[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03

DNSOP Working Group                                        W. Wijngaards
Internet-Draft                                                NLnet Labs
Intended status: Standards Track                                G. Wiley
Expires: September 7, 2015                                VeriSign, Inc.
                                                           March 6, 2015


                            Confidential DNS
               draft-wijngaards-dnsop-confidentialdns-03

Abstract

   This document offers opportunistic encryption to provide privacy for
   DNS queries and responses.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 7, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



Wijngaards & Wiley      Expires September 7, 2015               [Page 1]


Internet-Draft              Confidential DNS                  March 2015


   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   The privacy of the Question, Answer, Authority and Additional
   sections in DNS queries and responses is protected by the
   confidential DNS protocol by encrypting the contents of each section.
   The goal of this change to the DNS protocol is to make large scale
   monitoring more expensive, see [draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy]
   and [draft-koch-perpass-dns-confidentiality].  Authenticity and
   integrity may be provided by DNSSEC, this protocol does not change
   DNSSEC and does not offer the means to authenticate responses.

   Confidential communication between any pair of DNS servers is
   supported, both between iterative resolvers and authoritative servers
   and between stub resolvers and recursive resolvers.

   The confidential DNS protocol has minimal impact on the number of
   packets involved in a typical DNS query/response exchange by
   leveraging a cacheable ENCRYPT Resource Record and an optionally
   cacheable shared secret.  The protocol supports selectable
   cryptographic suites and parameters (such as key sizes).

   The client fetches an ENCRYPT RR from the server that it wants to
   contact.  The public key retrieved in the ENCRYPT RR is used to
   encrypt a shared secret or public key that the client uses to encrypt
   the sections in the DNS query and which the name server uses to
   encrypt the DNS response.

   As this is opportunistic encryption, the key is (re-)fetched when the
   exchange fails or after the TTL expires.  If the key fetch fails or
   the encrypted query fails, communication in the clear is performed.

   The server advertises which crypto suites and key lengths may be used
   in the ENCRYPT RR, the client then chooses a crypto suite from this
   list and includes that selection in subsequent DNS queries.

   The key from the server can be cached by the client, using the TTL
   specified in the ENCRYPT RR, the IP address of the server
   distinguishes keys in the cache.  The server may also cache shared
   secrets and keys from clients.

   The optional authenticated mode of operation uses two mechanisms, one
   for authoritative and one for recursive servers, that fetch the
   public key for the server and sign it with DNSSEC.  For authoritative



Wijngaards & Wiley      Expires September 7, 2015               [Page 2]


Internet-Draft              Confidential DNS                  March 2015


   servers, the key is included in an extra DS record in the parent's
   delegation.  For recursive servers the key is at the reverse IP
   address location.

2.  ENCRYPT RR Type

   The RR type for confidential DNS is ENCRYPT, type TBD (decimal).  The
   presentation format is:

   . ENCRYPT [flags] [algo] [id] [data]

   The flags, algo and id are unsigned numbers in decimal and the data
   is in base-64.  The wireformat is: one octet flags, one octet algo,
   one octet id and the remainder of the rdata is for the data.  The
   type is class independent.  The domain name of the ENCRYPT record is
   '.' (the root label) for hop-by-hop exchanges.

   In the flags the least two bits are the usage value.  The other flag
   bits MUST be sent as zeroes, and the receiver MUST ignore RRs that
   have other flag bits set.

   o  PAD (usage=0): the ENCRYPT contains padding material.  Algo and id
      are set to 0.  Its data length varies (0-63 octets), and may
      contain any value.  It is used to pad packets to obscure the
      packet length.  Append such records to make the DNS message for
      queries and answers a whole multiple of 64 bytes.

   o  KEY (usage=1): the ENCRYPT contains a public or symmetric key.
      The algo field gives the algorithm.  The id identifies the key,
      this id is copied to ENCRYPT type RRS to identify which key to use
      to decrypt the data.  The data contains the key bits.

   o  RRS (usage=2): encrypted data.  The data contains encrypted
      resource records.  The data is encrypted with the selected
      algorithm and key id.  The data contains resource records in DNS
      wireformat [RFC1034], with a domain name, type, class, ttl,
      rdatalength and rdata.

   o  SYM (usage=3): the ENCRYPT contains an encrypted symmetric key.
      The contained, encrypted data is rdata of an ENCRYPT of type KEY
      and has the symmetric key.  The data is encrypted with the
      algorithm and id indicated.  The encrypted data encompasses the
      flags, algo, id, data for the symmetric key.

   The ENCRYPT RR type can contain keys.  It uses the same format as the
   DNSKEY record [RFC4034] for public keys. algo=0 is reserved for
   future expansion of the algorithm number above 255. algo=1 is RSA,
   the rdata determines the key size. algo=2 is AES, aes-cbc, size of



Wijngaards & Wiley      Expires September 7, 2015               [Page 3]


Internet-Draft              Confidential DNS                  March 2015


   the rdata determines the size of the key.

3.  Server and Client Algorithm

   If a clients wants to fetch the keys for the server from the server,
   it performs a query with query type ENCRYPT and query name '.' (root
   label).  The reply contains the ENCRYPT (or multiple if a choice is
   offered) in the answer section.  These ENCRYPTs have the KEY usage.

   If a client wants to perform an encrypted query, it sends an
   unencrypted outer packet, with query type ENCRYPT and query name '.'
   (root label).  In the authority section it includes an ENCRYPT record
   of type RRS.  This encrypts a number of records, the first is a
   query-section style query record, and then zero or more ENCRYPTs of
   type KEY that the server uses to encrypt the reply.  If the client
   wants to use a symmetric key, it omits the KEYs, and instead includes
   an ENCRYPT of type SYM in the authority section.  The ENCRYPT of type
   RRs then follows after the SYM and can be encrypted with the key from
   that SYM.

   If a server wants to encrypt a reply, it also uses the ENCRYPT type.
   The reply looks like a normal DNS packet, i.e. it has a normal
   unencrypted outer DNS packet.  Because the query name and query type
   have been encrypted, the outer packet has a query name of '.' and
   query type of ENCRYPT and the reply has an ENCRYPT type RRS in the
   answer section.  The reply RRs have been encrypted into the data of
   the ENCRYPT record.  The RRS data starts with 10 bytes of header; the
   flags and section counts.

   The client may lookup keys whenever it wants to.  It may cache the
   keys for the server, using the TTL of those ENCRYPT records.  It
   should also cache failures to lookup the ENCRYPT record for some
   time.  If the client fails to look up the ENCRYPT records it MUST
   fall back to unencrypted communication (this is the opportunistic
   encryption case).  The result of an encrypted query may also be
   timeouts, errors or replies with mangled contents, in that case the
   client MUST fall back to unencrypted communication (this is the
   opportunistic encryption case).

   If some middlebox removes the ENCRYPT from the authority section of
   an encrypted query, the query looks like a .  ENCRYPT lookup and
   likely a reply with ENCRYPTs of type KEY is returned instead of the
   encrypted reply with an ENCRYPT of type RRS, and again the client
   does the unencrypted fallback (this is the opportunistic encryption
   case).  If the server has changed its keys and does not recognize the
   keys in an encrypted query, it should return an ENCRYPT record of
   type PAD with no data.  A server may decide it does not (any longer)
   have the resources for encryption and reply with SERVFAIL to



Wijngaards & Wiley      Expires September 7, 2015               [Page 4]


Internet-Draft              Confidential DNS                  March 2015


   encrypted queries, forcing unencrypted fallback (this is the
   opportunistic encryption case).  Keys for unknown algorithms should
   be ignored by the client, if no usable keys remain, fallback to
   insecure (this is for both opportunistic and authenticated).

   The client may cache the ENCRYPT of type SYM for a server together
   with the symmetric secret, this is better for performance, as public-
   key operations can be avoided for repeated queries.  The server may
   also cache the ENCRYPTs of type SYM with the decoded secret,
   associating a lookup for the rdata of the SYM record with the decoded
   secret, avoiding public-key operations for repeated queries.  This is
   why the SYM record is sent separately in the authority section in
   queries (it is identical and can be used for cache lookups).

   Key rollover is possible, support the old key for its TTL, while
   advertising the new key, for the servers.  For clients, generate a
   new public or symmetric key and use it.

4.  Authenticated Operation

   The previous documented the opportunistic operation, where deployment
   is easier, but security is weaker.  This documents options for
   authenticated operation.  The client selects if encryption is
   authenticated, opportunistic, or disabled in its local policy
   (configuration).

   The authentication happens with a DNSSEC signed DS record that
   carries the key for confidential DNS.  This removes a full roundtrip
   from the connection setup cost.  The DS has hash type TBDhashtype,
   that is specific for confidential DNS.  The DS record carries a flag
   byte and the public key (in DNSKEY's wireformat) in its rdata.  This
   means that the confidential DNS keys are acquired with a referral to
   the zone and are secured with DNSSEC.

   Because the key itself is carried, the probe sequence can be omitted
   and an encrypted query can be sent to the delegated server straight
   away.  The nameservers for that zone then MUST support using that key
   for encrypting packets.  The servers have the same key with
   authenticated mode, where with the opportunistic mode, every server
   could have its own key.

   Validators do not know or support the DS with ENCRYPT hash type,
   those validators ignore them and continue to DNSSEC validate the
   zone.  Validators that support the new hash type should use them to
   encrypt messages and use the remaining DS records to DNSSEC validate
   the zone.

   This changes the opportunistic encryption to authenticated



Wijngaards & Wiley      Expires September 7, 2015               [Page 5]


Internet-Draft              Confidential DNS                  March 2015


   encryption.  The fallback to insecure is still possible and this may
   make deployment easier.  The one byte at the start of the base64
   data, in its least significant bit, signals if fallback to insecure
   is allowed (value 0x01).  That gives the zone owner the option to
   enable fallback to insecure or if it should be disabled.  The
   remainder of the DS base64 data contains a public key in the same
   format as when sent in the rdata of ENCRYPT KEY.  The type of the key
   is in the key type field of this DS record.  With fallback to
   insecure disabled and the keys authenticated the confidential DNS
   query and response should be fully secure (i.e. not
   'Opportunistically' secure).

   With fallback to insecure disabled, queries fail instead of falling
   back to insecure.  This means no answer is acquired, and DNS lookups
   for that zone fail because the security failed.

   The DS method works for authority servers.  Recursors need another
   method.  The client looks up reverse-of-recursors-IP.arpa ENCRYPT and
   gets the keys signed with DNSSEC from there (type ENCRYPT KEY
   lookup).  If there is no dnssec secure answer with a key, the
   opportunistic key exchange is attempted.  Do this for DNSSEC-insecure
   answers, if there is no trust anchor, or when no such name and
   ENCRYPT are present.  If it is dnssec bogus, then authentication
   failed and it is not possible to communicate with the server (with
   the authenticated communication mode selected by the client).

5.  IANA Considerations

   An RR type registration for type ENCRYPT with number TBD and it
   references this document [[to be done when this becomes RFC]].

   A DS record hash type is registered TBDhashtype that references this
   document.  It is for the confidential DNS public key, acronym
   ENCRYPT.

6.  Security Considerations

   Opportunistic encryption can be configured.  Opportunistic encryption
   has many drawbacks against active intrusion, but it works against
   pervasive passive surveillance, and thus it improves privacy.

   With authentication (if selected by the client) the key is secured
   with DNSSEC.

   This technique encrypts DNS queries and answers, but other data
   sources, such as timing, IP addresses, and the packet size can be
   observed.  These could provide almost all the information that was
   encrypted.



Wijngaards & Wiley      Expires September 7, 2015               [Page 6]


Internet-Draft              Confidential DNS                  March 2015


7.  Acknowledgments

   Roy Arends

8.  Normative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

Authors' Addresses

   Wouter Wijngaards
   NLnet Labs
   Science Park 140
   Amsterdam  1098 XH
   The Netherlands

   EMail: wouter@nlnetlabs.nl


   Glen Wiley
   VeriSign, Inc.
   Reston, VA
   USA

   EMail: gwiley@verisign.com


















Wijngaards & Wiley      Expires September 7, 2015               [Page 7]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.128b, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/