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Network Working Group                                         M. Thomson
Internet-Draft                                                   Mozilla
Intended status: Standards Track                             G. Eriksson
Expires: May 3, 2017                                         C. Holmberg
                                                                Ericsson
                                                        October 30, 2016


        An Architecture for Secure Content Delegation using HTTP
                       draft-thomson-http-scd-02

Abstract

   An architecture is described for content distribution using a
   secondary server that might be operated with reduced privileges.
   This architecture allows a primary server to delegate the
   responsibility for delivery of the payload of an HTTP response to a
   secondary server.  The secondary server is unable to modify this
   content.  The content is encrypted, which in some cases will prevent
   the secondary server from learning about the content.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Content Distribution Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Secure Content Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Out-of-Band Content Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Performance Trade-Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Confidentiality of Resource Identity  . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Content Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Content Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Resource Map  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     7.1.  Confidentiality Protection Limitations  . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.2.  Cross-Origin Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.3.  Traffic Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Content Distribution Security

   The distribution of content on the web at scale is necessarily highly
   distributed.  Large amounts of content needs large numbers of
   servers.  And distributing those servers closer to clients has a
   significant, positive impact on performance.

   A major drawback of existing solutions for content distribution is
   that a primary server is required to cede control of resources to the
   secondary server.  The secondary server is able to see and modify
   content that they distribute.

   There are few technical mechanisms in place to limit the capabilities
   of servers that provide content for a given origin.  Mechanisms like
   content security policy [CSP] and sub-resource integrity [SRI] can be
   used to prevent modification of resources in some contexts, but these
   mechanisms are limited in what they can protect and they can impose
   certain operational costs.  For the most part, server operators are
   forced to limit the content that is served on servers that are not




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   directly under their control or rely on non-technical measures such
   as contracts and courts to proscribe bad behavior.

1.1.  Secure Content Delegation

   This document describes how an primary origin server might securely
   delegate the responsibility for serving content to a secondary
   server.

   The solution comprises three basic components:

   o  A delegation component allows a primary server to delegate
      specific resources to another server.

   o  Integrity attributes ensure that the content cannot be modified by
      the secondary server.

   o  Confidentiality protection limits the ability of the secondary
      server to learn what the content holds.

   Note that the guarantees provided by confidentiality protection are
   not strong, see Section 4 for details.

   In addition to these basic components, a fourth mechanism provides a
   client with the ability to learn resource metadata from the primary
   server prior to making a request for specific resources.  This can
   dramatically improve performance where a client needs to acquire
   multiple delegated resources.

   No new mechanisms are described in this document; the application of
   several existing and separately-proposed protocol mechanisms to this
   problem is described.  A primary server can use these mechanisms to
   take advantage of secondary servers where concerns about security
   might have otherwise prevented their use.  This might be for content
   that was previously considered too sensitive for third-party
   distribution, or to access secondary servers that were previously
   consider insufficiently trustworthy.

1.2.  Notational Conventions

   The words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", and "MAY" are used in this
   document.  It's not shouting; when they are capitalized, they have
   the special meaning defined in [RFC2119].

   This document uses the terms client, primary server and secondary
   server.  These terms refer to the three roles played in this
   architecture.  Note that "primary server" as used in this document




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   encompasses the notion of both an origin server and a gateway as
   defined in [RFC7230].

2.  Out-of-Band Content Encoding

   The out-of-band content encoding [I-D.reschke-http-oob-encoding]
   provides the basis for delegation of content distribution.  A request
   is made to the primary server, but in place of the complete response
   only response header fields and an out-of-band content encoding is
   provided.  The out-of-band content encoding directs the client to
   retrieve content from another resource.

      Client           Secondary          Primary
        |                  |                 |
        | Request          |                 |
        +----------------------------------->|
        |                  |                 |
        |                  Response + OOB CE |
        |<-----------------------------------+
        |                  |                 |
        |GET               |                 |
        +----------------->|                 |
        |                  |                 |
        |              200 |                 |
        |<-----------------+                 |
        |                  |                 |

               Figure 1: Using Out-of-Band Content Encoding

   Out-of-band content encoding behaves much like a redirect.  In fact,
   a redirect was considered as part of the early design, but rejected
   because without defining a new set of 3xx status codes it would
   change the effective origin [RFC6454] of the resource.  Furthermore,
   the content encoding specifically preserves header fields sent by the
   primary server, rejecting any unauthenticated header fields that
   might be provided by the secondary server.

2.1.  Performance Trade-Off

   An additional request is necessary to retrieve content.  This has a
   negative impact on latency.  However, if the secondary server is
   positioned close to the client, there are several potential benefits:

   Fewer bit-miles:  Content hosted in the secondary server that is
      nearby can be served to those clients without having to traverse a
      long network path.





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   Better server resource allocation:  Using a dedicated secondary
      server reduces the load on the primary server, allowing it more
      capacity for serving other requests.

   Better throughput:  If a secondary server is closer to a client, more
      bandwidth might be available for delivery of content when compared
      with the link between client and primary server.

   Lower time to last byte:  For some resources, increased bandwidth can
      counteract the added latency cost of the extra requests, and
      potentially reduce the time needed to retrieve the entire
      resource.

   The problems of providing integrity protection for content delivered
   in this fashion is discussed in Section 3; confidentiality protection
   and its limitations is described in Section 4; and reducing the
   latency impact of making multiple requests for each resource is
   described in Section 5.

2.2.  Confidentiality of Resource Identity

   The URL used to acquire a resource from a secondary server can be
   unrelated to the URL of the resource that refers to its contents.
   This allows a primary server to hide the relationship between content
   in a secondary server and the original resources that is use that
   content.

   Any entity SHOULD be unable to determine the URL of the original
   resource based on the URL of the secondary server resource alone.
   This can be achieved by having randomized URLs for secondary
   resources and maintaining a mapping table, or by using a fixed
   mapping function with a secret input such as HMAC [RFC2104].

   Without other information, this would prevent the secondary server
   from learning which resources are requested from the primary server
   by observing the requests that it serves for out-of-band content.
   While in some cases, information about the resource is obtainable by
   the secondary server cache, see Section 4, an unpredictable mapping
   ensures that other protection mechanisms can be effective if
   possible.

3.  Content Integrity

   Ensuring that content is not modified by the secondary server is
   critical.  Information that is acquired from the secondary server is
   not integrity protected and therefore MUST NOT be used without being
   authenticated.




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   A cryptographic hash over the content sent in the initial response
   could be compared against a hash of the content delivered by the
   secondary server.  This is an expansion of the the basic design of
   [SRI].

   A progressive integrity mechanism like the one described in
   [I-D.thomson-http-mice] ensures that there are no significant
   performance penalties imposed by the integrity protection.
   Progressive integrity allows for consumption of content as it is
   delivered without losing integrity protection.

   A response from the primary server could include an M-I header field
   with an integrity proof, allowing the content to be delivered out-of-
   band without any additional header fields.

4.  Content Confidentiality

   Confidentiality protection for content is provided by applying an
   encryption content encoding [I-D.ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding] to
   content before that content is provided to a secondary server.

   Much of the value provided by a secondary server derives from its
   ability to deliver the same content to multiple nearby clients.  The
   more clients that can be delivered the same resource, the greater the
   efficiency gains.  As a result, resources that are provided to many
   or all clients are the ones that benefit most from caching.

   This means that unless a resource has access control mechanisms that
   would prevent the secondary from accessing a resource, the
   confidentiality protections provided by encrypting content is
   limited.  A secondary server need only independently request
   resources from the primary server in order to learn everything about
   the content it is serving, including the mapping of primary URLs to
   secondary URLs.  For instance, employing a web crawler on a web site
   might reveal the identity of numerous resources and the location of
   the any out-of-band content for those resources.

   Confidentiality protection allows resources that are protected by
   client authentication to remain confidential.  Confidentiality
   protection also improves protections against cross-origin theft of
   confidential data (see Section 7.2).

5.  Resource Map

   Learning about header fields and out-of-band cache locations for
   resources in advance of needing to make requests to those resources
   allows a client to avoid making requests to the primary server.  This
   can greatly improve the performance of applications that make



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   multiple requests of the same server, such as web browsing or video
   streaming.

   Without defining any new additional protocol mechanisms, HTTP/2
   server push [RFC7540] can be used to provide requests, responses and
   the out-of-band content encoding information describing resources.
   Since no actual content is included, this requires relatively little
   data to describe a number of resources.  Once this information is
   available, the client no longer needs to contact the origin server to
   acquire the described resources.

   This approach has some significant deployment drawbacks, so explicit
   data formats for carrying this data might be defined.

   Note:  We need a separate draft on these alternative methods.

6.  Error Handling

   Error handling for clients is described in
   [I-D.reschke-http-oob-encoding].

   For idempotent requests, a second request might be made to the
   primary server.  This request would omit any indication of support
   for out-of-band content coding from the Accept-Encoding header field,
   plus a link relation indicating the secondary resource and the reason
   for failure.

   A primary server can use this information to make informed choices
   about whether to use content delegation.

   Non-idempotent requests cannot be safely retried.  Therefore, clients
   cannot retry a a request and provide information about errors to the
   primary server.  For this reason, primary servers SHOULD NOT delegate
   content for non-idempotent methods.

7.  Security Considerations

   This document describes a framework whereby content might be
   distributed to a secondary server, without losing integrity with
   respect to the content that is distributed.

   This design relies on integrity and confidentiality for the request
   and response made to the primary server.  These requests MUST be made
   using HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) [RFC2818] only.  Though there is a lesser
   requirement for confidentiality, requests made to the secondary
   server MUST also be secured using HTTPS.





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7.1.  Confidentiality Protection Limitations

   Content that requires only integrity protection can be safely
   distributed by a third-party using this design.  Entities that make a
   decision about confidentiality for others have often been shown to be
   incorrect in the past.  An incorrect conclusion have serious
   consequences.  Thus the choice of whether confidentiality protection
   is needed is quite important.

   Some confidentiality protection against the secondary server is
   provided, but that is limited to content that is not otherwise
   accessible to that server (see Section 4).  Only content that has
   access controls on the primary server that prevent access by the
   secondary server can retain confidentiality protection.

   Content with different access control policies MUST use different
   keying material for encryption.  This prevents a client with access
   to one resource from acquiring keys that can be used for resources
   they are not authorized to access.

   Clients that wish to retain control over the confidentiality of
   responses can omit the out-of-band label from the Accept-Encoding
   header field on requests, thereby indicating that a direct response
   is necessary.

7.2.  Cross-Origin Access

   The content delegation creates the possibility that a primary server
   could adopt remotely hosted content.  On the web, this is normally
   limited by Cross-Origin Resource Sharing [CORS], which requires that
   a client first request permission to make a resource accessible to
   another origin.

   This document describes a method whereby content hosted on a remote
   secondary server can be made accessible to another origin.  The
   content of the out-of-band resource is written into the content of a
   response from the origin.  All an origin needs to make this happen is
   knowledge of the identity of the out-of-band resource, something that
   might be difficult based on the guidance in Section 2.2, but not
   infeasible.  A client requests this content using any ambient
   authority available to it (such as HTTP authentication header fields
   and cookies).

   The simplest option for reducing the ability to steal content in this
   fashion is to require that the origin demonstrate that it knows the
   content of the resource.  Unfortunately, this demonstration is
   difficult without imposing significant performance penalties, so we




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   require a lesser assurance: that the origin knows how to decrypt the
   content.

   This makes content confidentiality (Section 4) mandatory and limits
   the resources that can be stolen by an origin to those that are
   already encrypted.  Most importantly, only resources for which the
   origin knows the encryption key can be stolen.

   For this protection to be effective, origins MUST use different
   encryption keys for resources with different sets of authorized
   recipients.  Otherwise, an attacker might learn the encryption key
   for one resource then use that to decrypt a resource that it is not
   authorized to read.

   Resources that rely on signature-based integrity protection are made
   only marginally more difficult to steal, since the origin needs to
   learn the signing public key.  However, this is not expected to be
   difficult, since confidentiality protection for public keys.
   Resources that rely on hash-based integrity protection require that
   the origin learn the hash of the resource.

7.3.  Traffic Analysis

   Using a secondary server reveals a great deal of information to the
   secondary server about resources even if confidentiality protection
   is effective.  The size of responses and the pattern of requests for
   resources can reveal information about their contents.  When used
   carefully, padding as described in
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding] can obscure the length of
   responses and reduce the information that the secondary server is
   able to learn.

   A random or unpredictable mapping from the primary resource URL on
   the primary server to the URL of the content is necessary, see
   Section 2.2.

   Length hiding for header fields on responses from the primary server
   might be more important when an out-of-band encoding is used, since
   the body of the response becomes less variable.

   Making requests for content to multiple different servers can improve
   the amount of content length information available to network
   observers.  HTTP/2 multiplexing might have otherwise reduced the
   exposure of length information, but using out-of-band content
   encoding could expose lengths for those resources that can be
   distributed by a secondary server.  Note that this is not
   fundamentally worse than HTTP/1.1 in the absence of pipelining.




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   Padding in HTTP/2 or encrypted content encoding can be used to
   further obscure lengths.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.reschke-http-oob-encoding]
              Reschke, J. and S. Loreto, "'Out-Of-Band' Content Coding
              for HTTP", draft-reschke-http-oob-encoding-07 (work in
              progress), July 2016.

   [I-D.thomson-http-mice]
              Thomson, M., "Merkle Integrity Content Encoding", draft-
              thomson-http-mice-01 (work in progress), June 2016.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

   [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [CORS]     van Kesteren, A., "Cross-Origin Resource Sharing", January
              2014, <https://www.w3.org/TR/cors/>.

   [CSP]      West, M., Barth, A., and D. Veditz, "Content Security
              Policy Level 2", August 2015, <https://w3c.github.io/
              webappsec-csp/2/>.

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding]
              Thomson, M., "Encrypted Content-Encoding for HTTP", draft-
              ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding-02 (work in progress),
              June 2016.



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   [I-D.thomson-http-content-signature]
              Thomson, M., "Content-Signature Header Field for HTTP",
              draft-thomson-http-content-signature-00 (work in
              progress), July 2015.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.

   [RFC6454]  Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>.

   [SRI]      Akhawe, D., Braun, F., Marier, F., and J. Weinberger,
              "Subresource Integrity", November 2015,
              <https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-subresource-integrity>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   Magnus Westerlund noted the potential for a violation of the cross
   origin protections offered in browsers.

Authors' Addresses

   Martin Thomson
   Mozilla

   Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com


   Goeran AP Eriksson
   Ericsson

   Email: goran.ap.eriksson@ericsson.com


   Christer Holmberg
   Ericsson

   Email: christer.holmberg@ericsson.com






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