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DHC                                                            W. Kumari
Internet-Draft                                                    Google
Intended status: Informational                            O. Gudmundsson
Expires: July 17, 2014                                     Shinkuro Inc.
                                                             P. Ebersman
                                                                Infoblox
                                                                S. Sheng
                                                                   ICANN
                                                        January 13, 2014


                 Captive-Portal identification in DHCP
                      draft-wkumari-dhc-capport-00

Abstract

   In many environments (such as hotels, coffee shops and other
   establishments that offer Internet service to customers) it is common
   to start new connections in a captive portal mode, i.e. highly
   restrict what the customer can do until the customer has accepted
   terms of service, provided payment information or authenticated.

   This document describes a DHCP option to inform clients that they are
   behind some sort of captive portal device, and that they will need to
   authenticate to get Internet Access.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 17, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.




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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  DNS Redirection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  HTTP Redirection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  IP Hijacking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  The Captive-Portal DHCP Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Use of the Captive-Portal Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix A.  Changes / Author Notes.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   In many environments (coffee shops and hotels) users need to connect
   to a captive portal device and agree to an acceptable use policy or
   provide billing information before they can access the Internet.

   In order to present the user with the captive portal web page, many
   devices perform DNS and / or HTTP and / or IP hijacks.  As well as
   being kludgy hacks, these techniques looks very similar to attacks
   that DNSSEC and TLS protect against.

   This document describes a DHCP option (Captive-Portal) that informs
   DHCP clients that they are behind a captive portal device, and how to
   contact it.

   This document neither condones nor condemns captive portals; instead
   it recognises that they are here to stay, and attempts to improve the
   user's experience.




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1.1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Background

   Many Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that offer public Internet
   access require theuser to first accept an Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)
   and / or provides billing information (such as their last name and /
   or room number in a hotel, credit card information, etc) through a
   web interface.

   In order to meet this requirement, some ISPs implement a captive
   portal (CP) - a system that intercepts user requests and redirects
   them to an interstitial login page.

   Captive portals intercept and redirects user requests in a number of
   ways, including:

   o  DNS Redirection

   o  IP Redirection

   o  HTTP Redirection

   o  Restricted scope addresses

   o  Traffic blocking (until the user is authenticated)

   In order to ensure that the user is unable to access the Internet,
   captive portals usually implement IP based filters, or place the user
   in to a restricted VLAN or restricted IP range until after they have
   been authorized.

2.1.  DNS Redirection

   The CP either intercepts all DNS traffic or advertises itself (for
   example using DHCP) as the recursive server for the network.  Until
   the user has authenticated to the captive portal, the CP responds to
   all DNS requests listing the address of its web portal.  Once the
   user has authenticated the CP returns the "correct" addresses.

   This technique has many shortcomings.  It fails if the client is
   performing DNSSEC validation, or if the client already has the DNS
   information cached.




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2.2.  HTTP Redirection

   In this implmentation, the CP acts like a transparent HTTP proxy, but
   when it sees an HTTP request from an unauthenticated client it
   intercepts the request and responds with an HTTP status code 302 to
   redirect the client to the Captive Portal Login.

   The issues with this technique include:

   o  It fails if the user is only using HTTPS

   o  It exposes various private user information, such as HTTP Cookies,
      etc.

   o  It doesn't work if the client has a VPN and / or proxies their web
      traffic to an external web proxy.

2.3.  IP Hijacking

   In this scenario, the captive portal intercepts connections to any IP
   address.  It spoofs the destination IP address and "pretends" to be
   whatever the user tried to access.

   This technique has similar issues as the HTTP solution, but may also
   break other protocols, and may expose more of the users private
   information, etc.

3.  The Captive-Portal DHCP Option

   The Captive Portal DHCP Option (TBA1) informs the DHCP client that it
   is behind a captive portal and provides the URI to access the
   authentication page.

   The format of the DHCPv4 Captive-Portal DHCP option is shown below.

     Code    Len          Data
     +------+------+------+------+------+--   --+-----+
     | code |  len |  URI                  ...        |
     +------+------+------+------+------+--   --+-----+

   o  Code: The Captive-Portal DHCP Option (TBA1)

   o  Len: The length, in octets of the URI.

   o  URI: The URI of the authentication page that the user should
      connect to.





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   The URI SHOULD be a URL with an IP-literal for the host portion (to
   remove the need to allow DNS from unauthenticated clients).

   [ED NOTE: Using an address literal is less than awesome, but better
   than the alternatives.  Recommending a DNS name means that the CP
   would need to allow DNS from unauthenticated clients (as we don't
   want to force users to use the CP's provided DNS) and some folk would
   use this to DNS Tunnel out.  This would make the CP admin block
   external recursives).]

4.  Use of the Captive-Portal Option

   [ED NOTE: This section is, and probably will remain, fairly hand
   wavy.  This option provides notice to the OS / User applications that
   there is a CP, but I think that the UI / etc is best designed /
   handled by the Operating System vendors / Application developers. ]

   The purpose of the Captive-Portal DHCP Option is to inform the
   operating system and applications that they are behind a captive
   portal type device, and will need to authenticate before getting
   network access (and how to reach the authentication page).

   The exact method that the interaction with the user occurs is device
   / operating system / application dependent, the below is simply one
   option.

   When the device receives a DHCP response with the Captive-Portal
   Option it SHOULD:

   1.  Not initiate new IP connections until the CP has been satisfied.
       [TODO(Someone): Existing connections should be placed on hold
       (need better text).  This will happen more often than some expect
       -- you buy 1h of Internet at a cafe and stay there for 3h -- this
       will "interrupt" you a few times).]

   2.  Present a dialog box to the user informing that they are behind a
       captive portal and ask if they wish to proceed.

   3.  If the user elects to proceed, the device should initiate a
       connection to the captive portal login page using a web browser
       configured with a separate cookie store.  Some captive portals
       send the user a cookie when they authenticate (so that the user
       can re-authenticate more easily in the future - the browser
       should keep these CP cookies separate from other cookies.

   4.  Once the user has authenticated (how does it know?  HTTP
       response?! Probe (ugh?)) normal IP connectivity should resume.




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   5.  The device should (using an OS dependent method) expose to the
       user / user applications that they have connected though a
       captive portal (for example by creating a file in /proc/net/
       containing the interface and captive portal URI).  This should
       continue until the network changes, or a new DHCP message without
       the CP is received.

5.  IANA Considerations

   [ This section stolen from draft-ietf-dhc-access-network-identifier.
   :-) ]

   This document defines DHCPv4 Captive-Portal option which requires
   assignment of DHCPv4 option code TBD1 assigned from "Bootp and DHCP
   options" registry (http://www.iana.org/assignments/ bootp-dhcp-
   parameters/bootp-dhcp-parameters.xml), as specified in [RFC2939].

6.  Security Considerations

   An attacker with the ability to inject DHCP messages could include
   this option and so force users to contact him.  As an attacker with
   this capability could simply list himself as the default gateway (and
   so see all the victims traffic) we do not think this gives them
   significantly more capabilities.  Fake DHCP servers are currently a
   security concern - this doesn't make them any better or worse.

   Devices and systems that automatically connect to open network could
   potentially be tracked using the techniques described in this
   document (forcing the user to continually authenticate, or exposing
   their browser fingerprint), but similar tracking could already be
   performed with the standard captive portal mechanisms, so this
   doesn't seem to give the attackers more capabilities.

   By simplifying the interaction with the captive portal systems, and
   doing away with the need for interception, we think that users will
   be less likely to disable useful security safeguards like DNSSEC
   validation, VPNs, etc.

7.  Acknowledgements

   The primary author has discussed this idea with a number of folk, and
   asked them to assist by becoming co-authors.  Unfortunately he has
   forgotten who many of them were; if you were one of them, I
   apologize.

   Thanks to Vint Cerf for the initial idea / asking me to write this.





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8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [IANA.AS_Numbers]
              IANA, "Autonomous System (AS) Numbers",
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-iana-objects]
              Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "RPKI Objects
              issued by IANA", draft-ietf-sidr-iana-objects-03 (work in
              progress), May 2011.

Appendix A.  Changes / Author Notes.

   [RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication ]

   From -00 to -01.

   o  Nothing changed in the template!

Authors' Addresses

   Warren Kumari
   Google
   1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   US

   Email: warren@kumari.net


   Olafur Gudmundsson
   Shinkuro Inc.
   4922 Fairmont Av, Suite 250
   Bethesda, MD  20814
   USA

   Email: ogud@ogud.com







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   Paul Ebersman
   Infoblox

   Email: ebersman-ietf@dragon.net


   Steve Sheng
   Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
   12025 Waterfront Drive, Suite 300
   Los Angeles  90094
   United States of America

   Phone: +1.310.301.5800
   Email: steve.sheng@icann.org





































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