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  Internet Draft                                               P.Urien
  Document: draft-urien-eap-smartcard-04.txt             A.J. Farrugia
                                                               M.Groot
                                                             G.Pujolle
                                                             J.Abellan
  Expires:                                                  August 2004

                          EAP-Support in smartcard


Status

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.
   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.
   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsolete by other documents
   at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
   reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

1 Abstract

   This document will describe the interface to the EAP protocol in
   smartcards, which could store multiple identities associated to
   Network Access Identifiers.





















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Table of Contents

   1 Abstract.........................................................1
   2 Overview.........................................................3
   3 Terms............................................................4
   4 Relationship with RFC 2284.......................................4
      4.1 EAP multiplexing model......................................4
      4.2 EAP smartcards..............................................5
   5 Identification label.............................................6
   6 UserID Coding Rules..............................................6
   7 Mandatory and optional services..................................7
      7.1 Add-Identity................................................7
      7.2 Delete-Identity.............................................7
      7.3 Get-Preferred-Identity......................................7
      7.4 Get-Current-Identity........................................7
      7.5 Get-Next-Identity...........................................7
      7.6 Get-Profile-Data............................................8
      7.7 Set-Identity................................................8
      7.8 Process-EAP.................................................8
      7.9 Get-Session-Key (SK)........................................9
      7.10 Get-802.1X-State...........................................9
      7.11 Reset-801.1X-State.........................................9
      7.12 Method Functions...........................................9
      7.13 Relationship with the 802.1X supplicant state machine......9
      7.14 Authentication-Status.....................................10
      7.15 Multiple EAP Identity selections..........................10
   8 Relationships with the Authentication Agent.....................11
   9 ISO 7816-4 APDUs................................................11
      9.1 ISO 7816 Status Word.......................................11
      9.2 PIN Management.............................................12
          9.2.1 Verify PIN...........................................12
          9.2.2 Change PIN...........................................12
          9.2.3 Enable PIN...........................................13
          9.2.4 Disable PIN..........................................13
          9.2.5 Unblock PIN..........................................13
      9.3 Multi-Applications smartcard considerations................13
      9.4 Add-Identity...............................................14
      9.5 Delete-Identity............................................14
      9.6 Get-Preferred-Identity.....................................14
      9.7 Get-Current-Identity.......................................15
      9.8 Get-Next-Identity..........................................15
      9.9 Get-Profile-Data...........................................15
      9.10 Set-Identity..............................................16
      9.11 Set-Multiple-Identity.....................................16
      9.12 Process-EAP...............................................16
      9.13 Method Functions..........................................18
      9.14 Get-Session-Key...........................................19
      9.15 Get-Current-Version.......................................19
      9.16 Get-802.1X-State..........................................20
      9.17 Reset-802.1X-State........................................20
      9.18 Commands summary..........................................21

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   10 State Machine Sequence.........................................21
      10.1 Supplicant software state machine sequence................21
      10.2 Smartcard EAP framework state machine sequence............22
   11 Security Considerations........................................22
      11.1 General Considerations....................................22
      11.2 PEAP Consideration........................................23
   12 Intellectual Property Right Notice.............................23
   13 Annex 1 (Informative) - EAP/SIM packet detail..................23
   14 Annex 2 (Informative) - EAP/MD5 packet details.................27
   15 Annex 3 (Informative) TLS support..............................29
      15.1 Unix time issue...........................................29
      15.2 Fragment maximum size.....................................29
      15.3 EAP/TLS messages format...................................30
      15.4 Example of EAP/TLS Authentication.........................31
   16 Annex 4 (Normative) ASN.1 BER Tag coding for the subscriber
   profile information...............................................31
      16.1 ASN.1 Subscriber Profile Encoding.........................31
          16.1.1 EapID...............................................32
          16.1.2 EapType.............................................32
          16.1.3 Version.............................................32
          16.1.4 User Credential.....................................32
          16.1.5 UserProfile.........................................32
          16.1.6 UserProfile encoding example........................33
   17 Annex 5 (Informative) APDUs exchange example...................33
   18 References.....................................................34
   18 Author's Addresses.............................................35

2 Overview

   All technologies derived from 802.11 specifications such as 802.11a,
   802.11b, 802.11g need strong security protocols for data privacy,
   integrity and network access. The 802.1X [8] specification describes
   the risks and the protocols for the protection of the exchanged data
   during the network connection.
   802.1X specification requires the Extensible Authentication Protocol
   (EAP) to be used as the framework for application dependent
   authentication processes with a mutual authentication between the
   supplicant and the authenticator. It is obvious that the role of the
   supplicant in this specification could partly be implemented in the
   smartcard as an authentication processing mean. The flexibility of
   EAP (RFC 2284) specification does not provide a Mandatory-to-
   implement solution. The structure of the EAP frames allows the
   applications to identify the EAP type of consequently to operate the
   appropriate authentication.
   This draft describes a standard interface to EAP implementation
   embedded in a smartcard. This device is generally considered as the
   most secure computing platform.





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3 Terms

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119.

   Authentication Agent: A piece of software implemented in the
   supplicant that processes the authentication sequence.

   AS
   Authentication Server

   Authenticator: See the IEEE 802.1X specification for a definition of
   this concept.

   EAP
   Extensible Authentication Protocol

   GSM
   Global System for Mobile communications

   IMSI
   International Mobile Subscriber Identifier, used in GSM to identify
   subscribers.

   NAI
   Network Access Identifier

   PIN
   Personal Identification Number

   SK
   Session Key

   SIM
   Subscriber Identity Mobile

   Supplicant: an IEEE 802.1X concept, which in the context of IEEE
   802.11 represents a STA (station) seeking to attach to an IEEE 802
   LAN via an IEEE 802.1X Port. See the IEEE 802.1X specification for a
   complete definition.

4 Relationship with RFC 2284

4.1 EAP multiplexing model

   According to [14], EAP implementations conceptually consist of the
   three following components:




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   [a] Lower layer.  The lower layer is responsible for transmitting
   and receiving EAP frames between the peer and authenticator.  EAP
   has been run over a variety of lower layers including
   - PPP;
   - Wired  IEEE 802 LANs [IEEE-802.1X];
   - IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs [IEEE-802.11];
   - UDP (L2TP [RFC2661] and ISAKMP [PIC]);
   - and TCP [PIC].

   [b] EAP layer.  The EAP layer receives and transmits EAP packets via
   the lower layer, implements duplicate detection and retransmission,
   and delivers and receives EAP messages to and from EAP methods.

   [c] EAP method.  EAP methods implement the authentication algorithms
   and receive and transmit EAP messages via the EAP layer.  Since
   fragmentation support is not provided by EAP itself, this is the
   responsibility of EAP methods.

4.2 EAP smartcards

   An EAP smartcard implements an EAP method and works in cooperation
   with a smartcard interface entity, that sends and receives EAP
   messages to/from this component. The simplest form of this interface
   is a software bridge that forwards EAP messages to smartcard.
   According to EAP methods complexity and smartcard computing
   capacities, protocols sub-sets, that donÆt deal with security
   features may be computed by the smartcard interface entity.

            +-+-+-+-+-+-+
            | EAP method|
            | Smartcard |
            +-+-+-+-+-+-+
                  !
            +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
            | Smartcard |           |  |           |           |
            | Interface | EAP method|  | EAP method| EAP method|
            | Type = X  | Type = Y  |  | Type = X  | Type = Y  |
            |       V   |           |  |       ^   |           |
            +-+-+-+-!-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-!-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
            |       !               |  |       !               |
            |  EAP  ! Layer         |  |  EAP  !  Layer        |
            |       !               |  |       !               |
            +-+-+-+-!-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-!-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
            |       !               |  |       !               |
            | Lower !  Layer        |  | Lower !  Layer        |
            |       !               |  |       !               |
            +-+-+-+-!-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-!-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                    !                          !
                    !   Peer                   ! Authenticator
                    +------------>-------------+


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5 Identification label

   802.1X specification [5] requires an authentication between the
   authentication server (AS) and the supplicant. The authentication is
   embedded in the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) RFC2284 [1]
   specification. The authentication consists of a challenge response
   between both parties without consideration of the involved crypto-
   suite. Before starting the mutual authentication, the AS needs the
   supplicant identity to establish the session. The AS or the
   authenticator sends an EAP Request Identity to the supplicant that
   returns its system identity. A user may own several identities
   associated to corporate networks or operatorsÆ networks.

   The identification label is a pointer to a system identity (the EAP-
   ID value returned in the EAP-Identity.response message) stored in
   smartcard; it may be of various types:

   1. A network SSID as described in the 802.11 standard [4].
   2. A userÆs identification (userid) e.g. an ASCII string. A network
   access identifier, NAI [6] may be used as userid.
   3. A pseudonym, e.g. a friendly name.
   According to the network environment, the supplicant software needs
   to set the appropriate identity and verifies if the smartcard is
   able to mirror the authenticator.

   If the smartcard is not able to process the authentication related
   to the identity then any setting process is rejected by the NAK
   code.

   The subsequent sections give the description of the methods used by
   a supplicant for processing an 802.1X authentication using the
   smartcard.

   Annex one provides a reference implementation example for a SIM
   based authentication. Annex two provides a reference implementation
   example for a MD5 based authentication. Annex three provides a
   reference implementation for a TLS based authentication. Annex four
   describes the userÆs profile according to the ASN.1 [9] syntax.
   Annex five illustrates an MD5 authentication scenario that works
   with an EAP smartcard.

6 UserID Coding Rules

   This section describes the structure and the architecture of the
   userid.

   A userid consists of 2 fields separated by the Internet symbol "@".
   The right hand side of the "@" symbol is the userid realms while the
   left hand side is an application dependent and unique identification
   number. EAP/SIM has defined the userid where the application

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   identification is "1IMSI". Other userid such as email address can be
   used by the application.

7 Mandatory and optional services

   Mandatory services must be implemented in any smartcard that claims
   conformance with this draft. Optional services are not required by
   basic authentication operations.

7.1 Add-Identity
   Status: Optional.
   This command and the Delete-Identity are part of the userÆs identity
   management protocols. The smartcard is initially manufactured
   without any identification label. The personalization or the
   supplicant software adds in the smartcard userÆs identification
   label that can be retrieved by other smartcard command.

7.2 Delete-Identity
   Status: Optional
   This command and the add-Identity are part of the userÆs identity
   management protocols. The smartcard contains a list of one or
   several identification labels that can be retrieved by the
   supplication software. The command deletes one entry of the
   smartcard list.

7.3 Get-Preferred-Identity
   Status: Optional
   The smartcard contains at least one userÆs identity related to the
   userÆs network subscription. The supplicant software gets from the
   smartcard the initial and preferred identification label. If the
   user has more than one identity the supplicant software uses the
   Get-Next-Identity to read all the available other userÆs identities.

7.4 Get-Current-Identity
   Status: Mandatory
   The smartcard contains at least one userÆs identity related to the
   userÆs network subscription. The supplicant software gets from the
   smartcard its current identification label.

7.5 Get-Next-Identity
   Status: Mandatory
   The smartcard may contain one or more userÆs identities according to
   the userÆs network subscriptions. The supplicant software should
   prompt the userÆs identity and a subsequent selection allows the
   smartcard to process the appropriate EAP authentication type. The
   method Get-Next-Identity allows the supplicant software to read all
   the available userÆs identities.

   The Get-Next-Identity method may inform the supplicant software when
   all userÆs identities have been read. Otherwise the supplicant


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   software detects the identity list end when it gets again the first
   identity.

7.6 Get-Profile-Data
   Status: Optional
   The Authentication Agent or the authenticator may request the
   subscriber profile information. The Get-Profile-Data returns all
   related information available in the smartcard. Details of the
   subscriber profile information are given in annex 4. The
   implementation of the information may be ruled but ASN.1 BER coding
   specification [9] or by an XML dialect [10].

7.7 Set-Identity
   Status: Mandatory
   Once the Identity selection is processed, the supplicant software
   needs to set the smartcard EAP framework according to the selected
   userÆs identity. The Set-Identity sets or restarts the smartcard EAP
   framework state machine for further processing using the EAP-Packets
   method.

7.8 Process-EAP
   Status: Mandatory
   The EAP process is described in the RFC 2284 specification [1] and
   involves several EAP requests and responses packets,

   1) EAP request/response Identity;
   2) A suite of EAP request/response related to a particular
   authentication scenario; and
   3) EAP success or failure.

   The Set-Identity restarts the smartcard EAP framework state machine
   for further processing using the EAP-Packets method.

   An incoming EAP/Request/Identity restarts the smartcard EAP
   framework state machine for further processing using other EAP-
   Packets methods.

   The smartcard receives the RFC 2284 frames. It retrieves the
   appropriate EAP authentication type in the frame and the identifier.

   The smartcard maintains the EAP state machine and returns an EAP NAK
   packet if the state sequence is broken. In that case it restarts the
   AUTHENTICATING state.

   Any EAP request is silently ignored if the state machine was not
   started.

   The last step of the protocol retrieves the session Key from the
   smartcard.



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7.9 Get-Session-Key (SK)
   Status: Mandatory.
   At the end of a successful authentication the supplicant needs to
   update the appropriate crypto suite (if any) using the session key.
   The Get-Session-Key returns to the supplicant software the key to
   initialize radio security protocols like TKIP, or CCMP.

   In an 801.1X [5] context, SK should be interpreted as the unicast
   key.

   In an 802.11i or WPA context SK should be interpreted as the PMK
   (Pairwise Master Key).

7.10 Get-802.1X-State.
   Status: Mandatory.
   This command returns the current smartcard 802.1X state.

7.11 Reset-801.1X-State.
   Status: Mandatory.

   This command forces the EAP smartcard in the AUTHENTICATING state.
   See section -Relationship with the 802.1X supplicant state machine-.

7.12 Method Functions
   Status: Optional.

   EAP smartcards that are not able to completely process an EAP method
   MAY support some essential security procedures, like for example,

    -X509 Certificate storage
    -Random generator
    -Private key encryption
    -Private key decryption
    -Public key encryption
    -Public key decryption
    -Symmetric key encryption
    -Symmetric key decryption


7.13 Relationship with the 802.1X supplicant state machine

   The supplicant state machine, as described in 802.1x standard is
   split between the terminal and the smartcard. The smartcard only
   implements the AUTHENTICATING state. Upon reception of the Set-
   Identity command smartcard unconditionally transits in the
   AUTHENTICATING state. Upon reception of the EAP Identity-Request
   message, smartcard unconditionally moves in the ACQUIRED state,
   delivers an Identity response message and re-enters the
   AUTHENTICATING state. In agreement with the 802.1x state machine all
   EAP requests are processed in the AUTHENTICATING state. The final
   EAP notification message (either success or failure) indicates the

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   end of the authentication process. If any error occurs during the
   authentication procedure (reception of NAK or failure messages ...)
   the smartcard restarts at the AUTHENTICATING state where it will
   wait for an identity request or the first EAP-Type request.
   If the EAP smartcard support security features like PIN code or
   biometric identification, all EAP messages will be silently discard
   before the occurrence of a successful bearer authentication.

                                    reset
        +-------------------+      +------>+----------------------+
    +-->|     ACQUIRED      |      |   +-->|    AUTHENTICATING    |<-+
    |   +-------------------+      |   |   +----------------------+  |
    |   | txRspId(reveiveId,|      |   |   | txRspAuth(receivedId,|  |
    |   |        previousId)|      |   |   |        previousId)   |  |
    |   | previousId=       |      |   |   |   previousId=        |  |
    |   |     receivedId    |      |   |   |         reveivedId   |  |
    |   +-------------------+      |   |   +--+---+----------+----+  |
    |             |                |   |      |   | reqId    |       |
    |             +----------------+   +--<---+   |          +---->--+
    |                                  reqAuth    |             error
    +--------------------<------------------------+

7.14 Authentication-Status

   At any time, the smartcard may return the authentication status.
   This status may reveal the following situations:

   1) No authentication identity has been selected.
   2) Authenticating
   3) Authentication Success, AUTHENTICATING state restarted.
   4) Authentication failure, AUTHENTICATING state restarted.

7.15 Multiple EAP Identity selections

   Multiple EAP authentications may be processed simultaneously in the
   same smartcard. If this capability is supported, the following rules
   apply:

   1) Multiple EAP Identities may be selected at the same time.
   2) The supplicant software shall indicate in the Set-Identity
   command short identifier to be associated with the selected EAP
   identity.

   Note: If another EAP identity was associated with the same short
   identity this EAP identity becomes necessarily unlinked and is no
   longer more possible to accessible to it unless a new set-identity
   command is processed (in this case the state machine is reset) or
   unless a different short identity has been also associated with it.

   The supplicant software shall include this short identifier within
   the EAP-Packets, Authentication-Status and Get-Session-Key commands

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   to inform which of the selected EAP identities the command is
   targeted to.

   The smartcard and the supplicant software shall maintain a separate
   EAP state machine for each of the different selected EAP identities.

   Note: the EAP state machine is associated with each EAP identity:
   whether two or more different short identities are associated to the
   same EAP identity, the results of EAP-Packets, Authentication-Status
   and Get-Session-Key commands do not depend on the short identifier
   used to refer the EAP identity. In other words, there is only one
   state machine for selected EAP Identity dependently of the short
   identities associated with it.

8 Relationships with the Authentication Agent

   The authentication agent is a piece of software implemented in the
   supplicant that processes the authentication method. This component
   must be able to detect a smartcard. If this device is not present,
   or if it silently discards an EAP.request message, then
   authentication agent must reject all incoming request messages by
   the NAK code.

9 ISO 7816-4 APDUs

   This section of the document provides an implementation of the
   previous descriptions for an ISO 78176-4 compatible smartcard. The
   section does not preclude of the transport protocol used between the
   smartcard and the reader. Thus, this specification does not mandate-
   to-implement any transport protocol such as T=0 or T=1, which are
   not in the scope of this document. It should be noted that all
   values are in hex representation.

   The restriction and security related descriptions are not present in
   the document. Annexes of this document give implementation examples.

   Note: Class byte value defined in this section ('A0') shall be
   interpreted as an implementation example. Other values may be used
   respecting conventions defined in ISO 78176-4.

9.1 ISO 7816 Status Word

   According to ISO 7816, the status word SW1,SW2 is a two bytes word,
   giving information about current operation either success or
   failure.

   '90' '00' indicates an operation success
   '98' '04' indicates one of the following events,
        - Access Condition not fulfilled, e.g. a pin code presentation
        is required.
        - Unsuccessful user PIN verification, at least one attempt left.

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   '98' '40' indicate one of the following events
        - Unsuccessful user PIN verification, no attempt left
        - Smartcard blocked
   '67' 'XX'
        - Incorrect parameter P3
   '6B' 'XX'
        - Incorrect parameter P1 or P2
   '6D' 'XX'
        - Unknown instruction code (INS) given in the command
   '6E' 'XX'
        - Wrong instruction class (CLA) given in the command
   '6F' 'XX'
        - Technical problem, not implemented
   '61 ''XX'
        - Operation result must be fetched by the ISO Get Response APDU
        (CLA = 'C0', P3= 'XX')
   '6C ''XX'
         - Operation must be performed again, with the LE parameter
        value sets to 'XX'.
   '70' '00'
        - Packet silently discarded.
   '70' '01'
        - Authentication failure

9.2 PIN Management

   Some services may require that the smartcardÆs bearer presents its
   PIN code.

   Smartcard returns the '98' '04' status word when itÆs necessary to
   check the PIN code, before accessing to a particular service (see
   previous section). A PIN code is typically a four digits decimal
   number, ASCII encoded, and ranging between '0000' and '9999'.

  9.2.1 Verify PIN
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   | Verify | A0  |  20 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   The ISO APDU Verify is used when a PIN code presentation is required

   Lc is the PIN code length, typically height ASCII encoded bytes.


  9.2.2 Change PIN

   This APDU modifies the user PIN code.



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   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   | Change | A0  |  24 | 00 | 00 | 10 | 00 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   The old PIN (8 bytes) and new PIN (8 bytes) are presented

  9.2.3 Enable PIN

   This APDU enables the user PIN function.

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   | Enable | A0  |  26 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   The user PIN code (8 bytes) is presented.

  9.2.4 Disable PIN
   This APDU disables the user PIN function.

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   | Disable| A0  |  28 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   The user PIN code is presented.

  9.2.5 Unblock PIN

   This APDU unblocks a smartcard, blocked after three wrong PIN code
   presentations.
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   | Unblock| A0  |  2C | 00 | 00 | 10 | 00 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   The user PIN code (8 bytes) and an unblock code (8 bytes) are
   presented.


9.3 Multi-Applications smartcard considerations

   A smartcard may store several applications, each of them being
   identified by a set of bytes referred as the Application IDentifier
   (AID).


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   The ISO APDU Select is used when itÆs necessary to select an
   application, able to process one or more EAP authentication
   scenarios.

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   | Select | 00  |  A4 | 04 | 00 | XX | 00 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   Le is the AID length.

   According to ISO 7816-7 AID is made of two parts
   -RID, a mandatory 5 bytes field that identifies a company or a
   standardization body.
   -PIX, up to 11 bytes, which identifies an application.

9.4 Add-Identity

   This command adds an identification label as described in the
   section: Identification Label Coding Rules. The smartcard list is
   managed by the smartcard. The identification label is appended as
   the last element of the list.

   Identity coding guidelines are not yet specified.

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  |  17 | 00 | 81 | xx | 00 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

9.5 Delete-Identity

   This command deletes the identification label as described in the
   section: Identification Label Coding Rules. The command parameter
   gives the identification label to be deleted.
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  |  17 | 00 | 82 | xx | 00 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+


9.6 Get-Preferred-Identity

   This command returns the userÆs preferred identification label as
   described in the section: Identification Label Coding Rules

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |

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   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  |  17 | 00 | 02 | 00 | XX |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

9.7 Get-Current-Identity

   This command returns userÆs current identification label as
   described in the section: Identification Label Coding Rules.

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  |  18 | 00 | AA | 00 | XX |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall be set to '00'.

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP
   identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers
   are coded as described in Set-Identity command.

9.8 Get-Next-Identity

   This command returns a user identification label as described in the
   section: Identification Label Coding Rules.
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  |  17 | 00 | 01 | 00 | XX |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

9.9 Get-Profile-Data

   The command returns the related subscriber profile information
   according to the application requirements and format. Profile coding
   rules are defined in annex 4.
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  |  1A | 00 | AA | 00 | YY |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall be set to '00'.

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP
   identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers
   are coded as described

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9.10 Set-Identity

   The command resets and initializes the state machine for processing
   the EAP Packets. The first step after this command is an EAP request
   identity packet. If a different EAP packet is sent to the smartcard
   the smartcard returns an EAP NAK response.

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  |  16 | 00 | 80 | XX | 00 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

9.11 Set-Multiple-Identity

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  |  16 | 00 | 83 | XX | 00 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   The command resets and initializes the state machine for processing
   the EAP Packets. The first step after this command is an EAP request
   identity packet. If a different EAP packet is sent to the smartcard
   the smartcard returns an EAP NAK response.

   When "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, then the first
   status byte is '90' and the second one indicates the short
   identifier (coded in 1 byte) to be associated with the selected
   identity.

9.12 Process-EAP

   The command is the method for EAP packet management. The smartcard
   identifies the EAP packet type and processes the EAP authentication
   according to current state machine. The state machine sequences have
   to be respected and the smartcard enforces the EAP sequence
   processing.



   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  | 80  | 00 | AA | XX | YY |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   The EAP request or response packet lengths are represented by the
   unknown value XX and YY. The supplicant software should set these
   elements in accordance with the EAP packet types.


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   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall be set to '00'.

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP
   identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers
   are coded as described in Set-Identity command.

   Most EAP request packets will produce an EAP response packet from
   the smartcard. If no response is to be produced (e.g. packet
   silently discard because invalid sequence) the smartcard shall
   inform the client software with an alert status word (70 00).

   Success and failure packets do not require any response from the EAP
   client. A "successfully ending of command (90 00)" status word shall
   be send from the smartcard once a success EAP packet is processed.
   An alert status word (70 00) shall be send from the smartcard once a
   failure EAP packet is received.

   EAP Identity packets are independent of the authentication type;
   this section of the document provides the packet details. The rest
   of the EAP packet being authentication protocol dependent, they are
   detailed in the informative annex of this document.

   The description of the EAP/Request/Identity is detailed according to
   the IETF RFC 2284 [1].

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Request    |  Identifier   |          Length = 5            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 01   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The description of the EAP/Response/identity is detailed according
   to the IETF RFC 2284 [1].

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Response   |  Identifier   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 01   |                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                                               |
   |                        User Identity                          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Note : Command chaining and extended length



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   1) When an incoming EAP packet exceeds 255 bytes, the transport
   mechanisms for Extended APDU described in ISO/IEC 7816-3 for T=0 and
   T=1 may be used
   For T=0 the APDU Command (APDU-C) is split into data strings of at
   most 255 bytes  and transported in the Data Field of a series of
   consecutive APDU ENVELOPE
   For T=1 the APDU-C is split into data strings of at most 254 bytes
   and transported in the Information Field of chained I-blocks. In
   both cases, on reception of the TPDU the smartcard has to
   concatenate the successive data strings in order to obtain the
   original APDU.

   2) When an outgoing EAP packet exceeds 256 bytes, the smartcard may
   use the mechanisms described in ISO/IEC 7816-4, i.e. extended length
   field (ISO/IEC 7816-4 2002) for T=0 and T=1.
   For T=0 the APDU response (APDU-R) is split into successive data
   strings of at most 256 bytes by the card. The Terminal can retrieve
   them by a series of consecutive GET RESPONSE APDU.
   For T=1 the APDU-R is split into data strings of at most 254 bytes
   by the card and transported in the Information Field of chained I-
   blocks. On reception, the Terminal performs the concatenation of the
   Information Field of the successive I-blocks to get the APDU-R. The
   supplicant software shall then reassemble the complete EAP packet
   before sending it to the authenticator.

9.13 Method Functions.

   EAP smartcards that are not able to process a specific full EAP
   method may support some essential security procedures.


   +------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |   Command  |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   | Method-FCT | A0  | 60  | zz | AA | xx | yy |
   +------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall be set to æ00Æ.

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP
   identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers
   are coded as described in Set-Identity Command.

   xx is the length of the input value.
   yy is the length of the returned value.

   P1 identifies a particular function, and is organized according to
   the following scheme:


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   b7b6     00-Do.Final, 01-Initialize  10-More 11-Reserved
   b5b4     Function index
   b3b2b1   Function type
    0 X509      Certificate reading
    1 Random    generator
    2 Private   key encrypt
    3 Private   key decrypt
    4 Public    key encrypt
    5 Public    key decrypt
    6 Symmetric key encrypt
    7 Symmetric key decrypt
   b0 reserved


9.14 Get-Session-Key

   Once the state machine has received the EAP Success packet the
   smartcard process is able to send the Session Key used by the 802.1X
   specification for the crypto-suite.

   As an illustration the EAP SIM authentication [2] specifies the
   Session Key usage according to the system cryptographic suite.

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  | A6  | 00 | AA | 00 | 20 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall be set to æ00Æ.

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP
   identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers
   are coded as described in Set-Identity Command.


9.15 Get-Current-Version

   This command returns the EAP-Type protocol version and the WLAN-SCC
   version.

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  |  18 | xx | yy | 00 | 02 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   P1=00, Reserved
   P1 is the current EAP-Type

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   P2=0, gets the EAP-Type version
   P2=1, gets the WLAN-SCC version

9.16 Get-802.1X-State

   This command returns the current smartcard 802.1X state.

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  |  19 | 00 | AA | 00 | 01 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall be set to æ00Æ.

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP
   identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers
   are coded as described in Set-Identity Command.

   Returned values:
   01 No Identity set, EAP messages silently discarded.
   02 EAP/Request/Identity received, AUTHENTICATING state.
   03 Authentication in progress, AUTHENTICATING state.
   04 Success, AUTHENTICATING state, waiting for an EAP/Request
   05 Failure, AUTHENTICATING state, waiting for an EAP/Request
   06 Error, AUTHENTICATING state, waiting for an EAP/Request

9.17 Reset-802.1X-State
   This command forces the EAP smartcard to the 802.1X AUTHENTICATING
   state
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  |  19 | 10 | AA | 00 | 01 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall be set to æ00Æ.

   If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value)
   shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP
   identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers
   are coded as described in Set-Identity Command.

   Returned values:
   01 No Identity set, EAP messages silently discarded.
   04 Success, AUTHENTICATING state, waiting for an EAP/Request



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9.18 Commands summary.

    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |         Command        |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |       Process-EAP      | A0  |  80 | 00 | ii | xx | yy |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |        Method-FCT      | A0  |  60 | zz | ii | xx | yy |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |    Get-802.1X-State    | A0  |  19 | 00 | ii | 00 | 01 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |    Set-802.1X-State    | A0  |  19 | 10 | ii | 00 | 01 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |     Get-Session-Key    | A0  |  A6 | 00 | ii | 00 | xx |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |    Get-Profile-Data    | A0  |  1A | 00 | ii | 00 | yy |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |  Get-Current-Identity  | A0  |  18 | 00 | ii | 00 | yy |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |    Get-Next-Identity   | A0  |  17 | 00 | 01 | 00 | yy |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    | Get-Preferred-Identity | A0  |  17 | 00 | 02 | 00 | yy |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |      Set-Identity      | A0  |  16 | 00 | 80 | xx | 00 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    | Set-Multiple-Identity  | A0  |  16 | 00 | 83 | xx | 00 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |       Add-Identity     | A0  |  17 | 00 | 81 | xx | 00 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |     Delete-Identity    | A0  |  17 | 00 | 82 | xx | 00 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |   Get-Current-Version  | A0  |  18 | xx | yy | 00 | 02 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |       Verify-PIN       | A0  |  20 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |       Change-PIN       | A0  |  24 | 00 | 00 | 10 | 00 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |       Enable-PIN       | A0  |  26 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |       Disable-PIN      | A0  |  28 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |       Unblock-PIN      | A0  |  2C | 00 | 00 | 10 | 00 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
    |       Select-AID       | A0  |  A4 | 04 | 00 | xx | 00 |
    +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

10 State Machine Sequence

10.1 Supplicant software state machine sequence



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   +-----------------------+   +-----------------------+
   |A-Get userÆs identity  |>>>|B-Set userÆs identity  |>>>
   +-----------------------+   +-----------------------+
   +---------------------------+   +---------------------------+
   |C-send/receive EAP packets |>>>|D-Get-Session-Key          |
   +---------------------------+   +---------------------------+

   Transitions:

   A-B : All available identities received by Get-Next-Identity
   commands
   B-C : Set-Identity command successfully performed
   C-D : Successful ending of EAP-Packets command with no outgoing
   packet(Status word of the command equals æ9000'). This can be also
   detected by 'authenticated' status following the Authentication-
   Status command.
   D-C : An incoming EAP packet

10.2 Smartcard EAP framework state machine sequence

   +----------------------+   +----------------------+
   | Z-Identity not set   |>>>| Y-Authenticating     |>>>
   +----------------------+   +----------------------+

   +----------------------+   +----------------------+
   | X-Authenticated      |   | W- Not authenticated |
   |   /Authenticating    |   |    /Authenticating   |
   +----------------------+   +----------------------+

   Transitions:

   Z-Y : An available identity successfully set
   Y-X : EAP success packet received
   Y-W : EAP failure packet received
   X-Y : EAP Request identity packet received
   W-Y : EAP Request identity packet received

11 Security Considerations

11.1 General Considerations

   As a reference implementation the previous section provides the
   details of the EAP authentication using the GSM SIM. This section of
   the document highlights the new potential risks providers of
   application may face by re-using deployed networks for other
   purposes. From the document [7] fatal flaw does exist when have
   physical access to the smartcard.

   The nature of the Internet network does no longer require getting
   physical access to the smartcard. Worms, Trojan horses or viruses
   can move to the computing platforms and performs the jobs. It is

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   important for a reference implementation to provide the relevant
   level of protection for the new applications but not to create other
   flaws.

   Other consideration have been introduced in [2] to protect the
   smartcard against crypto attack and recommends the authentication
   should take place in a PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT.

11.2 PEAP Consideration

   Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) [12] is a pre-
   processing protocol that allows the privacy of data when processing
   EAP [1] protocol. EAP protocol, as defined in [1], starts by an EAP
   packet request/Identity. The EAP packet response Identity returns
   the userÆs identification label with no privacy being not part of
   [1].

   PEAP protocol allows both part of the EAP packet exchange creating a
   session key that can be for privacy over the subsequent execution of
   the EAP protocol.

   This implementation of EAP in the smartcard shall allow performing a
   PEAP tunnel for privacy. Once PEAP first phase has been successfully
   preformed, the EAP protocol (or other protocol) has defined shall be
   performed according the EAP smartcard requirements.


12 Intellectual Property Right Notice

   To be specify according to the author and participant.

13 Annex 1 (Informative) - EAP/SIM packet detail.

   The protocol implementation is out of the scope of this document but
   as a reference implementation this section gives details using the
   SIM as specified by [3]. Other protocol can be implemented using ISO
   7816-3 TPDU. This section of the document gives the APDU syntax and
   coding which makes the specification protocol free.
   The first EAP packet is the EAP Request Identity. This initial
   packet format complies with [1]. The smartcard returns an EAP
   response identity according to the IMSI length and the supported
   version according to [2].

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  | 80  | 00 | 00 | 05 | YY |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+




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   The description of the EAP/Request/identity is detailed according to
   the IETF RFC 2284 [1]. This EAP packet doesnÆt respect the EAP/SIM
   format since it is only part of [1].




    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Request    |  Identifier   |          Length = 5            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 01   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The description of the EAP/Response/identity is detailed according
   to the IETF RFC 2284 [1].

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Response   |  Identifier   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 01   |                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                                               |
   |                                                               |
   |                         User Identity                         |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Note the EAP/Response/Identity when returning the userÆs identity
   that includes the IMSI includes the real coded IMSI in the EAP
   packet and not the IMSI coded for GSM network. Further information
   can be retrieved in [3] for the IMSI coding in the SIM during the
   SIM setting.

   The user Identity field can contains the userÆs permanent pseudonym
   or re-authentication identity.
   The second EAP Packet is the EAP request SIM start as represented in
   the IETF draft document [2].

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  | 80  | 00 | 00 | XX | YY |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   The description of the EAP/Request/SIM/Start is detailed according
   to [2] incoming SIM data where further information can be retrieved.
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1

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   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Request    |  Identifier   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 18   | Subtype = 10  |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |AT_PERM..._REQ | Length = 1    |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |AT_FULL..._RES | Length = 1    |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |AT_ANY_ID_REQ  | Length = 1    |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |AT_VERSION_L...| Length        | Actual Version List Length    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Supported version 1           | Supported version 2           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Supported version 3           | Padding                       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The description of the EAP/Response/SIM/Start is detailed according
   to [2] outgoing SIM data where further information can be retrieved.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Response   |  Identifier   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 18   | Subtype = 10  |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |AT_NONCE_MT    | Length = 5    |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   |                           NONCE_MT                            |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  AT_SELECTED  | Length = 1    |   Select Version              |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  AT_IDENTITY  |    Length     | Actual Identity Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   |                User Identity (Optional)                       |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The description of the EAP/Response/SIM/Start is detailed according
   to [2] outgoing SIM data where further information can be retrieved.
   The third EAP Packet is the EAP request SIM Challenge as represented
   in the IETF draft document [2].




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   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  | 80  | 00 | 00 | XX | 1C |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   The description of the EAP/Request/SIM/Challenge is detailed
   according to [2] incoming SIM data where further information can be
   retrieved.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Request   |  Identifier   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 18   | Subtype = 11  |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | AT_RAND       | Length        |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   |                           n*RAND                              |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | AT_MAC        | Length = 5    |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   |                              MAC                              |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | AT_IV         | Length = 5    |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   |               Initialization Vector (Optional)                |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | AT_ENCR_DATA  | Length        |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   |                Encrypted Data (Optional)                      |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The description of the EAP/Response/SIM/Challenge is detailed
   according to [2] outgoing SIM data where further information can be
   retrieved.





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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Response   |  Identifier   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 18   | Subtype = 11  |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  AT_MAC       | Length = 5    |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   |                           MAC                                 |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The last EAP Packet is the EAP success notification as represented
   in the IETF RFC 2284 [2].

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  | 80  | 00 | 00 | 04 | 00 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+-- -+----+

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Success    |  Identifier   |          Length = 04          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

14 Annex 2 (Informative) - EAP/MD5 packet details

   The first EAP packet is the EAP Request Identity. This initial
   packet format complies with the RFC 2284. The smartcard returns an
   EAP response identity according to the NAI length.

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  | 80  | 00 | 00 | 05 | YY |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+

   The description of the EAP/Request/identity is detailed according to
   the IETF RFC 2284 [1].

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Request     |  Identifier   |            Length = 5         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Type = 01    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

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   The description of the EAP/Response/identity is detailed according
   to the IETF RFC 2284 [1].


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Response    |  Identifier   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 01   |                                               |
   |-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+             Identity Value                    |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The second EAP Packet is the EAP/request/MD5/challenge as
   represented in the IETF RFC 2284 [1].
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  | 80  | 00 | 00 | XX | 16 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   The description of the EAP/Request/MD5/challenge is detailed
   according to the IETF RFC 2284 [1].
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Request    |  Identifier   |           Length              |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 04   |                                               |
   |-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+           MD5-Challenge.Value                 |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The description of the EAP/Response/MD5/challenge is detailed
   according to the IETF RFC 2284 [1].

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Response   |  Identifier   |        Length = 16            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 04   |  Type_Size=10 |                               |
   |-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+---------------+     MD5 Digest Value          |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+





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   The third EAP Packet is the EAP success notification as represented
   in the IETF RFC 2284 [1].
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  | 80  | 00 | 00 | 04 | 00 |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+-- -+----+

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Success    |  Identifier   |          Length = 04          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Further information can be retrieved from the IETF draft document
   [2].

15 Annex 3 (Informative) TLS support.

15.1 Unix time issue.

   As mentioned in [15] TLS RFC the client hello message includes a 32
   byte random number, whose first 4 bytes are interpreted as the Unix
   time. As smartcard is not able to maintain a clock, this parameter
   MUST be added to the EAP-TLS Start message.

   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+
   |        | A0  | 80  | 00 | 00 | 0A | YY |
   +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Code=01   |  Identifier   |      Length  = 6              |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 13   |     Flag=20   |          Unix Time            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |             Unix Time         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+



15.2 Fragment maximum size.

   A single TLS record may be up to 16384 octets in length, but a TLS
   message may span multiple TLS records, and a TLS certificate message
   may in principle be as long as 16MB. The group of EAP-TLS messages


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   sent in a single round may thus be larger than the maximum RADIUS
   packet size of 4096 octets, or the maximum 802 LAN frame size.

   The chaining and extended length mechanisms identified in this
   document provide enough extension to manage incoming and outgoing
   EAP-TLS packets. Then, authenticator shall not necessary follow a
   specific fragment policy regarding whether EAP-TLS is provided by
   the smartcard or not.

   However, in order to prevent multiple segmentation and re-assembly
   operations, the maximum EAP message length of a no fragmented packet
   shall be set to 240 bytes. For a fragmented EAP message, the maximum
   length value shall be 240 bytes.

   As defined in EAP-TLS, when the smartcard receives an EAP-Request
   packet with the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Response with
   EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data.  This serves as a fragment ACK.

15.3 EAP/TLS messages format.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Code      |  Identifier   |      Length  <= 240           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type = 13   |     Flag      |        TLS Message Length     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |       TLS Message Length      |          TLS DATA             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Flags
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |L M S R R R R R|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   L = Length included.
   M = More fragments
   S = EAP-TLS start, set in an EAP-TLS Start message.
   R = Reserved









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15.4 Example of EAP/TLS Authentication

      Smartcard           Authentication Server
                              <- EAP-Request/
                                 Identity
   EAP-Response/
   Identity (MyID) ->
                              <- EAP-Request/
                              EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
                              (TLS Start)
   EAP-Response/
   EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
   TLS client_hello)->
                              <- EAP-Request/
                                 EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
                                (TLS server_hello,
                                 TLS certificate,
                                 TLS certificate_request,
                                 TLS server_hello_done)
                                 (Fragment 1: L, M bits set)
   EAP-Response/
   EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
                              <- PPP EAP-Request/
                                 EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
                                (Fragment 2)

   EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
   (TLS certificate,
    TLS client_key_exchange,
    TLS certificate_verify,
    TLS change_cipher_spec,
    TLS finished) ->
                              <- EAP-Request/
                                 EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
                                (TLS change_cipher_spec,
                                 TLS finished)
   EAP-Response/
   EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
                              <- EAP-Success


16 Annex 4 (Normative) ASN.1 BER Tag coding for the subscriber profile
information

   The subscriber profile is a collection of data associated to every
   identity. It can be used be the operating system of a wireless
   terminal in order to get information about user credentials.

16.1 ASN.1 Subscriber Profile Encoding



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  16.1.1 EapID

   EapID ::= OCTET STRING

   The EAP-ID associated to the current identity.

  16.1.2 EapType

   EapType ::= INTEGER

   The EAP type associated to the current identity.

  16.1.3 Version

   Version ::= INTEGER

   The protocol version associated to an EAP type.

  16.1.4 User Credential

   UserCredential ::= SEQUENCE OF CredentialObject

   CredentialObject ::= SEQUENCE {
   ObjectValue SubscriberInformation
   }

   SubscriberInformation ::= CHOICE {

   SSIDList [0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF {
   SSIDName OCTET STRING
   },

   SubscriberCertificate [1] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF {
   Certificate X509Certificate
   },

   RootCertificate [2] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF {
   Certificate X509Certificate
   }

   X509Certificate an ASN.1 definition, as described in [13].
  16.1.5 UserProfile

   UserProfile ::= SEQUENCE {
   ThisEapID   EapID,
   ThisEapType EapType,
   ThisVersion Version,
   ThisCredential UserCredential
   }



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  16.1.6 UserProfile encoding example

   30 82 xx yy
    04 05 31 32 33 34 35          EapID   = 1235
    02 01 0D                      EapType = EAP-TLS
    02 01 01                      Version = 1
    30 xx
     A0 0E
      04 05 61 62 63 64 65       SSID = abcde
      04 05 66 67 68 69 6A       SSID = fghij
     A1 82 xx yy
      First  X509Certificate
      Second X509Certificate
     A2 82 xx yy
      First  Root X509Certificate
      Second Root X509Certificate

17 Annex 5 (Informative) APDUs exchange example

   This annex shows ISO 7816 (T=0) TPDUs exchanged between the
   smartcard and the authentication agent

   // Select EAP application (AID= 11 22 33 44 55 66 01)
   Select.request:  00 A4 04 00 07 11 22 33 44 55 66 01
   Select.response: 90 00

   // Get current identity
   Get-Current-Identity.request:       A0 18 00 00 00
   Get-Current-Identity.response       98 04
   // !Pin code is requested

   // PIN code verification      (0000)
   Verify.request:             A0 20 00 00 08 30 30 30 30 FF FF FF FF
   Verify.response:            90 00

   // Try again
   Get-Current-Identity.request:       A0 18 00 00 00
   Get-Current-Identity.response:      6C 04
   Get-Current-Identity.request        A0 18 00 00 04
   Get-Current-Identity.response:      61 62 63 64 90 00


   // Get-Next-Identity()
   Get-Next-Identity.request:  A0 17 00 01 00
   Get-Next-Identity.response: 6C 04
   Get-Next-Identity.request:  A0 17 00 01 04
   Get-Next-Identity.response: 61 62 63 64 90 00

   // Set-Identity()
   Set-Identity.request:  A0 16 00 80 04 61 62 63 64
   Set-Identity.response: 90 00

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   // Process EAP-Packets()
   EAP-Packet.request:   A0 80 00 00 05 01 A5 00 05 01
   EAP-Packet.response:  61 09
   GetResponse.request:  A0 C0 00 00 09
   GetResponse.response: 02 A5 00 09 01 61 62 63 64 90 00
   EAP-Packet.request    A0 80 00 00 08 01 A6 00 08 04 02 12 34
   EAP-Packet.response:  61 16
   GetResponse.request:  A0 C0 00 00 16
   GetResponse.response: 02 A6 00 16 04 10 CF A5 2D CD 63 5F 5C 6D
                         55 B8 09 FD B7 BB EC 3C 90 00

18 References

   [1] L. Blunk, J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol
   (EAP)", RFC 2284, March 1998. (NORMATIVE)

   [2] EAP SIM Authentication,  draft-haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-12.txt.

   [3] GSM Technical Specification GSM 11.11. Digital cellular
   telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Specification of the
   Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM - ME)

   [4] Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
   Layer (PHY) Specifications

   [5] Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Standard for
   Port based Network Access Control.

   [6] "The Network Access Identifier" RFC 2486

   [7] "Can you Clone a GSM Smartcard (SIM)? " From Charles Brookson
   Chairman GSM Association Security Group

   [8] Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and physical layer
   (PHY) specifications: Specification for Enhanced Security

   [9] ASN.1 standard 2002 edition ISO/IEC 8825.1.
   http://asn1.elibel.tm.fr/en/standards/index.htm

   [10] Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition), W3C
   Recommendation 6 October 2000

   [11] B. Aboba, D. Simon, EAP TLS Authentication Protocol RFC 2716,
   October 1999.

   [12] H. Andersson, S. Josefsson, G. Zorn, D. Simon, A. Palekar,
   "Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP)", draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-
   05.txt, work-in-progress, September 2002. (INFORMATIVE)



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   [13] PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard, An RSA
   Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.5, Revised November 1, 1993.

   [14] RFC 2284 bis, draft-ietf-eap-rfc2284bis-08.txt

   [15] T.Dierks, C.Allen, RFC 2246, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
   January 1999.

18 Author's Addresses

   Pascal Urien
   ENST
   46 rue Barrault
   75013 Paris               Phone: NA
   France                    Email: Pascal.Urien@enst.fr

   Augustin J. Farrugia
   Impasse des CAMEGIERS     Phone: NA
   Ceyreste, 13600 France    Email: afarrugia@csi.com

   Max de Groot
   Gemplus
   Avenue du Pic de Bertagne
   BP 100, 13881 Gemenos     Phone: NA
   France                    Email: max.de-groot@gemplus.com

   Guy Pujolle
   LIP6 - University Paris 6
   8 rue Capitaine Scott     Phone: NA
   Paris 75015 France        Email: Guy.Pujolle@lip6.fr

   Jorge Abellan
   Axalto.
   50, Av Jean Jaures        Phone: +33 1 46 00 59 33
   Montrouge 92542 France    Email: Jorge.abellan@slb.com

















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