a URL.

   IP addresses are ephemeral and forbidden in SNI and therefore Pins
   MUST NOT be associated with IP addresses.

3.  Message Definitions

   This section defines the format of the PinningTicket extension.  We
   follow the message notation of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].







Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


    opaque pinning_ticket<0..2^16-1>;

    opaque pinning_proof<0..2^8-1>;

    struct {
      select (Role) {
      case client:
          uint16 ticket_len; //zero if no ticket
          pinning_ticket ticket<0..2^16-1>; //omitted on 1st connection

        case server:
          uint16 proof_len; //zero if no proof
          pinning_proof proof<0..2^8-1>; //no proof on 1st connection
          uint16 ticket_len; //zero if no ticket
          pinning_ticket ticket<0..2^16-1>; //omitted on ramp down
          uint32 lifetime;
      }
   } PinningTicketExtension;

   ticket  a pinning ticket sent by the client or returned by the
      server.  The ticket is opaque to the client.  The extension MUST
      contain exactly 0 or 1 tickets.

   proof  a demonstration by the server that it understands the ticket
      and therefore that it is in possession of the secret that was used
      to generate it originally.  The proof is further bound to the
      server's public key to prevent some MITM attacks.  The extension
      MUST contain exactly 0 or 1 proofs.

   ticket_len, proof_len  the length in octet of the ticket or,
      respectively, the proof.  The length values are each 2 bytes, in
      network order.

   lifetime  the duration (in seconds) that the server commits to accept
      the newly offered ticket in the future.

4.  Cryptographic Operations

   This section provides details on the cryptographic operations
   performed by the protocol peers.

4.1.  Pinning Secret

   On each connection that includes the PinningTicket extension, both
   peers derive the the value pinning_secret from the shared Diffie
   Hellman secret.  They compute:

   pinning_secret = HKDF(xSS + xES, "pinning secret", L)



Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


   using the notation of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], sec.  Key Schedule.  This
   secret is used by the server to generate the new ticket that it
   returns to the client.

   The length of the secret L is determined by the server, and MUST be
   between 16 and 63 octets, inclusive.

4.2.  Pinning Ticket

   The pinning ticket's format is not specified by this document, but it
   MUST be encrypted and integrity-protected using a long-term pinning-
   ticket protection key.  The server MUST rotate the protection key
   periodically, and therefore the ticket MUST contain a protection key
   ID or serial number.  The ticket MUST allow the server to recover the
   pinning_secret value, and MAY include additional information.

   As noted in Section 5.1, if the server is actually a cluster of
   machines, the protection key MUST be synchronized between them.  An
   easy way to do it is to derive it from the session-ticket protection
   key, which is already synchronized.  For example:

   pinning_protection_key = HKDF(resumption_protection_key,
                                 "pinning protection", L)

4.3.  Pinning Proof

   The proof sent by the server consists of this value:

   proof = HMAC(original_pinning_secret, "pinning proof" + crlen +
           client.random + srlen + server.random +
           Hash(server_public_key))

   where HMAC [RFC2104] uses the Hash algorithm for the handshake, and
   the same hash is also used over the server's public key.  The
   server_public_key value is the DER representation of the public key,
   specifically the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure as-is.  The nonce
   lengths crlen and srlen are a single octet each.

5.  Operational Considerations

   The main motivation behind the current protocol is to enable identity
   pinning without the need for manual operations.  Manual operations
   are susceptible to human error and in the case of public key pinning,
   can easily result in "server bricking": the server becoming
   inaccessible to some or all of its users.






Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


5.1.  Protection Key Synchronization

   The only operational requirement when deploying this protocol is that
   if the server is part of a cluster, protection keys (the keys used to
   encrypt tickets) MUST be synchronized between all cluster members.
   The protocol is designed so that if resumption ticket protection keys
   [RFC5077] are already synchronized between cluster members, nothing
   more needs to be done.

   Moreover, synchronization does not need to be instantaneous, e.g.
   protection keys can be distributed a few minutes or hours in advance
   of their rollover.

   Misconfiguration can lead to the server's clock being off by a large
   amount of time.  Therefore we recommend never to automatically delete
   protection keys, even when they are long expired.

5.2.  Ticket Lifetime

   The lifetime of the ticket is a commitment by the server to retain
   the ticket's corresponding protection key for this duration, so that
   the server can prove to the client that it knows the secret embedded
   in the ticket.  For production systems, the lifetime SHOULD be
   between 7 and 30 days.

5.3.  Certificate Renewal

   The protocol ensures that the client will continue speaking to the
   correct server even when the server's certificate is renewed.  In
   this sense, we are not "pinning certificates" and the protocol should
   more precisely be called "server identity pinning".

5.4.  Certificate Revocation

   The protocol is orthogonal to certificate validation, in the sense
   that, if the server's certificate has been revoked or is invalid for
   some other reason, the client MUST refuse to connect to it.

5.5.  Disabling Pinning

   A server implementing this protocol MUST have a "ramp down" mode of
   operation where:

   -  The server continues to accept valid pinning tickets and responds
      correctly with a proof.

   -  The server does not send back a new pinning ticket.




Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


   After a while no clients will hold valid tickets any more and the
   feature may be disabled.

5.6.  Server Compromise

   If a server compromise is detected, the pinning secret MUST be
   rotated immediately, but the server MUST still accept valid tickets
   that use the old, compromised key.  Clients that still hold old
   pinning tickets will remain vulnerable to MITM attacks, but those
   that connect to the correct server will immediately receive new
   tickets.

5.7.  Disaster Recovery

   All web servers in production need to be backed up, so that they can
   be recovered if a disaster (including a malicious activity) ever
   wipes them out.  Backup typically includes the certificate and its
   private key, which must be backed up securely.  The pinning secret,
   including earlier versions that are still being accepted, must be
   backed up regularly.  However since it is only used as an
   authentication second factor, it does not require the same level of
   confidentiality as the server's private key.

   Readers should note that [RFC5077] session resumption keys are more
   security sensitive, and should normally not be backed up but rather
   treated as ephemeral keys.  Even when servers derive pinning secrets
   from resumption keys (Section 4.1), they MUST NOT back up resumption
   keys.

6.  Previous Work

   This section compares ticket pinning to two earlier proposals, HPKP
   and TACK.

6.1.  Comparison: HPKP Deployment

   The current IETF standard for pinning the identity of web servers is
   the Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP, or HPKP [RFC7469].
   Unfortunately HPKP has not seen wide deployment yet.  As of March
   2016, the number of servers using HPKP was less than 3000 [Netcraft].
   This may simply be due to inertia, but we believe the main reason is
   the onerous manual certificate management which is needed to
   implement HPKP for enterprise servers.  The penalty for making
   mistakes (e.g. being too early or too late to deploy new pins) is
   having the server become unusable for some of the clients.

   To demonstrate this point, we present a list of the steps involved in
   deploying HPKP on a security-sensitive Web server.



Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017               [Page 10]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


   1.   Generate two public/private key-pairs on a computer that is not
        the Live server.  The second one is the "backup1" key-pair.

        "openssl genrsa -out "example.com.key" 2048;"

        "openssl genrsa -out "example.com.backup1.key" 2048;"

   2.   Generate hashes for both of the public keys.  These will be used
        in the HPKP header:

        "openssl rsa -in "example.com.key" -outform der -pubout |
        openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | openssl enc -base64"

        "openssl rsa -in "example.com.backup1.key" -outform der
        -pubout | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | openssl enc -base64"

   3.   Generate a single CSR (Certificate Signing Request) for the
        first key-pair, where you include the domain name in the CN
        (Common Name) field:

        "openssl req -new -subj "/C=GB/ST=Area/L=Town/O=Company/
        CN=example.com" -key "example.com.key" -out "example.com.csr";"

   4.   Send this CSR to the CA (Certificate Authority), and go though
        the dance to prove you own the domain.  The CA will give you
        back a single certificate that will typically expire within a
        year or two.

   5.   On the Live server, upload and setup the first key-pair (and its
        certificate).  At this point you can add the "Public-Key-Pins"
        header, using the two hashes you created in step 2.

        Note that only the first key-pair has been uploaded to the
        server so far.

   6.   Store the second (backup1) key-pair somewhere safe, probably
        somewhere encrypted like a password manager.  It won't expire,
        as it's just a key-pair, it just needs to be ready for when you
        need to get your next certificate.

   7.   Time passes... probably just under a year (if waiting for a
        certificate to expire), or maybe sooner if you find that your
        server has been compromised and you need to replace the key-pair
        and certificate.

   8.   Create a new CSR (Certificate Signing Request) using the
        "backup1" key-pair, and get a new certificate from your CA.




Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017               [Page 11]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


   9.   Generate a new backup key-pair (backup2), get its hash, and
        store it in a safe place (again, not on the Live server).

   10.  Replace your old certificate and old key-pair, and update the
        "Public-Key-Pins" header to remove the old hash, and add the new
        "backup2" key-pair.

   Note that in the above steps, both the certificate issuance as well
   as the storage of the backup key pair involve manual steps.  Even
   with an automated CA that runs the ACME protocol, key backup would be
   a challenge to automate.

6.2.  Comparison: TACK

   Compared with HPKP, TACK [I-D.perrin-tls-tack] is a lot more similar
   to the current draft.  It can even be argued that this document is a
   symmetric-cryptography variant of TACK.  That said, there are still a
   few significant differences:

   -  Probably the most important difference is that with TACK,
      validation of the server certificate is no longer required, and in
      fact TACK specifies it as a "MAY" requirement (Sec. 5.3).  With
      ticket pinning, certificate validation by the client remains a
      MUST requirement, and the ticket acts only as a second factor.  If
      the pinning secret is compromised, the server's security is not
      immediately at risk.

   -  Both TACK and the current draft are mostly orthogonal to the
      server certificate as far as their life cycle, and so both can be
      deployed with no manual steps.

   -  TACK uses ECDSA to sign the server's public key.  This allows
      cooperating clients to share server assertions between themselves.
      This is an optional TACK feature, and one that cannot be done with
      pinning tickets.

   -  TACK allows multiple servers to share its public keys.  Such
      sharing is disallowed by the current document.

   -  TACK does not allow the server to track a particular client, and
      so has better privacy properties than the current draft.

   -  TACK has an interesting way to determine the pin's lifetime,
      setting it to the time period since the pin was first observed,
      with a hard upper bound of 30 days.  The current draft makes the
      lifetime explicit, which may be more flexible to deploy.  For
      example, Web sites which are only visited rarely by users may opt




Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017               [Page 12]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


      for a longer period than other sites that expect users to visit on
      a daily basis.

7.  Implementation Status

   [Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication.]

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC6982].
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.

   According to RFC 6982, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
   to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
   running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
   and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
   It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
   they see fit".

7.1.  Mint Fork

7.1.1.  Overview

   A fork of the Mint TLS 1.3 implementation, developed by Yaron Sheffer
   and available at https://github.com/yaronf/mint.

7.1.2.  Description

   This is a fork of the TLS 1.3 implementation, and includes client and
   server code.  In addition to the actual protocol, several utilities
   are provided allowing to manage protection keys on the server side,
   and pinning tickets on the client side.

7.1.3.  Level of Maturity

   This is a prototype.







Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017               [Page 13]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


7.1.4.  Coverage

   The entire protocol is implemented.

7.1.5.  Licensing

   Mint itself and this fork are available under an MIT license.

7.1.6.  Contact Information

   See author details below.

8.  Security Considerations

   This section reviews several security aspects related to the proposed
   extension.

8.1.  Trust on First Use (TOFU) and MITM Attacks

   This protocol is a "trust on first use" protocol.  If a client
   initially connects to the "right" server, it will be protected
   against MITM attackers for the lifetime of each received ticket.  If
   it connects regularly (depending of course on the server-selected
   lifetime), it will stay constantly protected against fake
   certificates.

   However if it initially connects to an attacker, subsequent
   connections to the "right" server will fail.  Server operators might
   want to advise clients on how to remove corrupted pins, once such
   large scale attacks are detected and remediated.

   The protocol is designed so that it is not vulnerable to an active
   MITM attacker who has real-time access to the original server.  The
   pinning proof includes a hash of the server's public key, to ensure
   the client that the proof was in fact generated by the server with
   which it is initiating the connection.

8.2.  Pervasive Monitoring

   Some organizations, and even some countries perform pervasive
   monitoring on their constituents [RFC7258].  This often takes the
   form of always-active SSL proxies.  Because of the TOFU property,
   this protocol does not provide any security in such cases.








Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017               [Page 14]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


8.3.  Server-Side Error Detection

   Uniquely, this protocol allows the server to detect clients that
   present incorrect tickets and therefore can be assumed to be victims
   of a MITM attack.  Server operators can use such cases as indications
   of ongoing attacks, similarly to fake certificate attacks that took
   place in a few countries in the past.

8.4.  Client Policy and SSL Proxies

   Like it or not, some clients are normally deployed behind an SSL
   proxy.  Similarly to [RFC7469], it is acceptable to allow pinning to
   be disabled for some hosts according to local policy.  For example, a
   UA MAY disable pinning for hosts whose validated certificate chain
   terminates at a user-defined trust anchor, rather than a trust anchor
   built-in to the UA (or underlying platform).  Moreover, a client MAY
   accept an empty PinningTicket extension from such hosts as a valid
   response.

8.5.  Client-Side Error Behavior

   When a client receives a malformed or empty PinningTicket extension
   from a pinned server, it MUST abort the handshake and MUST NOT retry
   with no PinningTicket in the request.  Doing otherwise would expose
   the client to trivial fallback attacks, similar to those described in
   [RFC7507].

   This rule can however have negative affects on clients that move from
   behind SSL proxies into the open Internet and vice versa, if the
   advice in Section 8.4 is not followed.  Therefore, we RECOMMEND that
   browser and library vendors provide a documented way to remove stored
   pins.

8.6.  Client Privacy

   This protocol is designed so that an external attacker cannot
   correlate between different requests of a single client, provided the
   client requests and receives a fresh ticket upon each connection.

   On the other hand, the server to which the client is connecting can
   easily track the client.  This may be an issue when the client
   expects to connect to the server (e.g., a mail server) with multiple
   identities.  Implementations SHOULD allow the user to opt out of
   pinning, either in general or for particular servers.







Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017               [Page 15]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


9.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to allocate a TicketPinning extension value in the
   TLS ExtensionType Registry.

   No registries are defined by this document.

10.  Acknowledgements

   The original idea behind this proposal was published in [Oreo] by
   Moty Yung, Benny Pinkas and Omer Berkman.  The current protocol is
   but a distant relative of the original Oreo protocol, and any errors
   are the draft author's alone.

   I would like to thank Dave Garrett, Daniel Kahn Gillmor and Yoav Nir
   for their comments on this draft.  Special thanks to Craig Francis
   for contributing the HPKP deployment script, and to Ralph Holz for
   several fruitful discussions.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
              Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-13 (work in progress),
              May 2016.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5077]  Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
              Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
              January 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.perrin-tls-tack]
              Marlinspike, M., "Trust Assertions for Certificate Keys",
              draft-perrin-tls-tack-02 (work in progress), January 2013.



Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017               [Page 16]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


   [Netcraft]
              Mutton, P., "HTTP Public Key Pinning: You're doing it
              wrong!", March 2016,
              <http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2016/03/30/
              http-public-key-pinning-youre-doing-it-wrong.html>.

   [Oreo]     Berkman, O., Pinkas, B., and M. Yung, "Firm Grip
              Handshakes: A Tool for Bidirectional Vouching", Cryptology
              and Network Security, pp. 142-157 , 2012.

   [RFC6454]  Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>.

   [RFC6962]  Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
              Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962>.

   [RFC6982]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", RFC 6982,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6982, July 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6982>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC7469]  Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning
              Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469, April
              2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7469>.

   [RFC7507]  Moeller, B. and A. Langley, "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher
              Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
              Attacks", RFC 7507, DOI 10.17487/RFC7507, April 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7507>.
















Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017               [Page 17]


Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   July 2016


Appendix A.  Document History

A.1.  draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-02

   -  Added an Implementation Status section.

   -  Added lengths into the extension structure.

   -  Changed the computation of the pinning proof to be more robust.

   -  Clarified requirements on the length of the pinning_secret.

   -  Revamped the HPKP section to be more in line with current
      practices, and added recent statistics on HPKP deployment.

A.2.  draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01

   -  Corrected the notation for variable-sized vectors.

   -  Added a section on disaster recovery and backup.

   -  Added a section on privacy.

   -  Clarified the assumptions behind the HPKP procedure in the
      comparison section.

   -  Added a definition of pin indexing (origin).

   -  Adjusted to the latest TLS 1.3 notation.

A.3.  draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-00

   Initial version.

Author's Address

   Yaron Sheffer
   Intuit

   EMail: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com











Sheffer                  Expires January 9, 2017               [Page 18]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129b, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/