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AVT Working Group                                                D. Wing
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status:  Standards Track                      November 11, 2007
Expires:  May 14, 2008


           Datagram TLS Secure RTP (DTLS-SRTP) Key Transport
               draft-wing-avt-dtls-srtp-key-transport-00

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 14, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   The existing DTLS-SRTP specification allows SRTP keys to be
   established between a pair of SRTP endpoints.  However, when there
   are more than two participants in an RTP session, DTLS-SRTP is unable
   to provide a single key for all of the participants.

   This document describes an extension to DTLS-SRTP which transports
   SRTP keying material from one DTLS-SRTP peer to another, so the same
   SRTP keying material can be used by multiple DTLS-SRTP peers.  This



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   reduces or eliminates the need to key each SRTP session individually.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1.  Point to Multipoint using the RFC 3550 mixer model . . . .  3
     3.2.  Point to Multipoint using video switching MCU  . . . . . .  4
   4.  Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.1.  key_transport extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.2.  SRTP Key Transport Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.3.  Key Transport SSRC and RTP SSRC Collisions . . . . . . . . 10
     4.4.  Fragmentation, Reassembly, and Retransmission  . . . . . . 11
   5.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     9.2.  Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15



























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1.  Introduction

   Unique SRTP master keys can be established, in each direction, using
   DTLS-SRTP [I-D.ietf-avt-dtls-srtp].  Using DTLS, each peer
   contributes part of the keying material to generate the eventual SRTP
   master key.

   In some scenarios after the DTLS handshake has completed, it is
   desirable for one peer to change its SRTP key and to transmit SRTP
   packets using an SRTP key that was not derived from the DTLS key
   exchange.  These scenarios are described in Section 3.

   The extensions described in this document allow transporting an SRTP
   master key from one DTLS peer to the other.  Thus, DTLS Key Transport
   differs from from normal DTLS-SRTP in that the SRTP master key is not
   derived from the TLS handshake.


2.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


3.  Scenarios

   DTLS Key Transport allows mixers and video switchers to avoid having
   to encrypt each packet multiple times under multiple SRTP keys.  DTLS
   Key Transport causes sharing of SRTP keys.  When sharing SRTP keys
   with several listeners, it is imperative that the SRTP is changed
   when a new listener is added or a listener is removed.  This is
   because a legitimate listener should only be able to decrypt the SRTP
   stream while he is listening; he should not be able to decrypt the
   SRTP stream prior to joining the conference or after leaving the
   conference.  The needs for audio mixing and video switching are
   different, and are described below.

3.1.  Point to Multipoint using the RFC 3550 mixer model

   In [I-D.ietf-avt-topologies], this RTP topology is called 'Topo-
   Mixer'.  A common application of an RTP mixer is to receive one (or
   more) streams from speakers, each individually keyed.  The mixer will
   then do something intelligent with those streams (e.g., select the
   loudest one), and sends that stream to all of the listeners.  Using
   DTLS-SRTP, without key transport, it is computationally expensive for
   the mixer to encrypt the payload uniquely for each SRTP listener.
   The architecture of a typical mixer requires each listener's SRTP to



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   be encrypted serially, incurring additional delay for each successive
   listener.  This is depicted below in Figure 1.

                                +-------+         +------------+
           +---------+          |       +--key=C->+ listener 1 |
           | speaker +--key=A-->+       |         +------------+
           +---------+          |       |         +------------+
                                | mixer +--key=D->+ listener 2 |
           +---------+          |       |         +------------+
           | speaker +--key=B-->+       |         +------------+
           +---------+          |       +--key=E->+ listener 3 |
                                +-------+         +------------+

      Figure 1: Point to Multipoint Mixer, without DTLS Key Transport

   With DTLS Key Transport, the mixer can maintain one outbound SRTP
   cryptographic context, and encrypt the SRTP once for all listeners.
   This is depicted below in Figure 2.

                                +-------+         +------------+
           +---------+          |       +--key=C->+ listener 1 |
           | speaker +--key=A-->+       |         +------------+
           +---------+          |       |         +------------+
                                | mixer +--key=C->+ listener 2 |
           +---------+          |       |         +------------+
           | speaker +--key=B-->+       |         +------------+
           +---------+          |       +--key=C->+ listener 3 |
                                +-------+         +------------+

       Figure 2: Point to Multipoint Mixer, with DTLS Key Transport

   The mixer is aware of listeners leaving or joining, and can rekey the
   remaining active listeners by the mixer sending them a DTLS
   "new_srtp_key" message Section 4.

3.2.  Point to Multipoint using video switching MCU

   In [I-D.ietf-avt-topologies], this RTP topology is called 'Topo-
   Video-switch-MCU'.  Video switching works differently than audio
   mixing.  In video switching a simple decision is made:  which video
   stream to send to the listeners.  As with audio mixing shown above,
   DTLS-SRTP without key transport is computationally expensive for the
   video switcher to encrypt the payload uniquely for each SRTP
   listener.  The architecture of a typical video switcher requires each
   listener's SRTP to be encrypted serially, incurring additional delay
   for each successive listener.  This is depicted below in Figure 3.





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                               +--------- +         +------------+
          +---------+          |          +--key=C->+ listener 1 |
          | speaker +--key=A-->+selected  |         +------------+
          +---------+          |          |         +------------+
                               | switcher +--key=D->+ listener 2 |
          +---------+          |          |         +------------+
          | speaker +--key=B-->+dropped   |         +------------+
          +---------+          |          +--key=E->+ listener 3 |
                               +----------+         +------------+

      Figure 3: Point to Multipoint Video Switching, without DTLS Key
                                 Transport

   With DTLS key transport, this becomes easier; in fact, the video
   switcher doesn't need to decrypt the SRTP at all, but just make its
   decision (select the stream or drop the stream) and transmit the SRTP
   packets to the listeners.  This is depicted below in Figure 4.

                               +----------+         +------------+
          +---------+          |          +==key=A=>+ listener 1 |
          | speaker +==key=A==>+selected  |         +------------+
          +---------+          |          |         +------------+
                               | switcher +==key=A=>+ listener 2 |
          +---------+          |          |         +------------+
          | speaker +==key=B==>+dropped   |         +------------+
          +---------+          |          +==key=A=>+ listener 3 |
                               +----------+         +------------+

       Figure 4: Point to Multipoint Video Switching, with DTLS Key
                                 Transport

   The video switcher is aware of listeners leaving or joining.  When
   such a change occurs, the video switcher SHOULD request the
   speaker(s) change their respective SRTP keys.  This is done by the
   video switcher sending a DTLS "new_srtp_key_request" message.  The
   speaker will respond with a DTLS "new_srtp_key" message, which will
   be relayed, by the switcher, to each of the active listeners.
   Failing to change the key when a listener joins (or leaves) allows a
   listener to decrypt SRTP traffic prior to (or after) they are
   authorized participants in the conference.

      Discussion point:  additionally, do we want to recommend the video
      switcher also SRTP traffic until the key is changed?  Some
      security policies would reasonably require that, but other
      security policies would not require that.

   When there are multiple speakers, as shown in Figure 4 above, each
   speaker transmits with his own SRTP key.  That SRTP key is derived



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   from the DTLS handshake with the switcher.  Each speaker uses DTLS-
   SRTP Key Transport to signal the SSRC that it will use.


4.  Protocol Description

   This section describes the extension to the DTLS protocol for DTLS-
   SRTP key transport, which allows securely communicating the SRTP key
   to the DTLS peer.

4.1.  key_transport extension

   This document adds a new negotiated extension called "key_transport",
   which MUST only be requested in conjunction with the "use_srtp"
   extension (Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-avt-dtls-srtp]).  The DTLS server
   indicates its support for key_transport by including key_transport in
   its ServerHello message.  If a DTLS client includes key_transport in
   its ClientHello, but does not receive key_transport in the
   ServerHello, the DTLS client MUST NOT send DTLS packets with the
   srtp_key_transport content-type.

   Support for the DTLS Key Transport extension is indicated in SDP with
   the "srtp-kt" attribute.  Advertising support for the extension is
   necessary in SDP because in some cases it is required to establish an
   SRTP call.  For example, a mixer may be able to only support SRTP
   listeners if those listeners implement DTLS Key Transport (because it
   lacks the CPU cycles necessary to encrypt SRTP uniquely for each
   listener).























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   A message flow showing a DTLS client and DTLS server using the
   key_transport extension

        Client                                               Server

        ClientHello + use_srtp + key_transport
                                     -------->
                             ServerHello + use_srtp + key_transport
                                                       Certificate*
                                                 ServerKeyExchange*
                                                CertificateRequest*
                                     <--------      ServerHelloDone
        Certificate*
        ClientKeyExchange
        CertificateVerify*
        [ChangeCipherSpec]
        Finished                     -------->
                                                 [ChangeCipherSpec]
                                     <--------             Finished
        SRTP packets                 <------->      SRTP packets

                     Figure 5: Hangshake Message Flow

   After successful negotiation of the key_transport extension, the DTLS
   client and server MAY exchange SRTP packets, encrypted using the KDF
   described in [I-D.ietf-avt-dtls-srtp].  This is normal and expected,
   even if Key Transport was negotiated by both sides, as neither side
   may (yet) have a need to alter the SRTP key.  However, it is also
   possible that one (or both) peers will immediately send a
   new_srtp_key message before sending any SRTP.

4.2.  SRTP Key Transport Protocol

   A new protocol is defined, called the srtp_key_transport protocol
   which uses srtp_key_transport content-type which consists of the
   following message types:

   new_srtp_key_request:  request that the DTLS peer choose a new key.
      Valid responses are new_srtp_key and new_srtp_key_error.

   new_srtp_key:  contains the new SRTP keying material.  This message
      is sent by a DTLS endpoint that wants to change its SRTP key.
      This does not change any cryptographic parameters (a new DTLS
      handshake is necessary for that), but only the DTLS key for the
      associated SRTP session.  This message includes the SSRC that will
      be used for this key, which allows listeners to establish one SRTP
      crypto-context per speaker (necessary for the video switching
      scenario).  The key chosen MUST be cryptographically random



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      [RFC4086].

   new_key_activate:  indicates receiver is prepared to receive SRTP
      packets encrypted with the new key.

   new_srtp_key_failure:  indicates a failure.

   At any time, the DTLS client or DTLS server MAY send a key_transport
   message, as shown in Figure 6.  The sender of the new_srtp_key
   message MAY immediately start transmitting SRTP packets with this new
   key.  However, to account for loss of the new_srtp_key message it is
   RECOMMENDED that the sender wait before changing to the new SRTP key
   until it receives the new_key_activate message or it times out
   waiting for the new_key_activate_message.  The duration of this
   timeout may vary depending on the sensitivity of the content (e.g., 1
   second or 10 seconds).  In any case, the new_srtp_key message is
   retransmitted until acknowledged by receipt of a new_key_activate
   message.


        Client / Server                             Server / Client

        [new_srtp_key_request]        -------->
                                     <--------         new_srtp_key
        new_srtp_key_activiate        -------->

                      Figure 6: New Key Message Flow

   The following figure shows the state machine for the protocol.






















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                   receive new_srtp_key_request from peer
                      or decide to choose new SRTP key
                                  |
                                  |
             send                 V
             new_srtp_key  +---------------+    timeout
                 +---------| Communicate   |--------+
                 |         |     Key       |        |
                 +-------->|               |        |
                           +---------------+        |
                             |           ^          |
                  receive    |           |   +----------------+
             new_key_activate|           +---| send SRTP using|
                             |               |  new SRTP key  |
                     +----------------+      +----------------+
                     | send SRTP using|
                     |  new SRTP key  |
                     +----------------+
                             |
                             V
                            done

              Figure 7: Key Transport protocol state machine




























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   Using the syntax described in TLS [RFC4346], the following structures
   are used:

       enum {
          new_srtp_key_request(0),
          new_srtp_key(1),
          new_srtp_key_activate(2),
          new_srtp_key_failure(128),
          (255)
       } SRTPKeyTransportType;

       struct {
          SRTPKeyTransportType keytrans_type;
          uint24 length;
          uint16 message_seq;
          uint24 fragment_offset;
          uint24 fragment_length;
          select (SRTPKeyTransportType) {
             case new_srtp_key_request:         NewSRTPKeyRequest;
             case new_srtp_key:                 NewSRTPKey;
             case new_srtp_key_activate:        NewSRTPKeyActivate;
             case new_srtp_key_failure:         NewSRTPKeyFailure;
           };
       } KeyTransport;

       struct {
           uint  random<64>;           // additional entropy for peer
       } NewSRTPKeyRequest;

       struct {
           uint32 ssrc;                // SSRC used for this keys
           uint   key<16..32>;         // The last change_cipher_spec
           uint   auth_tag<4..10>      // decides the length of key
                                       // and auth_tag
           uint  random<64>;           // additional entropy for peer
       } NewSRTPKey;

       struct {
           uint  random<64>;           // additional entropy for peer
       } NewSRTPKeyActivate;

       struct { } NewSRTPKeyFailure;

4.3.  Key Transport SSRC and RTP SSRC Collisions

   Per [RFC3550], if an RTP source notices an RTP SSRC collision, it is
   required to change its SSRC.  If it has negotiated support for DTLS-
   SRTP Key Transport, it then MUST also send a new_srtp_key message



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   indicating the new SSRC.  As part of this procedure, it does not need
   to also change its SRTP key.

   The communication of the SSRC used for each key is necessary if there
   are multiple speakers in the video switching scenario.  However,
   because a speaker is not able to determine if their audio or their
   video is being switched, a speaker MUST always adhere indicate a
   change in SSRC by following the procedure in this section for any
   SRTP stream (audio, video, or other).

4.4.  Fragmentation, Reassembly, and Retransmission

   Much like the DTLS handshake itself, this extension also needs to
   handle fragmentation and reassembly (to send a large key) and
   retransmission (to account for packet loss).  Using the same
   technique as DTLS's handshake, the message_seq, fragment_offset,
   fragment_length are used.

   When transmitting the key transport message, the sender divides the
   message into a series of N contiguous data ranges.  These ranges MUST
   NOT be larger than the maximum handshake fragment size and MUST
   jointly contain the entire key transport message.  The ranges SHOULD
   NOT overlap.  The sender then creates N key transport messages, all
   with the same message_seq value as the original key transport
   message.  Each new message is labelled with the fragment_offset (the
   number of bytes contained in previous fragments) and the
   fragment_length (the length of this fragment).  The length field in
   all messages is the same as the length field of the original message.
   An unfragmented message is a degenerate case with fragment_offset=0
   and fragment_length=length.

   When a DTLS implementation receives a key transport message fragment,
   it MUST buffer it until it has the entire key transport message.
   DTLS implementations MUST be able to handle overlapping fragment
   ranges.  This allows senders to retransmit key transport messages
   with smaller fragment sizes during path MTU discovery.


5.  Examples

   In some scenarios, a device cannot successfully establish an SRTP
   session without DTLS-SRTP Key Transport.  The following two examples
   show








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   Using the SDP syntax described in
   [I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-capability-negotiation], the following figure
   shows an offerer that requires DTLS Key Transport in order to set up
   this call as an SRTP call, otherwise it can set up this call as an
   RTP call.  This is indicated by the ",2" on the "a=pcfg" line.  If
   the answerer does not understand "a=dtls-srtp" but does understand
   DTLS-SRTP and [I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-capability-negotiation], this can
   cannot be established using DTLS-SRTP; however, it can be established
   using RTP.
         v=0
         o=- 25678 753849 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
         s=
         c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
         t=0 0
         m=audio 53456 RTP/AVP 0 18
         a=tcap:1 RTP/SAVP
         a=acap:1 SHA-1 \
           4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
         a=acap:2 dtls-srtp
         a=pcfg:1 t=1 a=1,2

       Figure 9: Example SDP offer showing Key Transport is required

   Using the SDP syntax described in
   [I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-capability-negotiation], the following figure
   shows an offerer that indicates support for DTLS Key Transport but
   does not require DTLS Key Transport in order to set up this call as
   an SRTP call.  This is indicated by the ",[2]" on the "a=pcfg" line.
   If the answerer does not understand "a=dtls-srtp" but does understand
   DTLS-SRTP and [I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-capability-negotiation], this call
   can still be established using DTLS-SRTP.
         v=0
         o=- 25678 753849 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
         s=
         c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
         t=0 0
         m=audio 53456 RTP/AVP 0 18
         a=tcap:1 RTP/SAVP
         a=acap:1 SHA-1 \
             4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
         a=acap:2 dtls-srtp
         a=pcfg:1 t=1 a=1,[2]

      Figure 10: Example SDP offer showing Key Transport is optional







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6.  Security Considerations

   In the point-to-multipoint scenario, Section 3.1, all of the
   listeners know the key being used by the mixer.  Any of those
   listeners could create SRTP packets that are encrypted with this same
   key, and send those SRTP packets to other listeners.  In order to
   reduce the vulnerability to this threat, it is RECOMMENDED that the
   source transport address of received SRTP packets be discarded if
   they do not match the source transport address of the associated
   DTLS-SRTP session.  Additionally, the network SHOULD prevent IP
   address spoofing [RFC2827].

   In the


7.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to David McGrew for his improvements to this document and to
   the underlying protocol.


8.  IANA Considerations

   Register new SDP attribute "dtls-kt", new TLS content-type
   "key_transport" (26?).


9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-avt-dtls-srtp]
              McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for  Secure
              Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
              draft-ietf-avt-dtls-srtp-00 (work in progress), July 2007.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4346]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.

   [I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-capability-negotiation]



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              Andreasen, F., "SDP Capability Negotiation",
              draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-capability-negotiation-07 (work in
              progress), October 2007.

9.2.  Informational References

   [I-D.ietf-avt-topologies]
              Westerlund, M. and S. Wenger, "RTP Topologies",
              draft-ietf-avt-topologies-07 (work in progress),
              October 2007.

   [RFC3550]  Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
              Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
              Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, July 2003.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.


Author's Address

   Dan Wing
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email:  dwing@cisco.com























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   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
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Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).





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