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NETWORK WORKING GROUP L. Zhu
Internet-Draft A. Medvinsky
Intended status: Standards Track Microsoft Corporation
Expires: January 10, 2008 J. Altman
Secure Endpoints
July 9, 2007
Public Key Cryptography Based User-to-User Authentication - (PKU2U)
draft-zhu-pku2u-02
Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 10, 2008.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract
This document defines the public key cryptography based user-to-user
authentication protocol - PKU2U. This mechanism provides security
services in peer to peer networking environments without requiring a
trusted third party. Furthermore, the binding of PKU2U for the
Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) per
RFC2743 is defined based on RFC4121.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The PKU2U Realm Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. PKU2U Kerberos Principal Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. The Protocol Description and the Context Establishment
Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. The GSS-API Binding for PKU2U . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Guidelines for Credentials Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 11
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1. Introduction
Peer-to-peer systems are increasingly popular today. In a peer-to-
peer system, all clients provide resources that contribute positively
to the total capacity of the overall system and there is no single
point of failure. This distributed nature makes such systems highly
scalable and robust.
A true peer-to-peer system is self-organized, typically there is no
trusted third party in such environments. Consequently the Kerberos
protocol as defined in [RFC4120] and [RFC4556] is inadequate to
provide security services. Currently there is no interoperable GSS-
API mechanism for establishing trust in the information received from
the peer. The inability to authenticate the messages exchanged among
peers enables many attacks such as poisoning (e.g. providing data
contents are different from the description) and polluting (e.g.
inserting "bad" packets).
To remedy this, the PKU2U protocol extends [RFC4120] and [RFC4556] to
support peer-to-peer authentication without the help of a Key
Distribution Center (KDC) [RFC4120]. In addition, the binding of
PKU2U for GSS-API is defined based on [RFC4121].
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
In this document, the GSS-API initiator or acceptor is referred to as
the peer when the description is applicable to both the initiator and
the acceptor.
3. The PKU2U Realm Name
The PKU2U realm name is defined as a reserved Kerberos realm name per
[KRB-NAME], and it has the value of "RESERVED:PKU2U".
Unless otherwise specified, the realm name in any Kerberos message
used by PKU2U is the PKU2U realm name.
4. PKU2U Kerberos Principal Names
If the X.509 certificate [RFC3280] of a peer contains an id-pkinit-
san Subject Alternative Name (SAN) as defined in Section 3.2.2 of
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[RFC4556] or an id-ms-sc-logon-upn SAN as defined in [REFERALS], then
the Kerberos Principal Name for the peer is as specified in that SAN
in the certificate.
If the acceptor's X.509 certificate contains a dNSName SAN [RFC3280],
the acceptor's Kerberos principal name is a two-components NT-SRV-HST
type name as defined in Section 6.2.1 of [RFC4120], with the first
component as "host" and the second component as the name in the
dNSName SAN of the certificate.
Otherwise unless otherwise specified, the peer's Kerberos principal
name is of the NT-X500-PRINCIPAL type [RFC4120], and the name-string
field [RFC4120] contains a single component whose value is a string
representation of the peer's Distinguished Name [X500] encoded
according to [RFC2253]. The Distinguished Name contained in the
PKU2U Kerberos principal name MUST begin with the most specific
attribute and continue with progressively broader attrbiutes.
5. The Protocol Description and the Context Establishment Tokens
The PKU2U protocol is based on [RFC4120], and it can only be used in
conjunction with GSS-API.
This section describes how PKU2U works and how it differs from
[RFC4120].
If initially the initiator has a service ticket to the acceptor, the
initiator, acting as the client in the parlance of [RFC4120],
performs the client-server authentication exchange according to
[RFC4121] and Section 3.2 of [RFC4120], with the acceptor acting as
the server.
When the initiator does not have a service ticket to the acceptor, it
requests a ticket from the acceptor instead of the KDC by
constructing a KRB_AS_REQ message, where the acceptor is identified
as the server and the initiator is identified as the client,
according to Section 3.1.1 of [RFC4120]. The initiator always
includes the PA_PK_AS_REQ pre-authentication data computed according
to Section 3.2.1 of [RFC4556]. In a modification to [RFC4120], the
KRB_AS_REQ message is not sent directly to the acceptor, but instead
returned within the output GSS-API token. GSS_Init_sec_context()
returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status [RFC2743] indicating at least
one more token is needed in order to establish the context, and the
KRB_AS_REQ message is returned as the innerContextToken defined in
Section 3.1 of [RFC2743], in the output token.
This output token that contains the KRB_AS_REQ message is then passed
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to GSS_Accept_security_context() as the input token in accordance
with GSS-API. The acceptor processes the KRB_AS_REQ request
according to Section 3.1.2 of [RFC4120]. The acceptor MUST verify
that the server name in the request is that of the acceptor itself.
The acceptor validates the pre-authentication data in the request
according to Section 3.2.2 of [RFC4556]. The acceptor MUST verify
the binding between the initiator's name and the initiator's public
key. The initiator's X.509 certificate MUST contain the id-pkinit-
KPClientAuth [RFC4556] Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension or the id-
kp-clientAuth EKU [RFC3280].
If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message will result in
the creation of a ticket for the initiator to present to the acceptor
and the response is a KRB_AS_REP message generated according to
Section 3.1.3 of [RFC4120].
If an error occurs, however, the response is a KRB_ERROR message
generated according to Section 3.1.4 of [RFC4120].
In all cases, GSS_Accept_security_context() returns
GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status [RFC2743] and the output token is a
KRB_AS_REP message if a ticket was created or a KRB_ERROR message if
there was an error while processing the request or the local policy
prevented a ticket from being issued. The reply token is then passed
to the initiator as the input token to GSS_Init_sec_context().
The initiator then processes the reply token according to Section
3.1.5 of [RFC4120] if a ticket has been returned. Upon receipt of
the KRB_AS_REP message, the initiator MUST validate the PA_PK_AS_REP
pre-authentication data in the reply according to Section 3.2.4 of
[RFC4556]. The inclusion of the EKU KeyPurposeId [RFC3280] id-
pkinit-KPKdc in the X.509 certificate in the response is not
applicable when PKU2U is used because there is no KDC involved in
this protocol. The initiator MUST verify the binding between the
acceptor's name and the acceptor's public key.
PKU2U derivates from [RFC4556] and allows the use of self-signed
certificates given the binding between the named principal and the
public key can be verified and cannot be spoofed.
The GSS-API acceptor is identified using the targ_name parameter
[RFC2743] of the GSS_Init_sec_context() call, the initiator MUST
verify the binding between the targ_name and the acceptor in order to
provide authentication of the acceptor. In addition, the acceptor's
X.509 certificate MUST contain the id-kp-clientAuth EKU [RFC3280] or
id-kp-serverAuth EKU [RFC3280] or the id-pkinit-KPClientAuth EKU
[RFC4556].
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If an error message was returned, the initiator processes the
response according to Section 3.1.6 of [RFC4120].
With the obtained ticket, the initiator then, acting as the client in
the parlance of [RFC4120], performs the client-server authentication
exchange according to [RFC4121] and Section 3.2 of [RFC4120], with
the acceptor acting as the server.
To recapitulate, the acceptor and the initiator communicate by
tunneling the authentication service exchange messages through the
use of the GSS-API tokens and application traffic. The reliable
delivery of the authentication service exchange messages at the GSS-
API token level is mandatory. In the event of message loss, message
duplication, or out of order message delivery, the security context
MUST fail to establish.
The syntax of the initial context establishment token follows the
initialContextToken syntax defined in Section 3.1 of [RFC2743].
PKU2U is identified by the Objection Identifier (OID) id-kerberos-
pku2u.
id-kerberos-pku2u ::=
{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
pku2u(7) }
Subsequent context establishment tokens MUST NOT be encapsulated in
this GSS-API generic token framing.
The innerToken described in section 3.1 of [RFC2743] and subsequent
GSS-API mechanism tokens have the following formats: it starts with a
two-octet token-identifier (TOK_ID), followed by a Kerberos message.
The TOK_ID values for the KRB_AS_REQ message and the KRB_AS_REP
message [RFC4120] are defined in the table blow:
Token TOK_ID Value in Hex
-----------------------------------------
KRB_AS_REQ 01 01
KRB_AS_REP 02 02
The TOK_ID values for all other Kerberos messages are the same as
defined in [RFC4121].
By using anonymous PKINIT [KRB-ANON], PKU2U can provide server-
authentication without revealing the client's identity, thus provide
functional equivalency of Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC4346].
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6. The GSS-API Binding for PKU2U
Section 5 defines the context establishment tokens. PKU2U per-
message tokens are defined as the per-message tokens in [RFC4121].
The Kerberos principal name form and the host-based service Name
described in [RFC1964] MUST be supported by implementations
conforming to this specification.
When the Kerberos principal name type is NT-X500-PRINCIPAL [RFC4120],
the name-string field contains a single component that is a string
representation of a Distinguished Name [X500]. The single string
representation of an NT-X500-PRINCIPAL Kerberos principal name is
computed as follows: the Kerberos principal name is first converted
to a single string according to Section 2.1.1 of [RFC1964] and then
enclosed in a pair of open and close angle brackets. For example,
the following string is a single-string representation of a user:
<CN=Larry, O=Microsoft, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US>
For implementations comforming to this specification, both the
authenticator subkey and the GSS_EXTS_IAKERB_FINISHED extension as
defined in Section 3 of [IAKERB] MUST be present in the AP-REQ
authenticator. The checksum in the GSS_EXTS_IAKERB_FINISHED
extension provides integrity protection for the messages exchanged
between the initiator and the acceptor in the process of establishing
the context.
7. Guidelines for Credentials Selection
If a peer, either the initiator or the acceptor, has multiple pairs
of public-key private keys, a choice is to be made in choosing the
best fit. The trustedCertifiers field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ structure
[RFC4556] SHOULD be filled by the initiator, to provide hints for
guiding the selection of an appropriate certificate chain by the
acceptor. If the initiator's X.509 certificate cannot be validated
according to [RFC3280], the acceptor SHOULD send back the TD-TRUSTED-
CERTIFIERS structure [RFC4556] that provides hints for guiding the
selection of an appropriate certificate by the initiator.
It is RECOMMENDED that implementations of this protocol expose
sufficient information based on the hints described above to the
users and allow the certificates to be selected interactively.
If the certificates cannot be selected interactively, and multiple
certificates can be used, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations fail
the context establishment thus avoid confusions caused by an
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unexpected programmatic selection.
8. Security Considerations
The security considerations in [RFC4556] apply here. It is crucial
that both the initiator and the acceptor MUST be able to verify the
binding between the signing key and the associated identity.
Any of the attributes defined in the directory schema may be used to
make up a Distinguished Name. The order of the component attribute
value pairs is important. PKU2U requires that the most specific
attribute comes first in the Distinguished name. The security
considerations in Section 7 of [RFC2253] apply.
9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Jeffery Hutzelman for his insightful
comments on the earlier revisions of this document.
10. IANA Considerations
Section 3 defines the PKU2U realm. The IANA registry for the
reserved names should be updated to reference this document.
11. Normative References
[IAKERB] Zhu, L., "Initial and Pass Through Authentication Using
Kerberos V5 and the GSS-API", draft-zhu-ws-kerb-03.txt
(work in progress), 2007.
[KRB-ANON]
Zhu, L. and P. Leach, "Kerberos Anonymity Support",
draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon-04.txt (work in progress), 2007.
[KRB-NAME] L. Zhu, "Additional Kerberos Naming Constraints",
draft-ietf-krb-wg-naming, work in progress.
[REFERALS] Raeburn, K. and L. Zhu, "Generating KDC Referrals to
Locate Kerberos Realms,
draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals, work in progress.
[RFC1964] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism",
RFC 1964, June 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2253] Wahl, M., Kille, S., and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (v3): UTF-8 String Representation of
Distinguished Names", RFC 2253, December 1997.
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[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
July 2005.
[RFC4121] Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121,
July 2005.
[RFC4178] Zhu, L., Leach, P., Jaganathan, K., and W. Ingersoll, "The
Simple and Protected Generic Security Service Application
Program Interface (GSS-API) Negotiation Mechanism",
RFC 4178, October 2005.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[RFC4556] Zhu, L. and B. Tung, "Public Key Cryptography for Initial
Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)", RFC 4556, June 2006.
[X500] The Directory -- overview of concepts, models and services.
ITU-T Rec. X.500, 1993.
Authors' Addresses
Larry Zhu
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
Email: lzhu@microsoft.com
Ari Medvinsky
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
Email: arimed@microsoft.com
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Jeffery Altman
Secure Endpoints
255 W 94th St
New York, NY 10025
US
Email: jaltman@secure-endpoints.com
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