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TLS                                                           T. Fossati
Internet-Draft                                        H. Tschofenig, Ed.
Updates: 6347 (if approved)                                  Arm Limited
Intended status: Standards Track                           July 08, 2019
Expires: January 9, 2020

           Return Routability Check for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3


   This document specifies a return routability check for use in context
   of the Connection ID (CID) construct for the Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.

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   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
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   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Application Layer Return Routability Check  . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  The Return Routability Check Message  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  RRC Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix A.  History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix B.  Working Group Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix C.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   In "classical" DTLS, selecting a security context of an incoming DTLS
   record is accomplished with the help of the 5-tuple, i.e. source IP
   address, source port, transport protocol, destination IP address, and
   destination port.  Changes to this 5 tuple can happen for a variety
   reasons over the lifetime of the DTLS session.  In the IoT content
   NAT rebinding is a common reason with sleepy devices.  Other examples
   include end host mobility and multi-homing.  Without CID, if the
   source IP address and/or source port changes during the lifetime of
   an ongoing DTLS session then the receiver will be unable to locate
   the correct security context.  As a result, the DTLS handshake has to
   be re-run.

   A CID is an identifier carried in the record layer header of a DTLS
   datagram that gives the receiver additional information for selecting
   the appropriate security context.  The CID mechanism has been
   specified in [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id] for DTLS 1.2 and in
   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] for DTLS 1.3.

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   An on-path adversary could intercept and modify the source IP address
   (and the source port).  Even if receiver checks the authenticity and
   freshness of the packet, the recipient is fooled into changing the
   CID-to-IP/port association.  This attack is possible because the
   network and transport layer identifiers, such as source IP address
   and source port numbers, are not integrity protected and
   authenticated by the DTLS record layer.

   This attack makes strong assumptions on the attacker's abilities, and
   moreover it only misleads the peer until the next message gets
   through un-intercepted.

   A return routability check (RRC) is performed by the receiving peer
   before the CID-to-IP address/port binding is updated in that peer's
   session state database.  This is done in order to provide a certain
   degree of confidence to the receiving peer that the sending peer is
   reachable at the indicated address and port.

   Without such a return routability check, an adversary can redirect
   traffic towards a third party or a black hole.

   While an equivalent check can be performed at the application layer
   (modulo the DTLS API exposing the address update event to the calling
   application), it is advantageous to offer this functionality at the
   DTLS layer.  Section 3 describes the application layer procedure and
   Section 4 specifies a new message to perform this return routability

2.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document assumes familiarity with the CID solutions defined for
   DTLS 1.2 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id] and for DTLS 1.3

3.  Application Layer Return Routability Check

   When a record with CID is received that has the source address of the
   enclosing UDP datagram different from the one previously associated
   with that CID, the receiver MUST NOT update its view of the peer's IP
   address and port number with the source specified in the UDP datagram
   before cryptographically validating the enclosed record(s).  This is
   to ensure that a man-on-the-middle attacker that sends a datagram

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   with a different source address/port on an existing CID session does
   not successfully manage to re-route any return traffic.

   Furthermore, when using CID, anti-replay protection MUST be enabled.
   This is to ensure that a man-on-the-middle attacker sending a
   previously captured record with a modified source IP address and port
   will not be able to successfully pass the above check (since the
   datagram is very likely discarded on receipt - if it falls outside
   the replay window).

   The two countermeasures cannot complete stop a man-in-the-middle
   attacker who performs a DoS on the sender or uses the receiver as as
   backscatter source for a DDoS attack.  For a more generic protection,
   a return routability check is needed.

   It is RECOMMENDED that implementations of the CID functionaliy
   described in [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id] and in
   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] added peer address update events to their APIs.
   Applications can then use these events as triggers to perform an
   application layer return routability check, for example one that is
   based on successful exchange of minimal amount of ping-pong traffic
   with the peer.

4.  The Return Routability Check Message

         enum {
             heartbeat(24),  /* RFC 6520 */
             return_routability_check(TBD), /* NEW */
         } ContentType;

   The newly introduced return_routability_check message contains a
   cookie.  The semantic of the cookie is similar to the cookie used in
   the HelloRetryRequest message defined in [RFC8446].

   The return_routability_check message MUST be authenticated and
   encrypted using the currently active security context.

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       The endpoint that observes the peer's address update MUST stop
       sending any buffered application data (or limit the sending rate to a
       TBD threshold) and initiate the return routability check that
       proceeds as follows:

       1.  A cookie is placed in the return_routability_check message;

       2.  The message is sent to the observed new address and a timeout T
           is started;

       3.  The peer endpoint, after successfully verifying the received
           return_routability_check message echoes it back;

       4.  When the initiator receives and verifies the
           return_routability_check message, it updates the peer address

       5.  If T expires, or the address confirmation fails, the peer address
           binding is not updated.

       After this point, any pending send operation is resumed to the bound
       peer address.

         struct {
             opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>;
         } Cookie;

         struct {
             Cookie cookie;
         } return_routability_check;

5.  RRC Example

   The example shown in Figure 1 illustrates a client and a server
   exchanging application payloads protected by DTLS with an
   unilaterally used CIDs.  At some point in the communication
   interaction the IP address used by the client changes and, thanks to
   the CID usage, the security context to interpret the record is
   successfully located by the server.  However, the server wants to
   test the reachability of the client at his new IP address, to avoid
   being abused (e.g., as an amplifier) by an attacker impersonating the

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      Client                                             Server
      ------                                             ------

      Application Data            ========>
                                  <========        Application Data

                              <<   Some      >>
                              <<   Time      >>
                              <<   Later     >>

      Application Data            ========>

                                             <<< Unverified IP
                                                 Address B >>

                                  <--------  Return Routability Check

      Return Routability Check    -------->

                                             <<< IP Address B
                                                 Verified >>

                                  <========        Application Data

                   Figure 1: Return Routability Example

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6.  Security and Privacy Considerations

   As all the datagrams in DTLS are authenticated, integrity and
   confidentiality protected there is no risk that an attacker
   undetectably modifies the contents of those packets.  The IP
   addresses in the IP header and the port numbers of the transport
   layer are, however, not authenticated.  With the introduction of the
   CID, care must be taken to test reachability of a peer at a given IP
   address and port.

   Note that the return routability checks do not protect against third-
   party flooding if the attacker is along the path, as the attacker can
   forward the return routability checks to the real peer (even if those
   datagrams are cryptographically authenticated).

7.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to allocate an entry to the existing TLS
   "ContentType" registry, for the return_routability_check(TBD) defined
   in this document.

8.  Open Issues

   -  Should the return routability check use separate sequence numbers
      and replay windows?

   -  Should the heartbeat message be re-used instead of the proposed
      new message exchange?

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

              Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and T. Fossati, "Connection
              Identifiers for DTLS 1.2", draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-
              id-05 (work in progress), May 2019.

              Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-31 (work in progress), March

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

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   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,

9.2.  URIs

   [1] mailto:tls@ietf.org

   [2] https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

   [3] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/index.html

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Appendix A.  History


   -  Initial version

Appendix B.  Working Group Information


   The discussion list for the IETF TLS working group is located at the
   e-mail address tls@ietf.org [1].  Information on the group and
   information on how to subscribe to the list is at
   https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]

   Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.ietf.org/mail-
   archive/web/tls/current/index.html [3]

Appendix C.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank Achim Kraus, Hanno Becker and Manuel Pegourie-
   Gonnard for their input to this document.

Authors' Addresses

   Thomas Fossati
   Arm Limited

   EMail: thomas.fossati@arm.com

   Hannes Tschofenig (editor)
   Arm Limited

   EMail: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com

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