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Versions: (draft-varon-hrpc-methodology) 00 01 02 03 04 05 draft-irtf-hrpc-research

Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group         N. ten Oever
Internet-Draft                                                 Article19
Intended status: Informational                                   C. Cath
Expires: February 28, 2017                     Oxford Internet Institute
                                                         August 27, 2016


           Research into Human Rights Protocol Considerations
                    draft-tenoever-hrpc-research-05

Abstract

   The proliferating convolution of Internet and society increases the
   impact of the Internet on the lives of individuals.  Because of this,
   the design and development of the architecture of the Internet also
   has a growing impact on society.  This has led to an broad
   recognition that human rights [UDHR] [ICCPR] [ICESCR] have a role in
   the development and management of the Internet [HRC2012] [UNGA2013]
   [NETmundial].  It has also been argued that the Internet should be
   strengthened as a human rights enabling environment [Brown].

   This document provides a proposal for a vocabulary to discuss the
   relation between human rights and Internet protocols, an overview of
   the discussion in technical and academic literature and communities,
   a proposal for the mapping of the relation between human rights and
   technical concepts, and a proposal for guidelines for human rights
   considerations, similar to the work done on the guidelines for
   privacy considerations [RFC6973].

   Discussion of this draft at: hrpc@irtf.org //
   https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 28, 2017.



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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Vocabulary used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Research Questions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Literature and Discussion Review  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.1.  Data Sources  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       5.1.1.  Discourse analysis of RFCs  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       5.1.2.  Interviews with members of the IETF community . . . .  15
       5.1.3.  Participant observation in Working Groups . . . . . .  15
     5.2.  Data analysis strategies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       5.2.1.  Identifying qualities of technical concepts that
               relate to human rights  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       5.2.2.  Translation human rights to technical terms . . . . .  17
       5.2.3.  IPv4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       5.2.4.  DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       5.2.5.  HTTP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       5.2.6.  XMPP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       5.2.7.  Peer to Peer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       5.2.8.  Virtual Private Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       5.2.9.  HTTP Status Code 451  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       5.2.10. Middleboxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       5.2.11. DDOS attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     5.3.  Model for developing human rights protocol considerations  39
       5.3.1.  Human rights threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
       5.3.2.  Guidelines for human rights considerations  . . . . .  40
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
   9.  Research Group Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     10.1.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54



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     10.2.  URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68

1.  Introduction

   "There's a freedom about the Internet: As long as we accept the
      rules of sending packets around, we can send packets containing
      anything to anywhere."

   [Berners-Lee]

   This document aims to expose the relation between protocols and human
   rights, propose possible guidelines to protect the Internet as a
   human-rights-enabling environment in future protocol development, in
   a manner similar to the work done for Privacy Considerations in
   [RFC6973], and to increase the awareness in both the human rights
   community and the technical community on the importance of the
   technical workings of the Internet and its impact on human rights.

   Open, secure and reliable connectivity is necessary (although not
   sufficient) to excercise the human rights such as freedom of
   expression and freedom of association, as defined in the Universal
   Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR].  The Internet aims to be a global
   network of networks that provides unfettered connectivity to all
   users at all times and for any content [RFC1958].  This objective of
   stimulating global connectivity contributes to the Internet's role as
   an enabler of human rights.  Next to that, the strong commitment to
   security [RFC1984] [RFC3365] and privacy [RFC6973] [RFC7258] in the
   Internet's architectural design contribute to the strengthening of
   the Internet as a human rights enabling environment.  One could even
   argue that the Internet is not only an enabler of human rights, but
   that human rights lie at the basis of, and are ingrained in, the
   architecture of the network.  Internet connectivity increases the
   capacity for individuals to exercise their rights, the core of the
   Internet, its architectural design is therefore closely intertwined
   with the human rights framework [CathFloridi].  The quintessential
   link between the Internet's architecture and human rights has been
   argued by many.  [Bless] for instance argues that, 'to a certain
   extent, the Internet and its protocols have already facilitated the
   realization of human rights, e.g., the freedom of assembly and
   expression.  In contrast, measures of censorship and pervasive
   surveillance violate fundamental human rights.'  [Denardis15] argues
   that 'Since the first hints of Internet commercialization and
   internationalization, the IETF has supported strong security in
   protocol design and has sometimes served as a force resisting
   protocol-enabled surveillance features.'  By doing so, the IETF
   enabled the manifestation of the right to privacy, through the
   Internet's architecture.  Additionally, access to information gives
   people access to knowledge that enables them to help satisfy other



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   human rights, as such the Internet increasingly becoming a pre-
   condition for human rights rather than a supplement.

   Openness of communications of the technical design fostered freedom
   of communication as a core value, however as the scale and the
   commercialization of the Internet grew, topics like access, rights
   and connectivity are forced to compete with other values.  Therefore,
   important human rights enabling characteristics of the Internet might
   be degraded if they're not properly defined, described and protected
   as such.  And, the other way around, not protecting human right
   enabling characteristics could also result in (partial) loss of
   functionality and connectivity, and other inherent parts of the
   Internet's architecture.New protocols, particularly those that
   upgrade the core infrastructure of the Net, should be designed to
   continue to enable fundamental human rights.

   The IETF has produced guidelines and procedures to ensure and
   galvanize the privacy and security of the network in protocol
   development.  This document aims to explore the possibility of the
   development of similar procedures for guidelines for human rights
   considerations to ensure that protocols developed in the IETF do not
   have an adverse impact on the realization of human rights on the
   Internet.  By carefully considering the answers to the questions
   posed in the final part of this document, document authors should be
   able to produce a comprehensive analysis that can serve as the basis
   for discussion on whether the protocol adequately protects against
   human rights threats.

2.  Vocabulary used

   In the discussion of human rights and Internet architecture concepts
   developed in computer science, networking, law, policy-making and
   advocacy are coming together [Dutton],[Kaye], [Franklin].  The same
   concepts might have a very different meaning and implications in
   other areas of expertise.  In order to foster a constructive
   interdisciplinary debate, and minimize differences in interpretation,
   the following glossary is provided.

   Accessibility  Full Internet Connectivity as described in [RFC4084]
      to provide unfettered access to the Internet

      The design of protocols, services or implementation that provide
      an enabling environment for people with disabilities.

      The ability to receive information available on the Internet

   Anonymity  The condition of an identity being unknown or concealed.
      [RFC4949]



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   Anonymous  A state of an individual in which an observer or attacker
      cannot identify the individual within a set of other individuals
      (the anonymity set).  [RFC6973]

   Authenticity  The fact that the data does indeed come from the source
      it claims to come from.  (It is strongly linked with Integrity,
      see below).

   Censorship resistance  Methods and measures to prevent Internet
      censorship.

   Confidentiality  The non-disclosure of information to any unintended
      person or host or party.

   Connectivity  The extent to which a device or network is able to
      reach other devices or networks to exchange data.  The Internet is
      the tool for providing global connectivity [RFC1958].

   Content-agnosticism  Treating network traffic identically regardless
      of content.

   Debugging  Debugging is a methodical process of finding and reducing
      the number of bugs, or defects, or malfunctions in a protocol or
      its implementation, thus making it behave as expected.  It also
      includes analyzing the consequences that might have emanate from
      the error.  Debugging tends to be harder when various subsystems
      are tightly coupled, as changes in one may cause bugs to emerge in
      another.  [WP-Debugging]

      The process through which people troubleshoot a technical issue,
      which may include inspection of program source code or device
      configurations.  Can also include tracing or monitoring packet
      flow.

   Decentralized  Opportunity for implementation or deployment of
      standards, protocols or systems without one single point of
      control.

   End-to-End  The principal of extending characteristics of a protocol
      or system as far as possible within the system. technicall this
      means that intermediaries should not modify messages but simply
      route them to their desired end-points as capabilities should be
      given by the end-points, that the network then interconnects
      rather than controls.  For example, end-to-end instant message
      encryption would conceal communications from one user's instant
      messaging application through any intermediate devices and servers
      all the way to the recipient's instant messaging application.  If
      the message was decrypted at any intermediate point-for example at



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      a service provider-then the property of end-to-end encryption
      would not be present.

      One of the key architectural guidelines of the Internet is the
      end-to-end principle in the papers by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark
      [Saltzer] [Clark].  The end-to-end principle was originally
      articulated as a question of where best not to put functions in a
      communication system.  Yet, in the ensuing years, it has evolved
      to address concerns of maintaining openness, increasing
      reliability and robustness, and preserving the properties of user
      choice and ease of new service development as discussed by
      Blumenthal and Clark in [Blumenthal]; concerns that were not part
      of the original articulation of the end-to-end principle.
      [RFC3724]

   Federation  The possibility of connecting autonomous and possibly
      centralized systems into single system without a central
      authority.

   Heterogenity  The Internet is characterized by heterogeneity on many
      levels: devices and nodes, router scheduling algorithms and queue
      management mechanisms, routing protocols, levels of multiplexing,
      protocol versions and implementations, underlying link layers
      (e.g., point-to-point, multi-access links, wireless, FDDI, etc.),
      in the traffic mix and in the levels of congestion at different
      times and places.  Moreover, as the Internet is composed of
      autonomous organizations and Internet service providers, each with
      their own separate policy concerns,there is a large heterogeneity
      of administrative domains and pricing structures.  As a result,
      the heterogeneity principle proposed in [RFC1958] needs to be
      supported by design.  [FIArch]

   Integrity  Maintenance and assurance of the accuracy and consistency
      of data to ensure it has not been (intentionally or
      unintentionally) altered.

   Internet censorship  Internet censorship is the intentional
      suppression of information originating, flowing or stored on
      systems connected to the Internet where that information is
      relevant for decision making to some entity.  [Elahi]

   Inter-operable  A property of a documented standard or protocol which
      allows different independent implementations to work with each
      other without any restricted negotiation, access or functionality.

   Internet Standards as an Arena for Conflict  Pursuant to the
      principle of constant change, since the function and scope of the
      Internet evolves, so does the role of the IETF in developing



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      standards.  Internet standards are adopted on the basis of a
      series of criteria, including high technical quality, support by
      community consensus, and their overall benefit to the Internet.
      The latter calls for an assessment of the interests of all
      affected parties and the specifications' impact on the Internet's
      users.  In this respect, the effective exercise of the human
      rights of the Internet users is a relevant consideration that
      needs to be appreciated in the standardization process insofar as
      it is directly linked to the reliability and core values of the
      Internet.  [RFC1958] [RFC0226] [RFC3724]

   Internationalization (i18n)  The practice of making protocols,
      standards, and implementations usable in different languages and
      scripts.  (see Localization)

      (cf [RFC6365]) In the IETF, "internationalization" means to add or
      improve the handling of non-ASCII text in a protocol.  [RFC6365]
      A different perspective, more appropriate to protocols that are
      designed for global use from the beginning, is the definition used
      by W3C:

      "Internationalization is the design and development of a product,
      application or document content that enables easy localization for
      target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language."
      [W3Ci18nDef]

      Many protocols that handle text only handle one charset (US-
      ASCII), or leave the question of what CCS and encoding up to local
      guesswork (which leads, of course, to interoperability problems).
      If multiple charsets are permitted, they must be explicitly
      identified [RFC2277].  Adding non-ASCII text to a protocol allows
      the protocol to handle more scripts, hopefully all of the ones
      useful in the world.  In today's world, that is normally best
      accomplished by allowing Unicode encoded in UTF-8 only, thereby
      shifting conversion issues away from individual choices.

   Localization (l10n)  The practice of translating an implementation to
      make it functional in a specific language or for users in a
      specific locale (see Internationalization).

      (cf [RFC6365]): The process of adapting an internationalized
      application platform or application to a specific cultural
      environment.  In localization, the same semantics are preserved
      while the syntax may be changed.  [FRAMEWORK]

      Localization is the act of tailoring an application for a
      different language or script or culture.  Some internationalized
      applications can handle a wide variety of languages.  Typical



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      users only understand a small number of languages, so the program
      must be tailored to interact with users in just the languages they
      know.  The major work of localization is translating the user
      interface and documentation.  Localization involves not only
      changing the language interaction, but also other relevant changes
      such as display of numbers, dates, currency, and so on.  The
      better internationalized an application is, the easier it is to
      localize it for a particular language and character encoding
      scheme.

   Open standards  Conform [RFC2606]: Various national and international
      standards bodies, such as ANSI, ISO, IEEE, and ITU-T, develop a
      variety of protocol and service specifications that are similar to
      Technical Specifications defined here.  National and international
      groups also publish "implementors' agreements" that are analogous
      to Applicability Statements, capturing a body of implementation-
      specific detail concerned with the practical application of their
      standards.  All of these are considered to be "open external
      standards" for the purposes of the Internet Standards Process.

   Openness  The quality of the unfiltered Internet that allows for free
      access to other hosts.

      Absence of centralized points of control - a feature that is
      assumed to make it easy for new users to join and new uses to
      unfold [Brown].

   Permissionless innovation  The freedom and ability to freely create
      and deploy new protocols on top of the communications constructs
      that currently exist.

   Privacy  The right of an entity (normally a person), acting in its
      own behalf, to determine the degree to which it will interact with
      its environment, including the degree to which the entity is
      willing to share its personal information with others.  [RFC4949]

      The right of individuals to control or influence what information
      related to them may be collected and stored and by whom and to
      whom that information may be disclosed.

      Privacy is a broad concept relating to the protection of
      individual or group autonomy and the relationship between an
      individual or group and society, including government, companies
      and private individuals.  It is often summarized as "the right to
      be left alone" but it encompasses a wide range of rights including
      protections from intrusions into family and home life, control of
      sexual and reproductive rights, and communications secrecy.  It is
      commonly recognized as a core right that underpins human dignity



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      and other values such as freedom of association and freedom of
      speech.

      The right to privacy is also recognized in nearly every national
      constitution and in most international human rights treaties.  It
      has been adjudicated upon both by international and regional
      bodies.  The right to privacy is also legally protected at the
      national level through provisions in civil and/or criminal codes.

   Reliable  Reliability ensures that a protocol will execute its
      function consistently and error resistant as described and
      function without unexpected result.  A system that is reliable
      degenerates gracefully and will have a documented way to announce
      degradation.  It also has mechanisms to recover from failure
      gracefully, and if applicable, allow for partial healing.

   Resilience  The maintaining of dependability and performance in the
      face of unanticipated changes and circumstances.

   Robustness  The resistance of protocols and their implementations to
      errors, and to involuntary, legal or malicious attempts to disrupt
      its mode of operations.  [RFC0760] [RFC0791] [RFC0793] [RFC1122].
      Or framed more positively, a system can provide functionality
      consistently and without errors despite involuntary, legal or
      malicious attempts to disrupt its mode of operations.

   Scalable  The ability to handle increased or decreased workloads
      predictably within defined expectations.  There should be a clear
      definition of its scope and applicability.  The limits of a
      systems scalability should be defined.

   Stateless / stateful  In computing, a stateless protocol is a
      communications protocol that treats each request as an independent
      transaction that is unrelated to any previous request so that the
      communication consists of independent pairs of request and
      response.  A stateless protocol does not require the server to
      retain session information or status about each communications
      partner for the duration of multiple requests.  In contrast, a
      protocol which requires keeping of the internal state on the
      server is known as a stateful protocol.  [WP-Stateless]

   Strong encryption / cryptography  Used to describe a cryptographic
      algorithm that would require a large amount of computational power
      to defeat it.  [RFC4949]

   Transparent  "transparency" refers to the original Internet concept
      of a single universal logical addressing scheme, and the




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      mechanisms by which packets may flow from source to destination
      essentially unaltered.  [RFC2775]

   The combination of reliability, confidentiality, integrity,
   anonymity, and authenticity is what makes up security on the
   Internet.

  (     Reliability          )
 (      Confidentiality       )
 (      Integrity             ) = communication and information security
 (      Authenticity          )
  (     Anonymity            )

   The combination of the end-to-end principle, interoperability,
   resilience, reliability and robustness are the enableing factors that
   result in on the Internet.

     ( End-to-End      )
    (  Interoperability )
    (  Resilience       )
    (  Reliability      ) = connectivity
    (  Robustness       )
    (  Autonomy         )
     ( Simplicity      )

3.  Research Questions

   The Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group (hrpc) in the
   Internet Research Taskforce (IRTF) embarked on its mission to answer
   the following two questions which are also the main two questions
   which this documents seeks to answer:

   1.  How can Internet protocols and standards impact human rights,
       either by enabling them or by creating a restrictive environment?

   2.  Can guidelines be developed to improve informed and transparent
       decision making about potential human rights impact of protocols?

4.  Literature and Discussion Review

   Protocols and standards are regularly seen as merely performing
   technical functions.  However, these protocols and standards do not
   exist outside of their technical context nor outside of their
   political, historical, economic, legal or cultural context.  This is
   best exemplified by the way in which protocols have become part and
   parcel of political processes and public policies: one only has to
   look at the IANA transition, the RFC on pervasive monitoring or
   global innovation policy for concrete examples [Denardis15].  To



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   quote [Abbate]: "protocols are politics by other means".  Since the
   late 1990's a burgeoning group of academics and practitioners
   researched questions surrounding the societal impact of protocols.
   These studies vary in focus and scope: some focus on specific
   standards [Davidsonetal] [Musiani], others look into the political,
   legal, commercial or social impact of protocols [BrownMarsden]
   [Lessig], [Mueller] and yet others look at how the engineers'
   personal set of values get translated into technology
   [Abbate],[CathFloridi] [Denardis15] [WynsbergheMoura].

   Commercial and political influences on the management of the
   Internet's architecture are well-documented in the academic
   literature and will thus not be discussed here [Benkler]  [Brownetal]
   [Denardis15]  [Lessig]  [Mueller]  [Zittrain].  It is sufficient to
   say that the IETF community consistently tries to push back against
   the standardization of surveillance and certain other issues that
   negatively influence end-users' experience of and trust in the
   Internet [Denardis14].  The role human rights play in engineering,
   architecture and protocol design is much less clear.

   It is very important to understand how protocols and standards impact
   human rights.  In particular because Standard Developing
   Organizations (SDOs) are increasingly becoming venues where social
   values (like human rights) are discussed, although often from a
   technological point of view.  These SDOs are becoming a new focal
   point for discussions about values-by-design, and the role of
   technical engineers in protecting or enabling human rights
   [Brownetal] [Clarketal] {[Denardis14}} [CathFloridi] [Lessig]
   [Rachovitsa].

   In the academic literature five clear positions can be discerned, in
   relation to the role of human rights in protocol design and how to
   account for these human rights in protocol development: Clark et al.
   argue that there is a need to 'design for variation in outcome, so
   that the outcome can be different in different places, and the tussle
   takes place within the design (...) [as] Rigid designs will be
   broken; designs that permit variation will flex under pressure and
   survive [Clarketal].'  They hold that human rights should not be
   hard-coded into protocols because of four reasons: first, the rights
   in the UDHR are not absolute.  Second, technology is not the only
   tool in the tussle over human rights.  Third, there are inherent
   dangers to blunting the tools of enforcement and last but not least,
   it is dangerous to make promises that can't be kept.  The open nature
   of the Internet will never, they argue, be enough to fully protect
   individuals' human rights.

   Conversely, Brown et al.  [Brownetal] state that 'some key, universal
   values - of which the UDHR is the most legitimate expression - should



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   be baked into the architecture at design time.'  They argue that
   design choices have offline consequences, and are able shape the
   power positions of groups or individuals in society.  As such, the
   individuals making these technical decisions have a moral obligation
   to take into account the impact of their decisions on society, and by
   extension human rights.  Brown et al recognise that values and the
   implementation of human rights vary across the globe.  Yet they argue
   that all members of the United Nations have found 'common agreement
   on the values proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human
   Rights.  In looking for the most legitimate set of global values to
   embed in the future Internet architecture, the UDHR has the
   democratic assent of a significant fraction of the planet's
   population, through their elected representatives."

   The main disagreement between these two academic positions lies
   mostly in the question on whether a particular value system should be
   embedded into the Internet's architecture or whether the architecture
   needs to account for a varying set of values.

   A third position that is similar to that of Brown et al., is taken by
   [Broeders] who argues that 'we must find ways to continue
   guaranteeing the overall integrity and functionality of the public
   core of the Internet.'  He argues that the best way to do this is by
   declaring the backbone of the Internet - which includes the TCP/IP
   protocol suite, numerous standards, the Domain Name System (DNS), and
   routing protocols - a common public good.  This is a different
   approach than that of [Clarketal] and [Brownetal] because Broeders
   does not suggest that social values should (or should not) be
   explicitly coded into the Internet's architecture, but rather that
   the existing architecture should be seen as an entity of public
   value.

   Bless and Orwat [Bless] represent a fourth position.  They argue that
   it is to early to make any definitive claims, but that there is a
   need for more careful analysis of the impact of protocol design
   choices on human rights.  They also argue that it is important to
   search for solutions that 'create awareness in the technical
   community about impact of design choices on social values.  And work
   towards a methodology for co-design of technical and institutional
   systems.'

   Berners-Lee and Halpin argue that the Internet could lead to even new
   capacities, and these capacities may over time be viewed as new kinds
   of rights.  For example, Internet access may be viewed as a human
   right in of itself if it is taken to be a pre-condition for other
   rights, even if it could not have been predicted at the declaration
   of the UNHDR after the end of World War 2.[BernersLeeHalpin].  This




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   last position is interesting to keep in mind, but beyond the remit of
   this document.

   It is important to give some background to the academic discussion on
   this issue.  As it stems from the issues as they arise in the field
   of technical engineering.  They also are important to document as
   they inform the position of the authors of this document.  Our
   position is that hard-coding human rights into protocols is very
   complicated as each situation is dependent on its context.  At this
   point is difficult to say whether hard-coding human rights into
   protocols is wise (or feasible).  It is however important to make
   consicious and explicit design decisions that take into account the
   human rights protocol considerations guidelines developed below.
   This will ensure that the impact protocols can have on human rights
   is clear and explicit, both for developers and for users.  In
   addition, it ensures that the impact of specific protocol on human
   rights is carefully considered and that concrete design decisions are
   documented in the protocol.

   This document details the steps taken in theresearch into human
   rights protocol considerations by the HRPC group to clarify the
   relation between technical concepts used in the IETF and human
   rights.  This document sets out some preliminary steps and
   considerations for engineers to take into account when developing
   standards and protocols.

5.  Methodology

   Mapping the relation between human rights, protocols and
   architectures is a new research challenge, which requires a good
   amount of interdisciplinary and cross organizational cooperation to
   develop a consistent methodology.

   The methodological choices made in this document are based on the
   political science-based method of discourse analysis and ethnographic
   research methods [Cath].  This work departs from the assumption that
   language reflects the understanding of concepts.  Or as [Jabri]
   holds, policy documents are 'social relations represented in texts
   where language is used to construct meaning and representation'.
   This process happens in 'the social space of society' [Schroeder] and
   manifests itself in institutions and organizations [King], exposed
   using the ethnographic methods of semi-structured interviews and
   participant observation.  Or in non-academic language, the way the
   language in IETF/IRTF documents describes and approaches the issues
   they are trying to address is an indicator for the underlying social
   assumptions and relations of the engineers to their engineering.  By
   reading and analyzing these documents, as well as interviewing
   engineers and participating in the IETF/IRTF working groups, it is



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   possible to distill the relation between human rights, protocols and
   the Internet's architecture.

   The discourse analysis was operationalized using qualitative and
   quantitative means.  The first step taken by the research group was
   reading RFCs and other official IETF documents.  The second step was
   the use of a python-based analyzer, using the tool Big Bang, adapted
   by Nick Doty [Doty] to scan for the concepts that were identified as
   important architectural principles (distilled on the initial reading
   and supplemented by the interviews and participant observation).
   Such a quantitative method is very precise and speeds up the research
   process [Richie].  But this tool is unable to understand 'latent
   meaning' [Denzin].  In order to mitigate these issues of automated
   word-frequency based approaches, and to get a sense of the 'thick
   meaning' [Geertz] of the data, a second qualitative analysis of the
   data set was performed.  These various rounds of discourse analysis
   were used to inform the interviews and further data analysis.  As
   such the initial rounds of quantitative discourse analysis were used
   to inform the second rounds of qualitative analysis.The results from
   the qualitative interviews were again used to feed new concepts into
   the quantitative discourse analysis.  As such the two methods
   continued to support and enrich each other.

   The ethnographic methods of the data collection and processing
   allowed the research group to acquire the data necessary to 'provide
   a holistic understanding of research participants' views and actions'
   [Denzin] that highlighted ongoing issues and case studies where
   protocols impact human rights.  The interview participants were
   selected through purposive sampling [Babbie], as the research group
   was interested in getting a wide variety of opinions on the role of
   human rights in guiding protocol development.  This sampling method
   also ensured that individuals with extensive experience working at
   the IETF in various roles were targeted.  The interviewees included
   individuals in leadership positions (Working Group (WG) chairs, Area
   Directors (ADs)), 'regular participants', individuals working for
   specific entities (corporate, civil society, political, academic) and
   represented various backgrounds, nationalities and genders.

5.1.  Data Sources

   In order to map the potential relation between human rights and
   protocols, the HRPC research group gathered data from three specific
   sources:








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5.1.1.  Discourse analysis of RFCs

   To start addressing the issue, a mapping exercise analyzing Internet
   architecture and protocols features, vis-a-vis their possible impact
   on human rights was undertaken.  Therefore, research on the language
   used in current and historic RFCs and mailing list discussions was
   undertaken to expose core architectural principles, language and
   deliberations on human rights of those affected by the network.

5.1.2.  Interviews with members of the IETF community

   Interviews with the current and past members of the Internet
   Architecture Board (IAB), current and past members of the Internet
   Engineering Steering Group (IESG) and chairs of selected working
   groups and RFC authors was done at the IETF92 Dallas meeting in March
   2015.  To get an insider understanding of how they view the
   relationship (if any) between human rights and protocols to play out
   in their work.

5.1.3.  Participant observation in Working Groups

   By participating in various working groups, in person at IETF
   meetings and on mailinglists, information was gathered about the
   IETFs day-to-day workings.  From which which general themes,
   technical concepts, and use-cases about human rights and protocols
   were extracted.

5.2.  Data analysis strategies

   The data above was processed using three consecutive strategies:
   mapping protocols related to human rights, extracting concepts from
   these protocols, and creation of a common glossary (detailed under
   "2.vocabulary used").  Before going over these strategies some
   elaboration on the process of identifying technical concepts as they
   relate to human rights needs to be given:

5.2.1.  Identifying qualities of technical concepts that relate to human
        rights

5.2.1.1.  Mapping protocols and standards related to human rights

   By combining data from the three data sources named above, an
   extensive list of protocols and standards that potentially enable the
   Internet as a tool for freedom of expression and association was
   assembly.  In order to determine the enabling (or inhibiting)
   features we relied on direct references of such impact in the RFCs,
   as well as input from the community.  On the basis of this analysis a




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   list of RFCs that describe standards and protocols that are
   potentially closely related to human rights was compiled.

5.2.1.2.  Extracting concepts from mapped RFCs

   Mapping the protocols and standards that are related to human rights
   and create a human rights enabeling environment was the first step.
   For that we needed to focus on specific technical concepts that
   underlie these protocols and standards.  On the basis of this list a
   number of technical concepts that appeared frequently was extracted,
   and used to create a second list of technical terms that, when
   combined, create an enabling environment for excercising human rights
   on the Internet.

5.2.1.3.  Building a common vocabulary of technical concepts that impact
          human rights

   While interviewing experts, mapping RFCs and compiling technical
   definitions several concepts of convergence and divergence were
   identified.  To ensure that the discussion was based on a common
   understanding of terms and vocabulary, a list of definitions was
   created.  The definitions are based on the wording found in various
   IETF documents, and if these were unavailable definitions were taken
   from definitions from other Standards Developing Organizations or
   academic literature.

5.2.1.4.  Translating Human Rights Concept into Technical Definitions

   The previous steps allowed for the clarification of relation between
   human rights and technical concepts.  The steps taken show how the
   research process zoomed in, from compiling a broad lists of protocols
   and standards that relate to human rights to extracting the precise
   technical concepts that make up these protocols and standards, in
   order to understand the relationship between the two.  This sub-
   section presents the next step: translating human rights to technical
   concepts by matching the individuals components of the rights to the
   accompanying technical concepts, allowing for the creation of a list
   of technical concepts that when combined create an enabling
   environment for human rights.

5.2.1.5.  List technical terms that combined create enabling environment
          for human rights

   On the basis of the prior steps the following list of technical
   terms, that when combined create an enabling environment for human
   rights, such a freedom of expression and freedom of association, was
   drafted.




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     Architectural principles                    Enabling features
       and characteristics                        for user rights

                      /------------------------------------------------\
                      |                                                |
    +=================|=============================+                  |
    =                 |                             =                  |
    =                 |           End to end        =                  |
    =                 |          Reliability        =                  |
    =                 |           Resilience        =  Access as       |
    =                 |        Interoperability     =   Human Right    |
    =    Good enough  |          Transparency       =                  |
    =     principle   |       Data minimization     =                  |
    =                 |  Permissionless innovation  =                  |
    =    Simplicity   |     Graceful degradation    =                  |
    =                 |          Connectivity       =                  |
    =                 |          Heterogeneity      =                  |
    =                 |                             =                  |
    =                 |                             =                  |
    =                 \------------------------------------------------/
    =                                               =
    +===============================================+

5.2.2.  Translation human rights to technical terms

   The combination of the technical concepts that have been gathered the
   steps above have been grouped according to their impact on specific
   rights as they have been mentioned in the interviews done at IETF92
   as well as study of literature (see literature and discussion review
   above).

   This analysis aims to assist protocol developers by understanding
   better understanding the roles specific technical concepts with
   regards to the possibility to exercise human rights on the Internet.

   This analysis does not claim to be an complete or exhaustive mapping
   of all possible ways in which a protocols could potentially impact
   human rights, but it presents an initial combined concept mapping
   based on interviews and literature and discussion review.












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    (     Connectivity          )
   (      Privacy                )
   (      Security               )   = Right to freedom of expression
   (      Content agnosticism    )
   (      Internationalization   )
   (      Censorship resistance  )
   (      Open Standards         )
    (     Heterogeneity support )


   (     Anonymity          )
  (      Privacy             )   = Right to non-discrimination
  (      Pseudonymity        )
  (      Content agnosticism )
   (     Accessibility      )


  (       Content Agnosticism  )
  (       Security             )  = Right to equal protection

   (  Accessibility         )
  (   Internationalization   ) = Right to political participation
  (   Censorship resistance  )
   (      Accessibility     )


   (  Open standards         )
  (   Localization            ) = Right to participate in cultural life,
  (   Internationalization    )             arts and science &
  (   Censorship resistance   )    Right to education
   (  Accessibility          )



   (  Connectivity         )
  (   Decentralization      )
  (   Censorship resistance ) = Right to freedom of assembly
  (   Pseudonymity          )                   and association
  (   Anonymity             )
   (  Security             )

      ( Reliability    )
     (  Confidentiality )
     (  Integrity       ) = Right to security
     (  Authenticity    )
      ( Anonymity      )





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5.2.2.1.  Map cases of protocols that adversely impact human rights or
          are enablers thereof

   Given the information above, the following list of cases of protocols
   that adversely impact or enable human rights was formed.

5.2.3.  IPv4

   The Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4), also known as 'layer 3' of
   the Internet, and specified as a common encapsulation and protocol
   header, is defined in [RFC0791].  The evolution of Internet
   communications led to continued development in this area,
   encapsulated in the development of version 6 (IPv6) of the protocol
   in [RFC2460].  In spite of this updated protocol, we find that 25
   years after the specification of version 6 of the protocol, the older
   v4 standard continues to account for a sizeable majority of Internet
   traffic, and most (if not all) of the issues discussed here are valid
   for IPv4 as well as IPv6.

   The Internet was designed as a platform for free and open
   communication, most notably encoded in the end-to-end principle, and
   that philosophy is also present in the technical implementation of
   the Internet Protocol.  [RFC3724] While the protocol was designed to
   exist in an environment where intelligence is at the end hosts, it
   has proven to provide sufficient information that a more intelligent
   network core can make policy decisions and enforce policy shaping and
   restricting the communications of end hosts.  These capabilities for
   network control and limitations of the freedom of expression by end
   hosts can be traced back to the IPv4 design, helping us understand
   which technical protocol decisions have led to harm of this human
   rights.  A feature that can harm freedom of expression as well as the
   right to privacy through misuse of the Internet Protocol is the
   exploitation of the public visibility of the host pairs for all
   communications, and the corresponding ability to discriminate and
   block traffic as a result of that metadata.

5.2.3.1.  Network visibility of Source and Destination

   The IPv4 protocol header contains fixed location fields for both the
   source and destination IP addresses [RFC0791].  These addresses
   identify both the host sending and receiving each message, and allow
   the core network to understand who is talking to whom, and to
   practically limit communication selectively between pairs of hosts.
   Blocking of communication based on the pair of source and destination
   is one of the most common limitations on the ability for hosts to
   communicate today, [caida] and can be seen as a restriction of the
   ability for those hosts to assemble or to consensually express
   themselves.



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   Inclusion of an Internet-wide identified source in the IP header is
   not the only possible design, especially since the protocol is most
   commonly implemented over Ethernet networks exposing only link-local
   identifiers.  [RFC0894] A variety of alternative designs including
   source routing, which would allow for the sender to choose a per
   defined (safe) route, and spoofing of the source IP address are
   technically supported by the protocol, but neither are considered
   good practice on the Internet.  While projects like [torproject]
   provide an alternative implementation of anonymity in connections,
   they have been developed in spite of the IPv4 protocol design.

5.2.3.2.  Protocols

   The other major feature of the IP protocol header is that it
   specifies the protocol encapsulated in each message in an easily
   observable form, and does not encourage a design where the
   encapsulated protocol is not available to a network observer.  This
   design has resulted in a proliferation of routers which inspect the
   inner protocol, and also led to a stagnation where only the TCP and
   UDP protocols are widely supported across the Internet.  While the IP
   protocol was designed as the entire set of metadata needed for
   routing, subsequent enhanced routers have found value on making
   policy decisions based on the contents of TCP and UDP headers as
   well, and are encoded with the assumption that only these protocols
   will be used for data transfer. [spdy] [RFC4303] defines an encrypted
   encapsulation of additional protocols, but lacks widespread
   deployment and faces the same challenge as any other protocol of
   providing sufficient metadata with each message for routers to make
   positive policy decisions.  Protocols like [RFC4906] have seen
   limited wide-area uptake, and these alternate designs are frequently
   re-implemented on top of UDP. [quic]

5.2.3.3.  Address Translation and Mobility

   A major structural shift in the Internet which undermined the
   protocol design of IPv4, and significantly reduced the freedom of end
   users to communicate and assemble is the introduction of network
   address translation.  [RFC1631] Network address translation is a
   process whereby organizations and autonomous systems connect two
   networks by translating the IPv4 source and destination addresses
   between the two.  This process puts the router performing the
   translation into a privileged position, where it can decide which
   subset of communications are worthy of translation, and whether an
   unknown request for communication will be correctly forwarded to a
   host on the other network.

   This process of translation has widespread adoption despite promoting
   a process that goes against the stated end-to-end process of the



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   underlying protocol [natusage].  In contrast, the proposed mechanism
   to provide support for mobility and forwarding to clients which may
   move, encoded instead as an option in the IP protocol in [RFC5944],
   has failed to gain traction.  In this situation the compromise made
   in the design of the protocol resulted in a technology that is not
   coherent with the end-to-end principles and thus creates and extra
   possible hurdle for freedom of expression in its design, even though
   a viable alternative that would do this exists.  There is a
   particular problem surrounding NATs and VPN (as well as other
   connections used for privacy purposes) as they sometimes cause these
   not to work.

5.2.4.  DNS

   The Domain Name System (DNS) [RFC1035], provides service discovery
   capabilities, and provides a mechanism to associate human readable
   names with services.  The DNS system is organized around a set of
   independently operated 'Root Servers' run by organizations around the
   web which enact ICANN's policy by answering queries for which
   organizations have been delegated to manage registration under each
   Top Level Domain (TLD).  The DNS is centralized, and this brings up
   political and social concerns over control.  Top Level domains are
   maintained and determined by ICANN.  These namespaces encompass
   several classes of services.  The initial name spaces including
   '.Com' and '.Net', provide common spaces for expression of ideas,
   though their policies are enacted through US based companies.  Other
   name spaces are delegated to specific nationalities, and may impose
   limits designed to focus speech in those forums both to promote
   speech from that nationality, and to comply with local limits on
   expression and social norms.  Finally, the system has recently been
   expanded with additional generic and sponsored name spaces, for
   instance '.travel' and '.ninja', which are operated by a range of
   organizations which may independently determine their registration
   policies.  This new development has both positive and negative
   implications in terms of enabling human rights.  Some individuals
   argue that it undermines the right to freedom of expression because
   some of these new gtlds have restricted policies on registration and
   particular rules on hate speech content.  Others argue that precisely
   these properties are positive because they enable certain (mostly
   minority) communities to build safer spaces for association, thereby
   enabling their right to freedom of association.  An often mentioned
   example is an application like .gay.

   DNS has significant privacy issues per [RFC7626].  Most notable the
   lack of encryption to limit the visibility of requests for domain
   resolution from intermediary parties, and a limited deployment of
   DNSSEC to provide authentication, allowing the client to know that
   they received a correct, "authoritative", answer to a query.  In



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   response to the privacy issues, the IETF DNS PRIVate Exchange
   (DPRIVE) Working Group is developing mechanisms to provide
   confidentiality to DNS transactions, to address concerns surrounding
   pervasive monitoring [RFC7258].

   Authentication through DNSSEC creates a validation path for records.
   This authentication protects against forged or manipulated DNS data.
   As such DNSSEC protects the directory look-up and makes hijacking of
   a session harder.  This is important because currently interference
   with the operation of the DNS is becoming one of the central
   mechanisms used to block access to websites.  This interference
   limits both the freedom of expression of the publisher to offer their
   content, and the freedom of assembly for clients to congregate in a
   shared virtual space.  Even though DNSSEC doesn't prevent censorship,
   it makes it clear that the returned information is not the
   information that was requested, which contributes to the right to
   security and increases trust in the network.  It is however important
   to note that DNSSEC is currently not widely supported or deployed by
   domain name registrars, making it difficult to authenticate and use
   correctly.

5.2.4.1.  Removal of records

   There have been a number of cases where the records for a domain are
   removed from the name system due to real-world events.  Examples of
   this removal includes the 'seizure' of wikileaks [bbc-wikileaks] and
   the names of illegally operating gambling operations by the United
   States ICE unit, which compelled the US-based registry in charge of
   the .com TLD to hand ownership of those domains over to the US
   government.  The same technique has been used in Libya to remove
   sites in violation of "our Country's Law and Morality (which) do not
   allow any kind of pornography or its promotion." [techyum]

   At a protocol level, there is no technical auditing for name
   ownership, as in alternate systems like [namecoin].  As a result,
   there is no ability for users to differentiate seizure from the
   legitimate transfer of name ownership, which is purely a policy
   decision of registrars.  While DNSSEC addresses network distortion
   events described below, it does not tackle this problem.

5.2.4.2.  Distortion of records

   The most common mechanism by which the DNS system is abused to limit
   freedom of expression is through manipulation of protocol messages by
   the network.  One form occurs at an organizational level, where
   client computers are instructed to use a local DNS resolver
   controlled by the organization.  The DNS resolver will then
   selectively distort responses rather than request the authoritative



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   lookup from the upstream system.  The second form occurs through the
   use of deep packet inspection, where all DNS protocol messages are
   inspected by the network, and objectionable content is distorted, as
   in [turkey].

   A notable instance of distortion occurred in Greece [ververis], where
   a study found evidence of both of deep packet inspection to distort
   DNS replies, and overblocking of content.  ISPs prevented clients
   from resolving the names of domains which they were instructed to do
   through a governmental order, prompting this particular blocking
   systems there.

   At a protocol level, the effectiveness of these attacks is made
   possible by a lack of authentication in the DNS protocol.  DNSSEC
   provides the ability to determine authenticity of responses when
   used, but it is not regularly checked by resolvers.  DNSSEC is not
   effective when the local resolver for a network is complicit in the
   distortion, for instance when the resolver assigned for use by an ISP
   is the source of injection.  Selective distortion of records is also
   been made possible by the predictable structure of DNS messages,
   which make it computationally easy for a network device to watch all
   passing messages even at high speeds, and the lack of encryption,
   which allows the network to distort only an objectionable subset of
   protocol messages.  Specific distortion mechanisms are discussed
   further in [hall].

5.2.4.3.  Injection of records

   Responding incorrectly to requests for name lookups is the most
   common mechanism that in-network devices use to limit the ability of
   end users to discover services.  A deviation, which accomplishes a
   similar objective may be seen as different from a freedom of
   expression perspective, is the injection of incorrect responses to
   queries.  The most prominent example of this behavior occurs in
   China, where requests for lookups of sites deemed inappropriate will
   trigger the network to respond with a false response, causing the
   client to ignore the real response when it subsequently arrives.
   [greatfirewall] Unlike the other forms of discussion mentioned above,
   injection does not stifle the ability of a server to announce it's
   name, it instead provides another voice which answers sooner.  This
   is effective because without DNSSEC, the protocol will respond to
   whichever answer is received first, without listening for subsequent
   answers.








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5.2.5.  HTTP

   The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), described in its version 1.1
   in RFC 7230 to 7237, is a request-response application protocol
   developed throughout the 1990s, and factually contributed to the
   exponential growth of the Internet and the inter-connection of
   populations around the world.  Because of its simple design, HTTP has
   become the foundation of most modern Internet platforms and
   communication systems, from websites, to chat systems, and computer-
   to-computer applications.  In its manifestation with the World Wide
   Web, HTTP radically revolutionized the course of technological
   development and the ways people interact with online content and with
   each other.

   However, HTTP is also a fundamentally insecure protocol, that doesn't
   natively provide encryption properties.  While the definition of the
   Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), and later of Transport Layer Security
   (TLS), also happened during the 1990s, the fact that HTTP doesn't
   mandate the use of such encryption layers to developers and service
   providers, caused a very late adoption of encryption.  Only in the
   middle of the 2000s did we observed big Internet service providers,
   such as Google, starting to provide encrypted access to their web
   services.

   The lack of sensitivity and understanding of the critical importance
   of securing web traffic incentivized malicious and offensive actors
   to develop, deploy and utilize at large interception systems and
   later active injection attacks, in order to swipe large amounts of
   data, compromise Internet-enabled devices.  The commercial
   availability of systems and tools to perform these types of attacks
   also led to a number of human rights abuses that have been discovered
   and reported over the years.

   Generally we can identify in Traffic Interception and Traffic
   Manipulation the two most problematic attacks that can be performed
   against applications employing a clear-text HTTP transport layer.
   That being said, the IETF and especially the General Area Review Team
   (Gen-ART), is taking steady steps to move to the encrypted version of
   HTTP, HTTPSecure (HTTPS).

5.2.5.1.  Traffic Interception

   While we are seeing an increasing trend in the last couple of years
   to employ SSL/TLS as a secure traffic layer for HTTP-based
   applications, we are still far from seeing an ubiquitous use of
   encryption on the World Wide Web. It is important to consider that
   the adoption of SSL/TLS is also a relatively recent phenomena.
   E-mail providers such as riseup.net provided SSL on by default as on



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   of the first.  Google introduced an option for its GMail users to
   navigate with SSL only in 2008 [Rideout], and turned SSL on by
   default later in 2010 [Schillace].  It took an increasing amount of
   security breaches and revelations on global surveillance from Edward
   Snowden to have other Internet service providers to follow Google's
   lead.  For example, Yahoo enabled SSL/TLS by default on its webmail
   services only towards the end of 2013 [Peterson].

   TLS itself has been subject to many attacks and bugs which can be
   attributed to some fundamental design weaknesses such as lack of a
   state machine, which opens a vulnerability for a Triple Handshake
   Attack, and flaws caused by early U.S. government restrictions on
   cryptography, leading to cipher-suite downgrade attacks (Logjam
   attack).  These vulnerabilities have been corrected in TLS1.3.
   [Bhargavan] [Adrian]

   HTTP upgrading to HTTPS is also vulnerable to having an attacker
   remove the "S" in any links to HTTPS URIs from a web-page transferred
   in cleartext over HTTP, an attack called "SSL Stripping" [sslstrip].
   Thus, for high security use of HTTPS IETF standards such as HSTS
   [RFC6797] and certificate pinning should be used [RFC7469].

   As we learned through the Snowden's revelations, intelligence
   agencies have been intercepting and collecting unencrypted traffic at
   large for many years.  There are documented examples of such mass
   surveillance programs with GCHQ's TEMPORA and NSA's XKEYSCORE.
   Through these programs NSA/GCHQ have been able to swipe large amounts
   of data including email and instant messaging communications which
   have been transported by the respective providers in clear for years,
   unsuspecting of the pervasiveness and scale of governments' efforts
   and investment into global mass surveillance capabilities.

   However, similar mass interception of unencrypted HTTP communications
   is also often employed at a nation-level by less democratic countries
   by exercising control over state-owned Internet Service Providers
   (ISP) and through the use of commercially available monitoring,
   collection, and censorship equipment.  Over the last few years a lot
   of information has come to public attention on the role and scale of
   a surveillance industry dedicated to develop interception gear of
   different types, making use of known and unknown weaknesses in
   existing protocols [RFC7258].  We have several records of such
   equipment being sold and utilized by oppressive regimes in order to
   monitor entire segments of population especially at times of social
   and political distress, uncovering massive human rights abuses.  For
   example, in 2013 the group Telecomix revealed that the Syrian regime
   was making use of BlueCoat products in order to intercept clear-text
   traffic as well as to enforce censorship of unwanted content [RSF].
   Similarly in 2012 it was found that the French Amesys provided the



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   Gaddafi's government with equipment able to intercept emails,
   Facebook traffic, and chat messages ad a country level.  The use of
   such systems, especially in the context of the Arab Spring and of
   civil uprisings against the dictatorships, has caused serious
   concerns of significant human rights abuses in Libya.

5.2.5.2.  Traffic Manipulation

   The lack of a secure transport layer under HTTP connections not only
   exposes the users to interception of the content of their
   communications, but is more and more commonly abused as a vehicle for
   active compromises of computers and mobile devices.  If an HTTP
   session travels in clear over the network, any node positioned at any
   point in the network is able to perform man-in-the-middle attacks and
   observe, manipulate, and hijack the session and modify the content of
   the communication in order to trigger unexpected behavior by the
   application generating the traffic.  For example, in the case of a
   browser the attacker would be able to inject malicious code in order
   to exploit vulnerabilities in the browser or any of its plugins.
   Similarly, the attacker would be able to intercept, trojanize, and
   repackage binary software updates that are very commonly downloaded
   in clear by applications such as word processors and media players.
   If the HTTP session would be encrypted, the tampering of the content
   would not be possible, and these network injection attacks would not
   be successful.

   While traffic manipulation attacks have been long known, documented,
   and prototyped especially in the context of WiFi and LAN networks, in
   the last few years we observed an increasing investment into the
   production and sale of network injection equipment both available
   commercially as well as deployed at scale by intelligence agencies.

   For example we learned from some of the documents provided by Edward
   Snowden to the press, that the NSA has constructed a global network
   injection infrastructure, called QUANTUM, able to leverage mass
   surveillance in order to identify targets of interests and
   subsequently task man-on-the-side attacks to ultimately compromise a
   selected device.  Among other attacks, NSA makes use of an attack
   called QUANTUMINSERT [Haagsma] which intercepts and hijacks an
   unencrypted HTTP communication and forces the requesting browser to
   redirect to a host controlled by NSA instead of the intended website.
   Normally, the new destination would be an exploitation service,
   referred in Snowden documents as FOXACID, which would attempt at
   executing malicious code in the context of the target's browser.  The
   Guardian reported in 2013 that NSA has for example been using these
   techniques to target users of the popular anonymity service Tor
   [Schneier].  The German NDR reported in 2014 that NSA has also been




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   using its mass surveillance capabilities to identify Tor users at
   large [Appelbaum].

   Recently similar capabilities of Chinese authorities have been
   reported as well in what has been informally called the "Great
   Cannon" [Marcak], which raised numerous concerns on the potential
   curb on human rights and freedom of speech due to the increasing
   tighter control of Chinese Internet communications and access to
   information.

   Network injection attacks are also made widely available to state
   actors around the world through the commercialization of similar,
   smaller scale equipment that can be easily acquired and deployed at a
   country-wide level.  Companies like FinFisher and HackingTeam are
   known to have network injection gear within their products portfolio,
   respectively called FinFly ISP and RCS Network Injector
   [Marquis-Boire].  The technology devised and produced by HackingTeam
   to perform network traffic manipulation attacks on HTTP
   communications is even the subject of a patent application in the
   United States [Googlepatent].  Access to offensive technologies
   available on the commercial lawful interception market has been
   largely documented to have lead to human rights abuses and
   illegitimate surveillance of journalists, human rights defenders, and
   political activists in many countries around the world.  Companies
   like FinFisher and HackingTeam have been found selling their products
   to oppressive regimes with little concern for bad human rights
   records [Collins].  While network injection attacks haven't been the
   subject of much attention, they do enable even unskilled attackers to
   perform silent and very resilient compromises, and unencrypted HTTP
   remains one of the main vehicles.

   There is a new version of HTTP, called HTTP/2, which was published as
   [RFC7540] and which aimed to be largely backwards compatible but also
   offer new option such as data compression of HTTP headers and
   pipelining of request and multiplexing multiple requests over a
   single TCP connection.  Except for decreasing latency to improve page
   loading speeds it also facilitates more efficient use of connectivity
   in low-bandwith environments, which is an enabler for freedom of
   expression, the right to assembly, right to political participation
   and the right to participate in cultural life, art and science.
   [RFC7540] does not mandate Transport Layer Security or any other form
   of encryption, is also does not support opportunistic encryption, so
   the vulnerabilities listed above for HTTP/1 are also valid for HTTP/2
   as defined in [RFC7540].







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5.2.6.  XMPP

   The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), specified in
   [RFC6120], provides a standard for interactive chat messaging, and
   has evolved to encompass interoperable text, voice, and video chat.
   The protocol is structured as a federated network of servers, similar
   to email, where users register with a local server which acts one
   their behalf to cache and relay messages.  This protocol design has
   many advantages, allowing servers to shield clients from denial of
   service and other forms of retribution for their expression, and
   designed to avoid central entities which could control the ability to
   communicate or assemble using the protocol.

   None-the-less, there are plenty of aspects of the protocol design of
   XMPP which shape the ability for users to communicate freely, and to
   assembly through the protocol.  The protocol also has facets that may
   stifle speech as users self-censor for fear of surveillance, or find
   themselves unable to express themselves freely.

5.2.6.1.  User Identification

   The XMPP specification dictates that clients are identified with a
   resource (node@domain/home [1] / node@domain/work [2]) to distinguish
   the conversations to specific devices.  While the protocol does not
   specify that the resource must be exposed by the client's server to
   remote users, in practice this has become the default behavior.  In
   doing so, users can be tracked by remote friends and their servers,
   who are able to monitor presence not just of the user, but of each
   individual device the user logs in with.  This has proven to be
   misleading to many users, [pidgin] since many clients only expose
   user level rather than device level presence.  Likewise, user
   invisibility so that communication can occur while users don't notify
   all buddies and other servers of their availability is not part of
   the formal protocol, and has only been added as an extension within
   the XML stream rather than enforced by the protocol.

5.2.6.2.  Surveillance of Communication

   The XMPP protocol specifies the standard by which communication of
   channels may be encrypted, but it does not provide visibility to
   clients of whether their communications are encrypted on each link.
   In particular, even when both clients ensure that they have an
   encrypted connection to their XMPP server to ensure that their local
   network is unable to read or disrupt the messages they send, the
   protocol does not provide visibility into the encryption status
   between the two servers.  As such, clients may be subject to
   selective disruption of communications by an intermediate network
   which disrupts communications based on keywords found through Deep



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   Packet Inspection.  While many operators have commited to only
   establishing encrypted links from their servers in recognition of
   this vulnerability, it remains impossible for users to audit this
   behavior and encrypted connections are not required by the protocol
   itself [xmppmanifesto].

   In particular, section 13.14 of the protocol specification [RFC6120]
   explicitly acknowledges the existence of a downgrade attack where an
   adversary controlling an intermediate network can force the inter
   domain federation between servers to revert to a non-encrypted
   protocol were selective messages can then be disrupted.

5.2.6.3.  Group Chat Limitations

   Group chat in the XMPP protocol is defined as an extension within the
   XML specification of the XMPP protocol (https://xmpp.org/extensions/
   xep-0045.html).  However, it is not encoded or required at a protocol
   level, and not uniformly implemented by clients.

   The design of multi-user chat in the XMPP protocol suffers from
   extending a protocol that was not designed with assembly of many
   users in mind.  In particular, in the federated protocol provided by
   XMPP, multi-user communities are implemented with a distinguished
   'owner', who is granted control over the participants and structure
   of the conversation.

   Multi-user chat rooms are identified by a name specified on a
   specific server, so that while the overall protocol may be federated,
   the ability for users to assemble in a given community is moderated
   by a single server.  That server may block the room and prevent
   assembly unilaterally, even between two users neither of whom trust
   or use that server directly.

5.2.7.  Peer to Peer

   Peer-to-Peer (P2P) is a network architecture in which all the
   participant nodes can be responsible for the storage and
   dissemination of information from any other node (defined in
   [RFC7574], an IETF standard that used a P2P architecture).  A P2P
   network is a logical overlay that lives on top of the physical
   network, and allows nodes (or "peers") participating to it to
   establish contact and exchange information directly from one to each
   other.  The implementation of a P2P network may very widely: it may
   be structured or unstructured, and it may implement stronger or
   weaker cryptographic and anonymity properties.  While its most common
   application has traditionally been file-sharing (and other types of
   content delivery systems), P2P is increasingly becoming a popular
   architecture for networks and applications that require (or



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   encourage) decentralization.  A prime example is Bitcoin (and similar
   cryptocurrencies), as well as Skype, Spotify and other proprietary
   multimedia applications.

   In a time of heavily centralized online services, peer-to-peer is
   often seen as an alternative, more democratic, and resistant
   architecture that displaces structures of control over data and
   communications and delegates all peers equally to be responsible for
   the functioning, integrity, and security of the data.  While in
   principle peer-to-peer remains critical to the design and development
   of future content distribution, messaging, and publishing systems, it
   poses numerous security and privacy challenges which are mostly
   delegated to individual developers to recognize, analyze, and solve
   in each implementation of a given P2P network.

5.2.7.1.  Network Poisoning

   Since content, and in some occasions peer lists, are safeguarded and
   distributed by its members, P2P networks are prone to what are
   generally defined as "poisoning attacks".  Poisoning attacks might be
   directed directly at the data that is being distributed, for example
   by intentionally corrupting it, or at the index tables used to
   instruct the peers where to fetch the data, or at routing tables,
   with the attempt of providing connecting peers with lists of rogue or
   non-existing peers, with the intention to effectively cause a Denial
   of Service on the network.

5.2.7.2.  Throttling

   Peer-to-Peer traffic (and BitTorrent in particular) represents a high
   percentage of global Internet traffic and it has become increasingly
   popular for Internet Service Providers to perform throttling of
   customers lines in order to limit bandwidth usage [torrentfreak1] and
   sometimes probably as an effect of the ongoing conflict between
   copyright holders and file-sharing communities [wikileaks].  Such
   throtteling undermines the end-to-end principle.

   Throttling the peer-to-peer traffic makes some uses of P2P networks
   ineffective and it might be coupled with stricter inspection of
   users' Internet traffic through Deep Packet Inspection techniques
   which might pose additional security and privacy risks.

5.2.7.3.  Tracking and Identification

   One of the fundamental and most problematic issues with traditional
   peer-to-peer networks is a complete lack of anonymization of its
   users.  For example, in the case of BitTorrent, all peers' IP
   addresses are openly available to the other peers.  This has lead to



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   an ever-increasing tracking of peer-to-peer and file-sharing users
   [ars].  As the geographical location of the user is directly exposed,
   and so could be his identity, the user might become target of
   additional harassment and attacks, being of physical or legal nature.
   For example, it is known that in Germany law firms have made
   extensive use of peer-to-peer and file-sharing tracking systems in
   order to identify downloaders and initiate legal actions looking for
   compensations [torrentfreak2].

   It is worth noting that there are varieties of P2P networks that
   implement cryptographic practices and that introduce anonymization of
   its users.  Such implementations may be proved to be successful in
   resisting censorship of content, and tracking of the network peers.
   A primary example is FreeNet [freenet1], a free software application
   designed to significantly increase the difficulty of users and
   content identification, and dedicated to foster freedom of speech
   online [freenet2].

5.2.7.4.  Sybil Attacks

   In open-membership P2P networks, a single attacker can pretend to be
   many participants, typically by creating multiple fake identities of
   whatever kind the P2P network uses [Douceur].  Attackers can use
   Sybil attacks to bias choices the P2P network makes collectively
   toward the attacker's advantage, e.g., by making it more likely that
   a particular data item (or some threshold of the replicas or shares
   of a data item) are assigned to attacker-controlled participants.  If
   the P2P network implements any voting, moderation, or peer review-
   like functionality, Sybil attacks may be used to "stuff the ballots"
   toward the attacker's benefit.  Companies and governments can use
   Sybil attacks on discussion-oriented P2P systems for "astroturfing"
   or creating the appearance of mass grassroots support for some
   position where there is none in reality.  It is important to know
   that there are no known solutions to Sybil attacks, and routing via
   'friends' allows users to be de-anonymized via their social graph.

5.2.7.5.  Conclusions

   Encrypted P2P and Anonymous P2P networks already emerged and provided
   viable platforms for sharing material [tribler], publish content
   anonymously, and communicate securely [bitmessage].These platforms
   are not perfect, and more research needs to be done.  If adopted at
   large, well-designed and resistant P2P networks might represent a
   critical component of a future secure and distributed Internet,
   enabling freedom of speech and freedom of information at scale.






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5.2.8.  Virtual Private Network

5.2.8.1.  Introduction

   A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a point-to-point connection that
   enables two computers to communicate over an encrypted tunnel.  There
   are multiple implementations and protocols used in provisioning a
   VPN, and they generally diversify by encryption protocol or
   particular requirements, most commonly in proprietary and enterprise
   solutions.  VPNs are used commonly either to enable some devices to
   communicate through peculiar network configurations, or in order to
   use some privacy and security properties in order to protect the
   traffic generated by the end user; or both.  VPNs have also become a
   very popular technology among human rights defenders, dissidents, and
   journalists worldwide to avoid local illegitimate wiretapping and
   eventually also to circumvent censorship.  Among human rights
   defenders VPNs are often debated as a potential alternative to Tor or
   other anonymous networks.  Such comparison is misleading, as some of
   the privacy and security properties of VPNs are often misunderstood
   by less tech-savvy users, which could ultimately lead to unintended
   problems.

   As VPNs increased in popularity, commercial VPN providers have
   started growing in business and are very commonly picked by human
   rights defenders and people at risk, as they are normally provided
   with an easy-to-use service and sometimes even custom applications to
   establish the VPN tunnel.  Not being able to control the
   configuration of the network, and even less so the security of the
   application, assessing the general privacy and security state of
   common VPNs is very hard.  Often such services have been discovered
   leaking information, and their custom applications have been found
   flawed.  While Tor and similar networks receive a lot of scrutiny
   from the public and the academic community, commercial or non-
   commercial VPN networks are way less analyzed and understood, and it
   might be valuable to establish some standards to guarantee a minimal
   level of privacy and security to those who need them the most.

5.2.8.2.  No anonymity against VPN provider

   One of the common misconception among users of VPNs is the level of
   anonymity VPN can provide.  This sense of anonymity can be betrayed
   by a number of attacks or misconfigurations of the VPN provider.  It
   is important to remember that, contrarily to Tor and similar systems,
   VPN was not designed to provide anonymity properties.  From a
   technical point of view, the VPN might leak identifiable information,
   or might be subject of correlation attacks that could expose the
   originating address of the connecting user.  Most importantly, it is
   vital to understand that commercial and non-commercial VPN providers



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   are bound by the law of the jurisdiction they reside in or in which
   their infrastructure is located, and they might be legally forced to
   turn over data of specific users if legal investigations or
   intelligence requirements dictate so.  In such cases, if the VPN
   providers retain logs, it is possible that the information of the
   user is provided to the user's adversary and leads to his or her
   identification.

5.2.8.3.  Logging

   With VPN being point-to-point connections, the service providers are
   in fact able to observe the original location of the connecting users
   and they are able to track at what time they started their session
   and eventually also to which destinations they're trying to connect
   to.  If the VPN providers retain logs for long enough, they might be
   forced to turn over the relevant data or they might be otherwise
   compromised, leading to the same data getting exposed.  A clear log
   retaining policy could be enforced, but considering that countries
   enforce very different levels of data retention policies, VPN
   providers should at least be transparent on what information do they
   store and for how long is being kept.

5.2.8.4.  3rd Party Hosting

   VPN providers very commonly rely on 3rd parties to provision the
   infrastructure that is later going to be used to run VPN endpoints.
   For example, they might rely on external dedicated server hosting
   providers, or on uplink providers.  In those cases, even if the VPN
   provider itself isn't retaining any significant logs, the information
   on the connecting users might be retained by those 3rd parties
   instead, introducing an additional collection point for the
   adversary.

5.2.8.5.  IPv6 Leakage

   Some studies proved that several commercial VPN providers and
   applications suffer of critical leakage of information through IPv6
   due to improper support and configuration [PETS2015VPN].  This is
   generally caused by a lack of proper configuration of the client's
   IPv6 routing tables.  Considering that most popular browsers and
   similar applications have been supporting IPv6 by default, if the
   host is provided with a functional IPv6 configuration, the traffic
   that is generated might be leaked if the VPN application isn't
   designed to manipulate such traffic properly.







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5.2.8.6.  DNS Leakage

   Similarly, VPN services that aren't handling DNS requests and are not
   running DNS servers of their own, might be prone to DNS leaking which
   might not only expose sensitive information on the activity of the
   user, but could also potentially lead to DNS hijacking attacks and
   following compromises.

5.2.8.7.  Traffic Correlation

   As revelations of mass surveillance have been growing in the press,
   additional details on attacks on secure Internet communications have
   come to the public's attention.  Among these, VPN appeared to be a
   very interesting target for attacks and collection efforts.  Some
   implementations of VPN appear to be particularly vulnerable to
   identification and collection of key exchanges which, some Snowden
   documents revealed, are systematically collected and stored for
   future reference.  The ability of an adversary to monitor network
   connections at many different points over the Internet, can allow
   them to perform traffic correlation attacks and identify the origin
   of certain VPN traffic by cross referencing the connection time of
   the user to the endpoint and the connection time of the endpoint to
   the final destination.  These types of attacks, although very
   expensive and normally only performed by very resourceful
   adversaries, have been documented [spiegel] to be already in practice
   and could completely vanify the use of a VPN and ultimately expose
   the activity and the identity of a user at risk.

5.2.9.  HTTP Status Code 451

   Every Internet user has run into the '404 Not Found' Hypertext
   Transfer Protocol (HTTP) status code when trying, and failing, to
   access a particular website [Cath].  It is a response status that the
   server sends to the browser, when the server cannot locate the URL.
   '403 Forbidden' is another example of this class of code signals that
   gives users information about what is going on.  In the '403' case
   the server can be reached, but is blocking the request because the
   user is trying to access content forbidden to them.  This can be
   because the specific user is not allowed access to the content (like
   a government employee trying to access pornography on a work-
   computer) or because access is restricted to all users (like social
   network sites in certain countries).  As surveillance and censorship
   of the Internet is becoming more commonplace, voices were raised at
   the IETF to introduce a new status code that indicates when something
   is not available for 'legal reasons' (like censorship):

   The 451 status code would allow server operators to operate with
   greater transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public



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   policy affect their operation.  This transparency may be beneficial
   both to these operators and to end-users [Bray].

   The status code is named '451', a reference to Bradbury's famous
   novel on censorship, and the temperature (in Fahrenheit) at which
   bookpaper autoignites.

   During the IETF92 meeting in Dallas, there was discussion about the
   usefulness of '451'.  The main tension revolved around the lack of an
   apparent machine-readable technical use of the information.  The
   extent to which '451' is just 'political theatre' or whether it has a
   concrete technical use was heatedly debated.  Some argued that 'the
   451 status code is just a status code with a response body' others
   said it was problematic because 'it brings law into the picture'.
   Again others argued that it would be useful for individuals, or
   organizations like the 'Chilling Effects' project, crawling the web
   to get an indication of censorship (IETF discussion on '451' -
   author's field notes March 2015).  There was no outright objection
   during the Dallas meeting against moving forward on status code
   '451', and on December 18, 2015 the Internet Engineering Steering
   Group approved publication of 'An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal
   Obstacles'.  It is now an IETF approved HTTP status code to signal
   when resource access is denied as a consequence of legal demands
   [RFC7725].

   What is interesting about this particular case is that not only
   technical arguments but also the status code's outright potential
   political use for civil society played a substantial role in shaping
   the discussion, and the decision to move forward with this
   technology.

   It is however important to note that 451 is not a solution to detect
   all occasions of censorship.  A large swath of Internet filtering
   occurs in the network rather than the server itself.  For these forms
   of censorship 451 plays a limited role, as the servers will not be
   able to send the code, because they haven't received the requests (as
   is the case with servers with resources blocked by the Chinese Golden
   shield).  Such filtering regimes are unlikely to voluntarily inject a
   451 status code.  The use of 451 is most likely to apply in the case
   of cooperative, legal versions of content removal resulting from
   requests to providers.  One can think of content that is removed or
   blocked for legal reasons, like copyright infringement, gambling
   laws, child abuse, et cetera.  The major use case is thus clearly on
   the Web server itself, not the network.  Large Internet companies and
   search engines are constantly asked to censor content in various
   jurisdictions. 451 allows this to be easily discovered, for instance
   by initiatives like the Lumen Database.  In the case of adversarial




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   blocking done by a filtering entity on the network 451 is less
   useful.

   Overall, the strength of 451 lies in its ability to provide
   transparency by giving the reason for blocking, and giving the end-
   user the ability to file a complaint.  It allows organizations to
   easily measure censorship in an automated way, and prompts the user
   to access the content via another path (e.g.  TOR, VPNs) when (s)he
   encounters the 451 status code.

   Status code 451 impact human rights by making censorship more
   transparent and measurable.  The status code increases transparency
   both by signaling the existence of censorship (instead of a much more
   broad HTTP error message like HTTP status code 404) as well as
   providing details of the legal restriction, which legal authority is
   imposing it, and what class of resources it applies to.  This
   empowers the user to seek redress.

5.2.10.  Middleboxes

   On the current Internet, transparency on how packets reach a
   destination is no longer a given.  This is due to the increased
   presence of firewalls, spam filters, and network address translators
   networks (NATs) - or middleboxes as these hosts are often called -
   that make use of higher-layer fields to function [Walfish].  This
   development is contentious.  The debate also unfolded at the IETF,
   specifically at the Session Protocol Underneath Datagrams (SPUD)
   Birds of a Feather (BOF) meeting held at the IETF conference in March
   2015.  The discussion at the BOF focused on questions about adding
   meta-data, or other information to traffic flows, to enable the
   sharing of information with middleboxes in that flow.  During the
   sessions two competing arguments were distilled.  On the one hand
   adding additional data would allow for network optimization, and
   hence improve traffic carriage.  On the other hand, there are risks
   of information leakage and other privacy and security concerns.

   Middleboxes, and the protocols guiding them, influence individuals'
   ability to communicate online freely and privately.  Repeatedly
   mentioned in the discussion was the danger of censorship that comes
   with middleboxes, and the IETF's role to prevent such censorship from
   happening.  Middleboxes essentially undermine the end-to-end
   principle by inserting themselves in the network, and acting as
   intermediaries.  Although there are many advantages, such as
   increased security and network performance, to having middleboxes
   they also have downsides.  They are known to limit the choice of
   transport protocols and drop packets that don't conform.  As such,
   limiting both freedom of expression online and undermining the end-
   to-end principle.



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   Middleboxes are becoming a proxy for the debate on the extent to
   which commercial interests are a valid reason to undermine the end-
   to-end principle.  The potential for abuse and censoring, and thus
   ultimately the impact of middleboxes on the Internet as a place of
   unfiltered, unmonitored freedom of speech, is real.  It is impossible
   to make any definitive statements about the direction the debate on
   middleboxes will take at the IETF.  The opinions expressed in the
   SPUD BOF and by the various interviewees indicate that a majority of
   engineers are trying to mitigate the negative effects of middleboxes
   on freedom of speech, but their ability to act is limited by their
   larger commercial context that is expanding the use of middleboxes.

5.2.11.  DDOS attacks

   Many individuals, not excluding IETF engineers, have argued that DDoS
   attacks are fundamentally against freedom of speech.  Technically
   DDoS attacks are when one or multiple host overload the bandwidth or
   resources of another host by flooding it with traffic, causing it to
   temporarily stop being available to users.  One can roughly
   differentiate three types of DDoS attacks: Volume Based Attacked
   (This attack aims to make the host unreachable by using up all it's
   bandwith, often used techniques are: UDP floods and ICMP floods),
   Protocol Attacks (This attacks aims to use up actual server
   resources, often used techniques are SYN floods, fragmented packet
   attacks, and Ping of Death [RFC4949]) and Application Layer Attacks
   (this attack aims to bring down a server, such as the webserver).

   In their 2010 report Zuckerman et al argue that DDoS attacks are a
   bad thing because they are increasingly used by governments to attack
   and silence critics.  Their research demonstrates that in many
   countries independent media outlets and human rights organizations
   are the victim of DDoS attacks, which are directly or indirectly
   linked to their governments.  These types of attacks are particularly
   complicated because attribution is difficult, creating a situation in
   which governments can effectively censor content, while being able to
   deny involvement in the attacks [Zuckerman].  DDoS attacks can thus
   stifle freedom of expression, complicate the ability of independent
   media and human rights organizations to exercise their right to
   (online) freedom of association, while facilitating the ability of
   governments to censor dissent.  When it comes to comparing DDoS
   attacks to protests in offline life, it is important to remember that
   only a limited number of DDoS attacks involved solely willing
   participants.  In most cases, the clients are hacked computers of
   unrelated parties that have not consented to being part of a DDoS
   (for exceptions see Operation Abibil [Abibil] or the Iranian Green
   Movement DDoS [GreenMovement]).





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   In addition, DDoS attacks are increasingly used as an extortion
   tactic, with criminals flooding a website - rendering it inaccessible
   - until the owner pays them a certain amount of money to stop the
   attack.  The costs of mitigating such attacks, either by improving
   security to prevent them or paying off the attackers, ends up being
   paid by the consumer.

   All of these issues seem to suggest that the IETF should try to
   ensure that their protocols cannot be used for DDoS attacks.
   Decreasing the number of vulnerabilities in the network stacks of
   routers or computers, reducing flaws in HTTPS implementations, and
   depreciating non-secure HTTP protocols could address this issue.  The
   IETF can clearly play a role in bringing about some of these changes,
   and has indicated in [RFC7258] its commitment to mitigating
   'pervasive monitoring (...) in the design of IETF protocols, where
   possible.'  This means the use of encryption should become standard.
   Effectively, for the web this means standardized use of HTTPS.  The
   IETF could redirect its work such that HTPPS becomes part-and-parcel
   of its standards.  However, next to the various technical trade-offs
   that this might lead to it is important to consider that DDoS attacks
   are sometimes seen as a method for exercising freedom of speech
   [Sauter].

   There is a need for the IETF to be consistent in the face of attacks
   (an attack is an attack is an attack) to maintain the viability of
   the network.  Arguing that some DDoS attacks should be allowed, based
   on the motivation of the attackers complicates the work of the IETF.
   Because it approaches PM regardless of the motivation of the
   attackers (see [RFC7258]) for reasoning), taking the motivation of
   the attackers into account for DDoS would indirectly undermine the
   ability of the IETF to protect the right to privacy because it
   introduces an element of inconsistency into how the IETF deals with
   attacks.

   David Clark recently published a paper warning that the future of the
   Internet is in danger.  He argues that the private sector control
   over the Internet is too strong, limiting the myriad of ways in which
   it can be used [Daedalus], including for freedom of speech.  But just
   because freedom of speech, dissent, and protest are human rights, and
   DDoS is a potential expression of those rights, doesn't mean that
   DDoS in and of itself is a right.  To widen the analogy, just because
   the Internet is a medium through which the right to freedom of
   expression can be exercised does not make access to the Internet or
   specific ICTs or NCTs a human right.  Uses of DDoS might or might not
   be legitimate for political reasons, but the IETF has no means or
   methods to assess this, and in general enabling DDoS would mean a
   deterioration of the network and thus freedom of expression.




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   In summation, the IETF cannot be expected to take a moral stance on
   DDoS attacks, or create protocols to enable some attacks and inhibit
   others.  But what it can do is critically reflect on its role in
   creating a commercialized Internet without a defacto public space or
   inherent protections for freedom of speech.

5.3.  Model for developing human rights protocol considerations

   Having established how human rights relate to standards and
   protocols, a common vocabulary of technical concepts that impact
   human rights and how these technical concept can be combined to
   ensure that the Internet remains an enabling environment for human
   rights means the contours of a model for developing human rights
   protocol considerations has taken shape.  This subsection provides
   the last step by detailing how the technical concepts identified
   above relate to human rights, and what questions engineers should ask
   themselves when developing or improving protocols.  In short, it
   presents a set of human rights protocol considerations.

5.3.1.  Human rights threats

   Human rights threats on the Internet come in a myriad of forms.
   Protocols and standards can harm or enable the right to freedom of
   expression, right to non-discrimination, right to equal protection,
   right to participate in cultural life, arts and science, right to
   freedom of assembly and association, and the right to security.  An
   end-user who is denied access to certain services, data or websites
   may be unable to disclose vital information about the malpractices of
   a government or other authority.  A person whose communications are
   monitored may be prevented from exercising their right to freedom of
   association or participate in political processes [Penney].  In a
   worst-case scenario, protocols that leak information can lead to
   physical danger.  A realistic example to consider is when opposition
   group members (or those identified as such) in totalitarian regimes
   are subjected to torture on the basis of information gathered by the
   regime through information leakage in protocols.

   This sections details several 'common' threats to human rights,
   indicating how each of these can lead to human rights violations/
   harms and present several examples of how these threats to human
   rights materialize on the Internet.  This threat modeling is inspired
   by [RFC6973] Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols, which is
   based on the security threat analysis.  This method is by no means a
   perfect solution for assessing human rights risks in Internet
   protocols and systems; it is however the best approach currently
   available.  Certain specific human rights threats are indirectly
   considered in Internet protocols as part of the security
   considerations [RFC3552], but privacy guidelines [RFC6973] or



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   reviews, let alone human rights impact assessments of protocols are
   not standardized or implemented.

   Many threats, enablers and risks are linked to different rights.
   This is not unsurprising if one takes into account that human rights
   are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.  Here however we're
   not discussing all human rights because not all human rights are
   relevant to ICTs in general and protocols and standards in particular
   [Bless].  This is by no means an attempt to cherry picks rights, if
   other rights seem relevant, please contact the authors and/or the
   hrpc mailinglist.

5.3.2.  Guidelines for human rights considerations

   This section provides guidance for document authors in the form of a
   questionnaire about protocols being designed.  The questionnaire may
   be useful at any point in the design process, particularly after
   document authors have developed a high-level protocol model as
   described in [RFC4101].

   There should be some discussion of potential human rights risks
   arising from potential misapplications of the protocol or technology
   described in the RFC.  This might be coupled with an Applicability
   Statement for that RFC.

   Note that the guidance provided in this section does not recommend
   specific practices.  The range of protocols developed in the IETF is
   too broad to make recommendations about particular uses of data or
   how human rights might be balanced against other design goals.
   However, by carefully considering the answers to the following
   questions, document authors should be able to produce a comprehensive
   analysis that can serve as the basis for discussion on whether the
   protocol adequately protects against specific human rights threats.
   This guidance is meant to help the thought process of a human rights
   analysis; it does not provide specific directions for how to write a
   human rights protocol considerations section (following the example
   set in [RFC6973]).

5.3.2.1.  Technical concepts as they relate to human rights

5.3.2.1.1.  Connectivity

   Question(s): Does your protocol add application-specific functions to
   intermediary nodes?  Could this functionality also be added to end
   nodes instead of intermediary nodes?

   Explanation: The end-to-end principle [Saltzer] which aims to extend
   characteristics of a protocol or system as far as possible within the



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   system, or in other words 'the intelligence is end to end rather than
   hidden in the network' [RFC1958].  Middleboxes (which can be Content
   Delivery Networks, Firewalls, NATs or other intermediary nodes that
   provide other 'services' than routing), and the protocols guiding
   them, influence individuals' ability to communicate online freely and
   privately.  The potential for abuse and intentional and unintentional
   censoring and limiting permissionless innovation, and thus ultimately
   the impact of middleboxes on the Internet as a place of unfiltered,
   unmonitored freedom of speech, is real.

   Example: End-to-end instant message encryption would conceal
   communications from one user's instant messaging application through
   any intermediate devices and servers all the way to the recipient's
   instant messaging application.  If the message was decrypted at any
   intermediate point-for example at a service provider-then the
   property of end-to-end encryption would not be present.

   Impacts:

   -  Right to freedom of expression

   -  Right to freedom of assembly and association

5.3.2.1.2.  Privacy

   Question(s): Did you have a look at the Guidelines in the Privacy
   Considerations for Internet Protocols [RFC6973] section 7?  Could
   your protocol in any way impact the confidentiality of protocol
   metadata?  Could your protocol counter traffic analysis, or data
   minimization?

   Explanation: Privacy refers to the right of an entity (normally a
   person), acting in its own behalf, to determine the degree to which
   it will interact with its environment, including the degree to which
   the entity is willing to share its personal information with others.
   [RFC4949].

   Example: See [RFC6973]

   Impacts:

   -  Right to freedom of expression

   -  Right to non-discrimination







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5.3.2.1.3.  Content agnosticism

   Question(s): If your protocol impacts packet handling, does it look
   at the packet content?  Is it making decisions based on the content
   of the packet?  Is the protocol transparent about its decisions?
   Does your protocol prioritize certain content or services over
   others?

   Explanation: Content agnosticism refers to the notion that network
   traffic is treated identically regardless of content.

   Example: Content agnosticism prevents content-based discrimination
   against packets.  This is important because changes to this principle
   can lead to a two-tiered Internet, where certain packets are
   prioritized over others on the basis of their content.  Effectively
   this would mean that although all users are entitled to receive their
   packets at a certain speed, some users become more equal than others.

   Impacts:

   -  Right to freedom of expression

   -  Right to non-discrimination

   -  Right to equal protection

5.3.2.1.4.  Security

   Question(s): Did you have a look at Guidelines for Writing RFC Text
   on Security Considerations [RFC3552]?  Have you found any attacks
   that are out of scope for your protocol?  Would these attacks be
   pertinent to the human rights enabling features of the Internet (as
   descibred throughout this document)?

   Explanation: Most people speak of security as if it were a single
   monolithic property of a protocol or system, however, upon
   reflection; one realizes that it is clearly not true.  Rather,
   security is a series of related but somewhat independent properties.
   Not all of these properties are required for every application.  We
   can loosely divide security goals into those related to protecting
   communications (COMMUNICATION SECURITY, also known as COMSEC) and
   those relating to protecting systems (ADMINISTRATIVE SECURITY or
   SYSTEM SECURITY).  Since communications are carried out by systems
   and access to systems is through communications channels, these goals
   obviously interlock, but they can also be independently provided
   [RFC3552].  Security needs to be also be approached in terms of
   advesaries, and passive global adversaries whose attack is pervasive




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   surveillance now need to be taken into consideration when designing
   new protocols.

   Example: See [RFC3552].

   Impacts:

   -  Right to freedom of expression

   -  Right to freedom of assembly and association

   -  Right to non discrimination

5.3.2.1.5.  Internationalization

   Question(s): Does your protocol have text strings that are readable
   or entered by humans?  Does your protocol allow Unicode encoded in
   UTF-8 only, thereby shifting conversion issues away from individual
   choices?  Did you have a look at [RFC6365]?

   Explanation: Internationalization refers to the practice of making
   protocols, standards, and implementations usable in different
   languages and scripts.  (see Localization).  In the IETF,
   internationalization means to add or improve the handling of non-
   ASCII text in a protocol.  [RFC6365] A different perspective, more
   appropriate to protocols that are designed for global use from the
   beginning, is the definition used by W3C:

        "Internationalization is the design and development of a
        product, application or document content that enables easy
        localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region,
        or language."  {{W3Ci18nDef}}

   Many protocols that handle text only handle one charset (US-ASCII),
   or leave the question of what CCS and encoding are used up to local
   guesswork (which leads, of course, to interoperability problems).  If
   multiple charsets are permitted, they must be explicitly identified
   [RFC2277].  Adding non-ASCII text to a protocol allows the protocol
   to handle more scripts, hopefully representing users across the
   world.  In today's world, that is normally best accomplished by
   allowing Unicode encoded in UTF-8 only, thereby shifting conversion
   issues away from individual choices.

   Example: See localization Impacts:

   -  Right to freedom of expression

   -  Right to political participation



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   -  Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science

   -  Right to political participation

5.3.2.1.6.  Censorship resistance

   Question(s): Does this protocol introduce new identifiers that might
   be associated with persons or content?  Does your protocol make it
   apparent or transparent when filtering happens?  Can your protocol
   contribute to filtering in a way it could be implemented to censor
   data or services?  Could this be designed to ensure this doesn't
   happen?

   Explanation: Censorship resistance refers to the methods and measures
   to prevent Internet censorship.

   Example: Identifiers of content exposed within a protocol might be
   used to facilitate censorship, as in the case of IP based censorship,
   which affects protocols like HTTP.  Filtering can be made apparent by
   the use of status code 451 - which allows server operators to operate
   with greater transparency in circumstances where issues of law or
   public policy affect their operation [Bray].

   Impacts: - Right to freedom of expression - Right to political
   participation - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and
   science - Right to freedom of assembly and association

5.3.2.1.7.  Open Standards

   Question(s): Is your protocol fully documented in a way that it could
   be easily implemented, improved, build upon and/or further developed?
   Do you depend on proprietary code for the implementation, running or
   further development of your protocol?  Does your protocol favor a
   particular proprietary specification over technically equivalent and
   competing specification(s), for instance by making any incorporated
   vendor specification "required" or "recommended" [RFC2026]?  Do you
   normatively reference another standard that is not available without
   cost?  Are you aware of any patents that would prevent your standard
   from being fully implemented?

   Explanation: The Internet was able to developed into the global
   network of networks because of the existence of open, non-proprietary
   standards [Zittrain].  They are crucial for enabling
   interoperability.  Yet, open standards are not explicitly defined
   within the IETF.  On the subject, [RFC2606] states: Various national
   and international standards bodies, such as ANSI, ISO, IEEE, and ITU-
   T, develop a variety of protocol and service specifications that are
   similar to Technical Specifications defined at the IETF.  National



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   and international groups also publish "implementors' agreements" that
   are analogous to Applicability Statements, capturing a body of
   implementation-specific detail concerned with the practical
   application of their standards.  All of these are considered to be
   "open external standards" for the purposes of the Internet Standards
   Process.  Similarly, [RFC3935] does not define open standards but
   does emphasize the importance of 'open process': any interested
   person can participate in the work, know what is being decided, and
   make his or her voice heard on the issue.  Part of this principle is
   the IETF's commitment to making its documents, WG mailing lists,
   attendance lists, and meeting minutes publicly available on the
   Internet.

   Open standards are important as they allow for permissionless
   innovation, which is important to maintain the freedom and ability to
   freely create and deploy new protocols on top of the communications
   constructs that currently exist.  It is at the heart of the Internet
   as we know it, and to maintain its fundamentally open nature, we need
   to be mindful of the need for developing open standards.

   All standards that need to be normatively implemented should be
   freely available and with reasonable protection for patent
   infringement claims, so it can also be implemented in open source or
   free software.  Patents have often held back open standardization or
   been used against those deploying open stadards, particularly in the
   domain of cryptography [newegg].  Patents in open standards or in
   normative references to other standards should have a patent
   disclosure [notewell], royalty-free licensing [patentpolicy], or some
   other form of reasonable protection.  Reasonable patent protection
   should includes but is not limited to cryptographic primitives.

   Example: [RFC6108] describes a system for providing critical end-user
   notifications to web browsers, which has been deployed by Comcast, an
   Internet Service Provider (ISP).  Such a notification system is being
   used to provide near-immediate notifications to customers, such as to
   warn them that their traffic exhibits patterns that are indicative of
   malware or virus infection.  There are other proprietary systems that
   can perform such notifications, but those systems utilize Deep Packet
   Inspection (DPI) technology.  In contrast to DPI, this document
   describes a system that does not rely upon DPI, and is instead based
   in open IETF standards and open source applications.

   Impacts:

   -  Right to freedom of expression

   -  Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science




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5.3.2.1.8.  Heterogeneity Support

   Question(s): Does your protocol support heterogeneity by design?
   Does your protocol allow for multiple types of hardware?  Does your
   protocol allow for multiple types of application protocols?  Is your
   protocol liberal in what it receives and handles?  Will it remain
   usable and open if the context changes?  Does your protocol allow
   there to be well-defined extension points?  Do these extension points
   to allow open innovation possibly have security and privacy
   ramifications, and if so,how can these be dealt with?

   Explanation: The Internet is characterized by heterogeneity on many
   levels: devices and nodes, router scheduling algorithms and queue
   management mechanisms, routing protocols, levels of multiplexing,
   protocol versions and implementations, underlying link layers (e.g.,
   point-to-point, multi-access links, wireless, FDDI, etc.), in the
   traffic mix and in the levels of congestion at different times and
   places.  Moreover, as the Internet is composed of autonomous
   organizations and Internet service providers, each with their own
   separate policy concerns, there is a large heterogeneity of
   administrative domains and pricing structures.  As a result, the
   heterogeneity principle proposed in [RFC1958] needs to be supported
   by design [FIArch].

   Example: Heterogeneity is inevitable and needs be supported by
   design.  Multiple types of hardware must be allowed for, e.g.
   transmission speeds differing by at least 7 orders of magnitude,
   various computer word lengths, and hosts ranging from memory-starved
   microprocessors up to massively parallel supercomputers.  Multiple
   types of application protocol must be allowed for, ranging from the
   simplest such as remote login up to the most complex such as
   distributed databases [RFC1958].

   Impacts: - Right to freedom of expression - Right to security

5.3.2.1.9.  Anonymity

   Question(s): Did you have a look at the Privacy Considerations for
   Internet Protocols [RFC6973], especially section 6.1.1 ?

   Explanation: Anonymity refers to the condition of an identity being
   unknown or concealed [RFC4949].  It is an important feature for many
   end-users, as it allows them different degrees of privacy online.

   Example: Often standards expose private information, it is important
   to consider ways to mitigate the obvious privacy impacts.  For
   instance, a feature which uses deep packet inspection or geolocation




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   data could refuse to open this data to third parties, that might be
   able to connect the data to a physical person.

   Impacts: - Right to non-discrimination - Right to political
   participation - Right to freedom of assembly and association - Right
   to security

5.3.2.1.10.  Pseudonymity

   Question(s): Have you considered the Privacy Considerations for
   Internet Protocols [RFC6973], especially section 6.1.2 ? Does this
   specification collect personally derived data?  Does the standard
   utilize data that is personally-derived, i.e. derived from the
   interaction of a single person, or their device or address?  Does
   this specification generate personally derived data, and if so how
   will that data be handled?

   Explanation: Pseudonymity - the ability to disguise one's identity
   online - is an important feature for many end-users, as it allows
   them different degrees of disguised identity and privacy online.

   Example: Designing a standard that exposes private information, it is
   important to consider ways to mitigate the obvious impacts.  For
   instance, a feature which uses deep packet inspection or geolocation
   data could refuse to open this data to third parties, that might be
   able to connect the data to a physical person.

   Impacts:

   -  Right to non-discrimination

   -  Right to freedom of assembly and association

5.3.2.1.11.  Accessibility

   Question(s): Is your protocol designed to provide an enabling
   environment for people who are not able-bodied?  Have you looked at
   the W3C Web Accessibility Initiative for examples and guidance?  Is
   your protocol optimized for low bandwidth and high latency
   connections?  Could your protocol also be developed in a stateless
   manner?

   Explanation: The Internet is fundamentally designed to work for all
   people, whatever their hardware, software, language, culture,
   location, or physical or mental ability.  When the Internet meets
   this goal, it is accessible to people with a diverse range of
   hearing, movement, sight, and cognitive ability [W3CAccessibility].
   Sometimes in the design of protocols, websites, web technologies, or



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   web tools, barriers are created that exclude people from using the
   Web.

   Example: The HTML protocol as defined in [RFC1866] specifically
   requires that every image must have an alt attribute (with a few
   exceptions for HTML5) to ensure images are accessible for people that
   cannot themselves decipher non-text content in web pages.

   Impacts: - Right to non-discrimination - Right to freedom of assembly
   and association - Right to education - Right to political
   participation

5.3.2.1.12.  Localization

   Question(s): Does your protocol uphold the standards of
   internationalization?  Have made any concrete steps towards
   localizing your protocol for relevant audiences?

   Explanation: Localization refers to the adaptation of a product,
   application or document content to meet the language, cultural and
   other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)
   [W3Ci18nDef].  It is also described as the practice of translating an
   implementation to make it functional in a specific language or for
   users in a specific locale (see Internationalization).

   Example: The Internet is a global medium, but many of its protocols
   and products are developed with a certain audience in mind, that
   often share particular characteristics like knowing how to read and
   write in ASCII and knowing English.  This limits the ability of a
   large part of the world's online population from using the Internet
   in a way that is culturally and linguistically accessible.  An
   example of a protocol that has taken into account the view that
   individuals like to have access to data in their native language can
   be found in [RFC1766].  This protocol labels the information content
   with an identifier for the language in which it is written.  And this
   allows information to be presented in more than one language.

   Impacts: - Right to non-discrimination - Right to participate in
   cultural life, arts and science - Right to Freedom of Expression

5.3.2.1.13.  Decentralization

   Question(s): Can your protocol be implemented without one single
   point of control?  If applicable, can your protocol be deployed in a
   federated manner?  What is the potential for discrimination against
   users of your protocol?  How can use of your protocol be used to
   implicate users?  Does your protocol create additional centralized
   points of control?



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   Explanation: Decentralization is one of the central technical
   concepts of the architecture, and embraced as such by the IETF
   [RFC3935].  It refers to the absence or minimization of centralized
   points of control - a feature that is assumed to make it easy for new
   users to join and new uses to unfold {{Brown}. It also reduces issues
   surrounding single points of failure, and distributes the network
   such that it continues to function if one or several nodes are
   disabled.  With the commercialization of the Internet in the early
   1990's there has been a slow move to move away from decentralization,
   to the detriment of the technical benefits of having a decentralized
   Internet.

   Example: The bits traveling the Internet are increasingly susceptible
   to monitoring and censorship, from both governments and Internet
   service providers, as well as third (malicious) parties.  The ability
   to monitor and censor is further enabled by the increased
   centralization of the network that creates central infrastructure
   points that can be tapped in to.  The creation of peer-to-peer
   networks and the development of voice-over-IP protocols using peer-
   to-peer technology in combination with distributed hash table (DHT)
   for scalability are examples of how protocols can preserve
   decentralization [Pouwelse].

   Impacts: - Right to freedom of assembly and association

5.3.2.1.14.  Reliability

   Question(s): Is your protocol fault tolerant?  Does it degrade
   gracefully?  Do you have a documented way to announce degradation?
   Do you have measures in place for recovery or partial healing from
   failure?  Can your protocol maintain dependability and performance in
   the face of unanticipated changes or circumstances?

   Explanation: Reliability ensures that a protocol will execute its
   function consistently and error resistant as described, and function
   without unexpected result.  A system that is reliable degenerates
   gracefully and will have a documented way to announce degradation.
   It also has mechanisms to recover from failure gracefully, and if
   applicable, allow for partial healing.  As with confidentiality, the
   growth of the Internet and fostering innovation in services depends
   on users having confidence and trust [RFC3724] in the network.  For
   reliability it is necessary that services notify the users if a
   delivery fails.  In the case of real-time systems in addition to the
   reliable delivery the protocol needs to safeguard timeliness.

   Example: In the modern IP stack structure, a reliable transport layer
   requires an indication that transport processing has successfully
   completed, such as given by TCP's ACK message [RFC0793], and not



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   simply an indication from the IP layer that the packet arrived.
   Similarly, an application layer protocol may require an application-
   specific acknowledgement that contains, among other things, a status
   code indicating the disposition of the request (See [RFC3724]).

   Impacts: - Right to security

5.3.2.1.15.  Confidentiality

   Question(s): Does this protocol expose information related to
   identifiers or data?  If so, does it do so to each other protocol
   entity (i.e., recipients, intermediaries, and enablers) [RFC6973]?
   What options exist for protocol implementers to choose to limit the
   information shared with each entity?  What operational controls are
   available to limit the information shared with each entity?

   What controls or consent mechanisms does the protocol define or
   require before personal data or identifiers are shared or exposed via
   the protocol?  If no such mechanisms or controls are specified, is it
   expected that control and consent will be handled outside of the
   protocol?

   Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to share different
   pieces of information with different recipients?  If not, are there
   mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to provide initiators
   with such control?

   Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to limit which
   information is shared with intermediaries?  If not, are there
   mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to provide users with
   such control?  Is it expected that users will have relationships that
   govern the use of the information (contractual or otherwise) with
   those who operate these intermediaries?  Does the protocol prefer
   encryption over clear text operation?

   Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to express individuals'
   preferences to recipients or intermediaries with regard to the
   collection, use, or disclosure of their personal data?

   Explanation: Confidentiality refers to keeping your data secret from
   unintended listeners [RFC3552].  The growth of the Internet depends
   on users having confidence that the network protects their private
   information [RFC1984].

   Example: Protocols that do not encrypt their payload make the entire
   content of the communication available to the idealized attacker
   along their path.  Following the advice in [RFC3365], most such
   protocols have a secure variant that encrypts the payload for



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   confidentiality, and these secure variants are seeing ever-wider
   deployment.  A noteworthy exception is DNS [RFC1035], as DNSSEC
   [RFC4033]does not have confidentiality as a requirement.  This
   implies that, in the absence of changes to the protocol as presently
   under development in the IETF's DNS Private Exchange (DPRIVE) working
   group, all DNS queries and answers generated by the activities of any
   protocol are available to the attacker.  When store-and-forward
   protocols are used (e.g., SMTP [RFC5321]), intermediaries leave this
   data subject to observation by an attacker that has compromised these
   intermediaries, unless the data is encrypted end-to-end by the
   application-layer protocol or the implementation uses an encrypted
   store for this data [RFC7624].

   Impacts:

   -  Right to security

5.3.2.1.16.  Integrity

   Question(s): Does your protocol maintain and assure the accuracy of
   data?  Does your protocol maintain and assure the consistency of
   data?  Does your protocol in any way allow for the data to be
   (intentionally or unintentionally) altered?

   Explanation: Integrity refers to the maintenance and assurance of the
   accuracy and consistency of data to ensure it has not been
   (intentionally or unintentionally) altered.

   Example: See authenticity

   Impacts:

   -  Right to security

5.3.2.1.17.  Authenticity

   Question(s): Do you have sufficient measures to confirm the truth of
   an attribute of a single piece of data or entity?  Can the attributes
   get garbled along the way (see security)?  If relevant have you
   implemented IPsec, DNSsec, HTTPS and other Standard Security Best
   Practices?

   Explanation: Authenticity ensures that data does indeed come from the
   source it claims to come from.  This is important to prevent attacks
   or unauthorized access and use of data.

   Example: Authentication of data is important to prevent
   vulnerabilities and attacks, like man-in-the-middle-attacks.  These



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   attacks happen when a third party (often for malicious reasons)
   intercepts a communication between two parties, inserting themselves
   in the middle and posing as both parties.  In practice this looks as
   follows:

   Alice wants to communicate with Bob.  Alice sends data to Bob.  Niels
   intercepts the data sent to Bob.  Niels reads and alters the message
   to Bob.  Bob cannot see the data did not come from Alice but from
   Niels.  Niels intercepts and alters the communication as it is sent
   between Alice and Bob.  Niels knows all.

   Wat iImpacts:

   -  Right to security

5.3.2.1.18.  Acceptability

   Question(s): Do your protocols follow the principle of non-
   discrimination?  Do your protocols follow the principle of content
   agnosticism?  Does your protocol take into account the needs of
   special needs (Internet) groups, like the audio-visually impaired?
   Also see availability.

   Explanation: The Internet is a global medium.  Yet, there continue to
   be issues surrounding acceptability - the extent to which standards
   are non-discriminatory and relevant to the widest range of end-users
   - that need to be resolved.  Many standards are not suitable for end-
   users who are not-ablebodied, or otherwise restricted in their
   ability to access the Internet in its current form (text, data and
   English heavy).  Development of new standards should consider the
   ways in which they exclude or include non-traditional user
   communities.

   Example: Designing a feature that could make access to websites for
   non-able bodied people more difficult.

   -  Right to education

   -  Right to freedom of expression

   -  Right to freedom of assembly and association

5.3.2.1.19.  Adaptability

   Question(s): Is your protocol written in such a way that is would be
   easy for other protocols to be developed on top of it, or to interact
   with it?  Does your protocol impact permissionless innovation?  See
   'Connectivity' above.



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   Explanation: Adaptability is closely interrelated permissionless
   innovation, both maintain the freedom and ability to freely create
   and deploy new protocols on top of the communications constructs that
   currently exist.  It is at the heart of the Internet as we know it,
   and to maintain its fundamentally open nature, we need to be mindful
   of the impact of protocols on maintaining or reducing permissionless
   innovation to ensure the Internet can continue to develop.

   Example: WebRTC generates audio and/or video data.  In order to
   ensure that WebRTC can be used in different locations by different
   parties it is important that standard Javascript APIs are developed
   to support applications from different voice service providers.
   Multiple parties will have similar capabilities, in order to ensure
   that all parties can build upon existing standards these need to be
   adaptable, and allow for permissionless innovation.

   Impacts:

   -  Right to education

   -  Freedom of expression

   -  Freedom of assembly and association

6.  Acknowledgements

   A special thanks to all members of the hrpc RG who contributed to
   this draft.  The following deserve a special mention:

   -  Joana Varon for helping draft the first iteration of the
      methodology, previous drafts and the direction of the film Net of
      Rights and working on the interviews at IETF92 in Dallas.

   -  Daniel Kahn Gillmor (dkg) for helping with the first iteration of
      the glossary as well as a lot of technical guidance, support and
      language suggestions.

   -  Claudio Guarnieri for writing the first iterations of the case
      studies on VPN, HTTP, and Peer to Peer.

   -  Will Scott for writing the first iterations of the case studies on
      DNS, IP, XMPP.

   -  Avri Doria for proposing writing a glossary in the first place,
      help writing the initial proposals and Internet Drafts and
      contributing to the glossary.





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   and Stephane Bortzmeyer, John Curran, Barry Shein, Joe Hall, Joss
   Wright, Harry Halpin, and Tim Sammut who made a lot of excellent
   suggestions, many of which found their way directly into the text.
   We want to thank Shane Kerr, Giovane Moura, James Gannon, and Scott
   Craig for their reviews and testing the HRPC guidelines in the wild.
   We would also like to thank Molly Sauter, Arturo Filasto, Nathalie
   Marechal, Eleanor Saitta and all others who provided input on the
   draft or the conceptualization of the idea.

7.  Security Considerations

   As this document concerns a research document, there are no security
   considerations.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

9.  Research Group Information

   The discussion list for the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations
   proposed working group is located at the e-mail address hrpc@ietf.org
   [3].  Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to
   the list is at https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc

   Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.irtf.org/mail-
   archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html

10.  References

10.1.  Informative References

   [Abbate]   Abbate, J., "Inventing the Internet", MIT Press , 2000,
              <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/inventing-internet>.

   [Abibil]   Danchev, D., "Dissecting 'Operation Ababil' - an OSINT
              Analysis", 2012, <http://ddanchev.blogspot.be/2012/09/
              dissecting-operation-ababil-osint.html>.

   [Adrian]   Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P.,
              Green, M., Halderman, J., Heninger, N., Springall, D.,
              Thome, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E.,
              Zanella Beguelin, S., and P. Zimmermann, "Imperfect
              Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice",
              ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
              2015: 5-17 , 2015.





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   [Appelbaum]
              Appelbaum, J., Gibson, A., Kabish, V., Kampf, L., and L.
              Ryge, "NSA targets the privacy-conscious", 2015,
              <http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/
              nsa230_page-1.html>.

   [Babbie]   Babbie, E., "The Basics of Social Research", Belmont CA
              Cengage , 2010.

   [Benkler]  Benkler, Y., "The wealth of Networks - How social
              production transforms markets and freedom", New Haven and
              London - Yale University Press , 2006,
              <http://is.gd/rxUpTQ>.

   [Berners-Lee]
              Berners-Lee, T. and M. Fischetti, "Weaving the Web,",
              HarperCollins p 208, 1999.

   [BernersLeeHalpin]
              Berners-Lee, T. and H. Halpin, "Defend the Web", 2012,
              <http://www.ibiblio.org/hhalpin/homepage/publications/
              def-timbl-halpin.pdf>.

   [Bhargavan]
              Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti,
              A., and P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters:
              Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS", IEEE
              Symposium on Security and Privacy 2014: 98-113 , 2014.

   [Bless]    Bless, R. and C. Orwat, "Values and Networks", 2015.

   [Blumenthal]
              Blumenthal, M. and D. Clark, "Rethinking the design of the
              Internet: The end-to-end arguments vs. the brave new
              world", ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 1,
              No. 1, August 2001, pp 70-109. , 2001.

   [Bray]     Bray, T., "A New HTTP Status Code for Legally-restricted
              Resources", 2016, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-
              httpbis-legally-restricted-status-04>.

   [Broeders]
              Broeders, D., "The public core of the Internet", WRR ,
              2015,
              <http://www.wrr.nl/en/publications/publication/article/
              de-publieke-kern-van-het-internet-1/>.





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   [Brown]    Brown, I. and M. Ziewitz, "A Prehistory of Internet
              Governance", Research Handbook on Governance of the
              Internet. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. , 2013.

   [BrownMarsden]
              Brown, I. and C. Marsden, "Regulating code", MIT Press ,
              2013, <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/regulating-code>.

   [Brownetal]
              Brown, I., Clark, D., and D. Trossen, "Should specific
              values be embedded in the Internet Architecture?", Sigcomm
              , 2010, <http://conferences.sigcomm.org/co-
              next/2010/Workshops/REARCH/ReArch_papers/10-Brown.pdf>.

   [Cath]     Cath, C., "A Case Study of Coding Rights: Should Freedom
              of Speech Be Instantiated in the Protocols and Standards
              Designed by the Internet Engineering Task Force?", 2015,
              <https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/hrpc/current/
              pdf36GrmRM84S.pdf>.

   [CathFloridi]
              Cath, C. and L. Floridi, "The Design of the Internet's
              Architecture by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
              and Human Rights", August 2016.

   [Clark]    Clark, D., "The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet
              Protocols", Proc SIGCOMM 88, ACM CCR Vol 18, Number 4,
              August 1988, pp. 106-114. , 1988.

   [Clarketal]
              Clark, D., Wroclawski, J., Sollins, K., and R. Braden,
              "Tussle in cyberspace - defining tomorrow's Internet", ACM
              Digital Library , 2005, <https://dl.acm.org/
              citation.cfm?id=1074049>.

   [Collins]  Collins, K., "Hacking Team's oppressive regimes customer
              list revealed in hack", 2015,
              <http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2015-07/06/
              hacking-team-spyware-company-hacked>.

   [Daedalus]
              Clark, D., "The Contingent Internet", Daedalus Winter
              2016, Vol. 145, No. 1. p. 9-17 , 2016,
              <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/toc/daed/current>.







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   [Davidsonetal]
              Davidson, A., Morris, J., and R. Courtney, "Strangers in a
              strange land", Telecommunications Policy Research
              Conference , 2002,
              <https://www.cdt.org/files/publications/piais.pdf>.

   [Denardis14]
              Denardis, L., "The Global War for Internet Governance",
              Yale University Press , 2014,
              <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vkz4n>.

   [Denardis15]
              Denardis, L., "The Internet Design Tension between
              Surveillance and Security", IEEE Annals of the History of
              Computing (volume 37-2) , 2015, <http://is.gd/7GAnFy>.

   [Denzin]   Denzin, N. and Y. Lincoln, "Handbook of Qualitative
              Research", Thousand Oaks CA Sage , 2000,
              <http://www.amazon.com/SAGE-Handbook-Qualitative-Research-
              Handbooks/dp/1412974178>.

   [Doty]     Doty, N., "Automated text analysis of Requests for Comment
              (RFCs)", 2014, <https://github.com/npdoty/rfc-analysis>.

   [Douceur]  Douceur, J., "The Sybil Attack", 2002,
              <http://research.microsoft.com:8082/pubs/74220/
              IPTPS2002.pdf>.

   [Dutton]   Dutton, W., "Freedom of Connection, Freedom of Expression:
              the Changing legal and regulatory Ecology Shaping the
              Internet.", 2011, <http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-
              URL_ID=31397%26URL_DO=DO_TOPIC%26URL_SECTION=201.html>.

   [Elahi]    Elahi, T. and I. Goldberg, "CORDON - A taxonomy of
              Internet Censorship Resistance Strategies", 2012,
              <http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2012/
              cacr2012-33.pdf>.

   [FIArch]   "Future Internet Design Principles", January 2012,
              <http://www.future-internet.eu/uploads/media/
              FIArch_Design_Principles_V1.0.pdf>.

   [FRAMEWORK]
              ISO/IEC, ., "Information technology - Framework for
              internationalization, prepared by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 22/WG
              20 ISO/IEC TR 11017", 1997.





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   [Franklin]
              Franklin, U., "The Real World of Technology", 1999,
              <http://houseofanansi.com/products/
              the-real-world-of-technology-digital>.

   [Geertz]   Clifford, G., "Kinship in Bali", Chicago University of
              Chicago Press. , 1975,
              <http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/K/
              bo3625088.html>.

   [Googlepatent]
              Google, ., "Method and device for network traffic
              manipulation", 2012, <https://www.google.com/patents/
              EP2601774A1?cl=en>.

   [GreenMovement]
              Villeneuve, N., "Iran DDoS", 2009,
              <https://www.nartv.org/2009/06/16/iran-ddos/>.

   [HRC2012]  United Nations Human Rights Council, "UN General Assembly
              Resolution "The right to privacy in the digital age"
              (A/C.3/68/L.45)", 2011,
              <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/554342.120885849.html>.

   [Haagsma]  Haagsma, L., "Deep dive into QUANTUM INSERT", 2015,
              <http://blog.fox-it.com/2015/04/20/
              deep-dive-into-quantum-insert/>.

   [ICCPR]    United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant
              on Civil and Political Rights", 1976,
              <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
              CCPR.aspx>.

   [ICESCR]   United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant
              on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 1966,
              <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
              CESCR.aspx>.

   [Jabri]    Jabri, V., "Discourses on Violence - conflict analysis
              reconsidered", Manchester University Press , 1996.

   [Kaye]     Kaye, D., "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
              promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
              opinion and expression", 2016,
              <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/
              Privatesectorinthedigitalage.aspx>.





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   [King]     King, C., "Power, Social Violence and Civil Wars",
              Washington D.C. United States Institute of Peace Press ,
              2007.

   [Lessig]   Lessig, L., "Code - And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version
              2.0.", New York Basic Books , 2006, <http://codev2.cc/>.

   [Marcak]   Marcak, B., Weaver, N., Dalek, J., Ensafi, R., Fifield,
              D., McKune, S., Rey, A., Scott-Railton, J., Deibert, R.,
              and V. Paxson, "China's Great Fire Cannon", 2015,
              <https://citizenlab.org/2015/04/chinas-great-cannon/>.

   [Marquis-Boire]
              Marquis-Boire, M., "Schrodinger's Cat Video and the Death
              of Clear-Text", 2014, <https://citizenlab.org/2014/08/cat-
              video-and-the-death-of-clear-text/>.

   [Mueller]  Mueller, M., "Networks and States", MIT Press , 2010,
              <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/networks-and-states>.

   [Musiani]  Musiani, F., "Giants, Dwarfs and Decentralized
              Alternatives to Internet-based Services - An Issue of
              Internet Governance", Westminister Papers in Communication
              and Culture , 2015, <http://doi.org/10.16997/wpcc.214>.

   [NETmundial]
              NETmundial, "NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement", 2014,
              <http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
              NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf>.

   [PETS2015VPN]
              Pera, V., Barbera, M., Tyson, G., Haddadi, H., and A. Mei,
              "A Glance through the VPN Looking Glass", 2015,
              <http://www.eecs.qmul.ac.uk/~hamed/papers/
              PETS2015VPN.pdf>.

   [Penney]   Penney, J., "Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and
              Wikipedia Use", 2016, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
              papers.cfm?abstract_id=2769645>.

   [Peterson]
              Peterson, A., Gellman, B., and A. Soltani, "Yahoo to make
              SSL encryption the default for Webmail users. Finally.",
              2013, <http://gmailblog.blogspot.de/2010/01/
              default-https-access-for-gmail.html>.






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   [Pouwelse]
              Pouwelse, Ed, J., "Media without censorship", 2012,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pouwelse-censorfree-
              scenarios>.

   [RFC0226]  Karp, P., "Standardization of host mnemonics", RFC 226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC0226, September 1971,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc226>.

   [RFC0760]  Postel, J., "DoD standard Internet Protocol", RFC 760, DOI
              10.17487/RFC0760, January 1980,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc760>.

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, DOI
              10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.

   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC
              793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.

   [RFC0894]  Hornig, C., "A Standard for the Transmission of IP
              Datagrams over Ethernet Networks", STD 41, RFC 894, DOI
              10.17487/RFC0894, April 1984,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc894>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC1122]  Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC1122, October 1989,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1122>.

   [RFC1631]  Egevang, K. and P. Francis, "The IP Network Address
              Translator (NAT)", RFC 1631, DOI 10.17487/RFC1631, May
              1994, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1631>.

   [RFC1766]  Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of
              Languages", RFC 1766, DOI 10.17487/RFC1766, March 1995,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1766>.

   [RFC1866]  Berners-Lee, T. and D. Connolly, "Hypertext Markup
              Language - 2.0", RFC 1866, DOI 10.17487/RFC1866, November
              1995, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1866>.





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   [RFC1958]  Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the
              Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1958>.

   [RFC1984]  IAB and IESG, "IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic
              Technology and the Internet", BCP 200, RFC 1984, DOI
              10.17487/RFC1984, August 1996,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1984>.

   [RFC2026]  Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
              3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, DOI 10.17487/RFC2026, October 1996,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2026>.

   [RFC2277]  Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
              Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, DOI 10.17487/RFC2277,
              January 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2277>.

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
              December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.

   [RFC2606]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and A. Panitz, "Reserved Top Level DNS
              Names", BCP 32, RFC 2606, DOI 10.17487/RFC2606, June 1999,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2606>.

   [RFC2775]  Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", RFC 2775, DOI
              10.17487/RFC2775, February 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2775>.

   [RFC3365]  Schiller, J., "Strong Security Requirements for Internet
              Engineering Task Force Standard Protocols", BCP 61, RFC
              3365, DOI 10.17487/RFC3365, August 2002,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3365>.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, DOI
              10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.

   [RFC3724]  Kempf, J., Ed., Austein, R., Ed., and IAB, "The Rise of
              the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on
              the Evolution of the Internet Architecture", RFC 3724, DOI
              10.17487/RFC3724, March 2004,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3724>.

   [RFC3935]  Alvestrand, H., "A Mission Statement for the IETF", BCP
              95, RFC 3935, DOI 10.17487/RFC3935, October 2004,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3935>.



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   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
              4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.

   [RFC4084]  Klensin, J., "Terminology for Describing Internet
              Connectivity", BCP 104, RFC 4084, DOI 10.17487/RFC4084,
              May 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4084>.

   [RFC4101]  Rescorla, E. and IAB, "Writing Protocol Models", RFC 4101,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4101, June 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4101>.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
              4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.

   [RFC4906]  Martini, L., Ed., Rosen, E., Ed., and N. El-Aawar, Ed.,
              "Transport of Layer 2 Frames Over MPLS", RFC 4906, DOI
              10.17487/RFC4906, June 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4906>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI
              36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.

   [RFC5944]  Perkins, C., Ed., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4, Revised",
              RFC 5944, DOI 10.17487/RFC5944, November 2010,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5944>.

   [RFC6108]  Chung, C., Kasyanov, A., Livingood, J., Mody, N., and B.
              Van Lieu, "Comcast's Web Notification System Design", RFC
              6108, DOI 10.17487/RFC6108, February 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6108>.

   [RFC6120]  Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
              Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, DOI 10.17487/RFC6120,
              March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120>.

   [RFC6365]  Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in
              Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365, DOI
              10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6365>.




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   [RFC6797]  Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
              Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC6797, November 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6797>.

   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI
              10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC7469]  Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning
              Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469, April
              2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7469>.

   [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, DOI
              10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.

   [RFC7574]  Bakker, A., Petrocco, R., and V. Grishchenko, "Peer-to-
              Peer Streaming Peer Protocol (PPSPP)", RFC 7574, DOI
              10.17487/RFC7574, July 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7574>.

   [RFC7624]  Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T.,
              Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann,
              "Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A
              Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624, DOI
              10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7624>.

   [RFC7626]  Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS Privacy Considerations", RFC 7626,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7626, August 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7626>.

   [RFC7725]  Bray, T., "An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles",
              RFC 7725, DOI 10.17487/RFC7725, February 2016,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7725>.

   [RSF]      RSF, "Syria using 34 Blue Coat Servers to spy on Internet
              users", 2013, <https://en.rsf.org/syria-syria-using-34-
              blue-coat-servers-23-05-2013,44664.html>.




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   [Rachovitsa]
              Rachovitsa, A., "Engineering 'Privacy by Design' in the
              Internet Protocols - Understanding Online Privacy both as
              a Technical and a Human Rights Issue in the Face of
              Pervasive Monitoring", International Journal of Law and
              Information Technology , 2015, <https://www.ietf.org/mail-
              archive/web/hrpc/current/pdfRBnRYFeVsm.pdf>.

   [Richie]   Richie, J. and J. Lewis, "Qualitative Research Practice -
              A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers",
              London Sage , 2003, <http://www.amazon.co.uk/
              Qualitative-Research-Practice-Students-Researchers/
              dp/0761971106>.

   [Rideout]  Rideout, A., "Making security easier", 2008,
              <http://gmailblog.blogspot.de/2008/07/
              making-security-easier.html>.

   [Saltzer]  Saltzer, J., Reed, D., and D. Clark, "End-to-End Arguments
              in System Design", ACM TOCS, Vol 2, Number 4, November
              1984, pp 277-288. , 1984.

   [Sauter]   Sauter, M., "The Coming Swarm", Bloomsbury, London , 2014.

   [Schillace]
              Schillace, S., "Default https access for Gmail", 2010,
              <http://gmailblog.blogspot.de/2010/01/
              default-https-access-for-gmail.html>.

   [Schneier]
              Schneier, B., "Attacking Tor - how the NSA targets users'
              online anonymity", 2013,
              <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/
              tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity>.

   [Schroeder]
              Schroeder, I. and B. Schmidt, "Introduction - Violent
              Imaginaries and Violent Practice", London and New York
              Routledge , 2001, <http://resourcelists.st-
              andrews.ac.uk/items/
              BFC20363-67B0-B3EF-EA48-13E5230E7899.html>.

   [UDHR]     United Nations General Assembly, "The Universal
              Declaration of Human Rights", 1948,
              <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>.






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   [UNGA2013]
              United Nations General Assembly, "UN General Assembly
              Resolution "The right to privacy in the digital age"
              (A/C.3/68/L.45)", 2013,
              <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1133732.05065727.html>.

   [W3CAccessibility]
              W3C, "Accessibility", 2015,
              <https://www.w3.org/standards/webdesign/accessibility>.

   [W3Ci18nDef]
              W3C, "Localization vs. Internationalization", 2010,
              <http://www.w3.org/International/questions/qa-i18n.en>.

   [WP-Debugging]
              "Debugging", n.d., <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
              Debugging>.

   [WP-Stateless]
              "Stateless protocol", n.d.,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stateless_protocol>.

   [Walfish]  Walfish, M., Stribling, J., Krohn, M., Balakrishnan, H.,
              Morris, R., and S. Shenker, "Middleboxes No Longer
              Considered Harmful", 2004, <http://nms.csail.mit.edu/doa>.

   [WynsbergheMoura]
              Wynsberghe, A. and G. Moura, "The concept of embedded
              values and the example of internet security", 2013,
              <http://doc.utwente.nl/87095/>.

   [Zittrain]
              Zittrain, J., "The Future of the Internet - And How to
              Stop It", Yale University Press , 2008,
              <https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4455262/
              Zittrain_Future%20of%20the%20Internet.pdf?sequence=1>.

   [Zuckerman]
              Zuckerman, E., Roberts, H., McGrady, R., York, J., and J.
              Palfrey, "Report on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
              Attacks", The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at
              Harvard University , 2010,
              <https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/
              cyber.law.harvard.edu/
              files/2010_DDoS_Attacks_Human_Rights_and_Media.pdf>.






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   [ars]      Anderson, N., "P2P researchers - use a blocklist or you
              will be tracked... 100% of the time", 2007,
              <http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2007/10/p2p-
              researchers-use-a-blocklist-or-you-will-be-tracked-100-of-
              the-time/>.

   [bbc-wikileaks]
              BBC, "Whistle-blower site taken offline", 2008,
              <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7250916.stm>.

   [bitmessage]
              Bitmessage, "Bitmessage Wiki?", 2014,
              <https://bitmessage.org/wiki/Main_Page>.

   [caida]    Dainotti, A., Squarcella, C., Aben, E., Claffy, K.,
              Chiesa, M., Russo, M., and A. Pescape, "Analysis of
              Country-wide Internet Outages Caused by Censorship", 2013,
              <http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2014/
              outages_censorship/outages_censorship.pdf>.

   [freenet1]
              Freenet, "What is Freenet?", n.d.,
              <https://freenetproject.org/whatis.html>.

   [freenet2]
              Ian Clarke, ., "The Philosphy behind Freenet?", n.d.,
              <https://freenetproject.org/philosophy.html>.

   [greatfirewall]
              Anonymous, ., "Towards a Comprehensive Picture of the
              Great Firewall's DNS Censorship", 2014,
              <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/foci14/
              foci14-anonymous.pdf>.

   [hall]     Hall, J., Aaron, M., and B. Jones, "A Survey of Worldwide
              Censorship Techniques", 2015,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hall-censorship-tech-
              01>.

   [namecoin]
              Namecoin, "Namecoin - Decentralized secure names", 2015,
              <https://namecoin.info/>.

   [natusage]
              Maier, G., Schneider, F., and A. Feldmann, "NAT usage in
              Residential Broadband networks", 2011,
              <http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/pubs/networking/
              NATusage11.pdf>.



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   [newegg]   Mullin, J., "Newegg on trial: Mystery company TQP rewrites
              the history of encryption", 2013, <http://arstechnica.com/
              tech-policy/2013/11/newegg-on-trial-mystery-company-tqp-
              re-writes-the-history-of-encryption/>.

   [notewell]
              IETF, "Note Well", 2015, <https://www.ietf.org/about/note-
              well.html>.

   [patentpolicy]
              W3C, "W3C Patent Policy", 2004,
              <https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/>.

   [pidgin]   js, . and Pidgin Developers, "-XMPP- Invisible mode
              violating standard", July 2015,
              <https://developer.pidgin.im/ticket/4322>.

   [quic]     The Chromium Project, "QUIC, a multiplexed stream
              transport over UDP", 2014, <https://www.chromium.org/
              quic>.

   [spdy]     The Chromium Project, "SPDY - An experimental protocol for
              a faster web", 2009, <https://www.chromium.org/spdy/spdy-
              whitepaper>.

   [spiegel]  SPIEGEL, "Prying Eyes - Inside the NSA's War on Internet
              Security", 2014,
              <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/
              inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html>.

   [sslstrip]
              Marlinspike, M., "Software >> sslstrip", 2011,
              <https://moxie.org/software/sslstrip/>.

   [techyum]  Violet, ., "Official - vb.ly Link Shortener Seized by
              Libyan Government", 2010, <http://techyum.com/2010/10/
              official-vb-ly-link-shortener-seized-by-libyan-
              government/>.

   [torproject]
              The Tor Project, ., "Tor Project - Anonymity Online",
              2007, <https://www.torproject.org/>.

   [torrentfreak1]
              Van der Sar, E., "Proposal for research on human rights
              protocol considerations", 2015, <https://torrentfreak.com/
              is-your-isp-messing-with-bittorrent-traffic-find-out-
              140123/>.



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   [torrentfreak2]
              Andy, ., "LAWYERS SENT 109,000 PIRACY THREATS IN GERMANY
              DURING 2013", 2014, <https://torrentfreak.com/lawyers-
              sent-109000-piracy-threats-in-germany-during-
              2013-140304/>.

   [tribler]  Delft University of Technology, Department EWI/PDS/
              Tribler, "About Tribler", 2013, <https://www.tribler.org/
              about.html>.

   [turkey]   Akguel, M. and M. Kirlido&#287;, "Internet censorship in
              Turkey", 2015,
              <http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/
              internet-censorship-turkey>.

   [ververis]
              Vasilis, V., Kargiotakis, G., Filasto, A., Fabian, B., and
              A. Alexandros, "Understanding Internet Censorship Policy -
              The Case of Greece", 2015,
              <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/foci15/
              foci15-paper-ververis-update.pdf>.

   [wikileaks]
              Sladek, T. and E. Broese, "Market Survey : Detection &
              Filtering Solutions to Identify File Transfer of Copyright
              Protected Content for Warner Bros. and movielabs", 2011,
              <https://wikileaks.org/sony/docs/05/docs/Anti-Piracy/CDSA/
              EANTC-Survey-1.5-unsecured.pdf>.

   [xmppmanifesto]
              Saint-Andre, P. and . XMPP Operators, "A Public Statement
              Regarding Ubiquitous Encryption on the XMPP Network",
              2014,
              <https://raw.githubusercontent.com/stpeter/manifesto/
              master/manifesto.txt>.

10.2.  URIs

   [1] mailto:node@domain/home

   [2] mailto:node@domain/work

   [3] mailto:hrpc@ietf.org








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Authors' Addresses

   Niels ten Oever
   Article19

   EMail: niels@article19.org


   Corinne Cath
   Oxford Internet Institute

   EMail: corinnecath@gmail.com







































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