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Versions: (draft-borchert-sidrops-bgpsec-validation-signaling) 00 01 02 03 04 05

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       O. Borchert
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Intended status: Standards Track                                USA NIST
Expires: April 12, 2020                                 October 10, 2019

                   BGPsec Validation State Signaling
              draft-sidrops-bgpsec-validation-signaling-00

Abstract

   This document defines a new BGP non-transitive extended community to
   carry the BGPsec path validation state inside an autonomous system.
   Internal BGP (IBGP) speakers that receive this community string can
   use the embedded BGPsec validation state and configure local policies
   that allow it being used to influence their decision process.  This
   is especially helpful because Section 5 of RFC 8205 specifically
   allows putting BGPsec path validation temporarily on hold.  This
   allows reducing the load of validation particularly from IBGP learned
   routes.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html











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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document. Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Suggested Reading  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  BGPsec Validation State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . .  3
   4. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   6.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     6.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8






















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1.  Introduction

   This document defines a new BGP non-transitive extended community to
   carry the BGPsec path validation state inside an autonomous system.
   Internal BGP (IBGP) speakers that receive this community string can
   use the embedded BGPsec validation state and configure local policies
   that allow it being used to influence their decision process.  This
   is especially helpful because Section 5 of RFC 8205 specifically
   allows putting BGPsec path validation temporarily on hold.  This
   allows reducing the load of validation particularly from IBGP learned
   routes.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Suggested Reading

   It is assumed that the reader understands BGPsec [RFC8205].

3.  BGPsec Validation State Extended Community

   The origin validation state extended community is a non-transitive
   extended community [RFC4360] with the following encoding:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |       0x43    |      TBD      |             Reserved          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                    Reserved                   |validationstate|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   The value of the high-order octet of the extended Type field is 0x43,
   which indicates it is non-transitive.  The value of the low-order
   octet of the extended Type field as assigned by IANA is TBD.  The
   Reserved field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon the receipt of this
   community.  The last octet of the extended community is an unsigned
   integer that gives the BGPsec route's validation state, see [RFC8205]
   and [BORCHERT].






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   It can assume the following values:

   +-------+------------------------------+
   | Value | Meaning                      |
   +-------+------------------------------+
   |   0   | Lookup result = "Unverified" |
   |   1   | Lookup result = "Valid"      |
   |   2   | Lookup result = "Not valid"  |
   +-------+------------------------------+

   If the router is configured to support the extensions defined in this
   document, it SHOULD attach the BGPsec path validation state extended
   community to BGPsec UPDATE messages sent to IBGP peers by mapping the
   validation state in the last octet of the extended community.  A
   receiving BGPsec speaker, in the absence of a validation state set
   based on local RPKI data, SHOULD derive a validation state from the
   last octet of the extended community, if present.

   An implementation SHOULD NOT send more than one instance of the
   BGPsec path validation state extended community.  However, if more
   than one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all
   instances other than the one with the numerically greatest validation
   state value.  If the value received is greater than the largest
   specified value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar
   to attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community
   and logging the error for further analysis.

   By default, implementations MUST drop the BGPsec validation state
   extended community if received from an External BGP (eBGP) peer,
   without processing it further.  Similarly, by default, an
   implementation SHOULD NOT send the community to EBGP peers.  However,
   it SHOULD be possible to configure an implementation to send or
   accept the community when warranted.  An example of a case where the
   community would reasonably be received from, or sent to, an eBGP peer
   is when two adjacent ASes are under control of the same
   administration.  A second example is documented in [SIDR-RPKI].

4. Deployment Considerations

   As specified in (Section 5) of [RFC8205] "a BGPsec speaker MAY
   temporarily defer validation of incoming BGPsec UPDATE messages.  The
   treatment of such BGPsec UPDATE messages, whose validation has been
   deferred, is a matter of local policy".  Furthermore one can envision
   that the operator of a BGPsec router decides to defer BGPsec
   validation learned via IBGP (including a trusted EBGP peer for
   instance controlled by the same operator as lined out in Section 3)
   when already validated by the peer.  The router then will use the
   validation result learned via the community string and apply it the



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   the route.  In case the peer did send the validation state
   unverified, the receiving router SHOULD apply the validation state
   "unverified" and perform BGPsec path validation as described in
   (section 5.2) of [RFC8205].

5.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations such as those described in [RFC4272] continue
   to apply.  Because this document introduces an extended community
   that will generally be used to affect route selection, the analysis
   in Section 4.5 ("Falsification") of [RFC4593] is relevant.  These
   issues are neither new nor unique to the  validation extended
   community.

   The security considerations provided in [RFC8205] apply equally to
   this application of BGPsec path validation.  In addition, this
   document describes a scheme where router A outsources validation to
   some router B.  If this scheme is used, the participating routers
   should have the appropriate trust relationship -- B should trust A
   either because they are under the same administrative control or for
   some other reason (for example, consider [SIDR-RPKI]).  The security
   properties of the TCP connection between the two routers should also
   be considered.  See Section 5.1 of [RFC7454] for advice regarding
   protection of the TCP connection.

6.  IANA Considerations

   IANA shall assign a new value from the "BGP Opaque Extended
   Community" type registry from the non-transitive range, to be called
   "BGPsec Validation State Extended Community".





















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6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
              10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4360]  Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
              Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
              February 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
              RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI
              10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8205]  Lepinski, M., Ed., and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
              Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
              2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.

   [BORCHERT] Borchert, O., Montgomery, D., "BGPsec Validation State
              Unverified", draft-borchert-sidr-bgpsec-validation-state-
              unverified-02, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
              borchert-sidrops-bgpsec-state-unverified-02>


8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI
              10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC4272]  Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
              RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>.

   [RFC4593]  Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
              Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, DOI 10.17487/RFC4593,
              October 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4593>.

   [RFC7454]  Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP Operations
              and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454, DOI 10.17487/RFC7454,
              February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7454>.

   [RFC7606]  Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.



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              Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
              RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.

   [RFC8097]  Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
              Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
              Community", RFC 8097, DOI 10.17487/RFC8097, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8097>.











































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   [SIDR-RPKI] King, T., Kopp, D., Lambrianidis, A., and A. Fenioux,
               "Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-
               Server to Peers", Work in Progress,
               draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-01, January
               2017.

Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to thank P. Mohapatra, K. Patel, J. Scudder,
   D. Ward, and R. Bush for producing [RFC8097], which this document is
   based on.  The authors would also like to acknowledge the valuable
   review and suggestions from K. Sriram on this document.

Authors' Addresses

   Oliver Borchert
   National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, MD  20899
   United States of America

   Email: oliver.borchert@nist.gov



   Doug Montgomery
   National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, MD  20899
   United States of America

   Email: dougm@nist.gov



















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