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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 draft-xibassnez-i2nsf-capability

I2NSF                                                          L. Xia
Internet Draft                                                 Huawei
Intended status: Standard Track                               D Zhang
                                                              Alibaba
                                                          N. BOUTHORS
                                                               Qosmos

Expires: November 2015                                    May 25, 2015


        Information Model of Interface to Network Security Functions
                           Capability Interface
              draft-xia-i2nsf-capability-interface-im-01.txt


Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25,2015.

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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with



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   respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
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   warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Abstract

   This draft is focused on the north-bound interface of NSFs (Network
   Security Functions) and proposes an information model for
   configuring various kinds NSF security functions, based on the
   packet-based paradigm. The Yang structure and use examples are also
   presented to clarify how to use the information model.

Table of Contents


   1. Introduction ................................................ 2
   2. Conventions used in this document ........................... 3
      2.1. Terminology ............................................ 3
   3. Information Model for Capability Interface .................. 4
      3.1. Overview ............................................... 4
      3.2. Packet-Based Paradigm .................................. 6
      3.3. Rule ................................................... 9
      3.4. Match ................................................. 10
      3.5. Actions ............................................... 12
   4. I2NSF Capability Interface IM Yang Structure ............... 12
   5. Use Examples of I2NSF Capability Interface IM .............. 15
   6. Security Considerations .................................... 15
   7. IANA Considerations ........................................ 16
   8. References ................................................. 16
      8.1. Normative References .................................. 16
      8.2. Informative References ................................ 16
   9. Acknowledgments ............................................ 17

 1. Introduction

   Due to the rapid development and deployment of cloud computing
   services, the demand of cloud-based security services is also
   rapidly growing. The customers of them can be enterprises [I-
   D.zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases], User Equipment (UE) of mobile
   network and Internet of Things (IoT) [I-D.qi-i2nsf-access-network-
   usecase], residential access users [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-access-
   usecases], and so on.

   Derived from [I-D.dunbar-i2nsf-problem-statement], two types of
   I2NSF interface should be considered:



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   o Interface between I2NSF user/client with network/security
      controller: [I-D.xia-i2nsf-service-interface-DM] describes the
      information model used by this type of interface. It's a service-
      oriented interface, the main objective is to unify the
      communication channel and the security service request
      information model between various high-level application (e.g.,
      openstack, various BSS/OSS, etc) with various network controllers.
      The design goal of the service interface is to decouple security
      service in application layer from various kinds of security
      devices and their device-level security functions. The intent-
      based information model approach derived from RBAC model can be a
      feasible option for it;

   o North-bound interface provided by NSFs (e.g., FW, AAA, IPS, Anti-
      DDOS, Anti-Virus, etc), no matter whether the NSFs are Virtual
      Machines (VM) on servers or physical appliances. In this document,
      this type of interface is also called "capability interface". Any
      network entities (e.g., I2NSF clients, network/security
      controller, etc) can use this interface to configure the required
      security functions of NSFs. Current situation is different NSF
      vendors have different proprietary interfaces and information
      models for configuring their security functions.

   This draft is focused on the capability interfaces and proposes an
   information model for configuring various kinds NSFs. It's used by
   the NSFs to decouple from the various security services came from
   the application layer and highlight the security capabilities they
   can provide. Section 3 defines the information model for capability
   interface. Section 4 gives its representation by Yang data model.
   Section 5 includes some using examples to clarify how to use the
   information model.

 2. Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

  2.1. Terminology

  AAA -Access control, Authorization, Authentication

  ACL - Access Control List

  AD - Active Directory

  ANSI - American National Standards Institute


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  DDoS - Distributed Deny of Services

  FW - Firewall

  I2NSF - Interface to Network Security Functions

  INCITS - International Committee for Information Technology
Standards

  IoT - Internet of Things

  IPS - Intrusion Prevention System

  LDAP - Lightweight Directory Access Protocol

  NAT - Network Address Translation

  NBI - North-bound Interface

  NIST - National Institute of Standard Technology

  NSF - Network Security Function

  RBAC - Role Based Access Control

  UE - User Equipment

  URL - Uniform/Universal Resource Locator

  VM - Virtual Machine

 3. Information Model for Capability Interface

  3.1. Overview

   Similar to switchs and routers, NSFs realize the security
   capabilities (e.g., antivirus, IPS, FW, etc) in the device level,
   not in the service level. Although in some conditions, they can
   provide certain service-aware capabilities, i.e., application
   recognition, virus detection, etc. In other words, the IM of the
   capability interface should be designed by the way of abstracting
   from the various specific security capabilities to a generic model,
   so that it can be used to configure NSFs directly or by the
   translation of the adaptor in NSF easily.

   Below is the overall information model for I2NSF capability
   interface.


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                                            +-------------+
                                          +->  User/tenant|
                                          | |  /VN-id     |
                                          | +-------------+
                                          | +---------+
                                          | |Address/ |
                                          +->address  |
                                          | |group    |
                                          | +---------+
                                          | +-----------+
                                          | |Layer 2/3/4|
                                          +->header, or |
                                          | |payload    |
                                 +------+ | +-----------+
                                 |Packet| | +---------+
                               +->based |-+-> Service |
                               | |match | | +---------+
                               | +------+ | +-----------+
                               |          +->Application|
                               |            +-----------+
             +----+    +-----+ |
             |    |  +->Match|-+             +----------+
          +-->Rule|  | +-----+ |           +-> Session  |
          |  |    |  |         |           | | state    |
          |  +----+  |         | +-------+ | +----------+
          |          |         | |context| | +----------+
          |    *     |         +->based  +-+-> Schedule |
          |    *     |           |match  | | +----------+
          |    *     |           +-------+ | +---------+
          |          |                     | |Region/  |
          |          |                     +->region   |
+------+     +----+  |                       |group    |
|      |  |  |    |  |                       +---------+
|Policy+--+-->Rule+--+
|      |  |  |    |  |                         +-------+
+------+  |  +----+  |                       +->Permit +
          |          |                       | +-------+
          |    *     |             +-------+ | +-------+
          |    *     |           +->Basic  +-+-> Deny  |
          |    *     |           | |actions| | +-------+
          |          |           | +-------+ | +-------+
          |          |           |           +-> Mirror|
          |          |           |             +-------+
          |          |           |
          |          |           |              +----------+
          |          |           |            +->Antivirus:|
          |  +----+  |           |            | |profile   |


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          |  |    |  | +-------+ |            | +----------+
          +-->Rule|  +->Actions+-+            | +---------+
             |    |    +-------+ |            +->  IPS:   |
             +----+                           | |signature|
                                 |            | +---------+
                                 |            | +----------+
                                 |            | | URL      |
                                 |            +->Filtering:|
                                              | |data base |
                                 |            | +----------+
                                 | +--------+ | +----------+
                                 +->Advanced+-+ |  File    |
                                   |actions | +->Blocking: |
                                   +--------+ | |profile   |
                                              | +----------+
                                              | +----------+
                                              | |  Data    |
                                              +->Filtering:|
                                              | |profile   |
                                              | +----------+
                                              | +-----------+
                                              | |Application|
                                              +->  control  |
                                              | +-----------+
                                              |   *
                                              +-> *
                                                  *
        Figure 1. The Overall Information Model for I2NSF Capability
                                Interface

   At the top level, policy is a container including a set of security
   rules. Each rule represents some specific security requirements or
   actions. Security policy combines these rules together according to
   some logic, i.e., their similarity or mutual relations, etc.

   A Security policy is created and assigned to any NSFs depending on
   specific requirements and scenarios. For example, a security policy
   can be responsible for an enterprise branch, or can be used for the
   access control to one set of services.

  3.2. Packet-Based Paradigm

   [I-D.lopez-i2nsf-packet] analyzes the common nature of NSF functions
   that NSFs ultimately are packet-processing engines that inspect
   packets traversing networks, either directly or in context to
   sessions to which the packet is associated. This draft uses this
   packet-based paradigm for the design of NSF capability interface IM.


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   This packet-based design approach is very general and easily
   extensible, and so can avoid any potential constraints which could
   limit NSFs' functional capabilities.

   Considering from the perspective of packet-processing, NSFs differ
   in the depth of packet header or payload they can inspect, the
   various session/context states they can maintain, and the actions or
   specific profiles they can apply. Therefore, the NSF capabilities
   can be characterized by the level of packet-processing and context
   that a NSF can support, the actions and profiles that the NSF can
   apply. In the other hand, NSF Vendors can register their provided
   NSF capabilities by using the Subject-Object-Action-Function
   categories described by [I-D.lopez-i2nsf-packet].

   Table 1-4 below lists some examples included in the categories for
   constructing the NSF capability:

     +-----------------------------------------------------------+
     |         Subject (packet) Capability Index                 |
     +---------------+-------------------------------------------+
     | Layer 2       | Layer 2 header fields:                    |
     | Header        | Source/Destination/s-VID/c-VID/EtherType/.|
     |               |                                           |
     |---------------+-------------------------------------------+
     | Layer 3       | Layer header fields:                      |
     |               |            protocol                       |
     | IPv4 objects  |            port                           |
     |               |            src port                       |
     |               |            dscp                           |
     |               |            length                         |
     |               |            flags                          |
     |               |            ttl                            |
     |               |                                           |
     | IPv6 Object   |                                           |
     |               |            addr                           |
     |               |            protocol/nh                    |
     |               |            src port                       |
     |               |            length                         |
     |               |            traffic class                  |
     |               |            hop limit                      |
     |               |            flow label                     |
     |               |                                           |
     | TCP           |            Port                           |


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     | SCTP          |            syn                            |
     | DCCP          |            ack                            |
     |               |            fin                            |
     |               |            rst                            |
     |               |            psh                            |
     |               |            urg                            |
     |               |            window                         |
     |               |            sockstress                     |
     | UDP           |                                           |
     |               |            flood abuse                    |
     |               |            fragment abuse                 |
     |               |            Port                           |
     | HTTP layer    |                                           |
     |               |            hash collision                 |
     |               |            http - get flood               |
     |               |            http - post flood              |
     |               |            http - random/invalid url      |
     |               |            http - slowloris               |
     |               |            http - slow read               |
     |               |            http - r-u-dead-yet (rudy)     |
     |               |            http - malformed request       |
     |               |            http - xss                     |
     |               |            https - ssl session exhaustion |
     +---------------+-------------------------------------------+
     | IETF PCP      | Configurable                              |
     |               | Ports                                     |
     |               |                                           |
     +---------------+-------------------------------------------+
     | IETF TRAM     | profile                                   |
     |               |                                           |
     |               |                                           |
     |---------------+-------------------------------------------+
               Table 1. Subject (packet) Capability Index

     +-----------------------------------------------------------+
     |      Object (context) Capability Index                    |
     +---------------+-------------------------------------------+
     | Session       |   Session state,                          |
     |               |   bidirectional state                     |
     |               |                                           |
     +---------------+-------------------------------------------+


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     | Time          |   time span                               |
     |               |   days, minutes, seconds,                 |
     |               |   Events                                  |
     +---------------+-------------------------------------------+
     | Events        |   Event URL, variables                    |
     +---------------+-------------------------------------------+
               Table 2. Object (context) Capability Index

     +-----------------------------------------------------------+
     |      Actions Capability Index                             |
     +---------------+-------------------------------------------+
     | Ingress port  |   SFC header termination ,                |
     +---------------+-------------------------------------------+
     |               |   Pass                                    |
     | Egress        |   Deny                                    |
     |               |   Mirror                                  |
     |               |   Functional call                         |
     |               |   Encap various header                    |
     +---------------+-------------------------------------------+
                   Table 3. Actions Capability Index

     +-----------------------------------------------------------+
     | Functional profile (advanced actions) Capability Index    |
     +---------------+-------------------------------------------+
     | Profile types |   Vendor specific                         |
     |               |   Flexible Profile URL                    |
     |               |   Accept external                         |
     |               |                                           |
     +---------------+-------------------------------------------+

     Table 4. Functional profile (advanced actions) Capability Index


  3.3. Rule

   Each rule is defined in the classic "match & action" style that
   already implemented in most NSFs today to minimize the needed
   updates on existed NSFs and decrease the complexity.

   The NSF follows the rules one by one to process the passing traffic
   as follows:




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   1. The NSF analyzes traffics by either one of packet-based match and
      context-based match, or both of them. Packet-based match inspects
      the packet header and/or payload to retrieve the traffic
      attributes at network or application layers. The traffic
      attributes include user, address, other packet attributes,
      service and application. Context-based match analyzes and
      retrieves a variety of contextual attributes associated with the
      packet such as session state, schedule and region;

   2. The NSF compares the attributes with the match conditions defined
      in the first rule. If all the conditions are met, the traffic
      matches the rule. If one or more conditions are not met, the NSF
      compares the attributes with the conditions of objects defined in
      the next rule. If all rules are not met, the NSF denies the
      traffic by default;

   3. If the traffic matches a rule, the NSF performs the defined basic
      actions over the traffic. If the basic action is deny, the NSF
      blocks the traffic. If the basic action is permit/mirror, the NSF
      resumes checking whether certain advanced actions are referenced
      in the rule. If yes, go to step 4. If no, the traffic is
      permitted;

   4. If certain advanced actions (e.g., Antivirus, IPS, etc) are
      referenced in the rule and the basic action defined in the rule
      is permit/mirror, the NSF performs integrated checks on the
      content carried over the traffic. The integrated check inspects
      the content carried over the traffic based on the conditions
      defined in the referenced profiles of advanced action and
      implements appropriate actions based on the check result. If any
      advanced action determines to block the traffic, the NSF blocks
      the traffic. If all advanced actions determine to permit the
      traffic, the NSF allows the traffic through.

   One rule can be applied multiple times on different places, i.e.,
   links, devices, networks, vpns, etc. It not only guarantees the
   consistent policy enforcement in the whole network, but also
   decreases the configuration workload.

  3.4. Match

   Match (aka, Objects) consists of two categories of match condition:
   packet-based match and context-based match. Each category includes
   various match conditions representing different kinds of objects.
   The logic relation among all the conditions is flexible, it can be
   "AND", "OR". The former means the traffic must match all the



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   conditions, while the latter means the traffic only needs to match
   one of the conditions.

   The general objects for packet-based match are as follows:

   o User: A user is a person applicaiton who is authorized to access
      network resources. A user can be an internet access user who
      accesses Internet resources or intranet resources from inside the
      intranet through a FW, or a remote access user who connects to a
      FW in VPN, or PPPoE mode to access intranet resources. The NSFs
      need to know the IP address or other information (i.e., user's
      tenant or VN-id) of the user to identify the user's traffic and
      perform the pre-defined actions. It can also define a group of
      users to match and perform actions to them together;

   o Source and destination address scope;

   o Layer 2/3/4 header, or payload related attributes: other
      meaningful and useful attributes in packet except for existing
      objects;

   o Service: A service is an application identified by a protocol
      type and port number. It can be a service or a group of services.
      NSF matches the service traffics based on the protocol types and
      port numbers and applies the security actions to them;

   o Application: An application is a computer program for a specific
      task or purpose, and multiple applications constitute an
      application group. It provides a finer granularity than service
      in matching traffic. Even if different applications have the same
      service, they still can be distinguished by analyzing the data
      packets and comparing the signatures of each application. The
      hierarchy category method is appropriate for identifying
      applications. For example, the application of Gmail belongs to
      the category of business systems, and the subcategory of Email.
      Other key attributes that belongs to and can be used to identify
      an application are data transmission model (e.g., client-server,
      browser-based, networking, peer-to-peer, etc), risk level (e.g.,
      Exploitable, Evasive, Data-loss, Bandwidth-consuming, etc).

   The general objects for context-based match are as follows:

   o Session state: any one specific state related to the
      user/operation sessions, such as authentication state, TCP/UDP
      session state, bidirectional state, etc;




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   o Schedule: A schedule defines time ranges. A rule can reference a
      schedule to filter traffic that passes through the NSF within the
      schedule. A schedule can be a periodic schedule, or a one-time
      schedule;

   o Region/region group: the logical definition of users' location
      which can be pre-defined in the in the location signature
      database by the geographical information, or be manual defined by
      the user's IP information.

   Objects are extensible, new match conditions can be defined and
   added into them any time according to requirements.

  3.5. Actions

   The action of a security rule is also divided into two categories
   logically: basic actions and advanced actions. Basic actions are
   either permit, deny or mirror. Deny simple means to block the
   matching traffics. Permit and mirror have more meanings by
   performing the referenced advanced actions. The all advanced actions
   in one rule can inspect traffic content during one-pass, which
   greatly improves system performance.

   Every advanced action includes its own matching conditions to
   identify specific traffic and perform required actions. The advanced
   action is defined by specific requirements or for specific scenarios.
   Some typical advanced actions are Antivirus, IPS, URL filtering,
   File blocking, Data filtering, Application control, and so on.

   By combining advanced actions and using them appropriately, NSFs can
   defend against possible attacks and reduce the waste of system
   resources.

 4. I2NSF Capability Interface IM Yang Structure

   This section specifies the I2NSF capability interface information
   model in Yang structure [RFC6020].

   module: Security Policies

         +--security-policies

            +--rw policy-set* [policy-name]

               +--rw policy-name string

               +--rw policy-id  uint16


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               +--rw security-rules

                   +--rw rule-set* [rule-name]

                     +--rw rule-name  string

                     +--rw rule-id  uint16

                     +--rw Match

                     |  +--rw packet-based-match

                 |  |  +--rw user* [login-name]

                     |  |  |  +--rw login-name string

                     |  |  |  +--rw display-name string

                     |  |  |  +--rw group-name string

                     |  |  |  +--rw description string

                     |  |  |  +--rw parent-group string

                     |  |  |  +--rw password string

                     |  |  |  +--rw expired-date data-and-time

                     |  |  |  +--rw allow-multi-account-login boolean

                     |  |  |  +--rw address-binding Boolean

                     |  |  |  +--rw tenant? uint32

                     |  |  |  +--rw VN-id? uint32

                     |  |  +--rw address-scope*

                     |  |  |  +--rw src-address inet:ip-prefix

                     |  |  |  +--rw dst-address inet:ip-prefix

                 |  |  +--rw layer-header-payload*

                     |  |  |  ...

                     |  |  +--rw service* [name]


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                     |  |  |  +--rw name string

                     |  |  |  +--rw description string

                     |  |  |  +--rw protocol enumeration

                     |  |  |  +--rw protocol-num uint8

                     |  |  |  +--rw src-port-num uint16

                     |  |  |  +--rw dest-port-num uint16

                     |  |  +--rw application* [name]

                     |  |  |  +--rw name string

                     |  |  |  +--rw server-address inet:ip-address

                     |  |  |  +--rw protocol enumeration

                     |  |  |  +--rw dest-port-num uint16

                     |  |  |  +--rw category enumeration

                     |  |  |  +--rw subcategory enumeration

                     |  |  |  +--rw data-transmission-model enumeration

                     |  |  |  +--rw risk-level enumeration

                     |  +--rw context-based-match

                     |     +--rw session-state*

                     |     |  ...

                     |     +--rw schedule* [name]

                     |     |  +--rw name string

                     |     |  +--rw type enumeration

                     |     |  +--rw start-time data-and-time

                     |     |  +--rw end-time data-and-time

                     |     |  +--rw weekly-validity-time? data-and-time


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                 |     +--rw region*

                     |        ...

                   +--rw actions

                      +--rw basic-actions enumeration

                   +--rw advanced-actions* [name]

                      +--rw name string

                         +--rw profile-antivirus?

                         |  ...

                         +--rw profile-IPS?

                         |  ...

                         +--rw profile-url-filtering?

                         |  ...

                         +--rw profile-file-blocking?

                         |  ...

                         +--rw profile-data-filtering?

                         |  ...

                         +--rw profile-application-control?

                         |  ...



 5. Use Examples of I2NSF Capability Interface IM

   TBD

 6. Security Considerations

   TBD




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 7. IANA Considerations



 8. References

  8.1. Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2234] Crocker, D. and Overell, P.(Editors), "Augmented BNF for
             Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, Internet Mail
             Consortium and Demon Internet Ltd., November 1997.

   [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the
             Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
             October 2010.

  8.2. Informative References

   [INCITS359 RBAC]   NIST/INCITS, "American National Standard for
             Information Technology - Role Based Access Control",
             INCITS 359, April, 2003

   [I-D.zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases] Zarny, M., et.al., "I2NSF
             Data Center Use Cases", Work in Progress, October 2014.

   [I-D.qi-i2nsf-access-network-usecase] Qi, M., et.al., "Integrated
             Security with Access Network Use Case", Work in Progress,
             October, 2014.

   [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-access-usecases] Pastor, A., et.al., "Access Use
             Cases for an Open OAM Interface to Virtualized Security
             Services", Work in Progress, October, 2014.

   [I-D.dunbar-i2nsf-problem-statement] Dunbar, L., et.al., "Interface
             to Network Security Functions Problem Statement", Work in
             Progress, September, 2014.

   [I-D.xia-i2nsf-service-interface-DM] Xia, L., et.al., "Data Model of
             Interface to Network Security Functions Service Interface",
             February, 2015.

   [I-D.lopez-i2nsf-packet] Lopez, E., "Packet-Based Paradigm For
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 9. Acknowledgments



   This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.



Authors' Addresses

   Liang Xia
   Huawei
   Email: Frank.xialiang@huawei.com

   DaCheng Zhang
   Alibaba
   Email: Dacheng.zdc@alibaba-inc.com

   Nicolas BOUTHORS
   Qosmos
   Email: Nicolas.BOUTHORS@qosmos.com



























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