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TRANS (Public Notary Transparency)                          R. Stradling
Internet-Draft                                           Comodo CA, Ltd.
Intended status: Experimental                                 E. Messeri
Expires: March 4, 2017                                    Google UK Ltd.
                                                         August 31, 2016


            Certificate Transparency: Domain Label Redaction
                     draft-strad-trans-redaction-00

Abstract

   We define a mechanism to allow DNS domain name labels that are
   considered to be private to not appear in public Certificate
   Transparency (CT) logs, while still retaining most of the security
   benefits that accrue from using Certificate Transparency mechanisms.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 4, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Redacting Labels in Precertificates . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  redactedSubjectAltName Certificate Extension  . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Verifying the redactedSubjectAltName extension  . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Reconstructing the TBSCertificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.1.  Avoiding Overly Redacting Domain Name Labels  . . . . . .   5
   8.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.1.  Ensuring Effective Redaction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   Some domain owners regard certain DNS domain name labels within their
   registered domain space as private and security sensitive.  Even
   though these domains are often only accessible within the domain
   owner's private network, it's common for them to be secured using
   publicly trusted Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificates.

   Certificate Transparency [I-D.ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis] describes a
   protocol for publicly logging the existence of TLS server
   certificates as they are issued or observed.  Since each TLS server
   certificate lists the domain names that it is intended to secure,
   private domain name labels within registered domain space could end
   up appearing in CT logs, especially as TLS clients develop policies
   that mandate CT compliance.  This seems like an unfortunate and
   potentially unnecessary privacy leak, because it's the registered
   domain names in each certificate that are of primary interest when
   using CT to look for suspect certificates.

   TODO: Highlight better the differences between registered domains and
   subdomains, referencing the relevant DNS RFCs.

   Section TBD of [I-D.ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis] proposes two mechanisms
   for dealing with this conundrum: wildcard certificates and name-
   constrained intermediate CAs.  However, these mechanisms are
   insufficient to cover all use cases.

   TODO(eranm): Expand on when each of the other mechanisms is suitable
   and when this mechanism may be suitable.




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   We define a domain label redaction mechanism that covers all use
   cases, at the cost of increased implementation complexity.  CAs and
   domain owners should note that there are privacy considerations
   (Section 8) and that TLS clients may apply additional requirements
   (relating to the use of this redaction mechanism) for a certificate
   to be considered compliant.

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Redacting Labels in Precertificates

   When creating a precertificate, the CA MAY include a
   redactedSubjectAltName (Section 4) extension that contains, in a
   redacted form, the same entries that will be included in the
   certificate's subjectAltName extension.  When the
   redactedSubjectAltName extension is present in a precertificate, the
   subjectAltName extension MUST be omitted (even though it MUST be
   present in the corresponding certificate).

   Wildcard "*" labels MUST NOT be redacted, but one or more non-
   wildcard labels in each DNS-ID [RFC6125] can each be replaced with a
   redacted label as follows:

     REDACT(label) = prefix || BASE32(index || _label_hash)
       _label_hash = LABELHASH(keyid_len || keyid || label_len || label)

   "label" is the case-sensitive label to be redacted.

   "prefix" is the "?" character (ASCII value 63).

   "index" is the 1 byte index of a hash function in the CT hash
   algorithm registry (section TBD of [I-D.ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis]).
   The value 255 is reserved.

   "keyid_len" is the 1 byte length of the "keyid".

   "keyid" is the keyIdentifier from the Subject Key Identifier
   extension (section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280]), excluding the ASN.1 OCTET
   STRING tag and length bytes.

   "label_len" is the 1 byte length of the "label".

   "||" denotes concatenation.




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   "BASE32" is the Base 32 Encoding function (section 6 of [RFC4648]).
   Pad characters MUST NOT be appended to the encoded data.

   "LABELHASH" is the hash function identified by "index".

4.  redactedSubjectAltName Certificate Extension

   The redactedSubjectAltName extension is a non-critical extension (OID
   1.3.101.77) that is identical in structure to the subjectAltName
   extension, except that DNS-IDs MAY contain redacted labels
   (Section 3).

   When used, the redactedSubjectAltName extension MUST be present in
   both the precertificate and the corresponding certificate.

   This extension informs TLS clients of the DNS-ID labels that were
   redacted and the degree of redaction, while minimizing the complexity
   of TBSCertificate reconstruction (Section 6).  Hashing the redacted
   labels allows the legitimate domain owner to identify whether or not
   each redacted label correlates to a label they know of.

   TODO: Consider the pros and cons of this 'un'redaction feature.  If
   the cons outweigh the pros, switch to using Andrew Ayer's alternative
   proposal of hashing a random salt and including that salt in an
   extension in the certificate (and not including the salt in the
   precertificate).

   Only DNS-ID labels can be redacted using this mechanism.  However,
   CAs can use Name Constraints (section TBD of
   [I-D.ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis]) to allow DNS domain name labels in
   other subjectAltName entries to not appear in logs.

   TODO: Should we support redaction of SRV-IDs and URI-IDs using this
   mechanism?

5.  Verifying the redactedSubjectAltName extension

   If the redactedSubjectAltName extension is present, TLS clients MUST
   check that the subjectAltName extension is present, that the
   subjectAltName extension contains the same number of entries as the
   redactedSubjectAltName extension, and that each entry in the
   subjectAltName extension has a matching entry at the same position in
   the redactedSubjectAltName extension.  Two entries are matching if
   either:

   o  The two entries are identical; or





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   o  Both entries are DNS-IDs, have the same number of labels, and each
      label in the subjectAltName entry has a matching label at the same
      position in the redactedSubjectAltName entry.  Two labels are
      matching if either:

      *  The two labels are identical; or,

      *  Neither label is "*" and the label from the
         redactedSubjectAltName entry is equal to REDACT(label from
         subjectAltName entry) (Section 3).

   If any of these checks fail, the certificate MUST NOT be considered
   compliant.

6.  Reconstructing the TBSCertificate

   Section TBD of [I-D.ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis] describes how TLS clients
   can reconstruct the TBSCertificate component of a precertificate from
   a certificate, so that associated SCTs may be verified.

   If the redactedSubjectAltName extension (Section 4) is present in the
   certificate, TLS clients MUST also:

   o  Verify the redactedSubjectAltName extension against the
      subjectAltName extension according to Section 5.

   o  Once verified, remove the subjectAltName extension from the
      TBSCertificate.

7.  Security Considerations

7.1.  Avoiding Overly Redacting Domain Name Labels

   Redaction of domain name labels carries the same risks as the use of
   wildcards (e.g., section 7.2 of [RFC6125]).  If the entirety of the
   domain space below the unredacted part of a domain name is not
   registered by a single domain owner (e.g., REDACT(label).com,
   REDACT(label).co.uk and other [Public.Suffix.List] entries), then the
   domain name may be considered by clients to be overly redacted.

   CAs should take care to avoid overly redacting domain names in
   precertificates.  It is expected that monitors will treat
   precertificates that contain overly redacted domain names as
   potentially misissued.  TLS clients MAY consider a certificate to be
   non-compliant if the reconstructed TBSCertificate (Section 6)
   contains any overly redacted domain names.





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8.  Privacy Considerations

8.1.  Ensuring Effective Redaction

   Although the domain label redaction mechanism removes the need for
   private labels to appear in logs, it does not guarantee that this
   will never happen.  Anyone who encounters a certificate could choose
   to submit it to one or more logs, thereby rendering the redaction
   futile.

   Domain owners are advised to take the following steps to minimize the
   likelihood that their private labels will become known outside their
   closed communities:

   o  Avoid registering private labels in public DNS.

   o  Avoid using private labels that are predictable (e.g., "www",
      labels consisting only of numerical digits, etc).  If a label has
      insufficient entropy then redaction will only provide a thin layer
      of obfuscation, because it will be feasible to recover the label
      via a brute-force attack.

   o  Avoid using publicly trusted certificates to secure private domain
      space.

   CAs are advised to carefully consider each request to redact a label.
   When a CA believes that redacting a particular label would be futile,
   we advise rejecting the redaction request.  TLS clients may have
   policies that forbid redaction, so redaction should only be used when
   it's absolutely necessary and likely to be effective.

9.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Andrew Ayer and TBD for their
   valuable contributions.

   A big thank you to Symantec for kindly donating the OID from the
   1.3.101 arc that is used in this document.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis]
              Laurie, B., Langley, A., Kasper, E., Messeri, E., and R.
              Stradling, "Certificate Transparency", draft-ietf-trans-
              rfc6962-bis-18 (work in progress), July 2016.




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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [Public.Suffix.List]
              Mozilla Foundation, "Public Suffix List", 2016,
              <https://publicsuffix.org>.

Authors' Addresses

   Rob Stradling
   Comodo CA, Ltd.

   Email: rob.stradling@comodo.com


   Eran Messeri
   Google UK Ltd.

   Email: eranm@google.com











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