Network Working Group M. Vucinic
Internet-Draft Inria
Intended status: Informational G. Selander
Expires: June 11, 2020 J. Mattsson
Ericsson AB
D. Garcia
Odin Solutions S.L.
December 09, 2019

Requirements for a Lightweight AKE for OSCORE


This document compiles the requirements for a lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol for OSCORE.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

OSCORE [RFC8613] is a lightweight communication security protocol providing end-to-end security on application layer for constrained IoT settings (cf. [RFC7228]). OSCORE lacks a matching authenticated key exchange protocol (AKE). The intention with LAKE is to create a simple yet secure AKE for implementation in embedded devices supporting OSCORE.

To ensure that the AKE is efficient for the expected applications of OSCORE, we list the relevant public specifications of technologies where OSCORE is included:

Other industry fora which plan to use OSCORE:

This document compiles the requirements for the AKE for OSCORE. It summarizes the security requirements that are expected from such an AKE, as well as the main characteristics of the environments where the solution is envisioned to be deployed. The solution will presumably be useful in other scenarios as well since a low security overhead improves the overall performance.

2. Problem description

2.1. AKE for OSCORE

The rationale for designing this protocol is that OSCORE is lacking a matching AKE. OSCORE was designed for lightweight RESTful operations for example by minimizing the overhead, and applying the protection to the application layer, thereby limiting the data being encrypted and integrity protected for the other endpoint. Moreover, OSCORE was tailored for use with lightweight primitives that are likely to be implemented in the device, specifically CoAP, CBOR and COSE. The same properties must apply to the AKE.

In order to be suitable for OSCORE, at the end of the AKE protocol run the two parties must agree on (see Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]):

COSE provides the crypto primitives for OSCORE, and shall therefore be used also by the AKE, for several reasons including maintenance of crypto library. COSE provides identification of credentials and algorithms for OSCORE and the AKE, and an extension point for new schemes.

Moreover, the AKE must support transport over CoAP. Since the AKE messages most commonly will be encapsulated in CoAP, the AKE must not duplicate functionality provided by CoAP, or at least not duplicate functionality in such a way that it adds extra costs in terms of code size, code maintenance, etc. It is therefore assumed that the AKE is being transported in a protocol that provides reliable transport, that can preserve packet ordering and handle message duplication, that can perform fragmentation and protect against denial of service attacks, such as provided by the CoAP Echo option [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag].

The AKE may use other transport than CoAP. In this case the underlying layers must correspondingly handle message loss, reordering, message duplication, fragmentation, and denial of service protection.

2.2. Credentials

IoT deployments differ in terms of what credentials can be supported. Currently many systems use pre-shared keys (PSKs) provisioned out of band, for various reasons. PSKs are often used in a first deployment because of their perceived simplicity. The use of PSKs allows for protection of communication without major additional security processing, and also enables the use of symmetric crypto algorithms only, reducing the implementation and computational effort in the endpoints.

However, PSK-based provisioning has inherent weaknesses. There has been reports of massive breaches of PSK provisioning systems, and as many systems use PSKs without perfect forward secrecy (PFS) they are vulnerable to passive pervasive monitoring. The security of these systems can be improved by adding PFS through an AKE authenticated by the provisioned PSK.

Shared keys can alternatively be established in the endpoints using an AKE protocol authenticated with asymmetric public keys instead of symmetric secret keys. Raw public keys (RPK) can be provisioned with the same scheme as PSKs, which allows for a more relaxed trust model since RPKs need not be secret. The corresponding private keys are assumed to be provisioned to the party being authenticated beforehand (e.g. in factory or generated on-board).

As a third option, by using a public key infrastructure and running an asymmetric key AKE with public key certificates instead of RPKs, key provisioning can be omitted, leading to a more automated (“zero-touch”) bootstrapping procedure. The root CA keys are assumed to be provisioned beforehand.

These steps provide an example of a migration path in limited scoped steps from simple to more robust security bootstrapping and provisioning schemes where each step improves the overall security and/or simplicity of deployment of the IoT system, although not all steps are necessarily feasible for the most constrained settings.

In order to allow for these different schemes, the AKE must support PSK- (shared between two nodes), RPK- and certificate-based authentication of the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange.

Bandwidth is a scarce resource in constrained-node networks. The use of static DH public keys instead of signature public keys is a significant optimization and shall be supported.

To further minimize the bandwidth consumption it is required to support transporting the certificates by reference rather than by value. Considering the wide variety of deployments the AKE must support different schemes for transporting and identifying credentials, including those identified in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-cose-x509].

The common lack of a user interface in constrained devices leads to various credential provisioning schemes. The use of RPKs may be appropriate for the authentication of the AKE initiator but not for the AKE responder. The AKE must support different credentials for authentication in different directions of the AKE run, e.g. certificate-based authentication for the initiating endpoint and RPK-based authentication for the responding endpoint.

Assuming that both signature public keys and static DH public keys are in use, then also the case of mixed credentials need to be supported with one endpoint using a static DH public key and the other using a signature public key.

2.3. Mutual Authentication

The AKE must provide mutual authentication during the protocol run. At the end of the AKE protocol, each endpoint shall have authenticated the other.

The AKE cannot rely on messages being exchanged in both directions after the AKE has completed, because CoAP/OSCORE requests may not have a response [RFC7967]. Furthermore, there is no assumption of dependence between CoAP client/server and AKE initiator/responder roles, and an OSCORE context may be used with CoAP client and server roles interchanged as is done e.g. in [LwM2M]. Since the protocol may be initiated by different endpoints, it shall not be necessary to determine beforehand which endpoint takes the role of initiator of the AKE.

Compromise of initiator or responder long-term keys shall not enable an attacker to compromise past session keys (Perfect Forward Secrecy) and shall not enable a passive attacker to compromise future session keys. These two properties can be achieved with an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

To mitigate against bad random number generators the AKE shall mandate randomness improvements such as [I-D.irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements] and analogously for symmetric keys.

The AKE shall provide Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) resistance.

The AKE shall protect against replay attacks (injective).

The endpoints shall be able to verify that the identity of the other endpoint is an acceptable identity that it is intended to authenticate to. The AKE shall protect against identity misbinding attacks, when applicable. Note that the identity may be directly related to a public key such as for example the public key itself, a hash of the public key, or data unrelated to a key.

The AKE shall protect against reflection attacks, but need not protect against attacks when more than two parties legitimately share keys (cf. the Selfie attack on TLS 1.3) as that setting is out of scope.

2.4. Crypto Agility and Security Properties

Motivated by long deployment lifetimes, the AKE is required to support crypto agility, including modularity of COSE crypto algorithms and negotiation of preferred crypto algorithms for OSCORE and the AKE.

The AKE negotiation must be protected against downgrade attacks. [Further detailing is requested.]

2.5. Identity Protection

In general, it is necessary to transport identities as part of the AKE run in order to provide authentication of an entity not identified beforehand. In the case of constrained devices, the identity may contain sensitive information on the manufacturer of the device, the batch, default firmware version, etc. Protecting identifying information from passive and active attacks is important from a privacy point of view, but needs to be balanced with the other requirements, including security and lightweightness. For certain data we therefore need to make an exemption in order to obtain an efficient protocol.

The AKE is required to protect the identity against active attackers of one of the peers and protection against passive attackers of the other peer in the case of public key identities.

In case of a PSK identifier, this may be protected against passive attackers with a key derived from the Diffie-Hellman shared secret. The responder has first access to the shared secret but does in general not know from whom a message without PSK identifier is sent. Therefore the protection of PSK identifier in general needs to be performed by the initiator, i.e. at the earliest in message 3. As a consequence, in order to authenticate the responder within the AKE, at least four protocol messages are needed in case of symmetric key authentication with identity protection. Considering the need to keep the number of messages at a minimum (see Section 2.9.4), unless there are other good reasons for having more than 3 messages, it is not required to protect the PSK identifier, and it may thus be sent in the first message.

Other identifying information that needs to be transported in plain text is cipher suites and connection identifiers. Encrypting crypto algorithms does not allow negotiation of cipher suite within 3 messages. Encryption of connection identifiers only works in asymmetric case and does not enable arbitrarily short identifiers (see Section 2.1).

2.6. Application Data

In order to reduce round trips and number of messages, and in some cases also streamline processing, certain applications may want to transport application data within the AKE.

One example is the transport of third-party signed authorization information such as an access token or a voucher from initiator to responder or vice versa. Such a scheme could enable the party receiving the authorization information to make a decision about whether the party being authenticated is also authorized before the protocol is completed, and if not discontinue the protocol before it is complete, thereby saving time and message processing.

Another example is the embedding of certificate enrolment request or a newly issued certificate.

The AKE must support the transport of application data within the protocol messages.

It is expected that an AKE with 3 messages will provide the following protection of the application data:

Application data may contain privacy sensitive information. The application data must not violate the AKE security properties. The assumptions on the application data need to be detailed in the specification of the AKE.

2.7. Extensibility

It is desirable that the AKE supports some kind of extensibility, in particular, the ability to later include new AKE modes such as PAKE support. Note that by supporting COSE, the AKE can already support new algorithms, new certificate formats, ways to identify credentials, etc.

Since the main objective with this work is to create a simple yet secure AKE, care needs to be taken to avoid feature creep and extensions working against this.

2.8. Denial of Service

The AKE shall protect against denial of service attacks on responder and initiator to the extent that the protocol supports lightweight deployments (see Section 2.9) and without duplicating the DoS mitigation of the underlying transport (see Section 2.1).

Jamming attacks, cutting cables etc. leading to long term loss of availability may not be possible to mitigate, but an attacker temporarily injecting messages or disturbing the communication shall not have a similar impact.

2.9. Lightweight

We target an AKE which is efficiently deployable in 6TiSCH multi-hop networks, LoRaWAN networks and NB-IoT networks. The desire is to optimize the AKE to be ‘as lightweight as reasonably achievable’ in these environments, where ‘lightweight’ refers to:

These properties need to be considered in the context of the use of an existing CoAP/OSCORE stack in the targeted networks and technologies. Some properties are difficult to evaluate for a given protocol, for example, because they depend on the radio conditions or other simultaneous network traffic. Additionally, these properties are not independent. Therefore the properties listed here should be taken as input for identifying plausible protocol metrics that can be more easily measured and compared between protocols.

Per ‘bytes on the wire’, it is desirable for the AKE messages to fit into the MTU size of these protocols; and if not possible, within as few frames as possible, since using multiple MTUs can have significant costs in terms of time and power. Note that the MTU size depends on radio technology and its characteristics, including data rates, number of hops, etc. Example benchmarks are given further down in this section.

Per ‘time’, it is desirable for the AKE message exchange(s) to complete in a reasonable amount of time, both for a single uncongested exchange and when multiple exchanges are running in an interleaved fashion, like e.g. in a “network formation” setting when multiple devices connect for the first time. This latency may not be a linear function depending on congestion and the specific radio technology used. As these are relatively low data rate networks, the latency contribution due to computation is in general not expected to be dominant.

Per ‘round-trips’, it is desirable that the number of completed request/response message exchanges required before the initiating endpoint can start sending protected traffic data is as small as possible, since this reduces completion time. See Section 2.9.4 for a discussion about the tradeoff between message size and number of messages.

Per ‘power’, it is desirable for the transmission of AKE messages and crypto to draw as little power as possible. The best mechanism for doing so differs across radio technologies. For example, NB-IoT uses licensed spectrum and thus can transmit at higher power to improve coverage, making the transmitted byte count relatively more important than for other radio technologies. In other cases, the radio transmitter will be active for a full MTU frame regardless of how much of the frame is occupied by message content, which makes the byte count less sensitive for the power consumption. Increased power consumption is unavoidable in poor network conditions, such as most wide-area settings including LoRaWAN.

Per ‘new code’, it is desirable to introduce as little new code as possible onto OSCORE-enabled devices to support this new AKE. These devices have on the order of 10s of kB of memory and 100 kB of storage on which an embedded OS; a COAP stack; CORE and AKE libraries; and target applications would run. It is expected that the majority of this space is available for actual application logic, as opposed to the support libraries. In a typical OSCORE implementation COSE encrypt and signature structures will be available, as will support for COSE algorithms relevant for IoT enabling the same algorithms as is used for OSCORE (e.g. COSE algorithm no. 10 = CCM* used by 6TiSCH). The use of those, or CBOR or CoAP, would not add to the footprint.

While the large variety of settings and capabilities of the devices and networks makes it challenging to produce exact values of some these dimensions, there are some key benchmarks that are tractable for security protocol engineering and which have a significant impact.

2.9.1. LoRaWAN

LoRaWAN employs unlicensed radio frequency bands in the 868 MHz ISM band. As a case in point, we focus here on deployment in Europe, where this is regulated by ETSI EN 300 220. For LoRaWAN the most relevant metric is the Time-on-Air, which determines the back-off times and can be used as an indicator to calculate energy consumption. LoRaWAN is legally required to use a duty cycle with values such as 0.1%, 1% and 10% depending on the sub-band that is being used, leading to a payload split into fragments interleaved with back-off times. For Europe, the duty cycle is 1% (or smaller). Although there are exceptions from the use of duty cycle, the use of an AKE for providing end-to-end security on application layer needs to comply with the duty cycle. Bytes on the wire

LoRaWAN has a variable MTU depending on the Spreading Factor (SF). The higher the spreading factor, the higher distances can be achieved and/or better reception. LoRaWAN has a header size of 13 bytes, to which we have to add the maximum recommended payload depending on the SF used. If the coverage and distance allows it, with SF7 – corresponding to higher data rates – the maximum payload is 222 bytes. For a SF12 – and low data rates – the maximum payload is 51 bytes.

The benchmark used here is Data Rates 0-2 corresponding to a packet size of 51 bytes [LoRaWAN]. The use of larger frame size depend on good radio conditions which are not always present. Some libraries/providers only support 51-bytes packet size. Time

The time it takes to send a message over the air in LoRaWAN can be calculated as a function of the different parameters of the communication. These are the Spreading Factor (SF), the message size, the channel, bandwidth, coding rate, etc. An important feature of LoRaWAN is the duty cycle limitation due to the use of the ISM band. A duty cycle of 1% implies that the time to complete a fragmentation of the payload increases by at least 10,000%. This limitation determines how long time the device will have to wait for next use, which encourages the reduction of the message size as much as possible. Round trips and number of messages

Considering the duty cycle of LoRaWAN and associated back-off times, the round trips and number of messages needs to be reduced as much as possible. Power

The calculation of the power consumption in LoRaWAN is dependent on several factors, such as the spreading factor used and the length of the message sent, both having a clear dependency with the time it takes to transmit the message. The communication model (inherent to the different LoRaWAN classes of devices) also has an impact on the energy consumption, but overall the Time-on-Air is an important indication of the performance.

2.9.2. 6TiSCH

6TiSCH operates in the 2.4 GHz unlicensed frequency band and uses hybrid Time Division/Frequency Division multiple access (TDMA/FDMA). Nodes in a 6TiSCH network form a mesh. The basic unit of communication, a cell, is uniquely defined by its time and frequency offset in the communication schedule matrix. Cells can be assigned for communication to a pair of nodes in the mesh and so be collision-free, or shared by multiple nodes, for example during network formation. In case of shared cells, some collision-resolution scheme such as slotted-Aloha is employed. Nodes exchange frames which are at most 127-bytes long, including the link-layer headers. To preserve energy, the schedule is typically computed in such a way that nodes switch on their radio below 1% of the time (“radio duty cycle”). A 6TiSCH mesh can be several hops deep. In typical use cases considered by the 6TiSCH working group, a network that is 2-4 hops deep is commonplace; a network which is more than 8 hops deep is not common. Bytes on the wire

Increasing the number of bytes on the wire in a protocol message has an important effect on the 6TiSCH network in case the fragmentation is triggered. More fragments contribute to congestion of shared cells (and concomitant error rates) in a non-linear way.

The available size for key exchange messages depends on the topology of the network, whether the message is traveling uplink or downlink, and other stack parameters. A key performance indicator for a 6TiSCH network is “network formation”, i.e. the time it takes from switching on all devices, until the last device has executed the AKE and securely joined. As an example, given the size limit on the frames and taking into account the different headers (including link-layer security), if a 6TiSCH network is 5 hops deep, the maximum CoAP payload size to avoid fragmentation is 47/45 bytes (uplink/downlink) [AKE-for-6TiSCH]. Time

Given the slotted nature of 6TiSCH, the number of bytes in a frame has insignificant impact on latency, but the number of frames has. The relevant metric for studying AKE is the network formation time, which implies parallel AKE runs among nodes that are attempting to join the network. Network formation time directly affects the time installers need to spend on site at deployment time. Round trips and number of messages

Given the mesh nature of the 6TiSCH network, and given that each message may travel several hops before reaching its destination, it is highly desirable to minimize the number of round trips to reduce latency. Power

From the power consumption point of view, it is more favorable to send a small number of large frames than a larger number of short frames.

2.9.3. NB-IoT

3GPP has specified Narrow-Band IoT (NB-IoT) for support of infrequent data transmission via user plane and via control plane. NB-IoT is built on cellular licensed spectrum at low data rates for the purpose of supporting:

NB-IoT achieves these design objectives by: Bytes on the wire

The number of bytes on the wire in a protocol message has a direct effect on the performance for NB-IoT. In contrast to LoRaWAN and 6TiSCH, the NB-IoT radio bearers are not characterized by a fixed sized PDU. Concatenation, segmentation and reassembly are part of the service provided by the NB-IoT radio layer. As a consequence, the byte count has a measurable impact on time and energy consumption for running the AKE. Time

Coverage significantly impacts the available bit rate and thereby the time for transmitting a message, and there is also a difference between downlink and uplink transmissions (see Section The transmission time for the message is essentially proportional to the number of bytes.

Since NB-IoT is operating in licensed spectrum, in contrast to e.g. LoRaWAN, the packets on the radio interface can be transmitted back-to-back, so the time before sending OSCORE protected data is limited by the number of round trips/messages of the AKE and not by a duty cycle. Round trips and number of messages

As indicated in Section, the number of messages and round-trips is one limiting factor for protocol completion time. Power

Since NB-IoT is operating in licensed spectrum, the device is allowed to transmit at a relatively high power, which has a large impact on the energy consumption.

The benchmark for NB-IoT energy consumption is based on the same computational model as was used by 3GPP in the design of this radio layer [NB-IoT-battery-life-evaluation]. The device power consumption is assumed to be 500mW for transmission and 80mW for reception. Power consumption for “light sleep” (~ 3mW) and ”deep sleep” (~ 0.015mW) are negligible in comparison. The bitrates (uplink/downlink) are assumed to be 28/170 kbps for good coverage and 0,37/2,5 kbps for bad coverage.

The results [AKE-for-NB-IoT] show a high per-byte energy consumption for uplink transmissions, in particular in bad coverage. Given that the application decides about the device being initiator or responder in the AKE, the protocol cannot be tailored for a particular message being uplink or downlink. To perform well in both kind of applications the overall number of bytes of the protocol needs to be as low as possible.

2.9.4. Discussion

While “as small protocol messages as possible” does not lend itself to a sharp boundary threshold, “as few protocol messages as possible” does and is relevant in all settings above.

The penalty is high for not fitting into the frame sizes of 6TiSCH and LoRaWAN networks. Fragmentation is not defined within these technologies so requires fragmentation scheme on a higher layer in the stack. With fragmentation increases the number of frames per message, each with its associated overhead in terms of power consumption and latency. Additionally the probability for errors increases, which leads to retransmissions of frames or entire messages that in turn increases the power consumption and latency.

There are trade-offs between “few messages” and “few frames”; if overhead is spread out over more messages such that each message fits into a particular frame this may reduce the overall power consumption. While it may be possible to engineer such a solution for a particular radio technology and signature algorithm, the benefits in terms of fewer messages/round trips in general and for NB-IoT in particular (see Section 2.9.3) are considered more important than optimizing for a specific scenario. Hence an optimal AKE protocol has 3 messages and each message fits into as few frames as possible, ideally 1 frame per message.

The difference between uplink and downlink performance should not be engineered into the protocol since it cannot be assumed that a particular protocol message will be sent uplink or downlink.

2.9.5. AKE frequency

One question that has been asked in the context of lightweightness is: - How often is the AKE executed? While it may be impossible to give a precise answer there are other perspectives to this question.

  1. For some use cases, already one execution of the AKE is heavy, for example, because
  2. If a device reboots it may not be able to recover the security context, e.g. due to lack of persistent storage, and is required to establish a new security context for which an AKE is preferred. Reboot frequency may be difficult to predict in general.
  3. To limit the impact of a key compromise, BSI, NIST and ANSSI and other organizations recommend in other contexts frequent renewal of keys by means of Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This may be a symmetric key authenticated key exchange, where the symmetric key is obtained from a previous asymmetric key based run of the AKE.

To summarize, even if it we are unable to give precise numbers for AKE frequency, a lightweight AKE

3. Requirements Summary

4. Security Considerations

This document compiles the requirements for an AKE and provides some related security considerations.

The AKE must provide the security properties expected of IETF protocols, e.g., providing confidentiality protection, integrity protection, and authentication as is further detailed in the requirements.

5. IANA Considerations



The authors want to thank Richard Barnes, Karthik Bhargavan, Eric Rescorla, Michael Richardson, and Claes Tidestav for providing valuable input.

7. Informative References

[AKE-for-6TiSCH] "AKE for 6TiSCH", March 2019.
[AKE-for-NB-IoT] "AKE for NB-IoT", March 2019.
[Fairhair] "Security Architecture for the Internet of Things (IoT) in Commercial Buildings, Fairhair Alliance white paper", March 2018.
[HKDF] Krawczyk, H., "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme", May 2010.
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] Vucinic, M., Simon, J., Pister, K. and M. Richardson, "Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) for 6TiSCH", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-14, December 2019.
[I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag] Amsuess, C., Mattsson, J. and G. Selander, "CoAP: Echo, Request-Tag, and Token Processing", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-core-echo-request-tag-08, November 2019.
[I-D.ietf-cose-x509] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Headers for carrying and referencing X.509 certificates", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-cose-x509-05, November 2019.
[I-D.ietf-lpwan-coap-static-context-hc] Minaburo, A., Toutain, L. and R. Andreasen, "LPWAN Static Context Header Compression (SCHC) for CoAP", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lpwan-coap-static-context-hc-11, October 2019.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements] Cremers, C., Garratt, L., Smyshlyaev, S., Sullivan, N. and C. Wood, "Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols", Internet-Draft draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-08, November 2019.
[LoRaWAN] "LoRaWAN Regional Parameters v1.0.2rB", February 2017.
[LwM2M] "OMA SpecWorks LwM2M", August 2018.
[NB-IoT-battery-life-evaluation] "On mMTC, NB-IoT and eMTC battery life evaluation", January 2017.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M. and A. Keranen, "Terminology for Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228, DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014.
[RFC7967] Bhattacharyya, A., Bandyopadhyay, S., Pal, A. and T. Bose, "Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) Option for No Server Response", RFC 7967, DOI 10.17487/RFC7967, August 2016.
[RFC8613] Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F. and L. Seitz, "Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)", RFC 8613, DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019.

Authors' Addresses

Malisa Vucinic Inria EMail:
Goeran Selander Ericsson AB EMail:
John Preuss Mattsson Ericsson AB EMail:
Dan Garcia-Carrillo Odin Solutions S.L. EMail: