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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 draft-ietf-dnsop-let-localhost-be-localhost

DNSOP                                                            M. West
Internet-Draft                                               Google, Inc
Updates: 6761 (if approved)                              August 14, 2017
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: February 15, 2018


                     Let 'localhost' be localhost.
                draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-05

Abstract

   This document updates RFC6761 with the goal of ensuring that
   "localhost" can be safely relied upon as a name for the local host's
   loopback interface.  To that end, stub resolvers are required to
   resolve localhost names to loopback addresses.  Recursive DNS servers
   are required to return "NXDOMAIN" when queried for localhost names,
   which will cause non-conformant stub resolvers to fail safely closed.
   Together, these requirements would allow applications and
   specifications to join regular users in drawing the common-sense
   conclusions that "localhost" means "localhost", and doesn't resolve
   to somewhere else on the network.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 15, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology and notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The "localhost." Special-Use Domain Name  . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Domain Name Reservation Considerations  . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  DNSSEC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Non-DNS usage of localhost names  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Changes from RFC 6761  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix B.  Changes in this draft  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     B.1.  draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-05  . . . . . . . .   7
     B.2.  draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-04  . . . . . . . .   7
     B.3.  draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-03  . . . . . . . .   7
     B.4.  draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-02  . . . . . . . .   7
     B.5.  draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-01  . . . . . . . .   7
     B.6.  draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-00  . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix C.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   The "127.0.0.0/8" IPv4 address block and "::1/128" IPv6 address block
   are reserved as loopback addresses.  Traffic to this block is assured
   to remain within a single host, and can not legitimately appear on
   any network anywhere.  This turns out to be a very useful property in
   a number of circumstances; useful enough to label explicitly and
   interoperably as "localhost".  [RFC1537] suggests that this special-
   use top-level domain name has been implicitly mapped to loopback
   addresses for decades at this point, and that [RFC6761]'s assertion
   that developers may "assume that IPv4 and IPv6 address queries for
   localhost names will always resolve to the respective IP loopback
   address" is well-founded.

   Unfortunately, the rest of that latter document's requirements
   undercut the assumption it suggests.  Client software is empowered to
   send localhost names to DNS servers, and resolvers are empowered to



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   return unexpectedly non-loopback results.  This divide between theory
   and practice has a few impacts:

   First, the lack of confidence that "localhost" actually resolves to
   the loopback interface encourages application developers to hard-code
   IP addresses like "127.0.0.1" in order to obtain certainty regarding
   routing.  This causes problems in the transition from IPv4 to IPv6
   (see problem 8 in [I-D.ietf-sunset4-gapanalysis]).

   Second, HTTP user agents sometimes distinguish certain contexts as
   "secure"-enough to make certain features available.  Given the
   certainty that "127.0.0.1" cannot be maliciously manipulated or
   monitored, [SECURE-CONTEXTS] treats it as such a context.  Since
   "localhost" might not actually map to the loopback address, that
   document declines to give it the same treatment.  This exclusion has
   (rightly) surprised some developers, and exacerbates the risks of
   hard-coded IP addresses by giving developers positive encouragement
   to use an explicit loopback address rather than a localhost name.

   This document hardens [RFC6761]'s recommendations regarding
   "localhost" by requiring that name resolution APIs and libraries
   themselves return a loopback address when queried for localhost
   names, bypassing lookup via recursive and authoritative DNS servers
   entirely.  Further, recursive and authoritative DNS servers are
   required to return "NXDOMAIN" for such queries, ensuring that non-
   conformant stub resolvers will fail safely.

2.  Terminology and notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   IPv4 loopback addresses are registered in Table 4 of Section 2.2.2 of
   [RFC6890] as "127.0.0.0/8".

   IPv6 loopback addresses are registered in Table 17 of Section 2.2.3
   of [RFC6890] as "::1/128".

   The domain "localhost.", and any names falling within ".localhost.",
   are known as "localhost names".

3.  The "localhost."  Special-Use Domain Name

   Localhost names are special in the following ways:

   1.  Users are free to use localhost names as they would any other
       domain names.  Users may assume that IPv4 and IPv6 address



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       queries for localhost names will always resolve to the respective
       IP loopback address.

   2.  Application software MAY recognize localhost names as special, or
       MAY pass them to name resolution APIs as they would for other
       domain names.

       If application software wishes to make security decisions based
       upon the assumption that localhost names resolve to loopback
       addresses (e.g. if it wishes to ensure that a context meets the
       requirements laid out in [SECURE-CONTEXTS]), then it SHOULD avoid
       relying upon name resolution APIs, instead performing the
       resolution itself.  If such software chooses to rely on name
       resolution APIs, it MUST verify that the resulting IP address is
       a loopback address before making a decision about its security
       properties.

       In any event, application software MUST NOT use a searchlist to
       resolve a localhost name.  That is, even if DHCP's domain search
       option [RFC3397] is used to specify a searchlist of "example.com"
       for a given network, the name "localhost" will not be resolved as
       "localhost.example.com", and "subdomain.localhost" will not be
       resolved as "subdomain.localhost.example.com".

   3.  Name resolution APIs and libraries MUST recognize localhost names
       as special, and MUST always return an appropriate IP loopback
       address for IPv4 and IPv6 address queries and negative responses
       for all other query types.  Name resolution APIs MUST NOT send
       queries for localhost names to their configured recursive DNS
       server(s).

       As for application software, name resolution APIs and libraries
       MUST NOT use a searchlist to resolve a localhost name.

   4.  (Caching) recursive DNS servers MUST respond to queries for
       localhost names with NXDOMAIN.

   5.  Authoritative DNS servers MUST respond to queries for localhost
       names with NXDOMAIN.

   6.  DNS server operators SHOULD be aware that the effective RDATA for
       localhost names is defined by protocol specification and cannot
       be modified by local configuration.

   7.  DNS Registries/Registrars MUST NOT grant requests to register
       localhost names in the normal way to any person or entity.
       Localhost names are defined by protocol specification and fall
       outside the set of names available for allocation by registries/



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       registrars.  Attempting to allocate a localhost name as if it
       were a normal DNS domain name will not work as desired, for
       reasons 2, 3, 4, and 5 above.

4.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to update the "localhost." registration in the
   registry of Special-Use Domain Names [RFC6761] to reference the
   domain name reservations considerations section of this document.

4.1.  Domain Name Reservation Considerations

   This document requests that IANA update the "localhost." registration
   in the registry of Special-Use Domain Names [RFC6761] to reference
   the domain name reservation considerations defined in Section 3.

4.2.  DNSSEC

   The ".localhost" TLD is already assigned to IANA, as per [RFC2606].
   This document requests that a DNSSEC insecure delegation (that is, a
   delegation with no DS records) be inserted into the root-zone,
   delegated to "blackhole-[12].iana.org".

   This request for an insecure delegation relies on the rationale
   spelled out in section 4 of [I-D.wkumari-dnsop-internal], which
   discusses the DNSSEC considerations for the ".internal" TLD.  The
   same considerations apply to this document's discussion of localhost
   names.

5.  Implementation Considerations

5.1.  Non-DNS usage of localhost names

   Some application software differentiates between the hostname
   "localhost" and the IP address "127.0.0.1".  MySQL, for example, uses
   a unix domain socket for the former, and a TCP connection to the
   loopback address for the latter.  The constraints on name resolution
   APIs above do not preclude this kind of differentiation.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.




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   [RFC6761]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Special-Use Domain Names",
              RFC 6761, DOI 10.17487/RFC6761, February 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6761>.

   [RFC6890]  Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., Bonica, R., Ed., and B. Haberman,
              "Special-Purpose IP Address Registries", BCP 153,
              RFC 6890, DOI 10.17487/RFC6890, April 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6890>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-sunset4-gapanalysis]
              LIU, W., Xu, W., Zhou, C., Tsou, T., Perreault, S., Fan,
              P., Gu, R., Xie, C., and Y. Cheng, "Gap Analysis for IPv4
              Sunset", draft-ietf-sunset4-gapanalysis-09 (work in
              progress), August 2017.

   [I-D.wkumari-dnsop-internal]
              Kumari, W., "The .internal TLD.", draft-wkumari-dnsop-
              internal-00 (work in progress), July 2017.

   [RFC1537]  Beertema, P., "Common DNS Data File Configuration Errors",
              RFC 1537, DOI 10.17487/RFC1537, October 1993,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1537>.

   [RFC2606]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and A. Panitz, "Reserved Top Level DNS
              Names", BCP 32, RFC 2606, DOI 10.17487/RFC2606, June 1999,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2606>.

   [RFC3397]  Aboba, B. and S. Cheshire, "Dynamic Host Configuration
              Protocol (DHCP) Domain Search Option", RFC 3397,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3397, November 2002,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3397>.

   [SECURE-CONTEXTS]
              West, M., "Secure Contexts", n.d.,
              <http://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/>.

Appendix A.  Changes from RFC 6761

   Section 3 updates the requirements in section 6.3 of [RFC6761] in a
   few substantive ways:

   1.  Application software and name resolution APIs and libraries are
       prohibited from using searchlists when resolving localhost names,
       and encouraged to bypass resolution APIs and libraries altogether
       if they intend to make security decisions based on the
       "localhost" name.



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   2.  Name resolution APIs and libraries are required to resolve
       localhost names to loopback addresses, without sending the query
       on to caching DNS servers.

   3.  Caching and authoritative DNS servers are required to respond to
       resolution requests for localhost names with NXDOMAIN.

Appendix B.  Changes in this draft

B.1.  draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-05

   o  Updated obsolete references to RFC 5735 and 5156 in favor of
      [RFC6890].

   o  Clarify that non-caching recursive DNS servers are also addressed
      by #4 in Section 3.

   o  Reformulating the abstract and introduction based on feedback like
      Ted Lemon's in https://www.ietf.org/mail-
      archive/web/dnsop/current/msg20757.html

   o  Added a request that an insecure delegation for "localhost." be
      added to the root-zone.

B.2.  draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-04

   o  Restructured the draft as a stand-alone document, rather than as
      set of monkey-patches against [RFC6761].

B.3.  draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-03

   o  Explicitly referenced [I-D.ietf-sunset4-gapanalysis].

   o  Added a prohibition against using searchlists to resolve localhost
      names.

   o  Noted that MySQL has special behavior differentiating the
      connection mechanism used for "localhost" and "127.0.0.1".

B.4.  draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-02

   o  Pulled in definitions for IPv4 and IPv6 loopback addresses.

B.5.  draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-01

   o  Added a requirement that caching DNS servers MUST generate an
      immediate negative response.




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B.6.  draft-west-let-localhost-be-localhost-00

   First draft.

Appendix C.  Acknowledgements

   Ryan Sleevi and Emily Stark informed me about the strange state of
   localhost name resolution.  Erik Nygren poked me to take another look
   at the set of decisions we made in [SECURE-CONTEXTS] around
   "localhost."; this document is the result, and his feedback has been
   very helpful.

Author's Address

   Mike West
   Google, Inc

   Email: mkwst@google.com
   URI:   https://mikewest.org/
































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