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Internet Draft                                            I. van Beijnum
Document: draft-van-beijnum-multi6-cbhi-00.txt              January 2004
Expires: July 2004


                     Crypto Based Host Identifiers


         This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to
         all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

     Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
     Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
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     Internet-Drafts.

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Abstract

     This memo specifies a 64-bit crypto-based host identifier that can
     be used as an interface identifier in protocols that allow address
     agility, such as [ODT]. The cryptographic nature of the host
     identifier makes it possible to determine whether a correspondent
     is legitimately using said host identifier or not.

     The host identifiers can be used as regular interface identifiers
     in protocols that don't require an identifier that is separate from
     locators, or they can be expanded to 128-bit IPv6 address like
     values for use with protocols that do need such an identifier-only
     value.

1. Introduction

     In many types of interactions across the network it is important to
     know the identity of the correspondent. This is especially true in
     multihoming and mobility, where a correspondent may change its
     address during a session. In [MIPv6], [NOID] and [ODT] it has been
     shown to be possible to solve mobility and multihoming without
     introducing a long-lived host or stack name identifier. However,
     this doesn't mean that having such an identifier would be without
     benefits. This document explores the possibility of adding a means


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     to identify a host independent of the full IPv6 address used by the
     host and independent of a specific multihoming or mobility
     solution.

2. Overview

     There are two types of crypto-based host identifiers 64 bit and 80
     bit. The 64 bit type consists of 4 control bits, 48 site key bits
     and a 12 bit host number:

            0     8     16    24    32    40    48    56   63
            +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
            |  site  |C |     site (continued)     |  host  |
            +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

     The 64 bit host identifiers are appropriate in cases where the
     subnet bits (bits 48 - 63 in the IPv6 address) are subject to
     change, for instance in a host multihoming or mobility situation.
     When the subnet bits are fixed, which is likely to be the case with
     site multihoming or when no address changes are expected, 80 bit
     host identifiers that include the subnet bits are more appropriate,
     as these allow significantly more hosts to be grouped together in a
     site. The 80 bit host identifier consists of 4 control bits, 44
     site key bits, a 16 bit host number and a 16 bit subnet number:

     0     8     16    24    32    40    48    56    64    72   79
     +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
     |   subnet  |  site  |C |   site (continued)    |    host   |
     +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

     The control bits are:

     - reserved
     - 80 bit identifier (1) or 64 bit identifier (0)
     - u/l and g bits as outlined below

3. EUI-64 Compatibility

     Generally, a host will create IPv6 addresses for interfaces based
     on the interface's EUI-64 as outlined in [RFC 2462]. In order to
     avoid overlap from addresses generated by [RFC 3041] and from
     regular EUI-64 interface identifiers, for crypto-based host
     identifiers the universal/global bit is set to "universal" and the
     group bit is set to indicate a group (multicast) address. Note that
     the resulting EUI-64 value is only valid for the purposes of
     generating IPv6 addresses in accordance with [RFC 2462]. Under no
     circumstances may such a value be assigned to an interface for use
     as a link address.



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4. The Site Identifier

     The site identifier is created by generating a key pair using a
     public key crypto algorithm (to be decided). Then the SHA-1
     algorithm is used to calculate a hash over the public key. If 80
     bit host identifiers are to be used, the site identifier consists
     of the first 44 bits of the SHA-1 hash. If 64 bit host identifiers
     are to be used, the site identifier consists of the last 48 bits of
     the SHA-1 hash. (The terms "site identifier" and "site key bits"
     are used interchangeably.)

     All hosts that hold a host identifier must have a set of public key
     cryptographic keys. The host's public key is signed using the site
     secret key.

     Site identifiers, along with the full self-signed public key and
     other pertinent information, are registered publicly to avoid and
     resolve site identifier collisions. When a newly generated site
     identifier collides with an existing one, the new key pair is
     discarded and a new one is generated. This is the only required use
     of a public registry. All other use of such a registry is optional.

     Since it is computationally expensive to generate working keys that
     match a specific site identifier, possession of the secret key
     provides a "proof of ownership" of a site identifier that is good
     enough to fend off denial of service attacks and to provide
     authentication with a strength level somewhere between a simple
     encrypted password and full-out IPsec. An important feature is
     that the site identifier registry doesn't require rooted authority:
     any mechanism that makes a full list of site identifiers and public
     keys along with serial numbers available to anyone who wants to do
     a lookup within a reasonable timeframe after new identifiers have
     been generated is sufficient. A small number of repositories that
     accept new site identifiers and accompanying material after
     checking the signature would work well. Each repository could work
     independently but they could exchange new site identifiers for the
     sake of completeness. Repositories can then make their contents
     available through mirroring and direct querying mechanisms. A good
     way to allow direct queries to the site identifier database would
     be by publishing a copy of an up to date repository in the DNS.

     A fully populated 44 or 48 bit range of values is too large to
     store in the DNS without additional hierarchical structure.
     However, these ranges will never be fully populated, both because
     such a large number of site identifiers isn't necessary and because
     at some point, the chance of successive collisions becomes too
     large to be able to generate a new site identifier efficiently. A
     target for optimum performance would be a population somewhere
     between one in a million (approximately 17 million and 260 million


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     site identifiers respectively) and one in a thousand (17 / 260
     billion site identifiers). Current practice shows that the DNS can
     handle flat spaces with up to several tens of millions entries, so
     a modest growth rate (well below Moore's Law) maxing out at around
     one to ten billion sites in 2050 shouldn't be a problem.

5. The Challenge/Response Mechanism

     When a host wants to authenticate a correspondent using a
     crypto-based host identifiers, it issues a challenge to the
     correspondent. The layout of the challenge and the way it is
     transmitted to the correspondent is to be decided later.

     When checking a response, a host may optionally take advantage of
     information published in the DNS or through other means. This
     allows the host to detect whether it's dealing with the "real"
     holder of a site locator rather than an impostor that stumbled on a
     key pair that maps to an existing site identifier. It also allows
     for retiring a compromised host key: if the published site serial
     number is higher than that presented by the correspondent, the host
     key is invalid.

6. Turning the Site Identifier into an Address Range

     In certain types of multihoming solutions, such as [ODELL96], the
     locator and identifier functions of the IP address are separated.
     In these cases, the upper layer protocols such as TCP and UDP only
     see the identifier. In [ODELL96] the identifier consists of the
     lower 64 bits of the IPv6 address, which is compatible with what is
     proposed here. However, intra-site connectivity using just the
     lower 64 bits of the IPv6 address is problematic. To avoid this
     problem, and in order to provide a range of stable addresses a site
     may use regardless of its connectivity to the Internet, the site
     identifier may be transformed into a site prefix.

     The procedure for transforming a 80 bit host identifier into a site
     prefix is to take the site identifier bits and concatenate those to
     a 4 bit prefix assigned by IANA. The resulting 48 bit value is the
     provider independent site prefix. This prefix is combined with a 80
     bit host identifier to form a complete IPv6 address.

     Example of how a 80 bit host identifier is turned into a 48 bit
     site prefix:








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     0     8     16    24    32    40    48    56    64    72   79
     +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
     |   subnet  |  site  |C |   site (continued)    |    host   |
     +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
                  \        \ |                       |
                   \        \|                       |
                 +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
                 |IA|  s i t e   i d e n t i f i e r |
                 +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
                 0     8     16    24    32    40   47

     (IA = 4 bit prefix assigned by IANA)

     A 64 bit host identifier is turned into a site prefix by
     concatenating the site bits with a 12 bit prefix assigned by IANA.
     This results in a 60 bit provider independent prefix. To avoid
     being limited to a single subnet, the top 4 bits of the host number
     are copied to bits 60 - 63 in the IPv6 address. The full 64 bit
     host identifier is present in the lower 64 bits to arrive at a full
     IPv6 address. This allows for 16 subnets with 256 possible hosts
     each.

     Example of how a 64 bit host identifier is turned into a 60 bit
     site prefix / 64 bit subnet prefix:

           0     8     16    24    32    40    48    56   63
           +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
           |  site  |C |     site (continued)     |  host  |
           +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
            \        \ |                             |
             \        \|                             |
     +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
     |  IANA  |   s i t e   i d e n t i f i e r   |H |
     +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
     0     8     16    24    32    40    48    56   63

     (IANA = 12 bit prefix assigned by IANA)
     (H = top 4 bits of the host number)

     Use of an EUI-64 that isn't a host identifier as outlined in this
     document in combination with one of the above provider independent
     prefixes is undefined and not recommended.

7. Operational Overview

     If the host identifiers described here are used with ODT, then the
     ODT challenge/response interactions are changed as follows. A and B
     are hosts communicating using ODT, holding addresses A1, A2 and B1,
     B2 respectively. After A sees an address change from B1 to B2 in


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     incoming packets, it issues a challenge to B. Note that unlike with
     unmodified ODT there is no need to perform ODT interactions before
     a change of address happens, although a highly security conscious
     implementation may want to do so anyway.

     When A wants to challenge B, it needs to encrypt a nonce using B's
     public key. If A doesn't have B's public key yet, it requests B's
     public key which must be signed by the site key, along with a copy
     of the site public key. A then checks whether the site identifier
     bits are indeed the same as the truncated hash derived from B's
     site public key, and if so, uses the site public key to check the
     signature over B's public key. If this procedure succeeds, A has
     B's public key so it can encrypt a nonce and send it to B. B
     decrypts the nonce and returns it to A. When A receives back the
     nonce, it knows that B holds the matching private key so B's
     identity is verified.

8. IANA Considerations

     IANA is requested to allocate a /4 and a /12 for crypto-based site
     identifier derived provider independent address ranges.

9. Security Considerations

     Since the length of the hash over the public key is only 44 or 48
     bits, even though finding a key for a known hash is extremely
     difficult, there is a significant chance of accidental collisions.
     As such, this authentication scheme on its own isn't secure enough
     for use with very sensitive applications.

10. Author's Address

     Iljitsch van Beijnum
     Karel Roosstraat 95
     2571 BG  The Hague
     Netherlands

     Phone: +31-70-3103790

     Email: iljitsch@muada.com

11. References

     [RFC 2462] S. Thomson and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
                Autoconfiguration", December 1998

     [RFC 3041] T. Narten and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for
                Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6",
                Januari 2001


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     [ODT]      I. van Beijnum, "On Demand Tunneling For
                Multihoming", work in progress, January 2004

     [MIPv6]    "Mobility Support in IPv6",
                draft-ietf-mobileip-ipv6-24.txt, work in progress

     [NOID]     E. Nordmark and T. Li, "Multihoming without IP
                Identifiers", draft-nordmark-multi6-noid-00.txt,
                work in progress, October 2003

     [M6SEC]    Nordmark, E., and T. Li, "Threats relating to
                IPv6 multihoming solutions",
                draft-nordmark-multi6-threats-00.txt, work in
                progress, October 2003.

     [ODELL96]  O'Dell M., "8+8 - An Alternate Addressing
                Architecture for IPv6", draft-odell-8+8-00.txt,
                work in progress, October 1996
































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