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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 RFC 6978

TCPM WG                                                        J. Touch
Internet Draft                                                  USC/ISI
Intended status: Proposed Standard                       March 14, 2011
Expires: September 2011



                 A TCP Authentication Option NAT Extension
                       draft-touch-tcp-ao-nat-02.txt


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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2011.

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Abstract

   This document describes an extension to the TCP Authentication
   Option (TCP-AO) to support its use over connections that pass
   through network address and/or port translators (NATs/NAPTs). This
   extension changes the data used to compute traffic keys, but does
   not alter TCP-AO's packet processing or key generation algorithms.

Table of Contents


   1. Introduction...................................................2
   2. Conventions used in this document..............................2
   3. Background.....................................................3
   4. Extension to Allow NAT Use.....................................3
   5. Intended Use...................................................4
   6. Security Considerations........................................4
   7. IANA Considerations............................................5
   8. References.....................................................5
      8.1. Normative References......................................5
      8.2. Informative References....................................5
   9. Acknowledgments................................................5

1. Introduction

   This document describes an extension to the TCP Authentication
   Option (TCP-AO) [RFC5925] to support its use in the presence of
   network address and/or port translators (NAT/NAPT) [RFC2663]. These
   devices translate the source address and/or the source port number
   of a TCP connection. TCP-AO without these extensions would be
   sensitive to these modifications, and would discard authenticated
   segments.

   At least one potential application of this extension is to support
   the experimental multipath TCP protocol [Fo11], which uses multiple
   IP addresses to support a single TCP transfer.

   This document assumes detailed familiarity with TCP-AO [RFC5925]. As
   a preview, this document focuses on how TCP-AO generates traffic
   keys, and does not otherwise alter the TCP-AO mechanism or that of
   its key generation [RFC5926].

2. Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].


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   When used in lower case, these words have their conventional meaning
   and do not convey the interpretations in RFC-2119.

3. Background

   TCP-AO generates traffic keys that are specific to a socket pair
   [RFC5925]. Using the TCP-AO convention (local = source for outgoing
   segments, destination for incoming segments), the following
   information is used to create a connection's traffic keys:

   o  IP local address

   o  IP remote address

   o  TCP local port

   o  TCP remote port

   o  TCP local Initial Sequence Number (ISN)

   o  TCP remote Initial Sequence Number (ISN)

   Of these fields, the remote ISN is not known when for SYN segments,
   and is excluded from the traffic key used to authentication them.
   Otherwise, all fields are used in the traffic keys of all other
   segments.

   NATs and NAPTs (here just "NATs", even if port translation is
   included) would interfere with these uses, because they alter the
   local IP address and local TCP port [RFC2663].

4. Extension to Allow NAT Use

   It might be useful to allow TCP-AO use in the presence of NATs,
   e.g., to protect client/server communication where clients are
   behind NATs.

   This document describes an extension to TCP-AO that enables its use
   in the presence of NATs called TCP-AO-NAT. This extension requires
   no modification to the TCP-AO header or packet processing, and
   requires no modification to the algorithms used to generate traffic
   keys [RFC5926]. The change is limited to the data used to generate
   traffic keys only.

   For TCP-AO-NAT, there are two additional flags for each TCP
   connection. These flags, which could be copied from parameters of
   the MKT or set on a per-connection basis, are:


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   o  localNAT

   o  remoteNAT

   These flags indicate whether a segment's local or remote
   (respectively) IP address and TCP port are zeroed before MAC
   calculation, either for creating the MAC to insert (for outgoing
   segments) or for calculating a MAC to validate against the value in
   the option. I.e., these would modify the processing rules as
   follows:

   o  Traffic keys are computed by zeroing the local/remote IP address
      and TCP port as indicated by the localNAT and remoteNAT flags.

   o  MAC values are computed by zeroing the local/remote IP address
      and TCP port as indicated by the localNAT and remoteNAT flags.

5. Intended Use

   A client behind a NAT, or that suspects being behind a NAT, would
   set localNAT=TRUE. A server willing to support incoming TCP-AO-NAT
   connections would set remoteNAT=TRUE. Peer-to-peer applications with
   dual NAT support, e.g., those traversing symmetric NATs, would set
   both localNAT=TRUE and remoteNAT=TRUE [RFC5389].

6. Security Considerations

   TCP-AO-NAT does not affect the security of connections that do not
   set either of the localNAT or remoteNAT flags. Such connections are
   not affected themselves, and are not affected by segments in other
   connections that set those flags.

   Setting either the localNAT or remoteNAT flags reduces the
   randonmess of the input to the KDF used to generate the traffic
   keys. The largest impact occurs when using IPv4, which reduces the
   randomness from 2 IPv4 addresses, 2 ISNs, and both ports down to 1
   IPv4 address, 2 ISNs, and only the dynamic port. The amount of
   randomness in the IPv4 addresses and service port is likely to be
   small, and the randomness of the dynamic port is under debate and
   should not be considered substantial [RFC6056]; the KDF input
   randomness is thus expected to be dominated by that of the ISNs, so
   reducing it by one IPv4 address and the service port may not have a
   significant impact. IPv6 addresses can have substantially more
   randomness because they usually include the device's MAC address,
   which itself has more randomness than IPv6 prefixes or IPv4 address
   in total.



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   TCP-AO-NAT SHOULD NOT be used with both flags set in IPv4, however,
   as the result would rely entirely on the ISNs alone.

7. IANA Considerations

   There are no IANA considerations for this document. This section can
   be removed upon publication as an RFC.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5925] Touch, J., A. Mankin, R. Bonica, "The TCP Authentication
             Option", RFC 5925, Jun. 2010.

8.2. Informative References

   [Fo11]    Ford, A., C. Raiciu, M. Handley, O. Bonaventure, "TCP
             Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple
             Addresses", (work in progress), draft-ietf-mptcp-
             multiaddressed, Mar. 2011.

   [RFC2663] Srisuresh, P. and M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address
             Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations", RFC
             2663, August 1999.

   [RFC5389] Rosenberg, J., R. Mahy, P. Matthews, D. Wing, "Session
             Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389, Oct. 2008.

   [RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
             for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,
             June 2010.

   [RFC6056] Larsen, M., F. Gont, "Port Randomization," RFC 6056, Jan.
             2011.

9. Acknowledgments

   This extension was inspired by discussions with Dan Wing.

   This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.





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Author's Address

   Joe Touch
   USC/ISI
   4676 Admiralty Way
   Marina del Rey, CA 90292
   USA

   Phone: +1 (310) 448-9151
   Email: touch@isi.edu







































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