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dprive                                                       P. van Dijk
Internet-Draft                                                  PowerDNS
Intended status: Standards Track                                R. Geuze
Expires: 14 January 2021                                         TransIP
                                                             E. Bretelle
                                                                Facebook
                                                            13 July 2020


  Signalling Authoritative DoT support in DS records, with key pinning
             draft-vandijk-dprive-ds-dot-signal-and-pin-01

Abstract

   This document specifies a way to signal the usage of DoT, and the
   pinned keys for that DoT usage, in authoritative servers.  This
   signal lives on the parent side of delegations, in DS records.  To
   ensure easy deployment, the signal is defined in terms of (C)DNSKEY.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 January 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.











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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Document work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Generating and placing the (C)DNSKEY/DS records . . . . .   5
   6.  Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  Authoritative server changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.2.  Validating resolver changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.3.  Stub resolver changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.4.  Zone validator changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.5.  Domain registry changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.1.  PoC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   11. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   12. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   13. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix A.  Document history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     A.1.  Changes between -00 and -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   Even quite recently, DNS was a completely unencrypted protocol, with
   no protection against snooping.  In the past few years, this
   landscape has shifted.  The connections between stubs and resolvers
   are now often protected by DoT, DoH, or other protocols that provide
   privacy.

   This document introduces a way to signal, from the parent side of a
   delegation, that the name servers hosting the delegated zone support
   DoT, and with which TLS/X.509 keys.  This proposal does not require
   any changes in authoritative name servers, other than (possibly
   through an external process) actually offering DoT on port 853



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   [RFC7858].  DNS registry operators (such as TLD operators) also need
   to make no changes, unless they filter uploaded DNSKEY/DS records on
   acceptable DNSKEY algorithms, in which case they would need to add
   algorithm TBD to that list.

   This document was inspired by, and borrows heavily from,
   [I-D.bretelle-dprive-dot-for-insecure-delegations].

2.  Document work

   This document lives on GitHub (https://github.com/PowerDNS/parent-
   signals-dot/blob/master/draft-vandijk-dprive-ds-dot-signal-and-pin/
   draft-vandijk-dprive-ds-dot-signal-and-pin.md); proposed text and
   editorial changes are very much welcomed there, but any functional
   changes should always first be discussed on the IETF DPRIVE WG (dns-
   privacy) mailing list.

3.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   CDNSKEY record  as defined in [RFC7344][RFC8078]

   DS record  as defined in [RFC4034]

   DNSKEY record  as defined in [RFC4034]





















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4.  Summary

   To enable the signaling of DoT a new DNSKEY algorithm type TBD is
   added.  If a resolver with support for TBD encounters a DS record
   with the DNSKEY algorithm type TBD it MUST connect to the
   authoritative servers for this domain via DoT.  It MUST use the
   hashes attached to the DS records with DNSKEY algorithm type TBD to
   check whether the public key supplied by the authoritative nameserver
   during the TLS handshake is valid.  If the DoT connection is
   unsuccessful or the public key supplied by the server does not match
   any of the DS digests, the resolver MUST NOT fall back to unencrypted
   Do53.  For resolvers that are willing to probe for protocol support
   (DNS over HTTPS, DNS over QUIC), a fallback to other encrypted
   protocols is allowed if they can satisfy the key pin.  This means
   that if a DS for algo TBD is present, and no name servers satisfy the
   pin requirement, the response returned to the client is SERVFAIL
   because no name servers for the domain were available to answer the
   questions.

   A domain MAY have more than one DS record with DNSKEY algorithm TBD.
   A resolver with support for TBD should then try to verify the public
   key supplied by the authoritative nameserver against every supplied
   DS record.  Multiple records can be used to support multiple DS
   digest types, multiple TLS key algorithms, different keys for each
   authoritative, and for key rollovers.  In case of an algorithm or key
   rollover the new DS record should be added to all served domains
   before the new key is deployed on the authoritatives.  To allow for
   emergency rollovers, having a standby DS record for all domains with
   a private key securely stored offline can be a valid strategy.

   The pseudo DNSKEY record (when considered in wire format) MUST
   contain the ([RFC4648] 4.)  DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo as defined in
   [RFC5280] 4.1.2.7.  Since the cert provided by the TLS server over
   the wire is already DER encoded this makes for easy validation.  (In
   the DNSKEY presentation format, the Public Key field contains the
   Base64 encoding of the DER SPKI, which is equivalent to the SPKI in
   PEM format minus the header and footer.)  The pseudo DNSKEY algorithm
   type TBD is algorithm agnostic, like the TLSA record, since the DER
   encoded data already contains information about the used algorithm.
   Algorithm support SHOULD be handled at the TLS handshake level, which
   means a DNS application SHOULD NOT need to be aware of the algorithm
   used by its TLS library.  The pseudo DNSKEY record MUST NOT be
   present in the zone.  The procedure for hashing the pseudo DNSKEY
   record is the same as for a normal DNSKEY as defined in RFC4034
   5.1.4.






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   As DNSKEY algorithm TBD is not meant to be used for Zone Signing, the
   existing ZONE and SEP flags do not mean anything.  This specification
   statically defines the flags value as 257 for optimal compatibility
   with existing registry operations.

   The pseudo DNSKEY type can be used in CDNSKEY and CDS (as defined in
   [RFC7344]) records.  These records MAY be present in the zone.

   For those familiar with TLSA ([RFC6698]), key matching for this
   protocol is identical to that provided by "TLSA 3 1 0" for (C)DNSKEY.
   For the DS case, key matching is similar to "TLSA 3 1 x" where x is
   not zero, except that the rest of the (C)DNSKEY, including the owner
   name, gets prepended before hashing.

5.  Example

   This section will take you through the various parts of this
   specification, by example.

   We assume that we are working with a domain "example.com." with one
   name server, "ns.example.com.".

5.1.  Generating and placing the (C)DNSKEY/DS records

   [NOTE: this section uses '225' instead of 'TBD' because otherwise the
   code does not work.  We need to fix this before publication.]

   We will walk you through the CDNSKEY/DS generation, demonstrating it
   in terms of basic shell scripting and some common tools.

   First, we extract the SubjectPublicKeyInfo:

   openssl s_client -connect ns.example.com:853 < /dev/null \
     | openssl x509 -noout -pubkey > pubkey.pem

   This gives us a file "pubkey.pem" that looks like this (abridged):

   -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
   MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEAxH2a6NxIcw5527b04kKy
   ...
   71AWASNoX2GQh7eaQPDD9i8CAwEAAQ==
   -----END PUBLIC KEY-----

   To turns this into a CDNSKEY:

   1.  remove the header and footer

   2.  remove all newlines



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   In other words:

   openssl s_client -connect ns.example.com:853 </dev/null \
     | openssl x509 -noout -pubkey \
     | sed '1d;$d' \
     | tr -d '\n'

   Then we prepend

   example.com. IN CDNSKEY 257 3 225

   so that we end up with

   example.com. IN CDNSKEY 257 3 225 MIICIj...AAQ==

   If your registry accepts CDNSKEY, or DNSKEY via EPP, you are done -
   you can get your DS placed.

   To generate the DS, do something like this:

   echo example.com. IN DNSKEY 257 3 225 MIICIj...AAQ== \
     | ldns-key2ds -f -n -2 /dev/stdin
   example.com.    3600    IN      DS      7573 225 2 fcb6...c26c

6.  Implementation

   The subsection titles in this section attempt to follow the
   terminology from [RFC8499] in as far as it has suitable terms.
   'Implementation' is understood to mean both 'code changes' and
   'operational changes' here.

6.1.  Authoritative server changes

   This specification defines no changes to query processing in
   authoritative servers.

   If DoT-signaling DS records are published for a zone, all name
   servers for the zone (from both the parent-side and child-side NS
   RRsets) SHOULD offer DoT service on port 853, and when they do, they
   SHOULD do so using keys present in the DS RRset.  However, there are
   potential cases where this is not possible, like having multiple DNS
   providers.  In this case the name servers that do not support DoT
   MUST respond with a RST response or similar on the port tcp/853 to
   prevent name resolution slowdowns.







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6.2.  Validating resolver changes

   If a resolver successfully uses DoT with a nameserver as specified in
   this document for one domain, it MAY assume DoT is always available
   from that nameserver for questions for another domain.  However, it
   MUST NOT assume that the connection is properly pinned for that other
   domain unless there is a DS record available for that other domain it
   is currently resolving.

   A validating resolver that supports this draft will perform the
   following actions when a DS record with algorithm TBD is encountered:

   1.  Connects to the name server on port 853.

   2.  During TLS handshake, the resolver will extract the
       SubjectPublicKeyInfo from the certificate.

   3.  Construct an in-memory DNSKEY record [RFC4034] section 2 with its
       fields set as follow:

       *  Flags: 257

       *  Protocol: 3

       *  Algorithm: TBD

       *  Public Key: The wire-format SubjectPublicKeyInfo

   4.  Get the list of Digest Type for DS records obtained from the
       parent with algorithm TBD

   5.  For each digest type from the list, compute the DS record of the
       previously computed DNSKEY, its fields are set as follow:

       *  Key Tag: computed from DNS key using [RFC4034] appendix B

       *  Algorithm: TBD

       *  Digest Type: the current Digest Type we are computing the DS
          for.

       *  Digest: Following [RFC4034] section 5.1.4, compute the digest
          of owner name | previously computed DNSKEY's RDATA.

   6.  Test the computed DS record against all the supplied DS records
       until a match is encountered.





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   7.  If any computed DS record matches a DS record in the DS record
       set we got from the parent, the connection is successfully
       authenticated.

6.3.  Stub resolver changes

   This specification defines no changes to stub resolvers.

6.4.  Zone validator changes

   This section covers both the 'online' type of zone validator, such as
   Zonemaster, and the 'offline full zone' type, such as "validns" and
   "dnssec-verify".

   Checks for child DNSKEY records based on parent DS records
   algorithms, and checks for zone RRSIG algorithms based on DNSKEY
   algorithms, MUST not be applied to algorithm TBD.  [NOTE: rephrase
   this in terms of the Zone Signing column at
   https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-
   numbers.xhtml (https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/
   dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml) ?]

   DNSKEY validity checks MAY verify correct DER syntax in DNSKEY Public
   Key content when algorithm is TBD.

6.5.  Domain registry changes

   Any pre-delegation or periodic checks by registries should honor the
   Zone validator changes from the previous section.

   This specification trusts that appearance of TBD in
   https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-
   numbers.xhtml (https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/
   dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml) will eventually lead registries to accept
   DS/(C)DNSKEY submissions for algorithm TBD.

   Registries that limit the total number of DS records for a delegation
   SHOULD consider having a separate limit for algorithm TBD DS records,
   as their management is separate from actual DNSSEC key management.

7.  Security Considerations

   This document defines a way to convey, authoritatively, that
   resolvers must use DoT to do their queries to the name servers for a
   certain zone.  By doing so, that exchange gains confidentiality, data
   integrity, peer entity authentication.





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8.  Implementation Status

   [RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication]

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   document, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC6982].  The
   description of implementations in this section is intended to assist
   the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs.
   Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here
   does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort has
   been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied
   by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not be
   construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.

   According to RFC 6982, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
   to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
   running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
   and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
   It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
   they see fit".

8.1.  PoC

   Some Proof of Concept code showing the generation of the (C)DNSKEY,
   and the subsequent hashing by a client (which should match one of the
   DS records with algo TBD), in Python and Go, is available at
   https://github.com/PowerDNS/parent-signals-dot/tree/master/poc
   (https://github.com/PowerDNS/parent-signals-dot/tree/master/poc)

9.  Design Considerations

   [RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication]

   A protocol design is nothing without a clear statement of the
   constraints it was designed to meet, and perhaps a list of other
   constraints it meets by accident.

   We humbly acknowledge Petr Spacek's excellent summary of the 'nice
   properties' this protocol has (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/
   dns-privacy/_Zf5TGVAcUfPRrQ_7o_NPnmnlZs/) as a source of inspiration
   for this section.

   Manu's DSPKI proposal had the following excellent properties:





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   *  no extra roundtrips (assuming DSPKI came 'for free' with
      delegations like DS records do today)

   *  downgrade resistance

   *  simple protocol, no indirections

   It also had this one very important undesirable property:

   *  a new RRtype with 'special' behaviour would be pretty much
      impossible to deploy

   In various private and public discussions, it was quickly realised
   that fitting this into the actual DS record would solve that problem.
   The first obvious answer to that is 'just assign some numbers and do
   in DS what DSPKI defined in its own type'.  Petr Spacek and others
   pointed out that this would be incompatible with 'DNSKEY-style'
   registries, i.e. those that demand DNSKEY, not DS, in their
   communications (those communications being either EPP, some registry-
   specific protocol, or CDNSKEY).  In other words, a protocol that
   would not allow the DS to be hashed 'the usual way' from a DNSKEY
   would not go far, as many registries are slow to update their
   software even _just_ for a couple of new numbers in an IANA registry.

   With that, the puzzle was clear.  We need some format to signal and
   pin DoT with a DNSKEY, in such a way that a DS can be hashed from it
   without software changes in parties such as registries, and such that
   that DS is enough for a resolver to validate a TLS connection.

   Eventually we realised that a resolver could take the TLS
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo, construct a 'pseudo' DNSKEY from it, and hash
   that into a DS.  This resolves the one bad property of DSPKI
   (deployability without changing every auth, resolver, and registry
   stack in the world).

   The design constraints we felt we must meet with this protocol were:

   *  deployability without demanding massive software changes or even
      'flag days'

   *  downgrade resistance

   And we feel we have met those.  The other positive properties of
   DSPKI (simplicity, no extra roundtrips) have been kept intact more by
   accident than by strong intention.






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   We can understand that several people are saying that this is hacky
   (we do not even disagree), and that TLSA should have been used.
   However, we feel that any TLSA-based protocol we can imagine would be
   a lot more complex, and therefore prone to breakage which might be
   hard to debug.  It would also be very easy to accidentally introduce
   chicken-and-egg problems with a more indirect approach.  Note that we
   are responding to imagined TLSA-based protocols here.  If a draft
   appears for a TLSA-based approach to DoT signaling/pinning, we would
   love to read it.  Depending on what that draft looks like, it might
   even make sense to have that protocol _and_ the protocol described in
   this document.

   The biggest downside to this DS-based protocol is that a change in
   TLS keys on an auth may require DS updates for thousands or even
   hundreds of thousands of domains.  This issue is partially mitigated
   by allowing backup keys to be part of those DS sets.  Furthermore we
   hope that efforts from Cloudflare and others for shortening the path
   between auth operator and domain registrar one day work out.  Those
   efforts are focused on NSset updates and DS updates for DNSSEC
   validation, but they would also aid key rollovers for this protocol
   greatly.

10.  IANA Considerations

   This document updates the IANA registry "DNS Security Algorithm
   Numbers" at https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-
   sec-alg-numbers.xhtml (https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-
   numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml)

   The following entries have been added to the registry:

   +--------------+----------------+
   | Number       | TBD            |
   | Description  | DoT signal+pin |
   | Mnemonic     | DOTPIN         |
   | Zone signing | N              |
   | Trans sec.   | N              |
   | Reference    | RFC TBD2       |
   +--------------+----------------+

11.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their
   useful input: Job Snijders, Maik Zumstrull, Petr Spacek, Pieter
   Lexis, Ralph Dolmans, Remi Gacogne, Seth Arnold, and Vladimir Cunat.

12.  Normative References




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   [I-D.bretelle-dprive-dot-for-insecure-delegations]
              Bretelle, E., "DNS-over-TLS for insecure delegations",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bretelle-dprive-
              dot-for-insecure-delegations-01, 11 March 2019,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-
              for-insecure-delegations-01>.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6982]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", RFC 6982,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6982, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6982>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7344]  Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
              DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.

   [RFC8078]  Gudmundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS Records from
              the Parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", RFC 8078,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8078, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8078>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

13.  Informative References



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   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
              2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.

   [RFC8499]  Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
              Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
              January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.

Appendix A.  Document history

A.1.  Changes between -00 and -01

   1.  Lots of clarifying text that does not change any semantics,
       including:

       *  a section on how resolvers would actually use this protocol.

       *  we made it clearer that multiple DS records for a delegation
          are allowed, and why you would want this.

   2.  DNSKEY flags are now set to 257, because it looks like this will
       make it a lot easier for many registries to accept the records.

   3.  Added a 'Design Considerations' section to give some background
       to why this protocol is what it is.

   We have tried to do a review of this protocol against the requirement
   of the DPRIVE phase 2 document.  You can find this review (which
   might be updated outside of revisions of this draft or the phase 2
   draft) in our GitHub repo (https://github.com/PowerDNS/parent-
   signals-dot/blob/master/draft-vandijk-dprive-ds-dot-signal-and-
   pin/yardsticks/draft-ietf-dprive-phase2-requirements-01.md).

Authors' Addresses

   Peter van Dijk
   PowerDNS
   Den Haag
   Netherlands

   Email: peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com





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   Robin Geuze
   TransIP
   Delft
   Netherlands

   Email: robing@transip.nl


   Emmanuel Bretelle
   Facebook

   Email: chantra@fb.com







































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