[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06

Network Working Group                                          A. Vesely
Internet-Draft                                             June 16, 2010
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: December 18, 2010


                     Verified Hello SMTP extension
                          draft-vesely-vhlo-06

Abstract

   Verified Hello (VHLO) is an SMTP extension for managing authorization
   by policy, as done for whitelisting messages.  The VHLO command verb
   provides for weak authentication of SMTP clients and policy
   negotiation.

   Policies and reputation are being increasingly used to identify
   messages worthiness.  However, they are currently enforced by
   rejecting SMTP transactions, or discarding messages.  Feedback is
   scarce, also because reply codes are difficult to interpret
   automatically.  Negotiation is not provided for.  VHLO is designed so
   that servers can provide feedback to their clients about which
   vouching services or authentication methods they require.
   Credentials can also be negotiated on the fly, in order to allow
   clients to learn whether messages will be whitelisted by the
   receiving server before actually transmitting them.  Negotiation and
   feedback are intended to ease rapid diffusion of popular reputation
   systems and authentication methods.  A IANA register is defined for
   extending the set of available methods.

   The VHLO command is similar to EHLO, but accepts a series of
   parameters.  The sender communicates the mail domain name of the
   organization on whose behalf it operates, along with any vouching
   services (VBR) for its reputation.  On the other hand, the sending
   host's affiliation with that mail domain is checked by DNS lookups
   (MX, PTR, or SPF) or using DKIM.  DNSBLs and Greylisting are also
   considered.

   Weakly authenticated clients enjoy an intermediate level of trust:
   they have no relying privileges, but may attempt to deliver mail to
   local users, are whitelisted from some filters, and may receive DSNs
   and feedback-loop abuse reports as needed.  However, failing to
   succesfully negotiate VHLO authentication does not preclude a
   client's ability to relay mail: It may relay as usual; that is to
   say, without knowing whether the credentials it tries to provide have
   any meaning for the receiving server.

Status of this Memo



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010               [Page 1]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 18, 2010.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.






















Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010               [Page 2]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Prime delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  Domains as branding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.3.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Definition and Registration of the VHLO Extension  . . . . . .  5
   3.  Behavior of SMTP client and server . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Syntax of the VHLO command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  Server side checks on the Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.2.1.  Greylisting check  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.2.2.  DNSBL check  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.2.3.  SPF check  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.2.4.  MX check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.2.5.  PTR and 'iprev' checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.2.6.  VBR check  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.2.7.  DKIM check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.3.  Responses to the VHLO command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.3.1.  Overview of possible responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.3.2.  Positive response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
         3.3.2.1.  VHLO parameter and MAIL FROM command . . . . . . . 13
       3.3.3.  Transient error responses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       3.3.4.  Negative responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       3.3.5.  Diagnosis of failed VHLO commands  . . . . . . . . . . 14
     3.4.  Restrictions and further server side checks  . . . . . . . 15
       3.4.1.  MAIL FROM restriction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       3.4.2.  VBR restriction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       3.4.3.  DKIM-Signature headers existence and verification  . . 16
       3.4.4.  Greylisting restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   4.  Forwarding of messages accepted under VHLO . . . . . . . . . . 17
   5.  Submission strategy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     6.1.  IANA Mail Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     6.2.  IANA VHLO methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   Appendix A.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     A.1.  Prime delivery message transfer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     A.2.  Failure after DNSBL check  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     A.3.  Failure on the MAIL FROM restriction check . . . . . . . . 24
     A.4.  Automatically finding a common vouching service  . . . . . 24
     A.5.  Reattempting Greylisted transmission . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     A.6.  Mandating DKIM usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     A.7.  Requiring extra DKIM tags  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26




Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010               [Page 3]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


1.  Introduction

   The SMTP extension defined by this memo provides a VHLO command verb
   that takes a registered domain name, instead of the client identity
   taken by EHLO.  The declared Domain identifies the organization that
   is responsible for sending the messages.  Two kinds of verifications
   are required to validate the VHLO command:

      the Domain is trustworthy, and

      the SMTP client is affiliated with the Domain.

   Not all mail messages are amenable to be transmitted in the framework
   of a VHLO command, only those transmitted on behalf of the weakly
   authenticated Domain.  If weak authentication succeeds, the client
   can transmit messages that will enjoy prime delivery (Section 1.1).
   If it fails, the client is told what requirements it misses, so that
   its administrators know exactly what to do in order to gain
   acceptance.  Such feedback is deemed necessary and sufficient for
   triggering widespread deployment of domain whitelists, a.k.a.  RHSWL
   (right hand side whitelists), as discussed below (Section 1.2).

1.1.  Prime delivery

   The term "prime delivery" is used to indicate that a message is not
   tagged as spam, quarantined, silently dropped, or delivered to junk
   folders.  Here, a junk folder is one from where unread messages are
   normally deleted, or moved to another junk folder, without human
   intervention.  In addition, prime delivery implies that messages are
   not altered in such a way as to make them less visible or discourage
   users from displaying their content.

   In case the message has to be forwarded to another internal or
   external server, its transmission SHOULD attempt to preserve the
   trust and reputation that was granted on acceptance, as detailed in
   Section 4, always reporting failure to relay.

   End users may operate their own content filtering.  They can do so
   within their clients, or setting up their own filtering recipes
   within per-user sections of the Mail Delivery Agent configuration.
   Prime delivery only concerns stock filters that operate for all
   users.  In case users can configure their mailboxes by making on/off
   decisions about specific content filters, implementing prime delivery
   involves dynamically turning off the relevant filters.  For the sake
   of reliability, the delivery agent SHOULD ensure that prime delivery
   is consistently flagged by Authentication Status [RFC5451] headers,
   and known IMAP keywords.  Administrators should educate their users
   on how to appropriately whitelist messages flagged that way.



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010               [Page 4]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


1.2.  Domains as branding

   DNS domain names can be used as a brand, and reputation records based
   on them last longer than those based on IP addresses.  While a domain
   is not formally required for sending email messages, Verified Hello
   provides for a framework where only messages sent on behalf of an
   authenticated domain are accepted.  In this respect, this extension
   is only useful for relaying messages across domain boundaries, which
   typically happens after Message Submission [RFC4409].

1.3.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].


2.  Definition and Registration of the VHLO Extension

   According to [RFC5321] provisions, the definition for this extension
   goes as follows:

   o  the textual name of this extension is "Verified Hello";

   o  the EHLO keyword associated with the extension is "VHLO";

   o  the parameter associated with the EHLO keyword is a random value
      up to 16 octets long (see Section 3.3.2.1);

   o  this extension defines one additional verb, VHLO, whose only
      mandatory parameter is the Domain name of the sender, possibly
      followed by one parameter for each reputation tag (see
      Section 3.1);

   o  VHLO is also defined as one additional parameter to the MAIL verb
      (see Section 3.3.2.1), no parameters are defined for the RCPT
      verb;

   o  supporting the extension affects the behavior of a server and
      client SMTP as described in Section 3; and

   o  the maximum length of the MAIL command is increased by 22 octets,
      while the RCPT command is not affected.

   Finally, as required by [RFC4409], this extension is NOT RECOMMENDED
   on the Submission port.





Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010               [Page 5]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


3.  Behavior of SMTP client and server

   The VHLO command is used by a client to request prime delivery
   (Section 1.1) of messages.  If the server accepts the command by
   giving a positive response (see Section 3.3.2), the messages
   transmitted thereafter are said to be in the framework of that VHLO
   command.

   The framework terminates on any of the following, whichever comes
   first:

      the end of the SMTP session,

      a further successful VHLO command, or

      a further successful EHLO command.

   An SMTP session contains zero or more VHLO frameworks, and each VHLO
   framework contains zero or more transactions.

   An SMTP client MAY issue the VHLO command as part of a session
   initiation, before initiating a mail transaction.  That is to say,
   right after the EHLO command, or instead of it.  (In the latter case,
   of course, the client has to infer that the server supports this
   extension by some other means.)  Clients MAY attempt the VHLO command
   various times with different parameters, as long as the receiving
   server allows further retries (see Section 3.3.4).

   If no EHLO command has been issued by the client, the server assumes
   an EHLO command with an address literal matching the remote address.
   However, if the client specified the PTR parameter, the server MAY
   assume an EHLO command with the resolved host name.

   Clients failing to issue a successful VHLO command MAY transmit
   messages using regular transactions, outside of any VHLO framework.
   If the server supports VHLO, and issued reply codes 550 or 553 to
   indicate that relaying from the given Domain is not wanted in the
   current state, then if the client's configuration includes a list of
   alternative MSAs that it may use as smart hosts in such cases, then
   the client SHOULD relay through an alternative MSA instead (see
   Section 5).

   After successfully transmitting one or more messages in the framework
   of a successful VHLO command, a client MAY issue another VHLO command
   to transmit more messages.  At any time in a VHLO framework, except
   during a transaction, a client MAY issue an EHLO command to transmit
   messages outside of any VHLO framework.  Changing framework is
   required when new messages are transmitted on behalf of a different



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010               [Page 6]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


   Domain, or with different VHLO parameters.

   Messages transmitted in a VHLO framework are subject to the MAIL FROM
   restriction, and, possibly, to the DKIM-Signature headers existence
   and verification, the VBR restriction, and any Greylisting
   restrictions (see Section 3.4).  A message satisfying all those
   restrictions is said to be compatible with the VHLO parameters.

   By giving a positive reply to VHLO, a server commits itself to accept
   messages compatible with the given VHLO parameters, and grants them
   prime delivery.  Prime delivery overrides any other policy that might
   otherwise encourage the server to discard messages, such as ADSP
   [RFC5617].  While this section indicates circumstances for the
   failure of each single check, it is up to the local policy to
   establish what combinations of successful checks yield positive
   responses.  Missing requirements are communicated to the client as
   described below (Section 3.3.5).

3.1.  Syntax of the VHLO command

   The only mandatory argument to VHLO is the Domain.  The syntax is as
   follows:

   vhlo            = "VHLO" SP Domain *( SP auth-rept-claim) CRLF

   auth-rept-claim = auth-rept-tag [ ":" tag-spec-param ]

   auth-rept-tag   = "GID" / "MX" / "PTR" / "VBR" / "DKIM" / further-tag

   tag-spec-param  = gid-param / vbr-param / dkim-param / further-param

   where the Domain is the fully-qualified DNS domain name delegated to
   the entity or organization that is responsible for sending the
   message(s) that will be transmitted in the framework of this command.
   Note that, unlike the EHLO command, the Domain is not necessarily the
   host name of the SMTP client.

   The maximum line length of the VHLO command is 1000 octets, including
   the terminating CRLF.

   When the authentication method corresponding to a VBR or DKIM auth-
   rept-tag fails, it may be recovered automatically as described in
   Section 3.3.5.  The remaining methods defined in this document don't
   provide for negotiation.

   The GID auth-rept-tag and its associated gid-param SHOULD be supplied
   in the special cases described in sections Greylisting check, and
   Greylisting restrictions.



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010               [Page 7]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


   The remaining arguments MAY be supplied to authenticate the domain
   name or provide hints for its reputation.  These arguments are
   supplied spontaneously by the client, up to the maximum line length.

3.2.  Server side checks on the Domain

   The receiving server SHOULD check that the supplied domain is valid
   and reckon its reputation.  The server is not limited by the checking
   methods indicated in the parameters.  Checks that are normally
   carried out anyway don't even have a corresponding auth-rept-tag, but
   are mentioned below.

   Some circumstances may require to terminate a VHLO framework and
   start a new one, with varied Domain or parameters.  Typically, only a
   part of the checks need to be carried out again.

3.2.1.  Greylisting check

   The GID auth-rept-tag provides the value of a VHLO framework that had
   been given by this same server or a related MX during a previous SMTP
   session:

   gid-param       = original-vhlo-string

   The receiving server SHOULD check that the original-vhlo-string
   corresponds to the value that it or a related MX has given as random-
   string in response to a successful VHLO command.  Use of the GID
   auth-rept-tag is reserved for retrying the transmission of messages
   that suffered a transient failure in the framework of the
   corresponding VHLO command, as described in Section 3.3.2.1.

   If the server applies Greylisting[greylisting], it MAY use the
   provided gid-param, if supplied, as an additional key to a group of
   messages, besides other data items used to implement Greylisting.  If
   using this parameter, the server MUST still check that the other data
   items correspond, and that the sender accomplishes the directives
   described in Greylisting restrictions.

   The server SHOULD NOT issue a negative response for improper usage of
   this parameter.  However, if bad faith can be ascertained, the server
   MAY add that knowledge to the sending Domain's reputation.  On the
   other hand, using this parameter eases the task of verifying that a
   Domain's servers adopt a regular retrying behavior.  Such knowledge
   MAY also be added to the Domain's reputation.  It is RECOMMENDED that
   Domains with enough reputation are whitelisted from Greylisting.






Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010               [Page 8]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


3.2.2.  DNSBL check

   The server SHOULD check any relevant DNSBL, and, if a DNSBL that the
   server, according to its policy, considers trustworthy for either
   rejecting messages or degrading their worthiness, gives a positive
   match, then the server SHOULD issue a negative 550 response to VHLO.
   See [RFC5782] for details on this check.

3.2.3.  SPF check

   Checking SPF SHOULD be omitted when the MX or DKIM parameters are
   specified by the client.  Otherwise, if the server carries out SPF
   checks, it SHOULD check the supplied Domain using the method
   described in [RFC4408], and, if that results in a "fail" or
   "permerror", the server SHOULD issue a negative 550 response.  For
   "temperror" see Section 3.3.3.  According to its policy, the server
   MAY issue a negative response when the result is anything but "pass".
   However, if the client specified the PTR parameter, then the "none",
   "neutral", and "softfail" SPF results SHOULD also be accepted.

   Administrators of a Domain who do not take responsibility for
   messages transmitted by specific hosts, even if those hosts would be
   related to the Domain according to the PTR and 'iprev' checks, SHOULD
   use SPF to exclude those addresses, so that the SPF check results in
   "fail".

   Note that the so-called "helo check" often gets a result of "none"
   because [RFC4408] does not provide for SPF (or TXT) RRs to be valid
   for a whole zone, and many hostmasters omit to define an SPF policy
   for each host.  Unlike EHLO, the Domain argument taken by VHLO points
   to the sending domain, not the host.  Because of the MAIL FROM
   restriction (Section 3.4.1), no further SPF checks are required for
   transactions in the framework of this VHLO command.

3.2.4.  MX check

   The MX auth-rept-tag suggests that the client is connecting from an
   IP address that belongs to one of the Domain's MX servers.  The
   receiving server SHOULD lookup the MX records of the given Domain and
   successively lookup the addresses (A or AAAA depending on the
   connection) of each of the hosts listed therein, until it finds a
   matching address or the list is exhausted.  If no match was found,
   the server SHOULD issue a negative 550 response.

3.2.5.  PTR and 'iprev' checks

   The PTR auth-rept-tag suggests that the client is connecting from an
   IP address that can be resolved backward to an host name under the



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010               [Page 9]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


   given Domain's hierarchy.

   The receiving server SHOULD lookup the PTR records for the connecting
   address and verify that at least one of the returned RRs, after
   resolving any CNAME, results in a host name whose rightmost part
   matches the Domain.  If no match was found, the server SHOULD issue a
   negative 550 response.

   The server SHOULD also check that the name found thereby resolves
   forward, possibly through a CNAME, to the connecting address, as
   indicated by the 'iprev' Authentication Method described in
   [RFC5451].  In case the 'iprev' check fails, the server SHOULD issue
   a negative 550 response.

3.2.6.  VBR check

   The VBR auth-rept-tag provides a list of vouching services:

   vbr-param       = [ "mc=" type-string ";" "mv=" ] certifier-list

   certifier-list  = domain-name *( ":" domain-name )

   If the receiving server has a list of trusted vouching services, it
   SHOULD carry out the VBR validation process as it would be done for a
   VBR-Info header containing the corresponding elements, see [RFC5518].
   In particular, the type-string defaults to "all", and the domain to
   certify is the given Domain.  The server SHALL remove from the
   certifier-list provided by the client any certifier not mentioned in
   its list of trusted vouching services.  If the resulting list is
   empty, the server SHOULD issue a negative 555 response, passing its
   full list of trusted vouching services as indicated in Section 3.3.5.
   Otherwise, the server SHOULD proceed with querying one or more
   services in the resulting list.  If any of those queries fails for
   non-transient reasons, the server SHOULD issue a 550 response.  If
   all the services in the resulting list fail for a transient reason,
   the server SHOULD issue either a 455 response (formatted as if the
   failed services were not trusted) or a 450 or 451 response.

   The meaning of the list of trusted vouching services configured
   within the server is that any single vouch suffices.  In case a more
   complicated logic is needed, e.g. service A and either B or C or else
   service D, it has to be implemented as an ad-hoc mashup of vouching
   services to be presented as a single service.

   Domains within a closed set may enjoy mutual whitelisting by setting
   up their own ad-hoc vouching server.





Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 10]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


3.2.7.  DKIM check

   The DKIM auth-rept-tag asserts that all messages transmitted in the
   given VHLO framework have a valid DKIM-Signature header field whose
   domain (d) tag matches the Domain in the VHLO command.

   The parameter contains additional properties of such signatures:

   See [RFC4871] for imported ABNF

   dkim-param      = sig-s-tag *( ";" sig-tag )

   where the sig-s-tag is the s=selector string, while the optional sig-
   tag's are selected parts of the DKIM-Signature header field.  Note
   that the parameter MUST NOT contain any whitespace, although it is
   allowed in the signature header.  At least the sig-s-tag for the
   selector (and the sig-q-tag if a query method different than "dns/
   txt" is used) MUST be provided.  In addition, in case multiple
   signatures are present whose domain (d) tag equals the Domain, then
   the client MUST include a sig-b-tag, that is a b=base64data string
   containing the signature data, or its first bytes, so that the
   receiving server can unambiguously identify which signature
   determines a message's compatibility with the VHLO framework.  Any
   other tag from the DKIM-Signature MAY be present in the parameter.

   The receiving server MAY fetch the public key required to verify the
   DKIM signatures.  If the key does not exist, the server SHOULD issue
   a negative 550 response.

   The receiving server may be picky about DKIM signatures; that is to
   say, it may reject or drop messages based on there being too few
   signed fields, too weak algorithm used for signing, too old signature
   timestamp, and similar policy requirements.  In such case, it SHOULD
   verify that the tags accompanying the parameter are sufficient to
   make a decision, and issue a negative 555 response otherwise, passing
   the full list of the tags it needs, as indicated in Section 3.3.5.
   The machine readable part of such response SHALL contain any required
   sig-tag, with or without a value.  Values given for header list,
   signature timestamp, and expiration date are not meant to be exact,
   but to specify minimal requirements, and the client may retry with
   compatible values.

      Header fields (h) are compatible if the dkim-param contains more
      fields than required by the 555 reply.  The dkim-param may contain
      fields required by the reply even if they are not present in the
      actual DKIM-Signature, provided that they are not present in the
      message's header.




Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 11]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


      Timestamp (t) is compatible if it is actually more recent in the
      dkim-param than required in the 555 reply.

      Expiration time (x) is compatible if it is actually more
      permissive than required in the 555 reply.

   In case the server can determine from the content of the tags present
   in the parameter that the DKIM-Signature is not adequate for its
   policy, it SHOULD issue a negative response 550, 553, or 555.

3.3.  Responses to the VHLO command

   An organization's servers accept incoming mail messages according to
   some policies.  The requisites for according a positive reply to a
   VHLO command SHOULD NOT be less strict than those for accepting an
   incoming message.  In particular, if a policy states that certain
   conditions imply that a message would be accepted with some reserves,
   it should likely state that VHLO is denied under the same conditions.

   When processing the optional auth-rept-claim's parameters, the server
   MUST ignore any parameter whose tag it does not support or
   understand.

   In case of unsuccessful response, the server retains its previous
   state.

3.3.1.  Overview of possible responses

      250 Domain OK, greetings and extension list

      450 VHLO temporarily unavailable

      451 VHLO aborted: error in processing

      455 Parameter temporarily unverifiable

      500 Syntax error, command unrecognized

      501 Syntax error in parameters or arguments

      502 Command not implemented

      503 Bad sequence of commands

      550 Missing required qualification

      553 Domain rejected by policy




Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 12]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


      555 Failed for recoverable reason

3.3.2.  Positive response

   If the checks carried out on the Domain and the connection indicate
   that the server will wholeheartedly accept messages from the client,
   the server returns a 250 reply code.  The response is a multi-line
   response with the same format as the EHLO response (ehlo-ok-rsp in
   [RFC5321]), with the keywords for all the SMTP extensions available
   as a consequence of entering this VHLO framework.

   Upon a positive response, the client MUST reset any flags and
   variables associated to SMTP extensions that it may have since
   previous EHLO or VHLO commands in the same session.

3.3.2.1.  VHLO parameter and MAIL FROM command

   The server response to the VHLO and EHLO commands includes the VHLO
   keyword along with a randomly generated token of up to 16 octets.
   The format of the relevant line is as follows:

   ehlo-line       = "VHLO" SP random-string

   random-string   = 1*16( %d33-60 / %d62-126 )
                   ; any CHAR excluding "=", SP, and control
                   ; characters.

   The random string supplied by the server MUST be repeated by the
   client as the value of the VHLO parameter to the MAIL command, for
   each transaction in the framework of this VHLO command.  This is
   meant to guard against blind attacks and to ease Greylisting checks.

3.3.3.  Transient error responses

   If the the server is temporarily unable to carry out any required
   check on the Domain, it SHOULD return the 451 reply code.  Then, the
   client SHOULD quit the session and retry at a later time.

   The server MAY return the 450 reply code to indicate that it is not
   able or willing to reckon the client's reputation during this
   session, irrespectively of any parameter supplied.  In this case, the
   client MAY try an EHLO command instead, to transmit messages outside
   of any VHLO framework.

   The server MAY return the 455 reply code to indicate that it is
   temporarily unable to carry out the checks implied by one or more
   specific parameters.  It is possible that a positive response is
   given if the client repeats the command using different auth-rept-



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 13]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


   claim's or different tag-spec-param's.  The text of the response
   SHOULD indicate the parameters that are still available as described
   in Section 3.3.5.

3.3.4.  Negative responses

   If the the server cannot grant prime delivery (Section 1.1) because
   of a missing parameter or parameter's value in the VHLO command, it
   SHOULD return the 550 or 555 reply codes indicating the missing
   parameters and arguments as described in Section 3.3.5.

   The server MAY return the 553 reply code to indicate that it will
   never grant prime delivery for the given Domain to the current
   client, whatever auth-rept-claim's the client may supply.

   The server MUST return the 503 reply code (bad sequence of commands)
   if a VHLO command is issued while a transaction is active.

   Servers that don't support this extension MAY return the 500 or 502
   reply codes.

   After a 555 reply code, the client MAY retry a VHLO command with the
   parameters modified accordingly.  Otherwise, if it is unable to
   satisfy the server requirements, the client SHOULD proceed as if it
   obtained a 500 reply code.  It is RECOMMENDED that the client
   application logs the missing requirements, so that administrators
   know how to gain access to the given server.

   After reply codes 500, 502, 550, and 553, the client MUST NOT attempt
   more VHLO commands during the current session.  In addition, after
   reply codes 550 and 553, the client SHOULD NOT ever attempt any
   further VHLO command to an MX server of the current target for
   messages originating from the given Domain; this implies caching the
   domains pair in a buffer that will be cleared by either configuration
   updates or overrun (in theory, VHLO should not be retried until the
   relevant datum changes in any of the involved servers, including
   third parties).

   After reply codes 500, 502, 550, 553, and 555, the client MAY quit
   the session and send the message through an alternative relay as
   described in Section 5.  Alternatively, the client MAY try an EHLO
   command, if it hasn't issued one already, and transmit messages
   outside of any VHLO framework.

3.3.5.  Diagnosis of failed VHLO commands

   Normally, a client supplies all the claims that can possibly result
   in increased reputation, except for line length limitations.  VBR's



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 14]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


   certifier-list's, for example, might grow quite long and clients may
   be unable to store them on a single line.  However, servers can issue
   multi-line responses containing the complete list, so that a client
   can select the correct certifiers to include in the next attempt.  As
   some failures can be worked around automatically, failure responses
   SHALL contain both human readable text and machine readable text.
   Formally, reply codes 455, 550, and 555 to the VHLO verb have the
   following syntax:

   See [RFC5234] for imported ABNF

   Failure-resp    = *( Failure-code "-" [ diag-text ] CRLF )
                   Failure-code [ SP diag-text ] CRLF

   Failure-code    = %x34-35 %x35 %x35

   diag-text       = hread-text / (":" mread-text)

   hread-text      = 1*( %d09 / %d32-57 / %d59-126 ) *VCHAR
                   ; the first character must not be ":"

   mread-text      = auth-rept-claim / check-failed

   check-failed    = check-keyword ":" check-spec-info

   check-keyword   = auth-rept-tag / "SPF"

   check-spec-info = hread-text
                   ; a column separated domain name list for VBR,
                   ; a domain name or URL for DNSBL,
                   ; required result or failure reason for SPF,
                   ; required tags or failure reason for DKIM,
                   ; n/a for MX, GID, PTR

   A server SHOULD NOT vary its requirements during a given session.

   If a client manages to issue a successful VHLO command for a given
   Domain after a previous attempt failed, it MAY store the parameters
   for future reuse.  However, the server requirements MAY be changed in
   future sessions.

3.4.  Restrictions and further server side checks

   Messages transmitted in the framework of a successful VHLO command
   are subject to the restrictions detailed in this section.  Clients
   MUST NOT attempt to break these restrictions.  Servers SHOULD check
   that clients comply.




Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 15]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


3.4.1.  MAIL FROM restriction

   Non-empty arguments of the MAIL FROM commands are restricted to
   addresses whose domain part consists of the authenticated Domain.

   In addition, the server MUST check that the VHLO parameter is
   included and that the corresponding value matches the random string
   that the server generated on giving the positive response to the VHLO
   command.

3.4.2.  VBR restriction

   If the VHLO command in whose framework the message is received
   contained a VBR tag, the message MAY have a VBR-Info header.  If that
   header is present, it MUST be compatible with the given vbr-param.
   Compatible here means that it mentions at least the certifier that
   the server trusts and verified before accepting the relevant VHLO
   command.

   If a VBR-Info header is not present, the receiving server MAY add one
   based on the Domain given, the certifiers it trusts and verified, and
   its guess of the type of content among those mentioned in the RR(s)
   obtained during the verification query.

3.4.3.  DKIM-Signature headers existence and verification

   If the VHLO command in whose framework the message is received
   contained a DKIM tag, the message MUST have a valid DKIM-Signature
   header field, compatible with the given dkim-param.  Compatible here
   means that the domain (d) of the DKIM-Signature is the same, the
   selector (s) is the same one given in the parameter, and any sig-tag
   on the signature that was also present in the VHLO parameter has a
   value compatible with what has been given in the parameter.  Again,
   compatible means different things for different tags:

      Header fields (h) are compatible if the actual signature contains
      more fields than dkim-param.  However, the signature may not
      contain some fields, present in the dkim-param, but not actually
      present in the message header, and still be compatible.

      Timestamp (t) is compatible if it is actually more recent than
      advertised in dkim-param.

      Expiration time (x) is compatible if it is actually more
      permissive than advertised in dkim-param.

      Signature data (b) is compatible if the actual signature begins
      with the same sequence of bytes contained in the dkim-param, and



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 16]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


      if it this unambiguously identifies it among signatures by the
      given Domain.

   If the server verifies signatures on the fly, the verification fails,
   and such failure would prevent the message from having a prime
   delivery (Section 1.1), the server SHOULD reject the message instead.

   Note that the server does not need to verify more than one signature.

3.4.4.  Greylisting restrictions

   If transmission of a message in the framework of a VHLO command fails
   due to transient conditions (4xx reply codes), and the transmission
   was not itself a retry, the sending server SHOULD annotate the
   current VHLO parameter in the message's meta data while it queues the
   message for further retries.  We refer to this piece of data as
   original-vhlo-string.  Typically, a message's meta data includes the
   envelope and possibly the failure reason, and is used by a server to
   devise a sending strategy as described in section 4.5.4.1 of
   [RFC5321].  (Note that we are talking about transient failures in the
   transmission of a message, i.e. after MAIL, RCPT, DATA, or data
   completion by <CRLF>.<CRLF>; not the VHLO command.)

   The current VHLO parameter should be added to meta data only after
   the very first failure; in particular, not if a previous attempt to
   transmit the message has happened before, whether in the framework of
   a VHLO command or not.  This implies that use of VHLO is restricted
   to hosts who are able to discern new messages from retried attempts.

   When attempting to retransmit a queued message that has this
   original-vhlo-string in its meta data, the sending client SHOULD
   transmit such string using the GID auth-rept-tag with

   gid-param       = original-vhlo-string

   Only messages that share the same original-vhlo-string may be
   transmitted in the framework of a VHLO command that used the GID
   auth-rept-tag with that value.  This implies that the sending client
   MUST terminate the current VHLO framework in case the next message's
   original-vhlo-string differs from the gid-param used to establish it
   (where no gid-param matches an empty original-vhlo-string.)


4.  Forwarding of messages accepted under VHLO

   A message accepted in the framework of a VHLO command deserves prime
   delivery (Section 1.1).  However, the receiving server possibly does
   not host the mailboxes of the relevant recipients directly.  For



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 17]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


   example, it may be a boundary or secondary exchanger, a vanity
   address server, or it may be following user-specific forwarding
   instructions.  For this specification, we just distinguish if the
   message is forwarded within the same organization or to an external
   domain.

   If the message is forwarded internally, all hosts MUST be configured
   so as to honor the promise of prime delivery that border or secondary
   exchangers grant on their behalf.  If, for whatever reason, prime
   delivery is not possible, a failure notification MUST be sent to the
   Return-Path address, if any.  Even if sending notifications is
   expected to be fairly safe at this point, it is RECOMMENDED that any
   organization-wide policy that can be applied on acceptance produces
   an on-line rejection rather than a delayed failure notification.

   If the message is forwarded to an external domain, the SMTP client
   SHOULD attempt to transmit it in the framework of a VHLO command,
   unless either it can determine that the target host does not
   implement this SMTP extension, or it has some other arrangement with
   the target host that grants prime delivery (e.g. using strong
   authentication as provided by [ff]).

   VHLO may be used for forwarding in two different ways:

      If the forwarder is affiliated with the original Domain or if the
      message contains a valid DKIM signature from it, then the message
      can be sent using the original envelope's originator address.  The
      Domain declared as VHLO parameter is the original one.  (This is
      as "Alias expansion".)

      Otherwise, the Domain in the VHLO parameter is the forwarder's
      domain and the originator address MUST be changed (e.g. using
      [srs]).  (This is as "List expansion".)

   Failure to relay MUST always be reported as indicated by [RFC5321].
   In particular, any reason that may be considered valid for not
   issuing a failure notification SHOULD be ruled out before giving a
   positive reply to the VHLO command.


5.  Submission strategy

   In order to avoid hassles, several smaller MTAs are configured to use
   external Mail Submission Agents (MSAs) as smart hosts.  One
   collateral advantage of using Verified Hello is that falling back to
   smart hosts can be confined to specific cases, depending on the
   outcome of the weak authentication process.  The postmasters of a
   sending domain can resort to smart hosts while they collect feedback.



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 18]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


   Then, for the increased privacy and efficiency that direct delivery
   yields, they'll have the ability to select what combination of
   mechanisms and brands will satisfy the majority of their targets, and
   decide to implement those requirements.

   The VHLO command, by allowing to check deliverability in advance,
   enables clients to use smart hosts optionally.  Rather than
   configuring a fixed mail-out path for certain target domains, relays
   can dynamically adjust their strategy according to the target host's
   response to the VHLO command.  The list of preferred VBR certifiers
   provided by a 555 negative response may be used as keys to build a
   corresponding list of smart hosts that can be used as Mail Submission
   Agents, provided that the certifiers of each smart host are known.

   To implement this strategy, a relay's configuration needs a list of
   alternative MSAs, consisting in one or more entries containing a host
   name, a username/password pair, and an optional list of VBR
   certifiers of that MSA.  The latter field should be updated
   dynamically whenever it does not correspond to the list returned with
   a 555 negative reply from the smart host; it is RECOMMENDED to log
   such updates as appropriate.  Other means to dynamically select an
   MSA, and how to determine the default one MAY also be provided for.


6.  IANA Considerations

6.1.  IANA Mail Parameters

   This extension will have to be inserted in the mail-parameters
   assignments IANA registry.  The keyword VHLO should appear

   o  as a Registry Keyword, along with the "Verified Hello"
      description, this document's reference, and a "+" for SMTP only,
      and

   o  as an SMTP extension keyword that has a parameter, after the
      "Verified Hello" description column, before the "Random ID"
      parameter description and this document's reference that terminate
      its row.

   Formally, VHLO is not a service type, as it requires or assumes EHLO.

6.2.  IANA VHLO methods

   A registry is needed for tracking the auth-rept-tag / check-keyword
   that must be unique in the diagnostic text.  New methods may be
   defined publishing their own RFCs where semantic and syntactic
   details are explained, including error response and diagnosis.  This



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 19]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


   document defines

        +---------+----------------------------------+-----------+
        | Keyword | Parameter/Description            | Reference |
        +---------+----------------------------------+-----------+
        | DKIM    | Key selector, query method, etc. | [this]    |
        | DNSBL   | None.  Diagnostic only.          | [this]    |
        | GID     | Greylisting ID.                  | [this]    |
        | MX      | None.  DNS lookup.               | [this]    |
        | PTR     | None. rDNS lookup.               | [this]    |
        | SPF     | None.  Diagnostic only.          | [this]    |
        | VBR     | Certifier list.                  | [this]    |
        +---------+----------------------------------+-----------+

                          Initial registry values


7.  Security Considerations

   Global communications require that SMTP servers accept mail coming
   from unknown hosts.  This requirement rules out strong authentication
   schemes, because, by definition, it is not possible to authenticate
   unknown entities.  Historically, Internet protocols granted some
   trust to any host, since sporting a global IP address was deemed a
   sufficient credential.  When more restrictive criteria became
   required, a number of mechanisms have emerged for identifying the
   sender.  DNS and rDNS are used to check the relationship between the
   sender's IP address and its domain.  However, using EHLO, the
   sender's domain can only be guessed at.  Some mechanisms, e.g. rDNS,
   are not universally available, and, although good senders try and
   facilitate the identification of themselves by setting up DNS as well
   as they can, receivers provide no feedback on their effort.  Since
   senders don't know which mechanism, if any, would satisfy the
   requirements of a target server, they can only follow generic
   guidelines, outdated static policy pages, and rare support team's
   hints whose validity is not imperishable.

   This document proposes an intermediate level of trust.  An SMTP
   client is being authenticated based on weak evidence, originating
   from the DNS and the TCP layer:

   o  The IP address of the remote client is known from the TCP layer.
      Verification of the random string implies it is fairly difficult
      to forge it.

   o  Any of the MX, PTR, or SPF checks confirms that the IP address is
      somehow authorized by the organization who owns the Domain.




Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 20]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


   o  The DNSBL check implies that the IP address is not that of a known
      attacker.

   The two remaining checks, DKIM and VBR, may provide two additional
   characterizations of the messages being transmitted.  DKIM ensures
   that messages have passed through the domain's signing process, which
   presumably implies that any sender's local policy has been enforced.
   In this respect, DKIM can be regarded as an open authorization to
   impersonate the original Domain for the purpose of forwarding a
   signed message.  See [RFC5617], [RFC5672], and [RFC5863] for further
   insight on DKIM semantics.

   VBR, depending on the certifier's policy, may generically ensure that
   the sending domain is well behaved.  A vouching service may
   scrutinize the DNS settings of a given domain, verify its whois
   record, check their spam rate using honeypots, investigate the
   domain's users, receive and process copies of the abuse reports
   issued against messages emitted by that domain, verify that reported
   spammers get blocked according to some policy, or otherwise establish
   the domain reputation.  The possibility to communicate the preferred
   vouching services may work as an incentive for the advertised service
   providers.

   The authentication provided by this extension is weaker than SMTP
   Authentication [RFC4954].  Therefore, it SHOULD NOT be used instead
   of it.

   Diagnostic messages provided with negative responses to the VHLO
   command may disclose acceptance policies of the target domain.  This
   is not considered harmful, since such policies are usually public.
   Letting a sender know which mechanism failed is a risk only in case
   of security through obscurity.  Mechanisms that are secure by design
   don't have to be kept secret.  The mechanisms considered in this memo
   only involve DNSBL, SPF, MX, PTR, VBR, and DKIM.  However, Verified
   Hello provides for extensibility of this authentication/reputation
   (auth-rept) mechanisms base.  Giving feedback is important for
   mechanism management, as it allows popular mechanisms to gain
   momentum.  In addition, some mechanisms reference a different domain
   that makes explicit assertions about the reputation of the sender's
   domain.  This is where the branding practice comes into play.  As the
   number of domains that give reputation indications may grow much more
   quickly than the number of mechanisms, feedback is specially
   important for spreading their popularity.  In this respect, Verified
   Hello is not yet another authentication mechanism.  It is a framework
   for managing those mechanisms.

   However, in case a Domain's security structure depends on keeping
   that information secret, the server should carefully consider what



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 21]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


   diagnostic messages it provides to what clients.  It is possible to
   provide VHLO services to selected domains only, and discarding the
   rest with the reply code 553.


8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4871]  Allman, E., Callas, J., Delany, M., Libbey, M., Fenton,
              J., and M. Thomas, "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
              Signatures", RFC 4871, May 2007.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              October 2008.

   [RFC5518]  Hoffman, P., Levine, J., and A. Hathcock, "Vouch By
              Reference", RFC 5518, April 2009.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4408]  Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
              for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1",
              RFC 4408, April 2006.

   [RFC4409]  Gellens, R. and J. Klensin, "Message Submission for Mail",
              RFC 4409, April 2006.

   [RFC4954]  Siemborski, R. and A. Melnikov, "SMTP Service Extension
              for Authentication", RFC 4954, July 2007.

   [RFC5451]  Kucherawy, M., "Message Header Field for Indicating
              Message Authentication Status", RFC 5451, April 2009.

   [RFC5617]  Allman, E., Fenton, J., Delany, M., and J. Levine,
              "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Author Domain Signing
              Practices (ADSP)", RFC 5617, August 2009.

   [RFC5672]  Crocker, D., "RFC 4871 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
              Signatures -- Update", RFC 5672, August 2009.

   [RFC5782]  Levine, J., "DNS Blacklists and Whitelists", RFC 5782,



Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 22]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


              February 2010.

   [RFC5863]  Hansen, T., Siegel, E., Hallam-Baker, P., and D. Crocker,
              "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Development,
              Deployment, and Operations", RFC 5863, May 2010.

   [ff]       FixForwarding.org, "solution proposed", 2009,
              <http://FixForwarding.org/wiki/solution_proposed>.

   [greylisting]
              Greylisting.org, "Greylisting.org - a great weapon against
              spammers", 2009, <http://www.greylisting.org/>.

   [srs]      Libsrs2.org, "libsrs2 - Home", 2004,
              <http://www.libsrs2.org/>.


Appendix A.  Examples

   Some examples showing the relevant snippet of client-server dialog.

A.1.  Prime delivery message transfer

   Complete example where the client successfully transfers a message

   S: 220 example.com SMTP server ready
   C: VHLO example.net
   S: 250-example.com greetings example.net
      250 VHLO 0123456789ABCDEF
   C: MAIL FROM:<author@example.net> VHLO=0123456789ABCDEF
   S: 250 Ok
   C: RCPT TO:<dest@example.com>
   S: 250 Ok
   C: DATA
   S: 354 Go ahead
   S: From: author@example.net
      To: dest@example.com
      Subject: test

      This is transmitted with prime delivery!
      .
   S: 250 Ok
   C: QUIT
   S: 221 Bye







Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 23]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


A.2.  Failure after DNSBL check

   Colons have been replaced in the automatic message to formally
   preserve machine readability

   C: VHLO example.net
   S: 555-You are blacklisted
      555 :DNSBL:see http_//www.dnsbl.example/query/bl?ip=192.0.2.3
   C: QUIT
   S: 221 Bye

   Alternatively, the failure can be signaled as usual.  Since feedback
   plays a minor role for negative (black) vouching, the following is
   likely to get an equivalent effect.

   C: VHLO example.net
   S: 550-You are blacklisted
      550 see http://www.dnsbl.example/query/bl?ip=192.0.2.3
   C: QUIT
   S: 221 Bye

A.3.  Failure on the MAIL FROM restriction check

   In this snippet, the domain names are mismatched

   C: VHLO example.net
   S: 250-example.com greetings example.net
      250 VHLO 0123456789ABCDEF
   C: MAIL FROM:<user@example.org> VHLO=0123456789ABCDEF
   S: 550 Domain origin mismatch
   C: QUIT
   S: 221 Bye

A.4.  Automatically finding a common vouching service

   In this snippet, the client finds a valid VBR name

   C: VHLO example.net MX VBR:vouch1.example:vouch2.example
   S: 555-we only accept these :VBR:vouch97.example:vouch98.example
      555-:VBR:vouch99.example:vouch100.example:vouch101:example
      555 :VBR:vouch102:example:vouch103:example:vouch104:example
   C: VHLO example.net MX VBR:vouch100.example:vouch101.example
   S: 250-example.com greetings example.net
      250 VHLO 0123456789ABCDEF







Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 24]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


A.5.  Reattempting Greylisted transmission

   On a first attempt the client got greylisted

   S: 220 example.com SMTP server ready
   C: VHLO example.net
   S: 250-example.com greetings example.net
      250 VHLO FirstTime
   C: MAIL FROM:<author@example.net> VHLO=FirstTime
   S: 250 Ok
   C: RCPT TO:<dest@example.com>
   S: 450 You are greylisted, retry after 5 mins.
   C: QUIT
   S: 221 Bye

   ... 5 minutes later ...

   S: 220 example.com SMTP server ready
   C: VHLO example.net GID:FirstTime
   S: 250-example.com greetings example.net
      250 VHLO SecondTime
   C: MAIL FROM:<author@example.net> VHLO=SecondTime
   S: 250 Ok
   C: RCPT TO:<dest@example.com>
   S: 250 Ok
   C: DATA
   S: 354 Go ahead
   S: From: author@example.net
      To: dest@example.com
      Subject: test

      This is transmitted after greylisting delay!
      .
   S: 250 Ok
   C: QUIT
   S: 221 Bye

A.6.  Mandating DKIM usage













Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 25]


Internet-Draft                    VHLO                         June 2010


   In this snippet, the server requires DKIM signature for specific
   headers.  The client might have turned for alternative delivery, EHLO
   or alternative MSA, if it could not comply.  In addition, a common
   vouching service is automatically found as in the example above
   (Appendix A.4).

   C: VHLO example.net VBR:v1.example:v2.example
   S: 555-we only accept these :VBR:v97.example:v98.example
      555-:VBR:v99.example:v100.example:v101:example
      555-:VBR:v102:example:v103:example:v104:example
      555 :DKIM:h=to:from:cc:date
   C: VHLO example.net VBR:v100.example DKIM:s=mail;h=to:from:cc:date
   S: 250-example.com greetings example.net
      250 VHLO 0123456789ABCDEF

A.7.  Requiring extra DKIM tags

   In this snippet, the server wants to know the timestamp and
   expiration of the signature.  Note that this almost certainly will
   require a new VHLO framework in case further message for that Domain
   have to be relayed.

   C: VHLO example.net DKIM:s=mail
   S: 555-we want to check signature timestamp and expiration time
      555 :DKIM:t=;x=
   C: VHLO example.net DKIM:s=mail;t=1117574938;x=1118006938
   S: 250-example.com greetings example.net
      250 VHLO 0123456789ABCDEF


Author's Address

   Alessandro Vesely
   v. L. Anelli 13
   Milano, MI  20122
   IT

   Email: vesely@tana.it













Vesely                  Expires December 18, 2010              [Page 26]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129b, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/