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IPSecME Working Group                                          A. Yamaya
Internet-Draft                                 Furukawa Network Solution
Intended Status: Informational                                   T. Ohya
Expires: March 27, 2016                                              NTT
                                                             T. Yamagata
                                                                    KDDI
                                                           S. Matsushima
                                                        Softbank Telecom
                                                      September 24, 2015




       Simple VPN solution using Multi-point Security Association
                      draft-yamaya-ipsecme-mpsa-06


Abstract


   This document describes the over-lay network solution by utilizing
   dynamically established IPsec multi-point Security Association (SA)
   without individual connection.

   Multi-point SA technology provides the simplified mechanism of the
   Auto Discovery and Configuration function.  This is applicable for
   any IPsec tunnels such as IPv4 over IPv4, IPv4 over IPv6, IPv6 over
   IPv4 and IPv6 over IPv6.


Status of this Memo


   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.


   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.










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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 27, 2016.


Copyright and License Notice


   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.


   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


























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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  Conventions Used in This Document  . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Procedure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.1.  Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  Extended format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.2.1.  Vendor ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.2.2.  MPSA_PUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.3.  Multi-point SA Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       3.3.1.  Controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       3.3.2.  CPE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       3.3.3.  Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     3.4.  Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   4. Peer discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.1 example of MPSA with BGP for route based VPN . . . . . . . . 16
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     5.1. Protected by MPSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     5.2 Security issues not to be solved by MPSA . . . . . . . . . . 17
       5.2.1 Attack from outside of the group . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       5.2.2 Attack from inside of the group  . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     5.3 Forward secrecy and backward secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   6.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     6.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     6.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18






















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1.  Introduction


   As described in the problem statement document [ad-vpn-problem],
   dynamic, secure and scalable system for establishing SAs is needed.


   With multi-point SA, an endpoint automatically discovers other
   endpoint. In this draft, an endpoint means an inexpensive CPE, which
   can hardly establish large number of IPsec sessions simultaneously.
   The CPEs also share a multi-point SA within the same group, and there
   is no individual connection between them.


   Scalability issue becomes serious in the service, such as triple play
   which requires large number of sessions at the same time. MPSA
   enables large scale simultaneous sessions even with inexpensive CPEs,
   and can avoid scalability issue.


   The latency between CPEs can be minimized because of stateless shared
   multipoint SA, MPSA is suitable for video and voice services which is
   very sensitive to latency.


   It can avoid the exhaustive configuration for CPEs and controllers.
   No reconfiguration is needed when a new CPE is added, removed, or
   changed. It can avoid high load on the controllers.


1.1.  Terminology


   Multi-point SA - This is similar to Dynamic Full Mesh topology
   described in [ad-vpn-problem]; direct connections exist in a hub and
   spoke manner, but only one SA for data transfer is shared with all
   CPEs.


1.2.  Conventions Used in This Document


   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].






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2.  Motivation


   There are two major topologies - Star topology and full-mesh topology
   - to communicate securely on over-lay network by using IPsec.

   Figure.1 shows star topology. The number of IPsec connection is the
   same as the number of CPEs (CPE). Authentication, Authorization and
   Accounting (AAA) of each CPE can be achieved on the gateway.

   The problem of the star topology is all the traffic go through the
   gateway, then it causes high load and latency.


            +---------------------------------------------+
            |                IPsec Gateway                |
            |                                             |
            |    +--------------(A<->C)--------------+    |
            |    | +---(A<->B)---+   +---(B<->C)---+ |    |
            +---:|-|:-----------:|---|:-----------:|-|:---+
                :| |:           :|   |:           :| |:
                :| |:           :|   |:           :| |:
                :| |:           :|   |:           :| |:
            +---:v-v:---+       :|   |:       +---:v-v:---+
            |           |       :|   |:       |           |
            |   CPE_A   |       :|   |:       |   CPE_C   |
            |           |       :|   |:       |           |
            +-----------+    +--:v---v:--+    +-----------+
                             |           |
                             |   CPE_B   |
                             |           |
                             +-----------+


                                Figure 1


   Figure.2 shows Full-mesh topology. There is no gateways. Each CPE
   establishes IPsec connection independently. The latency on this
   topology is relatively low compared to star topology.


   In large system, there are huge number ((N^2-N)/2) of IPsec
   connections. AAA of each CPE is hard to manage in this topology.
   Moreover, when a CPE is added, removed or changed, reconfiguration is
   needed for all rest of the CPEs.





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            +-----------+                     +-----------+
            |           |.....................|           |
            |   CPE_A   <-------(A<->C)------->  CPE_C    |
            |           |.....................|           |
            +---: ^ :---+                     +---: ^ :---+
                : | :                             : | :
                : | :        +-----------+        : | :
                : | :........|           |........: | :
                : +-(A<->B)-->  CPE_B    <--(B<->C)-+ :
                :............|           |............:
                             +-----------+


                                Figure 2


   The solution in this document eliminates the problems listed above.
   Figure 3 shows topology of multi-point SA. Traffic between CPEs does
   not go through the controller, low latency, AAA of each CPE can be
   achieved, the number of IPsec connection is almost same as star
   topology, and no reconfiguration is needed for all the rest of CPEs
   even when a CPE is added, removed or changed. MPSA controller do not
   necessarily need to be router. It is possible to change MPSA
   controller for a software, because a communication load which spans
   IPsec Gateway by multi-point SA is not big.

          +---------------------------------------------+
          |                MPSA Controller              |
          |                                             |
          +---: | :------------: | :------------: | :---+
              : | :            : | :            : | :
              : | :            : | :            : | :
             ----------------------------------------- SA to distribute
              : | :            : | :            : | :  Multi-point SA
              : | :            : | :            : | :
          +---: v :---+    +---: v :---+    +---: v :---+
          |           |    |           |    |           |
          |   CPE_A   |    |   CPE_B   |    |   CPE_C   |
          |           |    |           |    |           |
          +--- ^ ^ ---+    +--- ^ ^ ---+    +--- ^ ^ ---+
          .....| |..............| |..............| |.....
               | |              | |              | |     \
               | +----(A<->B)---+ +---(B<->C)----+ |   Multi-point SA
               +--------------(A<->C)--------------+   for data transfer
          .............................................../


                                Figure 3



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3.  Procedure


3.1.  Sequence


      The multi-point SA capability of the remote host is determined by
      an exchange of Vendor ID payloads. In the IKE_SA_INIT exchange,
      the Vendor ID payload for this specification is sent if the multi-
      point SA is used.


             CPE                       Controller
            -----------               -----------
             HDR, SAi1, KEi,
                Ni, V(MPSA)  -->
                                  <--  HDR, SAr1, KEr,
                                          Nr, [CERTREQ,] V(MPSA)


                                          MPSA: multi-point SA


      The initial exchange (including IKE_AUTH) is same as [IKEV2],
      other than Vendor ID payload included in IKE_SA_INIT.


      After the initial exchange has finished successfully, a new
      INFORMATIONAL exchange is used to distribute multi-point SA to the
      CPE, with the Notify payload of MPSA_PUT that includes
      cryptographic algorithm, nonce, keying material, SPI and so on.
      Keys for multi-point SA is generated according to the contents of
      the Notify payload by the CPE. The response of the Notify payload
      has empty Encrypted payload.





             CPE                       Controller
            -----------               -----------
                                  <--  HDR, SK {N(MPSA_PUT)}
             HDR, SK {}  -->








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3.2.  Extended format


3.2.1.  Vendor ID


      This document defines a new Vendor ID. The content of the payload
      is described below.


         "multi-point SA"


3.2.2.  MPSA_PUT


      This document defines a new Notify Message Type MPSA_PUT. The
      Notify Message Type of MPSA_PUT is 40960. Notification Data of
      MPSA_PUT has a Proposal-substructure-like format. It consists of
      Transform-substructure-like structures that have following data.


         Description                     Trans.  Reference
                                         Type
         -------------------------------------------------------
         Encryption Algorithm (ENCR)     1       RFC5996
         Pseudorandom Function (PRF)     2       RFC5996
         Integrity Algorithm (INTEG)     3       RFC5996
         Nonce (NONCE)                   241
         SK_d (SKD)                      242
         Lifetime (LIFE)                 243
         Rollover time 1 (ROLL1)         244
         Rollover time 2 (ROLL2)         245


   o  Nonce - For Transform Type 241, the Transform ID is 1. The
      attribute contains actual nonce value with attribute type 16384.
      The size of the Nonce Data is between 16 and 256 octets.

      Name                 Number
      ---------------------------------------------------
      NONCE_NONCE          1


      Attribute Type       Value         Attribute Format
      ------------------------------------------------------------
      Nonce Value          16384         TLV




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   o  SK_d - For Transform Type 242, the Transform ID is 1. The
      attribute contains actual SK_d value with attribute type 16385.
      The length of SK_d Data is the preferred key length of the PRF.


      Name                 Number
      ---------------------------------------------------
      SKD_SK_D             1


      Attribute Type       Value         Attribute Format
      ------------------------------------------------------------
      SK_d Value           16385         TLV


   o Lifetime - For For Transform Type 243, the Transform ID is 1. The
      attribute contains actual lifetime value with attribute type
      16386. The length of Lifetime Value is 4 octets. Lifetime is
      stored in seconds as effective time of the multi-point SA.


      Name                 Number
      ---------------------------------------------------
      LIFE_LIFETIME        1


      Attribute Type       Value         Attribute Format
      ------------------------------------------------------------
      Lifetime Value       16386         TLV


   o  Rollover time 1 - For Transform Type 244, the Transform ID is 1.
      The attribute contains actual rollover time 1 value with attribute
      type 16387. The length of Rollover time 1 Value is 4 octets.
      Rollover time 1 defines activation time delay for new outbound
      multi-point SA.


      Name                 Number
      ---------------------------------------------------
      ROLL1_ROLLOVER1      1


      Attribute Type       Value         Attribute Format
      ------------------------------------------------------------
      Rollover1 Value      16387         TLV





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   o  Rollover time 2 - For Transform Type 245, the Transform ID is 1.
      The attribute contains actual rollover time 2 value with attribute
      type 16388. The length of Rollover time 2 Value is 4 octets.
      Rollover time 2 defines deactivation time delay for old inbound
      multi-point SA.


      Name                 Number
      ---------------------------------------------------
      ROLL2_ROLLOVER2      1


      Attribute Type       Value         Attribute Format
      ------------------------------------------------------------
      Rollover2 Value      16388         TLV


   Therefore, the format of the MPSA_PUT of the Notify Message is
   described below.
































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       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |  Protocol ID  |   SPI Size    |      Notify Message Type      |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                Security Parameter Index (SPI)                 |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | 0 (last) or 2 |   RESERVED    |         Proposal Length       |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | Proposal Num  |  Protocol ID  |    SPI Size   |Num  Transforms|
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                Security Parameter Index (SPI)                 |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | 0 (last) or 3 |   RESERVED    |        Transform Length       |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |Transform Type |   RESERVED    |          Transform ID         |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               |
      ~                      Transform Attributes                     ~
      |                                                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | 0 (last) or 3 |   RESERVED    |        Transform Length       |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |Transform Type |   RESERVED    |          Transform ID         |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               |
      ~                      Transform Attributes                     ~
      |                                                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


      ~                                                               ~


      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |       0       |   RESERVED    |        Transform Length       |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |Transform Type |   RESERVED    |          Transform ID         |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               |
      ~                      Transform Attributes                     ~
      |                                                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+






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   The following example shows a N(MPSA_PUT) notification message. The
   SPIs in the Proposal-like and Tranform-like substructure are the same
   value. Following values are defined by the example.


      Protocol: ESP
      ENCR:     AES-CBC (256bits)
      PRF:      SHA-1
      INTEG:    HAMC-SHA-1-96
      NONCE:    241
      SKD:      242
      LIFE:     243
      ROLL1:    244
      ROLL2:    245




        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /|     0 (last)  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
     / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Notify |    3 (ESP)    | SPI Size = 4  |           MPSA_PUT            |
     \ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      \|                Security Parameter Index (SPI)                 |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /|    0 (last)   |   RESERVED    |         Proposal Length       |
Pro-   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 posal-| Prop Num = 1  |    3 (ESP)    | SPI Size = 4  |Num  Transforms|
  like +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      \|                Security Parameter Index (SPI)                 |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /|       3       |   RESERVED    |        Transform Length       |
     / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  ENCR |   1 (ENCR)    |   RESERVED    |      12 (ENCR_AES_CBC)        |
     \ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      \|1|       14 (Key Length)       |            256                |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /|       3       |   RESERVED    |        Transform Length       |
   PRF +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      \|    2 (PRF)    |   RESERVED    |      2 (PRF_HMAC_SHA1)        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /|       3       |   RESERVED    |        Transform Length       |
 INTEG +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      \|   3 (INTEG)   |   RESERVED    |    2 (AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96)      |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /|       3       |   RESERVED    |        Transform Length       |



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     / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    /  |   241 (NONCE) |   RESERVED    |              1                |
   /   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 NONCE |0|       16384 (Nonce)         |       Attribute Length        |
   \   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    \  |                                                               |
     \ ~                            [Nonce]                            ~
      \|                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /|       3       |   RESERVED    |        Transform Length       |
     / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    /  |   242 (SKD)   |   RESERVED    |              1                |
   /   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 SKD   |0|       16385 (SK_d)          |       Attribute Length        |
   \   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    \  |                                                               |
     \ ~                            [SK_d]                             ~
      \|                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /|       3       |   RESERVED    |        Transform Length       |
     / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    /  |  243 (LIFE)   |   RESERVED    |              1                |
  LIFE +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    \  |0|       16386 (Lifetime)      |     Attribute Length = 4      |
     \ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      \|                          [Lifetime]                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /|       3       |   RESERVED    |        Transform Length       |
     / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    /  |  244 (ROLL1)  |   RESERVED    |              1                |
 ROLL1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    \  |0|       16386 (Lifetime)      |     Attribute Length = 4      |
     \ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      \|                       [RolloverTime1]                         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /|       3       |   RESERVED    |        Transform Length       |
     / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    /  |  245 (ROLL2)  |   RESERVED    |              1                |
 ROLL2 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    \  |0|       16386 (Lifetime)      |     Attribute Length = 4      |
     \ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      \|                       [RolloverTime2]                         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+








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3.3.  Multi-point SA Management


3.3.1.  Controller


   Controller generates a multi-point SA for a group before connecting
   to any CPEs.


   After the initial exchanges have finished, controller distributes the
   same multi-point SA information to CPEs within the group by sending
   N(MPSA_PUT).


   SPI and Nonce is generated similar way of [IKEv2]. SK_d is generated
   from random numbers similar to Nonce.


   The same SPI value is stored to Notify payload and Proposal-like
   substructure.


   The multi-point SA will not be negotiated between controller and CPE,
   but will be notified from controller to CPE one way.


   Controller initiates rekey before Lifetime expiration. As the
   Lifetime, controller notifies the effective time left of the multi-
   point SA.


3.3.2.  CPE


   After the initial exchange has finished, CPE obtains multi-point SA
   information by receiving N(MPSA_PUT) from controller. The keys for
   the multi-point SA are generated in the same procedure described in
   [IKEv2], except Ni | Nr is replaced by Nonce.


   Therefore, KEYMAT is derived by PRF listed below.


     KEYMAT = prf+(SK_d, Nonce)


   The multi-point SA is protected in a cryptographic manner by ENCR and



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   INTEG which uses the generated keys.


   The SPI value for the multi-point SA is the same of its in Notify
   message.


   CPE uses the same multi-point SA as both inbound and outbound SAs.


   CPE deletes both of inbound and outbound SA when Lifetime is
   expired.


   Rollover time 1, 2 have no meaning when no old multi-point SA exists.


3.3.3.  Rekeying


   Rekeying should be finished before Lifetime expiration of current
   multi-point SA. Rekeying of multi-point SA will be performed as
   follows.


    - Controller generates a new multi-point SA
    - Controller distributes a new multi-point SA to all CPEs within the
      group
    - CPE replaces the current multi-point SA to new one


   CPE replaces multi-point SA using rollover method like [GDOI].


3.4.  Forwarding


   Each CPE sends and receives encapsulated packets using the multi-
   point SA.


   The destination address of encapsulated packet will be determined
   with routing information, which can achieved  by static configuration
   or route exchange mechanism such as BGP on encapsulated environment
   described in [MESH].


   It is applicable for any IPsec tunnels such as IPv4 over IPv4, IPv4



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   over IPv6, IPv6 over IPv4 and IPv6 over IPv6.


4. Peer discovery

   MPSA does not provide peer discovery function by itself. However,
   other mechanism, such as BGP, can be employed with MPSA for automatic
   peer discovery. One example is a use of BGP, described in [MESH], to
   learn peer information as next-hops.


4.1 example of MPSA with BGP for route based VPN

   Between controller and each peer, IKE_SA and CHILD_SA are established
   by IKEv2. On the IKE_SA, an MPSA management message (MPSA_PUT) is
   served from the controller to the peer.

   On the CHILD_SA, the controller and the peer establish a iBGP session
   to exchange route information (NLRIs). Controller can act as a BGP
   route reflector (RR), which can reflect NLRIs among all iBGP peers of
   the controller. In other words, the peer can learn all NLRIs
   advertised by all other peers.

   According to [ENCAPS], each peer can advertise ESP peer address as
   well as conventional NLRIs, all of those can be reflected by RR on
   the controller.

   At this point, each peer can have all other peer addresses as well as
   route information. The peer can decide a peer address by mean of
   recursive route lookup from the destination address of a packet to be
   forwarded. This decision can be made by the peer itself, without any
   additional communication with the controller.

   Instead of [ENCAPS], each peer can also do it by [RNH]. Each peer
   learns all other peer addresses by BGP Remote-Next-Hop attributes and
   decides a peer address from a packet to be forwarded, as same as
   using [ENCAPS].

5.  Security Considerations

   MPSA uses IKEv2 to protect MPSA management message, MPSA_PUT. Thus,
   CPEs are authenticated by IKEv2. Using a shared SA for communication
   between CPEs, MPSA does not provide the following features.
   - Data origin authentication
   - Anti-replay protection

   MPSA itself does not provide access control for user datagrams, but
   peer discovery may be able to provide access control as well as those



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   of route based VPN. For example, using BGP for peer discovery
   described in 4.1, access control could be provided by filtering
   exchanged routes at the controller. In this case, filtering by source
   address, protocol and ports can not be achieved. If you need it, you
   could do by other security policy rules as local setting at CPEs .


5.1. Protected by MPSA

   - Authenticating CPEs and controller Authentication is provided by
   IKEv2 with pre-shared key or RSA signature. MPSA management messages
   are exchanged after IKEv2 negotiation.

   - Confidentiality and integrity Packets are encapsulated by ESP, so
   that MPSA provides confidentiality and integrity against outside of
   the group, but does not them against members of the group


5.2 Security issues not to be solved by MPSA

5.2.1 Attack from outside of the group

   - Anti-replay protection
   MPSA does not provide anti-replay protection, because sequence number
   synchronization between peers needs additional mechanism. Using a
   closed network as a transport might be effective to mitigate this
   kind of attacks.

   - Leaking a IKE_SA key
   If an attacker could sniff packets on a IKE_SA, and key of the SA
   were leaked, the attacker may get a key of MPSA by decoding a sniffed
   MPSA_PUT message.


5.2.2 Attack from inside of the group

   If there is a malicious CPE or a CPE is hijacked by an attacker, MPSA
   can be attacked in the following way because MPSA, including
   cryptograghic key, is shared by all CPEs.

   - An attacker can impersonate another CPE. A closed network that
   prohibits source address spoofing could mitigate the impersonating.

   - An attacker can decode packets between the other CPEs if the
   attacker could sniff packets.


5.3 Forward secrecy and backward secrecy



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   MPSA MAY be rekeyed when a CPE is removed from the group, for the
   removed CPE not to access the other CPEs communication after that, or
   when a CPE is added from the group, for it not to do before that. If
   not rekeyed, a removed/added CPE could access


5.  IANA Considerations


   This memo includes no request to IANA.


6.  References


6.1.  Normative References


   [IKEv2] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, "Internet
              Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 5996,
              September 2010.
6.2.  Informative References

   [GDOI] Weis, B., Rowles, S., and T. Hardjono, "The Group Domain of
              Interpretation", RFC 6407, October 2011.

   [MESH] Wu, J., Cui, Y., Metz, C., and E. Rosen, "Softwire Mesh
              Framework", RFC 5565, June 2009.

   [ad-vpn-problem] Manral, V. and S. Hanna, "Auto-Discovery VPN Problem
              Statement and Requirements", RFC 7018, September 2013.

   [RNH] Van de Velde, G., Patel, K., Rao, D., Raszuk, R., and Bush, R.,
              "BGP Remote-Next-Hop", draft-vandevelde-idr-remote-next-
              hop-07, June 2014

   [ENCAPS] L. Berger, R. White and E. Rosen, "BGP IPsec Tunnel
              Encapsulation Attribute", RFC 5566, June 2009.







Authors' Addresses

   Arifumi Yamaya



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   Furukawa Network Solution Corp.
   5-1-9, Higashi-Yawata, Hiratsuka
   Kanagawa 254-0016, JAPAN
   Email: yamaya@fnsc.co.jp


   Takafumi Ohya
   NTT Corporation
   Nishi-shinjuku, Shinjuku-ku,
   Tokyo 163-8019, JAPAN
   Email: takafumi.ooya@hco.ntt.co.jp


   Tomohiro Yamagata
   KDDI Corporation
   Garden Air Tower
   Iidabashi, Chiyoda-ku,
   Tokyo 102-8460, JAPAN
   Email: to-yamagata@kddi.com


   Satoru Matsushima
   Softbank Telecom Corp.
   1-9-1, Higashi-Shimbashi, Minato-Ku
   Tokyo 105-7322, JAPAN
   Email: satoru.matsushima@g.softbank.co.jp

























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