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Versions: 00

Network Working Group                                        R. Van Rein
Internet-Draft                                          InternetWide.org
Intended status: Standards Track                      September 28, 2020
Expires: April 1, 2021


              InternetWide Identities with Realm Crossover
             draft-vanrein-internetwide-realm-crossover-00

Abstract

   Domains and domain user identities are available in many protocols,
   and can be expressed as part of the URI grammar.  This document
   outlines how clients can bring their self-controlled identities over
   when crossing over to foreign realms that rely on authenticated user
   identities.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 1, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Bring Your Own IDentity as a Usage Pattern  . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Grammar of Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Example Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Example of a Local Identity Grammar . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Example Targets for Access Control  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Example Regimen for Access Control  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Realm Crossover Techniques  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Realm Crossover for Kerberos  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  Realm Crossover for SASL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.3.  Realm Crossover for PKIX  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  New Application Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  Remote PKCS #11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  Keyful Identity Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.3.  Helm Access (from Arbitrary Nodes)  . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.4.  InternetWide Roaming  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   Many protocols identify clients and servers through a domain name or
   a user at a domain name.  Domain names follow the stepwise delegation
   of authority that is engrained in DNS, and an added username is
   generally considered a further refinement that falls under the
   authority of the named domain.

   URI grammar mirrors this idea in its authority section.  Some
   additional information is present to facilitate resource location
   beyond an identity; these involve the scheme and an optional port,
   and for some schemes there may be a host name as a mild
   overspecification for a domain.

   InternetWide Identity, as introduced herein, allows domain.name and
   user@domain.name identity forms across protocols, and when included
   in a URI it treats any path, query part, port, URI scheme and host-
   instead-of-a-domain as information beyond the abstraction level of
   interest to identity.  In other words, variable paths, host names,
   ports and service protocols can occur in URIs that represent the same
   identity.

   InternetWide Identities are domain-scoped and intended for use in
   foreign servers that may reside in the client's domain or any other
   domain.  We informally refer to this idea as "Bring Your Own IDentity
   (BYOID)" and to the technology facilitating it as "Realm Crossover"
   for domain.name and user@domain.name identities.



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   Within a protocol, the client and service may each have their own
   identity and when represented as a URI they may differ in many ways,
   specifically including a possibly different domain name.  This is
   common for communication protocols such as SMTP or XMPP.  It is less
   common for protocols granting access to resources, like HTTP, where
   resources may be specified with a URI but client identity is an
   after-thought that gets mixed into that one URI as though it were a
   service-side identity.  This conflation of client and service domain
   relaxes when the client identity is described with its own URI,
   allowing better integration with the client realm and other services
   working for it.

   Foreign services generally implement some form of access control,
   founded on an authenticated client identity.  The process of
   authentication validates the client domain name through such
   mechanisms as DNSSEC with DANE and TLS.  An identity callback to the
   client realm can then add the user part of the client identity,
   according to a source whose prerogative it is to define it.  The
   foreign service composes the domain.name that it validated for the
   client with this user part to find a user@domain.name.

   Since the client's username is provided under a domain's authority
   over user names, it is possible to modify that part before it is
   supplied to the foreign service.  The name of the foreign service can
   be a parameter in making this choice, especially when it is
   authenticated.  This point of change to the user name can be helpful
   to change to an alias for client privacy; it may be used to slip into
   a group or role; and it can support clients from yet another realm to
   be represented by an alias or group or role under the client domain.

   This document only outlines the ideas and protocol modifications that
   can realise them.  Specifics for each of the implements are deferred
   to separate documents, even when the concepts described herein have
   already been shown to work in code.

2.  Bring Your Own IDentity as a Usage Pattern

   The general usage pattern introduced with InternetWide Identity is
   one where a client controls a set of usernames, residing under a
   realm of its own choosing.  This client realm is implemented under a
   client domain name.  The client may approach services running under
   the same or any foreign domain.  In either case, the client brings
   their own identity composed of the client username and client domain;
   the client realm actively facilitates authentication under this
   composite identity.

   As part of client control over their own identity, a service-specific
   client username may be selected from among a set of pseudonyms



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   available to the cient.  This enables the client to manage their
   identity, and the client realm can provide a number of forms to
   facilitate this; clients may create fresh identities or offer
   "+alias" extensions, or switch to any of a group member or role
   occupant, or even to a shared identity for an entire group or role.
   The client realm or their user agent may remember choices made in the
   past and suggest them again during new encounters with the same
   service.

   The design challenge of InternetWide Identity is to facilitate these
   patterns in current-day protocols.  This calls for additional Realm
   Crossover protocols and techniques, and the sections below outline
   how application protocols with Kerberos [Section 5.1] and/or SASL
   [Section 5.2] authentication can be extended to connect client and
   service realms, usually without modifications to application-layer
   protocols.  It also explains how a distributed Public Key
   Infrastructure can be relied upon with similar techniques.

   The general pattern of Realm Crossover is founded on the two-level
   authority of a user@domain.name identity.  Though host, port and
   protocol as well as path and query string may be useful to locate a
   resource and for that reason incoporated into a URI, the proposed
   InternetWide Identity abstracts from those elements to allow shared
   identities across a variation of services and protocols.  Only the
   domain and the username are considered for identity.  The foreign
   service starts by authenticating the domain and makes an identity
   provider callback secured with mechanisms like DNSSEC, DANE and TLS.
   The callback should be validated to a point where its authority over
   usernames under the domain is certain.  The callback can then be
   used, in a manner specific to the Realm Crossover technology, to
   authenticate the username underneath its domain.  The composition of
   these two elements, username and domain, with an "@" to separate the
   fields, forms the full identity as it is further considered by the
   foreign service.  This approach can be used for client identities,
   but may even be useful to validate service identites.

3.  Grammar of Identities

   The grammar of client and service identities are related to the
   definition of a NAI with UTF-8 support [RFC7542].  However, the NAI
   defaults to realm-internal use but BYOID always needs to express the
   domain, so the root of the grammar tree is different:

   identity =  utf8-username "@" utf8-realm
   identity =/                   utf8-realm

   The grammars of utf8-username and utf8-realm follow the NAI
   specification [Section 2.2 of [RFC7542]] and neither may include the



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   "@" character.  The incorporated UTF-8 grammar [RFC3629] only allows
   the shortest representation for each code point.

   The utf8-username and utf8-realm are both considered to be case-
   insensitive, so technologies relying on Realm Crossover techniques
   can infer identity equality when nothing differs but for letter case.

   The utf8-realm is a domain name under which users may be defined;
   note how this domain is not represented in the Internationalised
   Domain Name form (IDNA) [RFC5890] that is used on the wire in DNS,
   but as an utf8-realm that can be mapped from or to IDNA for DNS-
   related purposes.  This allows rendering of domain names to users in
   the international form that they expect.

   Host names, if they occur in a URI or as part of a protocol, must be
   translated to a domain name in a manner that may be specific to the
   protocol, but a reasonable general strategy might be to allow
   precisely one level to be stripped off when no definitions in DNS
   suggest otherwise.

   For consistent BYOID portability, length considerations MUST NOT be
   constrained by support infrastructure beyond a general minimum, which
   follows the email limits [Section 4.5.3.1 of [RFC5321]] and IDNA.
   The utf8-username MUST be supported with sizes up to 64 octets and
   the domain in its DNS wire form MUST support sizes up to 255 octets.
   Note that the DNS wire form can be more compressed than the
   utf8-realm [Section 4.2 of [RFC5890]] because UTF-8 can use up to 4
   octets for a Unicode code point, while IDNA can get up to a full
   Unicode code point per DNS octet once it is initialised; a safe
   minimum size to be certain to hold any utf8-realm is 1020 octets.
   The size of an identity MUST therefore be supported with sizes up to
   1085 octets.  Note that this imposes constraints on usable RADIUS
   implementations and the RADIUS User-Name attribute cannot be used to
   contain the utf8-realm value; the User-Name in a RADIUS
   implementation may even be unsuitable to carry the utf8-username,
   which for BYOID portability MUST be supported up to 64 octet sizes,
   whereas RADIUS permits a maximum size of 63 octets in the User-Name
   field.

4.  Example Use Cases

   This section informally describes use cases that may be useful.

4.1.  Example of a Local Identity Grammar

   Under the prerogative of a realm's identity provider a more specific
   grammar may be used, and some forms may even be distinguished by
   notation.  Such distinctions however, MUST NOT be assumed by foreign



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   services and SHOULD NOT be assumed by anything in the provider's
   realm if that would break BYOID portability.  Having said that, we do
   give a few informative ideas:

   o  john@example.com might be a user

   o  john+cook@example.com might be a light-weight alias,
      administratively scoped under user john@example.com

   o  mary@example.com might be a different user, or an external user
      granted a local alter ego, or an unrecognisable pseudonym for
      john@example.com

   o  cooks@example.com might be a group of users that can be addressed
      all at once by a variety of services, each with their own group
      semantics

   o  cooks+john@example.com might be a group member for
      cooks@example.com, as an in-group pseudonym for a user under the
      same or another domain

   o  +stove@example.com might represent a service

   o  +stove+nr3+elt5@example.com might represent a service with sub-
      addressing parameters nr3 and elt5

4.2.  Example Targets for Access Control

   The targets of access control are often called "resource".  We
   specify a few forms that may be useful to consider, without it
   meaning to be the last word.

   One form worth considering might be a Communication ACL.  For a given
   local identity, this ACL would list the remote (client) identities
   that are welcomed for communication.  A concrete usage pattern of
   this mechanism could be to blacklist everything but a few welcomed
   peers; or to whitelist everything but for invasive parties; or to
   graylist access and require the prospective communication partner to
   jump through some hoops before being welcomed.  It is RECOMMENDED to
   verify access from a remote identity before initiating communication
   with them, thus ensuring their ability to respond to the sending
   identity.

   The form of a Communication ACL is very general, and covers any
   protocol that connects a remote identity with the local identity in
   control of the ACL.  So, after sending an email over SMTP, a response
   over SIP is also possible and LDAP may grant download for public keys
   for the local identity based on the same Communication ACL for the



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   local identity.  But while the Communication ACL spans across
   protocols, it should not span identities; a local user is likely to
   use pseudonyms for the specific purpose of regulating access to this
   identity.  Crossover should at best be limited to redirection from an
   access-blocking identity to a welcoming one.

   Another general form could be that of a Resource ACL, which may be
   centered around an identity in the form of a UUID [RFC4122].  Again,
   this need not be constrained to a protocol but may represent more
   general ideas, such as "storage space" or "versioning system".
   Whether these are delivered over HTTP, LDAP, MQTT or GIT should not
   matter to the access control mechanism.  Related, but different, are
   Resource Instances, which expand a general idea with a UUID-specific
   string format to describe a particular instantiation of the general
   idea; for example, a collection or object in a storage space; for
   example, a repository or version in a versioning system.

4.3.  Example Regimen for Access Control

   Access control is exercised while a service is accessed.  The process
   starts with an authenticated client identity and derives what access
   rights may be granted to the identified client.

   The facilitation of BYOID in access control demands that the realm in
   the client identity is fully taken into account.  When any local
   realm is at best used for compressed representation but not to
   differentiate rights, an access control solution can be completely
   open to foreign clients.

   One difference between foreign clients and local ones is the level of
   trust bestowed on them, another is the level of knowledge about their
   identity grammar.  Specifically, the username forms suggested above
   for "+service" or perhaps "+service+arg1+arg2+arg3", for
   "client+alias" or "groupname+membername" may all have local meaning,
   especially because for a given name part "service" or "client" or
   "groupname" there is some local knowledge about the kind of identity
   that they represent.  Though being permissive to foreign clients is
   vital for BYOID, differentiating rights for local identities (and
   identity patterns) can be useful in many operational contexts.

   As a general mechanism for access control, it is RECOMMENDED to
   iterate over a client identity by gradually generalising the form.
   Each of the forms might be called a "selector".  Going from concrete
   to abstract, ach Selector could serve as a (partial) identity string
   while looking for matching access rules.  Such lookups could also
   incorporate the target of access control.  Flags representing
   specific access rights such as read and write could be part of the
   lookup or returned as a result of it.  The first identity for which



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   an access rule matches is considered the proper one for the client
   identity being iterated over.

   The most specific username is the utf8-username field that passed
   authentication.  The most abstract username is a wildcard, which we
   shall write as "".  For local users, it may make sense to iterate
   over more specific forms as well, such as splitting after internal
   "+" signs.  For example, "john+cook" could yield a list "john+cook",
   "john+" and "" going from specific to general.

   The most specific domain name is the utf8-realm field that passed
   authentication.  The most abstract domain is the top-level domain
   ".", and intermediate domains can be written with a prefixed dot to
   distinguish them from a full domain name.  For example, "example.com"
   could yield a list "example.com", ".com" and "." going from specific
   to general.

   The combined iteration for a client identity uses domain iteration as
   an outer loop and username iteration as an inner loop.  So, combining
   the examples above including local interpretation of the username
   part, "john+cook@example.com" could yield a list
   "john+cook@example.com", "john+@example.com", "@example.com",
   "john+cook@.com", "john+@.com", "@.com", "john+cook@.", "john+@.",
   "@." where the latter is always the most abstract form found for a
   client@domain.name form.

   Most of this example list is likely to remain unused; several of
   these forms could be blocked with pragmatic rules, such as barring
   ".com" domains from an ACL.  When also the local interpretation of
   the username is barred, the lookups for such a remote client are
   reduced to "john+cook@example.com", "@example.com", "john+cook@." and
   "@." forms only, but for "john+cook@labs.example.com" there would
   still be the meaningful forms "john+cook@labs.example.com",
   "@labs.example.com", "john+cook@.example.com", "@.example.com",
   "john+cook@." and "@." to consider in the ACL.

   Note the importance of the initial dot in the domain name iteration.
   It differentiates identities as defined by a realm from identities as
   defined by a child realm.  One other choice that an ACL might make is
   to constain the iteration to go up one domain level and allow "." as
   a wildcard domain.

   In general, the application calling for access control is in the best
   position to determine what to consider.  An SMTP port 25 for external
   submissions may not want to consider internal identity forms, whereas
   an SMTP port 587 for submission by internal users may desire just
   that.




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5.  Realm Crossover Techniques

   This section details how Realm Crossover may be established with
   Kerberos and SASL, and how PKIX may benefit from it.  The
   descriptions are provided to sketch the structure of the solution,
   but complete details are worked out in other documents.

5.1.  Realm Crossover for Kerberos

   Kerberos uses a realm controller known as the KDC.  It is possible
   for the KDCs of two realms to connect, though this is not a dynamic
   process that can be called upon when a client first attempts to acces
   a foreign service.  Realm Crossover for Kerberos is an "Impromptu"
   extension to the existing facilities for Realm Crossover.

   Only the client KDC and service KDC need to support Realm Crossover
   to allow this to work.  Most current-day clients facilitate principal
   name canonicalization [RFC6806], which suffices for Realm Crossover.
   The client KDC needs to realise that a request was made for a service
   that is part of an external realm, obtain a (new or pre-existing)
   realm-crossing relation with that realm's KDC, and respond with a
   server referral [Section 8 of [RFC6806]] in order to redirect the
   client, armed with realm-crossing credentials, to the KDC of the
   service realm.

   For the creation of a new, impromptu realm crossover relation between
   two KDCs, a new protocol KXOVER has been devised.  It builds on TLS
   and derives a crossover key from the TLS master key.  As part of the
   KXOVER protocol, details such as a time window for crossover are
   negotiated.  Since the same crossover key can help any client on one
   KDC to connect to any service on another KDC, this procedure is
   efficient.  Only the first "impromptu" call upon the remote KDC can
   be somewhat time-consuming; beyond that, the procedures fall back to
   symmetric key management only.  When a crossover ticket is used
   regularly, it would make sense to refresh it before the old ticket
   expires.

   It is worth noting that the secrecy of the crossover keys established
   over TLS are only as secure as TLS is.  When no Post Quantum
   mechanisms are used, the crossover key derived by the client and
   service realm could be grounds for future abuse.  The security model
   of Kerberos permits derivation of all derived keys and that includes
   encryption keys.  Although Kerberos with proper initiation can be a
   Post Quantum technology, this may no longer hold under Realm
   Crossover.

   Kerberos supports anonymity, but that would not allow distinction
   between different clients.  It does not facilitate pseudonyms when



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   requesting a particular service on another realm; the KDC however, is
   in a perfect position to do just that.  Extensions can be easily
   imagined, whereby a client sets a flag in the initial exchange to
   indicate support for client identity changes, either from the KDC's
   recollection of previous desires or from an explicit request by the
   client.  As long as the KDC reflects this flag, identity changes
   could be requested or allowed as a protocol extension.

   The current DNS records for Kerberos specify where to find the KDC
   for a realm, but not for a service.  This was initially considered
   insecure, but since then DNSSEC has been rolled out, and it can now
   be done securely.  This means that a client or its KDC can look for a
   service host or domain, infer the realm under which it resides, and
   lookup the ticket for the protocol and host/domain under that realm.
   This is not current practice yet.

   In summary, the extensions to support Kerberos Realm Crossover are
   (1) the KXOVER protocol, (2) DNS lookup of realm names for hosts/
   domains, (3) optional support of pseudonymity.  With the exception of
   the optional last point, these can be implemented in the KDC alone.

5.2.  Realm Crossover for SASL

   SASL authentication is built into many Internet protocols.  It
   facilitates an extensible set of mechanisms, passed inside the
   application protocol which remains blissfully unaware of its details
   and upgrades.

   It is not generally safe to carry SASL over plaintext connections,
   and the customary use case runs it within a secure application
   protocol, such as after a STARTTLS exchange.  To avoid undetected
   relaying of SASL traffic to another resource, a precaution of channel
   binding may be used, where non-secret but unmistaken parts of the
   secure application protocol are mixed into a cryptographic
   computation to assure that the SASL server is the assumed one.

   To support Realm Crossover, it is possible to pass SASL to a backend
   server over Diameter [RFC6733].  The backend would be selected for
   the client's realm and looked up with Diameter's NAPTR and) SRV
   records in DNSSEC and connected under protection of DANE and (D)TLS.
   This is effectively an identity callback to a client realm.  Under
   Diameter, authentication is bidirectional, so the client realm is
   aware of the requesting service realm.

   Diameter is valuable because it is designed to authenticate across
   administrative domains, and pass success or failure along with
   descriptive attributes such as an authorisation username to a
   requesting service realm.  This usage is called Network Access



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   Service [RFC7155].  The value of passing just success or failure by
   default is that no resources are made available; as a result, a
   Diameter service can be made available as a public authentication
   callback service, unlike a resource-supplying protocol such as IMAP.

   Care must be taken to not ever pass traffic back up from Diameter to
   a higher-level protocol.  SXOVER ensures this by loosing vital
   information in that case, namely for channel binding.  Services other
   than Diameter MUST reject externally supplied channel binding octet
   strings and instead form their own.  That way, a resource-supplying
   application protocol could not possible be attacked in the backend of
   a foreign service contacted by the client.  That is, not when channel
   binding is being used.  The flip-side of this coin is that the
   foreign service contacted by the client MUST relay channel binding
   information to its Diameter backend, which then forwards it to the
   point where cryptographic computations are performed, in the client
   realm.  Channel binding effectively becomes the client's
   authentication of the foreign service.

   Based on this, only SASL mechanisms that support channel binding are
   suited for Realm Crossover.  There is another requirement however,
   and that is end-to-end encryption.  Given that SASL mechanisms are
   not generally safe to pass over unencrypted channels, they cannot
   generally be trusted to pass through a foreign service either.  A
   secret between the client and its realm must be obtained beforehand,
   and used to encrypt the exchange.  Note the relative ease of
   obtaining such a key relative to proving client identity.  A special
   SASL mechanism can then employ this secret, along with channel
   binding information, to securely wrap another SASL mechanism that
   does not need to live up to these requirements.  That special SASL
   mechanism is GS2-SXOVER-PLUS; it is possible that other mechanisms
   are devised to allow the same usage pattern however.

   Two last concerns to note for the special SASL mechanism are that it
   must mention the client's realm in a form readable to the foreign
   server.  This part will also be validated by the foreign server,
   while making the Diameter back-call.  The wrapped SASL mechanism
   therefore does not supply the client realm, but only its username,
   precisely its prerogative to define.  Also, the form of channel
   binding used must be visible to the foreign server, so it can pack
   the information for relaying over Diameter.  This is generally
   possible with GS2 mechanisms, though other forms can have specialised
   representations for the same information.

   Note that not all these concerns necessarily apply for clients that
   are local to the "foreign" service.  Even when they may also pass
   over Diameter, their traffic may remain "internal" and "trusted" and
   therefore more mechanisms may be available than for a truly foreign



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   client.  It is common in SASL to allow the server to present
   acceptable SASL mechanisms, so this can be part of operational
   practices.

   To allow SASL over Diameter, a few attribute-value pairs need to be
   defined under its Network Access Profile [RFC7155].  These are (1)
   SASL-Token, for relaying SASL's binary octets of a token in either
   direction, but only when one is supplied by the SASL endpoint; (2)
   SASL-Mechanism, a string listing space-separated mechanism names that
   are acceptable to the foreign service, or selected by the client; (3)
   SASL-Channel-Binding, to relay binary channel binding information
   from the foreign service to the client's Diameter server, and to
   allow the client and its realm to work out that no extra resources
   are in the loop.

   Not all application protocols support SASL.  Modern IRC does, and may
   benefit from incorporating Realm Crossover to make abusive patterns
   less likely, and to reserve usernames for returning clients.  The
   most notable omission is HTTP, which resorts to higher layers, often
   involving manual actions and code mixtures with executable content
   from uncontrolled remote sites.  An extension of HTTP with SASL is
   part of our proposal for realm crossover as an overall solution.

   In summary, the extensions to support SASL Realm Crossover are (1)
   support for SASL over Diameter, (2) the GS2-SXOVER-PLUS mechanism and
   its incorporation into user agents and SASL over Diameter; (3) the
   reliance on Diameter for client authentication in foreign servers.
   Finally, (4) non-SASL-aware protocols need to be extended to support
   SASL.

5.3.  Realm Crossover for PKIX

   The definition of PKIX references LDAP for the retrieval of
   certificates from a certificate's DistinguishedName.  Given the
   potential for access control when Realm Crossover enables requesters
   to authenticate, arbitrary privacy controls can be enforced using
   these mechanisms.  LDAP services can pass through STARTTLS and the
   certificate used may be assured through DNSSEC and DANE to allow
   remotes to validate the authority of the information in LDAP,
   specifically when its DistinguishedName patterns coincide with the
   domain name [RFC2247] and when usernames are located with (uid=...)
   search filters.

   When identities are managed with the BYOID intent, it makes sense to
   create key pairs for PKIX, OpenPGP and perhaps OpenSSH and store
   those in LDAP for retrieval by approved parties.  This establishes
   the long-missed Public Key Infrastructure for the Internet, to
   benefit security of email and most other forms of communication.



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   Note how PKIX currently relies on "central" organisations to approve
   of certifictes, and how LDAP may be supportive of a more distributed
   mechanism.  Also note how the mechanisms can be combined for maximum
   strength; one example use of this would be to facilitate federations
   with authentication that spans the Internet plus a root key that
   facilitates just the federation.

6.  New Application Protocols

   The idea of BYOID and its technological embedding as Realm Crossover
   allow a few useful ideas to be worked out in new application
   protocols.  The general idea of these protocols is described below,
   but the complete details are described in other documents.

6.1.  Remote PKCS #11

   Clients may want to use key-based mechanisms even on platforms that
   cannot be trusted to protect these well, such as a mobile phone or
   other easily lost device.  Such applications, as well as the desire
   to use the same keying material on multiple devices and the
   reflection that operational control of private keys with proper
   rollovers is difficult and may for a large portion of users better be
   left to their administrators, all combine to the idea that a Remote
   PKCS #11 service may be useful.

   When identities are generated along with public key certificates that
   can be looked up in LDAP, it is useful to facilitate the matching
   private keys in such a Remote PKCS #11 service.

   We have prepared an LDAP scheme to reflect private key references
   alongside public key certificates (with intended readability only to
   the key owners) and we have prepared a direct mapping of the PKCS #11
   interface to a request/response format that supports locally callable
   functions that are actually applied remotely to private keys
   contained there, perhaps in a highly secured context.

6.2.  Keyful Identity Protocol

   The enhancement of authentication with Realm Crossover allows a great
   diversity of new use cases; but encryption still relies on the
   publication of public key certificates by recipients.  When the
   requirement to encrypt sensitive content exists however, there is an
   immediate urge to have all recipient's public keys and not make an
   exception by sending unencrypted content to one recipient that lacks
   one.  In short, there is a desire for sender-initiated encryption.

   We devised a Keyful Identity Protocol (KIP) to fulfil this need.  Its
   essential function is to take in a symmetric key and wrap it in a



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   manner that can only be decrypted by an authenticated party.  In
   other words, it provides encryption to any client who can
   authenticate.  The actual content is not passed over KIP, but the
   session keys are.

   Encryption of session keys is done with a fixed key stored in the KIP
   service, and cryptographically bound to an access control list.
   Requests to authenticate require no authentication, and are ideally
   performed on a KIP service running under each recipient's domain.  To
   request decryption, a recipient must authenticate, and their session
   key can be provided when the cryptographically bound access control
   list allows it.

   KIP can also be used to sign a checksum, which is a notably different
   service from authentication.  This requires authentication by the
   signing party and is best done at their realm's KIP service.  To gain
   trust, a recipient would contact the KIP service under a (validated)
   signer's realm and see it approved.

   KIP Documents are a nested sequence of data and wrapped session keys
   and signatures.  This involves signed references, so an object may be
   stored outside of a KIP Document, and still be validated by it.  By
   defining a media type for KIP Documents, a data URI [RFC2397] can be
   made that triggers a handler when accessed by user agents such as
   HTTP and SMTP clients.

   The wrapped session keys of KIP underly the GS2-SXOVER-PLUS mechanism
   Section 5.2, without other dependency on the protocol; KIP service
   can be used to help clients to the initial key that provides end-to-
   end encryption between their user agent and the identity callback
   server in the client realm.

   In spite of its potential strength, KIP is operationally really
   simple to deploy.  It requires a secure storage mechanism for its
   fixed long-term key, but the only administrative control needed is
   the creation and destruction of virtual hosts; and a basic roll-out
   only needs one.  KIP can be a client to Realm Crossover for
   straightforward authentication.

6.3.  Helm Access (from Arbitrary Nodes)

   Domains may seem to be the anchor point for online identity, but in
   reality they often have fallbacks to a single email address, to which
   unencrypted email is sent.  Other online resources reproduce this
   insecure habit.  Email address may go awry, and with it, possibly the
   control over a domain name.  The general problem here is that no
   problem exists for "identity bootstrapping".  Realm crossover can be
   used to remedy that.



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   Online resources usually have a starting point, where administrative
   control may be exercised, including the removal of the resource and
   creation of new ones.  It may even include the addition of
   subordinate identities, such as domain users or subdomains under a
   domain name.  We introduce the general idea of a "Helm of Control",
   or helm for short, as the point of access to this facility.

   We propose the use of Realm Crossover to gain access to one's helm.
   This involves authentication with a (possibly external) credential
   and not the ability to receive unencrypted email, so it is already
   more constrained.  In addition, it should be straightforward to
   control in a more refined access how control can be held.  At the
   very least, it is desirable to allow access form multiple (external)
   identities to have no single point of failure when it comes to access
   recovery.

   Use cases may involve depositing credentials with others who can
   serve as fallbacks for access.  This is especially useful by handing
   them their own access control, possibly leading to their own Helm,
   where they can only control those online resources that they are
   supposed to control.  In general, a many-to-many mapping from
   identity to online resource at a given provider seems the most
   useful.

   One use of this access pattern include control over the removal of a
   person's online presence, for instance by family after a loved one
   passes away or after a company goes into bankruptcy.  At least some
   laws discard an individual's right to privacy upon death and may
   therefore not be supportive of a family's desire to erase online
   presence without going through disturbing practices in full control
   of a service provider; and not all of them see a benefit in
   destroying data.

   HAAN is short for Helm Arbitrary Access Node; the HAAN service
   generates a worthless username and password from scratch.  Note that
   any fresh account is without value until it is setup with online
   resources, perhaps by accessing a Helm.  Though supplied by a given
   realm, the HAAN service for a realm does not even need to store the
   credentials; it generates a random username with a lot of entropy and
   uses an internally held, fixed key to derive an accompanying
   password.  Later, when a client wants to gain access, the provided
   username is combined with the fixed key to recompute the password and
   perform any desired check.

   The implementation of HAAN is founded on a SASL mechanism named GS2-
   HAAN-GENERATE, which should be run directly with the supporting realm
   (or perhaps through an end-to-end encryption tunnel like the one for
   SXOVER).  Later authentication is possible using any SASL mechanism



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   that uses a password, usually with GS2-SXOVER-PLUS wrapped around it
   so a foreign provider can use it to gain access to its Helm.

   It is not generally advised to require authentication when adding a
   HAAN identity to a Helm.  First, it exchanges more credential
   information than strictly desired; second, users do not type
   identities from slips of paper but use copy/paste; third, backups
   exist in the form of additionally registered identities to access the
   helm; fourth, because HAAN can generate extra entropy to allow
   correction of typo's when a client enters a falsely entered identity
   as an authorisation identity.  When desiring a 128-bit security
   level, HAAN might generate 160 bits and as long as going from the
   proper 160-bit value to an authorisation identity can be described
   with entropy less than the extra 32 bits, the validation with HAAN
   can still provide the 128-bit security level.

   Dedicated methods can be built for HAAN-generated secrets.  One that
   springs to mind is TOTP [RFC6238], where the only storage needed on
   the server is for replay avoidance, and only when nothing specific to
   the SASL exchange itself avoids replay.  When replay is not to be
   suspected, the TOTP exchange can be accepted immediately; otherwise,
   a challenge/response exchange may remedy any risk of replay.  The
   server can safely err on the cautious side, and use something like a
   Bloom filter to detect possibly replay over the past timer period.

   In spite of its promising potential, HAAN is operationally really
   simple to deploy.  It requires a secure storage mechanism for its
   fixed long-term key, but the only administrative control needed is
   the creation and destruction of virtual hosts; and most roll-outs
   will only support one.

6.4.  InternetWide Roaming

   Networking is increasingly becoming an application under management
   of users.  Network authentication is customarily generalised in EAP,
   whereas application authentication is generalised with SASL.  An
   ability to run SASL over EAP supports the use of client credentials
   for network access applications such as VPN, 802.1x or Bluetooth.

   When SASL is backported over Diameter, an extra option arises, where
   the user is offered a tunnel to a home network.  Using ESP, such a
   tunnel would be protected from content inspection and manipulation.
   And quite interestingly, ESP could be carried over a multitude of
   protocols.

   When providing network access, this scheme has the benefit that
   nothing is known about the traffic, and so no responsibility is taken
   for those contents.  Furthermore, the IP address from which this



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   content is shared is only a tunnel endpoint to a home realm, but not
   a general carrier for traffic.  This could be a type of service to
   offer without concerns.

   Packets of an ESP tunnel may travel over a variety of carriers, not
   just over IP.  There could be an embedding for directly carrying it
   over ethernet or PPP, for example.  There is an additional need for
   key exchange, but the UDP encapsulation for ESP [RFC3948] solves that
   with a simple prefix to the key exchange traffic, so that a complete
   tunnel protocol arises.  This tunnel protocol can pass through PNAT
   using the UDP encapsulation.

   This allows wired and wireless ethernets to employ 802.1x access
   restriction with SASL over EAP, to open up an ESP/IKE uplink to a
   tunnel server whose address information is provided in a Diameter
   response when SASL over Diameter succeeds.  A base station may
   respond to a query for an "InternetWide Roaming" identity with just
   this dialog.

   Similar approaches might be employed with the Bluetooth Network
   Encapsulation Profile to grant nearby nodes access to an ethernet,
   albeit at much lower speed, but can reduce the ethernet header to
   just the ethernet type.  As a fallback scenario, mobile users may be
   helped with the older L2TP/IPsec stack which is available by default
   in most current-day configurations and this may serve as a fallback
   in circumstances where InternetWide Roaming is not available in a
   more direct form, but generic Internet access is.  The simplified
   access form however, can be particularly interesting for small
   devices, especially when the ESP traffic is founded on a fixed key.

   The integration of SASL into EAP adds a use case for key extraction
   from SASL, which is sometimes considered an older possibility, but
   which regains interest when it can setup end-to-end protection keys.
   In a scenario where SASL is followed by ESP, it may provide extra
   entropy to be mixed into the key exchange [RFC8784].

7.  Normative References

   [RFC2247]  Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber, R., and S.
              Sataluri, "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished
              Names", RFC 2247, DOI 10.17487/RFC2247, January 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2247>.

   [RFC2397]  Masinter, L., "The "data" URL scheme", RFC 2397,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2397, August 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2397>.





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   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.

   [RFC3948]  Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M.
              Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets",
              RFC 3948, DOI 10.17487/RFC3948, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3948>.

   [RFC4122]  Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
              Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.

   [RFC5890]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
              Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
              RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890>.

   [RFC6238]  M'Raihi, D., Machani, S., Pei, M., and J. Rydell, "TOTP:
              Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 6238,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6238, May 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6238>.

   [RFC6733]  Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
              Ed., "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6733, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6733>.

   [RFC6806]  Hartman, S., Ed., Raeburn, K., and L. Zhu, "Kerberos
              Principal Name Canonicalization and Cross-Realm
              Referrals", RFC 6806, DOI 10.17487/RFC6806, November 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6806>.

   [RFC7155]  Zorn, G., Ed., "Diameter Network Access Server
              Application", RFC 7155, DOI 10.17487/RFC7155, April 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7155>.

   [RFC7542]  DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7542>.






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   [RFC8784]  Fluhrer, S., Kampanakis, P., McGrew, D., and V. Smyslov,
              "Mixing Preshared Keys in the Internet Key Exchange
              Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) for Post-quantum Security",
              RFC 8784, DOI 10.17487/RFC8784, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8784>.

Author's Address

   Rick van Rein
   InternetWide.org
   Haarlebrink 5
   Enschede, Overijssel  7544 WP
   The Netherlands

   Email: rick@openfortress.nl




































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