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TLS                                                          N. Sullivan
Internet-Draft                                           Cloudflare Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                          March 13, 2017
Expires: September 14, 2017

                     Exported Authenticators in TLS


   This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   to provide an exportable proof of ownership of a certificate that can
   be transmitted out of band and verified by the other party.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.

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   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Authenticator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  API considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   This document provides a way to authenticate one party of a Transport
   Layer Security (TLS) communication to another using a certificate
   after the session has been established.  This allows both the client
   and server to prove ownership of additional identities at any time
   after the handshake has completed.  This proof of authentication can
   be exported and transmitted out of band from one party to be
   validated by the other party.

   This mechanism is useful in the following situations:

   o  servers that are authoritative for multiple domains the same
      connection but do not have a certificate that is simultaneously
      authoritative for all of them

   o  servers that have resources that require client authentication to
      access and need to request client authentication after the
      connection has started

   o  clients that want to assert ownership over an identity to a server
      after a connection has been established

   This document intends to replace much of the functionality of
   renegotiation in previous versions of TLS.  It has the advantages
   over renegotiation of not requiring additional on-the-wire changes
   during a connection.  For simplicity, only TLS 1.2 and later are

2.  Authenticator

   The authenticator is a structured message that can be exported from
   either party of a TLS connection.  It can be sent out-of-band to the
   other party of a TLS connection to be validated.

   An authenticator message can be constructed by either the client or
   the server given an established TLS connection, a certificate, and a
   corresponding private key.  This authenticator uses the message

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   structures from section 4.4. of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], but different
   parameters.  Also, unlike the Certificate and CertificateRequest
   messages in TLS 1.3, the messages described in this draft are not
   encryped with a handshake key.

   Each Authenticator is computed using a Handshake Context and Finished
   MAC Key derived from the TLS session.  The Handshake Context is
   identical for both parties of the TLS connection, the Finished MAC
   Key is dependent on whether the Authenticator is created by the
   client or the server.

   o  The Handshake Context is an [RFC5705] (for TLS 1.2) or
      [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] exporter value derived using the label
      "authenticator handshake context" and length 64 bytes.

   o  The Finished MAC Key is an exporter value derived using the label
      "server authenticator finished key" or "client authenticator
      finished key", depending on the sender.  The length of this key is
      equal to the length of the output of the hash function negotiated
      in TLS.  For TLS 1.3, it's the hash algorithm of the cipher suite.
      For TLS 1.2, it's the hash algorithm selected for the PRF for AEAD
      ciphers, or the hash algorithm used as the HMAC in non-AEAD

   If the connection is TLS 1.2, the master secret MUST have been
   computed with the extended master secret [RFC7627] to avoid key
   synchronization attacks.

   Certificate  The certificate to be used for authentication and any
      supporting certificates in the chain.

   The certificate message contains an opaque string called
   certificate_request_context which MUST be unique for a given
   connection.  Its format should be defined by the application layer
   protocol and MUST be non-zero length.  For example, it may be a
   randomly chosen identifier used by the higher-level protocol during
   the transport of the Authenticator to the other party.

   CertificateVerify  A signature over the value Hash(Handshake
      Context || Certificate)

   Finished  A HMAC over the value Hash(Handshake Context ||
      Certificate || CertificateVerify) using the hash function from the
      handshake and the Finished MAC Key as a key.

   The certificates used in the Certificate message MUST conform to the
   requirements of a Certificate message in the version of TLS

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   negotiated.  This is described in section 4.2.3. of
   [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] and sections 7.4.2. and 7.4.6. of [RFC5246].

   The exported authenticator message is the concatenation of messages:
   Certificate || CertificateVerify || Finished

3.  API considerations

   TLS implementations supporting the use of exported authenticators
   MUST provide application programming interfaces by which clients and
   servers may request and verify exported authenticator messages.

   Given an established connection, the application should be able to
   obtain an authenticator by providing the following:

   o  certificate_request_context (from 1 to 255 bytes)

   o  valid certificate chain for the connection and associated
      extensions (OCSP, SCT, etc.)

   o  signer (either the private key associated with the certificate, or
      interface to perform private key operation)

   Given an established connection and an exported authenticator
   message, the application should be able to provide the authenticator
   to the connection.  If the Finished and CertificateVerify messages
   verify, the TLS library should return the following:

   o  certificate chain and extensions

   o  certificate_request_context

   In order for the application layer to communicate which certificates
   it will accept, an API should be exposed that returns an array of TLS
   1.3 SignatureScheme objects that corresponds to the signature
   algorithms that the library is willing to validate in an exported
   authenticator message.

4.  Security Considerations

   The Certificate/Verify/Finished pattern intentionally looks like the
   TLS 1.3 pattern which now has been analyzed several times.  In the
   case where the client presents an authenticator to a server, [SIGMAC]
   presents a relevant framework for analysis.

   From a formal security perspective, one drawback of this mechanism is
   that there is no explicit signaling mechanism for one party to
   acknowledge an Authenticator to the party who computed it.  Nothing

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   about the state of the connection is changed when a new Authenticator
   is exported, and the Handshake Context of the TLS connection is
   unchanged after creating or validating an authenticator.  This
   property makes it difficult to formally prove that a server is
   jointly authoritative over multiple certificates, rather than
   individually authoritative on each certificate.

   Another result of the unidirectional nature of Authenticator messages
   is that the view of which certificates the other party is
   authoritative over does not reside in the TLS state machine.  Not
   knowing when the exported authenticator was created or validated at
   the TLS layer also means that assumptions about when the other party
   is considered authoritative can not be determined purely from where
   in the in the TLS record layer it was sent.  A valid authenticator
   can be created at any time during the connection.  If it matters to
   the application whether or not an authenticator was acknowledged
   before or after a particular piece of data, it should be tracked as
   part of the application layer semantics.

5.  Acknowledgements

   Comments on this proposal were provided by Martin Thomson.
   Suggestions for the security considerations section were provided by
   Karthikeyan Bhargavan.

6.  Normative References

              Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19 (work in progress),
              March 2017.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,

   [RFC5705]  Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
              March 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.

   [RFC7627]  Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,
              Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",
              RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,

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   [SIGMAC]   Krawczyk, H., "A Unilateral-to-Mutual Authentication
              Compiler for Key Exchange (with Applications to Client
              Authentication in TLS 1.3)", 2016,

Author's Address

   Nick Sullivan
   Cloudflare Inc.

   Email: nick@cloudflare.com

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