CFRG A. Langley
Internet-Draft Google
Intended status: Informational M. Hamburg
Expires: March 11, 2016 Rambus Cryptography Research
S. Turner
IECA, Inc.
September 8, 2015
Elliptic Curves for Security
draft-irtf-cfrg-curves-08
Abstract
This memo specifies two elliptic curves over prime fields that offer
high practical security in cryptographic applications, including
Transport Layer Security (TLS). These curves are intended to operate
at the ~128-bit and ~224-bit security level, respectively, and are
generated deterministically based on a list of required properties.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 11, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Recommended Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Curve25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.2. Curve448 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. The X25519 and X448 functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Side-channel considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Test vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Diffie-Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1. Curve25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2. Curve448 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Deterministic Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.1. p = 1 mod 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.2. p = 3 mod 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.3. Base points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
Since the initial standardization of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC
[RFC6090]) in [SEC1] there has been significant progress related to
both efficiency and security of curves and implementations. Notable
examples are algorithms protected against certain side-channel
attacks, various 'special' prime shapes that allow faster modular
arithmetic, and a larger set of curve models from which to choose.
There is also concern in the community regarding the generation and
potential weaknesses of the curves defined by NIST [NIST].
This memo specifies two elliptic curves ("curve25519" and "curve448")
that lend themselves to constant-time implementation and an
exception-free scalar multiplication that is resistant to a wide
range of side-channel attacks, including timing and cache attacks.
They are Montgomery curves (where y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x) and thus have
birationally equivalent Edwards versions. Edwards curves support the
fastest (currently known) complete formulas for the elliptic-curve
group operations, specifically the Edwards curve x^2 + y^2 = 1 +
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dx^2y^2 for primes p when p = 3 mod 4, and the twisted Edwards curve
-x^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2 when p = 1 mod 4. The maps to/from the
Montgomery curves to their (twisted) Edwards equivalents are also
given.
This memo also specifies how these curves can be used with the
Diffie-Hellman protocol for key agreement.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Notation
Throughout this document, the following notation is used:
p Denotes the prime number defining the underlying field.
GF(p) The finite field with p elements.
A An element in the finite field GF(p), not equal to -2 or 2.
d A non-zero element in the finite field GF(p), not equal to 1, in
the case of an Edwards curve, or not equal to -1, in the case of a
twisted Edwards curve.
P A generator point defined over GF(p) of prime order.
X(P) The x-coordinate of the elliptic curve point P on a (twisted)
Edwards curve.
Y(P) The y-coordinate of the elliptic curve point P on a (twisted)
Edwards curve.
u, v Coordinates on a Montgomery curve.
x, y Coordinates on a (twisted) Edwards curve.
4. Recommended Curves
4.1. Curve25519
For the ~128-bit security level, the prime 2^255-19 is recommended
for performance on a wide-range of architectures. Few primes of the
form 2^c-s with s small exist between 2^250 and 2^521, and other
choices of coefficient are not as competitive in performance. This
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prime is congruent to 1 mod 4 and the derivation procedure in
Appendix A results in the following Montgomery curve v^2 = u^3 +
A*u^2 + u, called "curve25519":
p 2^255-19
A 486662
order 2^252 + 0x14def9dea2f79cd65812631a5cf5d3ed
cofactor 8
The base point is u = 9, v = 1478161944758954479102059356840998688726
4606134616475288964881837755586237401.
This curve is birationally equivalent to a twisted Edwards curve -x^2
+ y^2 = 1 + d*x^2*y^2, called "edwards25519", where:
p 2^255-19
d 370957059346694393431380835087545651895421138798432190163887855330
85940283555
order 2^252 + 0x14def9dea2f79cd65812631a5cf5d3ed
cofactor 8
X(P) 151122213495354007725011514095885315114540126930418572060461132
83949847762202
Y(P) 463168356949264781694283940034751631413079938662562256157830336
03165251855960
The birational maps are:
(u, v) = ((1+y)/(1-y), sqrt(-486664)*u/x)
(x, y) = (sqrt(-486664)*u/v, (u-1)/(u+1))
The Montgomery curve defined here is equal to the one defined in
[curve25519] and the equivalent twisted Edwards curve is equal to the
one defined in [ed25519].
4.2. Curve448
For the ~224-bit security level, the prime 2^448-2^224-1 is
recommended for performance on a wide-range of architectures. This
prime is congruent to 3 mod 4 and the derivation procedure in
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Appendix A results in the following Montgomery curve, called
"curve448":
p 2^448-2^224-1
A 156326
order 2^446 -
0x8335dc163bb124b65129c96fde933d8d723a70aadc873d6d54a7bb0d
cofactor 4
The base point is u = 5, v = 3552939267855681752641275020637833348089
763993877142718318808984351690887869674100029326737658645509101427741
47268105838985595290606362.
This curve is birationally equivalent to the Edwards curve x^2 + y^2
= 1 + d*x^2*y^2 where:
p 2^448-2^224-1
d 611975850744529176160423220965553317543219696871016626328968936415
087860042636474891785599283666020414768678979989378147065462815545
017
order 2^446 -
0x8335dc163bb124b65129c96fde933d8d723a70aadc873d6d54a7bb0d
cofactor 4
X(P) 345397493039729516374008604150537410266655260075183290216406970
281645695073672344430481787759340633221708391583424041788924124567
700732
Y(P) 363419362147803445274661903944002267176820680343659030140745099
590306164083365386343198191849338272965044442230921818680526749009
182718
The birational maps are:
(u, v) = ((y-1)/(y+1), sqrt(156324)*u/x)
(x, y) = (sqrt(156324)*u/v, (1+u)/(1-u))
Both of those curves are also 4-isogenous to the following Edwards
curve x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d*x^2*y^2, called "edwards448", where:
p 2^448-2^224-1
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d -39081
order 2^446 -
0x8335dc163bb124b65129c96fde933d8d723a70aadc873d6d54a7bb0d
cofactor 4
X(P) 224580040295924300187604334099896036246789641632564134246125461
686950415467406032909029192869357953282578032075146446173674602635
247710
Y(P) 298819210078481492676017930443930673437544040154080242095928241
372331506189835876003536878655418784733982303233503462500531545062
832660
The 4-isogeny maps between the Montgomery curve and this Edwards
curve are:
(u, v) = (y^2/x^2, (2 - x^2 - y^2)*y/x^3)
(x, y) = (4*v*(u^2 - 1)/(u^4 - 2*u^2 + 4*v^2 + 1),
-(u^5 - 2*u^3 - 4*u*v^2 + u)/
(u^5 - 2*u^2*v^2 - 2*u^3 - 2*v^2 + u))
The curve edwards448 defined here is also called "Goldilocks" and is
equal to the one defined in [goldilocks].
5. The X25519 and X448 functions
The "X25519" and "X448" functions perform scalar multiplication on
the Montgomery form of the above curves. (This is used when
implementing Diffie-Hellman.) The functions take a scalar and a
u-coordinate as inputs and produce a u-coordinate as output.
Although the functions work internally with integers, the inputs and
outputs are 32-byte strings (for X25519) or 56-byte strings (for
X448) and this specification defines their encoding.
The u-coordinates are elements of the underlying field GF(2^255-19)
or GF(2^448-2^224-1) and are encoded as an array of bytes, u, in
little-endian order such that u[0] + 256*u[1] + 256^2*u[2] + ... +
256^(n-1)*u[n-1] is congruent to the value modulo p and u[n-1] is
minimal. When receiving such an array, implementations of X25519
(but not X448) MUST mask the most-significant bit in the final byte.
This is done to preserve compatibility with point formats which
reserve the sign bit for use in other protocols and to increase
resistance to implementation fingerprinting.
Implementations MUST accept non-canonical values and process them as
if they had been reduced modulo the field prime. The non-canonical
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values are 2^255-19 through 2^255-1 for X25519 and 2^448-2^224-1
through 2^448-1 for X448.
The following functions implement this in Python, although the Python
code is not intended to be performant nor side-channel free. Here
the "bits" parameter should be set to 255 for X25519 and 448 for
X448:
def decodeLittleEndian(b, bits):
return sum([b[i] << 8*i for i in range((bits+7)/8)])
def decodeUCoordinate(u, bits):
u_list = [ord(b) for b in u]
# Ignore any unused bits.
if bits % 8:
u_list[-1] &= (1<<(bits%8))-1
return decodeLittleEndian(u_list, bits)
def encodeUCoordinate(u, bits):
u = u % p
return ''.join([chr((u >> 8*i) & 0xff)
for i in range((bits+7)/8)])
Scalars are assumed to be randomly generated bytes. For X25519, in
order to decode 32 random bytes as an integer scalar, set the three
least significant bits of the first byte and the most significant bit
of the last to zero, set the second most significant bit of the last
byte to 1 and, finally, decode as little-endian. This means that
resulting integer is of the form 2^254 + 8 * {0, 1, ..., 2^(251) -
1}. Likewise, for X448, set the two least significant bits of the
first byte to 0, and the most significant bit of the last byte to 1.
This means that the resulting integer is of the form 2^447 + 4 * {0,
1, ..., 2^(445) - 1}.
def decodeScalar25519(k):
k_list = [ord(b) for b in k]
k_list[0] &= 248
k_list[31] &= 127
k_list[31] |= 64
return decodeLittleEndian(k_list, 255)
def decodeScalar448(k):
k_list = [ord(b) for b in k]
k_list[0] &= 252
k_list[55] |= 128
return decodeLittleEndian(k_list, 448)
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To implement the X25519(k, u) and X448(k, u) functions (where k is
the scalar and u is the u-coordinate) first decode k and u and then
perform the following procedure, which is taken from [curve25519] and
based on formulas from [montgomery]. All calculations are performed
in GF(p), i.e., they are performed modulo p. The constant a24 is
(486662 - 2) / 4 = 121665 for curve25519/X25519 and (156326 - 2) / 4
= 39081 for curve448/X448.
x_1 = u
x_2 = 1
z_2 = 0
x_3 = u
z_3 = 1
swap = 0
For t = bits-1 down to 0:
k_t = (k >> t) & 1
swap ^= k_t
// Conditional swap; see text below.
(x_2, x_3) = cswap(swap, x_2, x_3)
(z_2, z_3) = cswap(swap, z_2, z_3)
swap = k_t
A = x_2 + z_2
AA = A^2
B = x_2 - z_2
BB = B^2
E = AA - BB
C = x_3 + z_3
D = x_3 - z_3
DA = D * A
CB = C * B
x_3 = (DA + CB)^2
z_3 = x_1 * (DA - CB)^2
x_2 = AA * BB
z_2 = E * (AA + a24 * E)
// Conditional swap; see text below.
(x_2, x_3) = cswap(swap, x_2, x_3)
(z_2, z_3) = cswap(swap, z_2, z_3)
Return x_2 * (z_2^(p - 2))
(Note that these formulas are slightly different from Montgomery's
original paper. Implementations are free to use any correct
formulas.)
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Finally, encode the resulting value as 32 or 56 bytes in little-
endian order. For X25519, the unused, most-significant bit MUST be
zero.
The cswap function SHOULD be implemented in constant time (i.e.
independent of the swap argument). For example, this can be done as
follows:
cswap(swap, x_2, x_3):
dummy = mask(swap) AND (x_2 XOR x_3)
x_2 = x_2 XOR dummy
x_3 = x_3 XOR dummy
Return (x_2, x_3)
Where mask(swap) is the all-1 or all-0 word of the same length as x_2
and x_3, computed, e.g., as mask(swap) = 0 - swap.
5.1. Side-channel considerations
X25519 and X448 are designed so that fast, constant-time
implementations are easier to produce. The procedure above ensures
that the same sequence of field operations is performed for all
values of the secret key, thus eliminating a common source of side-
channel leakage. However, this alone does not prevent all side-
channels by itself. It is important that the pattern of memory
accesses and jumps not depend on the values of any of the bits of k.
It is also important that the arithmetic used not leak information
about the integers modulo p, for example by having b*c be
distinguishable from c*c. On some architectures, even primitive
machine instructions, such as single-word division, can have variable
timing based on their inputs.
Side-channel attacks are an active research area that still sees
significant, new results. Implementors are advised to follow this
research closely.
5.2. Test vectors
Two types of tests are provided. The first is a pair of test vectors
for each function that consist of expected outputs for the given
inputs. The inputs are generally given as 64 or 112 hexadecimal
digits that need to be decoded as 32 or 56 binary bytes before
processing.
X25519:
Input scalar:
a546e36bf0527c9d3b16154b82465edd62144c0ac1fc5a18506a2244ba449ac4
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Input scalar as a number (base 10):
31029842492115040904895560451863089656
472772604678260265531221036453811406496
Input u-coordinate:
e6db6867583030db3594c1a424b15f7c726624ec26b3353b10a903a6d0ab1c4c
Input u-coordinate as a number:
34426434033919594451155107781188821651
316167215306631574996226621102155684838
Output u-coordinate:
c3da55379de9c6908e94ea4df28d084f32eccf03491c71f754b4075577a28552
Input scalar:
4b66e9d4d1b4673c5ad22691957d6af5c11b6421e0ea01d42ca4169e7918ba0d
Input scalar as a number (base 10):
35156891815674817266734212754503633747
128614016119564763269015315466259359304
Input u-coordinate:
e5210f12786811d3f4b7959d0538ae2c31dbe7106fc03c3efc4cd549c715a493
Input u-coordinate as a number:
88838573511839298940907593866106493194
17338800022198945255395922347792736741
Output u-coordinate:
95cbde9476e8907d7aade45cb4b873f88b595a68799fa152e6f8f7647aac7957
X448:
Input scalar:
3d262fddf9ec8e88495266fea19a34d28882acef045104d0d1aae121
700a779c984c24f8cdd78fbff44943eba368f54b29259a4f1c600ad3
Input scalar as a number (base 10):
599189175373896402783756016145213256157230856
085026129926891459468622403380588640249457727
683869421921443004045221642549886377526240828
Input u-coordinate:
06fce640fa3487bfda5f6cf2d5263f8aad88334cbd07437f020f08f9
814dc031ddbdc38c19c6da2583fa5429db94ada18aa7a7fb4ef8a086
Input u-coordinate as a number:
382239910814107330116229961234899377031416365
240571325148346555922438025162094455820962429
142971339584360034337310079791515452463053830
Output u-coordinate:
ce3e4ff95a60dc6697da1db1d85e6afbdf79b50a2412d7546d5f239f
e14fbaadeb445fc66a01b0779d98223961111e21766282f73dd96b6f
Input scalar:
203d494428b8399352665ddca42f9de8fef600908e0d461cb021f8c5
38345dd77c3e4806e25f46d3315c44e0a5b4371282dd2c8d5be3095f
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Input scalar as a number (base 10):
633254335906970592779259481534862372382525155
252028961056404001332122152890562527156973881
968934311400345568203929409663925541994577184
Input u-coordinate:
0fbcc2f993cd56d3305b0b7d9e55d4c1a8fb5dbb52f8e9a1e9b6201b
165d015894e56c4d3570bee52fe205e28a78b91cdfbde71ce8d157db
Input u-coordinate as a number:
622761797758325444462922068431234180649590390
024811299761625153767228042600197997696167956
134770744996690267634159427999832340166786063
Output u-coordinate:
884a02576239ff7a2f2f63b2db6a9ff37047ac13568e1e30fe63c4a7
ad1b3ee3a5700df34321d62077e63633c575c1c954514e99da7c179d
The second type of test vector consists of the result of calling the
function in question a specified number of times. Initially, set k
and u to be the following values:
For X25519:
0900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
For X448:
05000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
For each iteration, set k to be the result of calling the function
and u to be the old value of k. The final result is the value left
in k.
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X25519:
After one iteration:
422c8e7a6227d7bca1350b3e2bb7279f7897b87bb6854b783c60e80311ae3079
After 1,000 iterations:
684cf59ba83309552800ef566f2f4d3c1c3887c49360e3875f2eb94d99532c51
After 1,000,000 iterations:
7c3911e0ab2586fd864497297e575e6f3bc601c0883c30df5f4dd2d24f665424
X448:
After one iteration:
3f482c8a9f19b01e6c46ee9711d9dc14fd4bf67af30765c2ae2b846a
4d23a8cd0db897086239492caf350b51f833868b9bc2b3bca9cf4113
After 1,000 iterations:
aa3b4749d55b9daf1e5b00288826c467274ce3ebbdd5c17b975e09d4
af6c67cf10d087202db88286e2b79fceea3ec353ef54faa26e219f38
After 1,000,000 iterations:
077f453681caca3693198420bbe515cae0002472519b3e67661a7e89
cab94695c8f4bcd66e61b9b9c946da8d524de3d69bd9d9d66b997e37
6. Diffie-Hellman
6.1. Curve25519
The X25519 function can be used in an elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) protocol as follows:
Alice generates 32 random bytes in f[0] to f[31] and transmits K_A =
X25519(f, 9) to Bob, where 9 is the u-coordinate of the base point
and is encoded as a byte with value 9, followed by 31 zero bytes.
Bob similarly generates 32 random bytes in g[0] to g[31] and computes
K_B = X25519(g, 9) and transmits it to Alice.
Using their generated values and the received input, Alice computes
X25519(f, K_B) and Bob computes X25519(g, K_A).
Both now share K = X25519(f, X25519(g, 9)) = X25519(g, X25519(f, 9))
as a shared secret. Both MUST check, without leaking extra
information about the value of K, whether K is the all-zero value and
abort if so (see below). Alice and Bob can then use a key-derivation
function that includes K, K_A and K_B to derive a key.
The check for the all-zero value results from the fact that the
X25519 function produces that value if it operates on an input
corresponding to a point with order dividing the co-factor, h, of the
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curve. This check is cheap and so MUST always be carried out. The
check may be performed by ORing all the bytes together and checking
whether the result is zero as this eliminates standard side-channels
in software implementations.
Test vector:
Alice's private key, f:
77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a
Alice's public key, X25519(f, 9):
8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a
Bob's private key, g:
5dab087e624a8a4b79e17f8b83800ee66f3bb1292618b6fd1c2f8b27ff88e0eb
Bob's public key, X25519(g, 9):
de9edb7d7b7dc1b4d35b61c2ece435373f8343c85b78674dadfc7e146f882b4f
Their shared secret, K:
4a5d9d5ba4ce2de1728e3bf480350f25e07e21c947d19e3376f09b3c1e161742
6.2. Curve448
The X448 function can be used in an ECDH protocol very much like the
X25519 function.
If X448 is to be used, the only differences are that Alice and Bob
generate 56 random bytes (not 32) and calculate K_A = X448(f, 5) or
K_B = X448(g, 5) where 5 is the u-coordinate of the base point and is
encoded as a byte with value 5, followed by 55 zero bytes.
As with X25519, both sides MUST check, without leaking extra
information about the value of K, whether the resulting shared K is
the all-zero value and abort if so.
Test vector:
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Alice's private key, f:
9a8f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28d
d9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a598726b
Alice's public key, X448(f, 5):
9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c
22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0
Bob's private key, g:
1c306a7ac2a0e2e0990b294470cba339e6453772b075811d8fad0d1d
6927c120bb5ee8972b0d3e21374c9c921b09d1b0366f10b65173992d
Bob's public key, X448(g, 5):
3eb7a829b0cd20f5bcfc0b599b6feccf6da4627107bdb0d4f345b430
27d8b972fc3e34fb4232a13ca706dcb57aec3dae07bdc1c67bf33609
Their shared secret, K:
07fff4181ac6cc95ec1c16a94a0f74d12da232ce40a77552281d282b
b60c0b56fd2464c335543936521c24403085d59a449a5037514a879d
7. Security Considerations
The security level (i.e. the number of "operations" needed for a
brute-force attack on a primitive) of curve25519 is slightly under
the standard 128-bit level. This is acceptable because the standard
security levels are primarily driven by much simplier, symmetric
primitives where the security level naturally falls on a power of
two. For asymmetric primitives, rigidly adhering to a power-of-two
security level would require compromises in other parts of the
design, which we reject. Additionally, comparing security levels
between types of primitives can be misleading under common threat
models where multiple targets can be attacked concurrently
[bruteforce].
The ~224-bit security level of curve448 is a trade-off between
performance and paranoia. Large quantum computers, if ever created,
will break both curve25519 and curve448, and reasonable projections
of the abilities of classical computers conclude that curve25519 is
perfectly safe. However, some designs have relaxed performance
requirements and wish to hedge against some amount of analytical
advance against elliptic curves and thus curve448 is also provided.
8. Acknowledgements
This document merges draft-black-rpgecc-01 and draft-turner-
thecurve25519function-01. The following authors of those documents
wrote much of the text and figures but are not listed as authors on
this document: Benjamin Black, Joppe W. Bos, Craig Costello, Patrick
Longa, Michael Naehrig and Watson Ladd.
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The authors would also like to thank Tanja Lange, Rene Struik, Rich
Salz, Ilari Liusvaara, Deirdre Connolly, Simon Josefsson, Stephan
Farrell and Georg Nestmann for their reviews and contributions.
The X25519 function was developed by Daniel J. Bernstein in
[curve25519].
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
.
9.2. Informative References
[brainpool]
ECC Brainpool, "ECC Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve
Generation", October 2005, .
[bruteforce]
Bernstein, D., "Understanding brute force", April 2005,
.
[curve25519]
Bernstein, D., "Curve25519 -- new Diffie-Hellman speed
records", 2006,
.
[ed25519] Bernstein, D., Duif, N., Lange, T., Schwabe, P., and B.
Yang, "High-speed high-security signatures", 2011,
.
[goldilocks]
Hamburg, M., "Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve",
2015, .
[montgomery]
Montgomery, P., "Speeding the Pollard and elliptic curve
methods of factorization", 1983,
.
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[NIST] National Institute of Standards, "Recommended Elliptic
Curves for Federal Government Use", July 1999,
.
[reducing]
Menezes, A., Okamoto, T., and S. Vanstone, "Reducing
elliptic curve logarithms to logarithms in a finite
field", 1993, .
[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
.
[safecurves]
Bernstein, D. and T. Lange, "SafeCurves: choosing safe
curves for elliptic-curve cryptography", Oct 2013,
.
[satoh] Satoh, T. and K. Araki, "Fermat quotients and the
polynomial time discrete log algorithm for anomalous
elliptic curves", 1998.
[SEC1] Certicom Research, "SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography",
September 2000,
.
[semaev] Semaev, I., "Evaluation of discrete logarithms on some
elliptic curves", 1998.
[smart] Smart, N., "The discrete logarithm problem on elliptic
curves of trace one", 1999,
.
Appendix A. Deterministic Generation
This section specifies the procedure that was used to generate the
above curves; specifically it defines how to generate the parameter A
of the Montgomery curve y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x. This procedure is
intended to be as objective as can reasonably be achieved so that
it's clear that no untoward considerations influenced the choice of
curve. The input to this process is p, the prime that defines the
underlying field. The size of p determines the amount of work needed
to compute a discrete logarithm in the elliptic curve group and
choosing a precise p depends on many implementation concerns. The
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performance of the curve will be dominated by operations in GF(p) so
carefully choosing a value that allows for easy reductions on the
intended architecture is critical. This document does not attempt to
articulate all these considerations.
The value (A-2)/4 is used in several of the elliptic curve point
arithmetic formulas. For simplicity and performance reasons, it is
beneficial to make this constant small, i.e. to choose A so that
(A-2) is a small integer which is divisible by four.
For each curve at a specific security level:
1. The trace of Frobenius MUST NOT be in {0, 1} in order to rule out
the attacks described in [smart], [satoh], and [semaev], as in
[brainpool] and [safecurves].
2. MOV Degree [reducing]: the embedding degree k MUST be greater
than (r - 1) / 100, as in [brainpool] and [safecurves].
3. CM Discriminant: discriminant D MUST be greater than 2^100, as in
[safecurves].
A.1. p = 1 mod 4
For primes congruent to 1 mod 4, the minimal cofactors of the curve
and its twist are either {4, 8} or {8, 4}. We choose a curve with the
latter cofactors so that any algorithms that take the cofactor into
account don't have to worry about checking for points on the twist,
because the twist cofactor will be the smaller of the two.
To generate the Montgomery curve we find the minimal, positive A
value, such that A > 2 and (A-2) is divisible by four and where the
cofactors are as desired. The find1Mod4 function in the following
Sage script returns this value given p:
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def findCurve(prime, curveCofactor, twistCofactor):
F = GF(prime)
for A in xrange(3, 1e9):
if (A-2) % 4 != 0:
continue
try:
E = EllipticCurve(F, [0, A, 0, 1, 0])
except:
continue
order = E.order()
twistOrder = 2*(prime+1)-order
if (order % curveCofactor == 0 and
is_prime(order // curveCofactor) and
twistOrder % twistCofactor == 0 and
is_prime(twistOrder // twistCofactor)):
return A
def find1Mod4(prime):
assert((prime % 4) == 1)
return findCurve(prime, 8, 4)
Generating a curve where p = 1 mod 4
A.2. p = 3 mod 4
For a prime congruent to 3 mod 4, both the curve and twist cofactors
can be 4 and this is minimal. Thus we choose the curve with these
cofactors and minimal, positive A such that A > 2 and (A-2) is
divisible by four. The find3Mod4 function in the following Sage
script returns this value given p:
def find3Mod4(prime):
assert((prime % 4) == 3)
return findCurve(prime, 4, 4)
Generating a curve where p = 3 mod 4
A.3. Base points
The base point for a curve is the point with minimal, positive u
value that is in the correct subgroup. The findBasepoint function in
the following Sage script returns this value given p and A:
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def findBasepoint(prime, A):
F = GF(prime)
E = EllipticCurve(F, [0, A, 0, 1, 0])
for uInt in range(1, 1e3):
u = F(uInt)
v2 = u^3 + A*u^2 + u
if not v2.is_square():
continue
v = v2.sqrt()
point = E(u, v)
order = point.order()
if order > 8 and order.is_prime():
return point
Generating the base point
Authors' Addresses
Adam Langley
Google
345 Spear St
San Francisco, CA 94105
US
Email: agl@google.com
Mike Hamburg
Rambus Cryptography Research
425 Market Street, 11th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105
US
Email: mike@shiftleft.org
Sean Turner
IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street
Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031
US
Email: turners@ieca.com
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