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Homenet                                                        E. Vyncke
Internet-Draft                                            A. Yourtchenko
Intended status:  Informational                              M. Townsley
Expires:  May 3, 2012                                      Cisco Systems
                                                        October 31, 2011


                     Advanced Security for IPv6 CPE
               draft-vyncke-advanced-ipv6-security-03.txt

Abstract

   This document describes how an IPv6 residential Customer Premise
   Equipment (CPE) can leverage modern security techniques to have
   strong security, while retaining as much of the end-to-end
   reachability of IPv6 as possible.

   It is a re-submission in the framework of the HOMENET working group.
   The reputation part of this document should leverage the work done in
   the REPUTE working group of the Application are.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     3.1.  Rules for Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     3.2.  Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8































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1.  Introduction

   Internet access in residential IPv4 deployments generally consist of
   a single IPv4 address provided by the service provider for each home.
   Residential CPE then translates the single address into multiple
   private addresses allowing more than one device in the home, but at
   the cost of losing end-to-end reachability.  IPv6 allows all devices
   to have a unique, global, IP address, restoring end-to-end
   reachability directly between any device.  Such reachability is very
   powerful for ubiquitous global connectivity, and is often heralded as
   one of the significant advantages to IPv6 over IPv4.  Despite this,
   concern about exposure to inbound packets from the IPv6 Internet
   (which would otherwise be dropped by the address translation function
   if they had been sent from the IPv4 Internet) remain.  This document
   describes firewall functionality for an IPv6 CPE which departs from
   the "simple security" model described in [RFC6092] .  The intention
   is to provide an example of a security model which allows most
   traffic, including incoming unsolicited packets and connections, to
   traverse the CPE unless the CPE identifies the traffic as potentially
   harmful based on a set of signatures (and other correlation data and
   heuristics) that are kept up to date on a regular basis.  The
   computational resources necessary to support some, not all,
   functionalities of this model are likely more intensive than those
   described in [RFC6092], but are easily within the realm of what is
   commonly available in 2011 on medium to high-end network based
   firewall systems for small and medium businesses, or host-based
   commercial firewalls that run on laptop and desktop PCs.  This set of
   techniques is also known as Universal Threat Mitigation (UTM).


2.  Threats

   For a typical residential network connected to the Internet over a
   broadband connection, the threats can be classified into:

   o  denial of service by packet flooding:  overwhelming either the
      access bandwidth or the bandwidth of a slower link in the
      residential network (like a slow home automation network) or the
      CPU power of a slow IPv6 host (like networked thermostat or any
      other sensor type nodes)

   o  denial of service by service requests:  like sending print jobs
      from the Internet to an ink jet printer until the ink cartridge is
      empty or like filing some file server with junk data

   o  unauthorized use of services:  like accessing a webcam or a file
      server which are open to anonymous access within the residential
      network but should not be accessed freely and anonymously from



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      outside of the home network

   o  exploiting a vulnerability in the host in order to get access to
      data or to execute some arbitrary code in the attacked host.
      Exploitation can be further divided in two classes:

      1.  day-0 attack when this attack has never been seen before
          (hence nothing can really detect it) and

      2.  day+n attack where this attack is known and can be detected by
          the use of an attack signature

   o  trojanized host (belonging to a Botnet) can communicate via a
      covert channel to its master and launch attacks to Internet
      targets.


3.  Overview

   The basic goal is to provide an adaptive security policy which aims
   to block known harmful traffic and allow the rest, restoring as much
   of end-to-end communication as possible.  In addition, new protocols
   may evolve and be deployed over time; only if they become a threat
   vector does the CPE firewall receive a signature update (including
   dynamic correlation data) to classify and block them.  This is in
   direct contrast to [RFC6092], which requires built-in knowledge of a
   number of protocols, or requires Internet communication to be limited
   to a handful of protocols that the CPE understands how to process.

   o  Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is a signature-based technology
      which inspects a pre-defined set of protocols at all layers (from
      layer-3 to layer-7) and uses a vast set of heuristics to detect
      attacks within one or several flow.  Upon detection, the flow is
      terminated and an event is logged for further optional auditing.
      As exploits are added every day, the signature database must be
      updated daily and is usually quite large (more than 100 MB).  This
      requires both large local storage (large flash or even a hard
      disk) and a subscription to an update service.

   o  Reputation database is a centralized database which gives a
      reputation score to any IPv6 address (or prefix).  The score
      varies from untrusted to trusted.  Untrusted IPv6 addresses are
      typically addresses of a well-known attacker or from a Botnet
      member or from an ISP with a poor track of security...  Protocols
      exist to dynamically request a reputation (based on DNS or HTTP).
      This usually requires a subscription.  Note:  in IPv6 the
      reputation database concept is still in its infancy, for example,
      little experience exists on the scope of the reputation:  a host



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      /128, a LAN prefix /64 or a delegated prefix size of /56 or /48...

   o  Local correlation uses another set of heuristics (like TCP
      distribution of Initial Sequence Number or used TCP ports or
      protocol handshake banners) to assert the variety of local hosts
      (namely operating system (OS) version and set of application) and
      raise or decrease the importance of a specific attack signature.
      For example, if the OS of host A is OS-A, then there is no point
      to inspect traffic to or from host A for attacks which are only
      relevant to OS-B.

   o  Global correlation leverage all IPS distributed on the Internet to
      build the reputation database as well as changing the relevance of
      an IPS signature (for example, a propagating worm will trigger a
      lot of identical signatures on several IPS, this should raise the
      relevance of a specific signature up to the point of blocking all
      inbound/outbound connections on a specific layer-4 port).

   The above techniques are common in the large network where budget is
   enough to buy firewalls, IPS and subscribe to signature or reputation
   source.  The authors of this document believes that competition and
   Moore's law will make the set of those techniques (commonly referred
   to as 'Universal Threat Mitigation') affordable for consumer space.

3.1.  Rules for Security Policy

   These are an example set of rules to be applied.  Each would normally
   be configurable, either by the user directly or on behalf of the user
   by a subscription service.  The default preferred state hasn't been
   listed, though it is expected that all rules would be on by default.

   If we named all hosts on the residential side of the CPE as 'inside'
   and all hosts on the Internet as 'outside', then the behavior of the
   CPE is described by a small set or rules:

   1.  Rule RejectBogon:  apply unicast reverse path forwarding (RPF)
       checks (anti-spoofing) for all inbound and outbound traffic
       (implicitly blocking link-local and ULA in the same shot)

   2.  Rule BlockBadReputation:  block all inbound and outbound packets
       whose outside IPv6 address has a bad reputation score

   3.  Rule AllowReturn:  inspect all outbound traffic and allow the
       return traffic matching the states (5-tuple + TCP sequence number
       or any layer-4 state), apply IPS on the outbound (to block
       Botnet) and inbound (to block malicious/cracked servers which
       could inject malware) with IPS.  If the protocol is not
       supported/recognized by the IPS, accept it anyway.



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   4.  Rule AllowToPublicDnsHost:  allow all inbound traffic to any
       inside address which is listed in the public DNS with a AAAA
       record (this requires that the CPE/RG can do a zone transfer,
       i.e., that the CPE/RG appears like a secondary name server), all
       inbound traffic is also inspected with IPS.  If the protocol is
       not supported/recognized by the IPS, accept it anyway.

   5.  Rule ProtectLocalOnly:  block all inbound traffic to any inside
       address as long as the inside address has never sent a packet to
       the outside.  The intent is to protect local-only devices like
       thermostat or printers.  Most (if not all) hosts expecting
       inbound connections have to send a couple of outbound packets to
       the outside (registration, DNS request, ...).  This is the usual
       IPv4 firewall behavior augmented with IPS and reputation

   6.  Rule CrypoIntercept:  at the exception of IPsec, all inbound
       connections that are encrypted (notably TLS [RFC5246]) must be
       intercepted (this is terminated by the CPE that will present its
       own self-signed certificate to the remote party which should have
       installed the CPE self-signed certificate in a secure way in its
       trust anchors store) in order to allow for further inspection.
       The decrypted flow is then passed again through those rules and
       encrypted again before being forwarded to the local host.  This
       is actually a Man-in-the-Middle attack done for a good reason:
       protect the naive residential user.  Of course, documentation and
       GUI MUST be provided to educate the user and help him/her to
       understand how to do it in a secure way.  Note:  this technique
       is also used nowadays by large enterprise web proxies with the
       self-signed certificate being securely distributed to all
       clients.

   7.  Rule ParanoidOpeness:  allow all unsolicited inbound connections
       rate limited to protect against port and address scanning attacks
       or overloading devices or slow links within the home.  The
       connection MUST be inspected by the IPS engine.  If the
       connection is anonymous or using a default password (like
       connecting to a webcam as a guest), then the flow SHOULD be
       dropped.  If the IPS detects an attack, then the flow MUST be
       closed.  If the protocol is not recognized as supported by the
       IPS, the flow MAY be allowed.

3.2.  Security Analysis

   This proposal of 'paranoid openness' stops the following attacks:

   o  unauthorized use of services/denial of service:  because all
      anonymous access to inside servers are blocked.




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   o  Denial of services on low bandwidth or low CPU inside hosts IFF
      those hosts never access the Internet

   o  Exploiting of a day+1 attack, those attacks are blocked with the
      IPS signature and address reputation database

   The CryptoIntercept part can also be leveraged as a small
   Certification Authority (CA) that could generate RSA key pairs and
   X.509 certificates at the CPE/RG owner's request.  Those key pairs
   and certificates can then be given to trusted devices or users (like
   the owner's laptop so that he/she could easily and safely connect
   from the outside).

   This proposal cannot help with the following attacks:

   o  flooding the access link to the Internet, this is exactly the same
      as with the old layers-3/4 firewall approach as only the ISP can
      effectively stop the flooding of the CE-PE link;

   o  weak password on inside services, of course the IPS component will
      detect multiple failed attempts (dictionary attack) and report the
      offender to the Global Correlation system;

   o  exploiting of day-0 attack:  until now, these day-0 attacks are
      caused either by rapidly propagating worms (then the global
      correlation of unusual traffic pattern will raise an alert and
      block the traffic after a couple of hundred's of successful
      attacks) or by targeted attacks against high-profile targets (like
      Government or banks or ;..) which should be protected by
      conventional less open security policies;

   o  exploiting a vulnerability in a rare or new protocol (not yet
      supported by the IPS), this case will probably never occur on a
      wide scale in a residential use of Internet.


4.  IANA Considerations

   There are no extra IANA consideration for this document.


5.  Security Considerations

   All security considerations have been done in the Security Analysis
   Section 3.2.

   It is also advisable that the inbound rate limiter system could be
   added to the [RFC6092] as it is light and does not depend on a



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   centralized policy server.


6.  Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to Ole Troan, Stuart Cheshire, Dave Oran and Eliot Lear
   for the review of the -00 version and to Ron Bonica, Sam Hartmans,
   Lee Howard, Greg Lebovitz, Jordi Palet, Tina Tsou and others for
   their comments during and after the first presentation at the
   Hiroshima IETF meeting in November 2009.

   A previous IETF work has similar ideas
   [I-D.palet-v6ops-ipv6security].


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.palet-v6ops-ipv6security]
              Palet, J., Vives, A., Martinez, G., and A. Gomez, "IPv6
              distributed security requirements",
              draft-palet-v6ops-ipv6security-02 (work in progress),
              February 2005.

   [RFC2993]  Hain, T., "Architectural Implications of NAT", RFC 2993,
              November 2000.

   [RFC6092]  Woodyatt, J., "Recommended Simple Security Capabilities in
              Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for Providing
              Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 6092,
              January 2011.














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Authors' Addresses

   Eric Vyncke
   Cisco Systems
   De Kleetlaan 6a
   Diegem  1831
   Belgium

   Phone:  +32 2 778 4677
   Email:  evyncke@cisco.com


   Andrew Yourtchenko
   Cisco Systems
   De Kleetlaan 6a
   Diegem  1831
   Belgium

   Phone:  +32 2 704 5494
   Email:  ayourtch@cisco.com


   Mark Townsley
   Cisco Systems
   11, Rue Camille Desmoulins
   Issy Les Moulineaux  92782
   France

   Phone:  +33 15 804 3483
   Email:  townsley@cisco.com





















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