Internet Draft W. Ladd
UC Berkeley
Category: Informational
Expires 20 August 2015 16 February 2015
SPAKE2, a PAKE
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Abstract
This Internet-Draft describes SPAKE2, a secure, efficient password
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based key exchange protocol.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
2. Definition of SPAKE2.............................................3
3. Table of points .................................................4
4. Security considerations .........................................5
5. IANA actions ....................................................5
6. Acknowledgements.................................................5
7. References.......................................................5
1. Introduction
This document describes a means for two parties that share a password
to derive a shared key. This method is compatible with any group, is
computationally efficient, and has a strong security proof.
2. Definition of SPAKE2
Let G be a group in which the Diffie-Hellman problem is hard of order
ph, with p a big prime and h a cofactor. We denote the operations in
the group additively. Let H be a hash function from arbitrary strings
to bit strings of a fixed length. Common choices for H are SHA256 or
SHA512. We assume there is a representation of elements of G as byte
strings: common choices would be SEC1 uncompressed for elliptic curve
groups or big endian integers of a particular length for prime field
DH.
|| denotes concatenation of strings. We also let len(S) denote the
length of a string in bytes, represented as an eight-byte big-endian
number.
We fix two elements M and N as defined in the table in this document
for common groups, as well as a generator G of the group. G is
specified in the document defining the group, and so we do not recall
it here.
Let A and B be two parties. We will assume that A and B are also
representations of the parties such as MAC addresses or other names
(hostnames, usernames, etc). We assume they share an integer w.
Typically w will be the hash of a user-supplied password, truncated
and taken mod p. Protocols using this protocol must define the method
used to compute w: it may be necessary to carry out normalization.
A picks x randomly and uniformly from the integers in [0,ph)
divisible by h, and calculates X=xG and T=wM+X, then transmits T to
B.
B selects y randomly and uniformly from the integers in [0,ph),
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divisible by h and calculates Y=yG, S=wN+Y, then transmits S to A.
Both A and B calculate a group element K. A calculates it as x(S-wN),
while B calculates it as y(T-wM). A knows S because it has received
it, and likewise B knows T.
This K is a shared secret, but the scheme as described is not secure.
It is essential to combine K with the values transmitted and received
via a hash function to have a secure protocol. If higher-level
protocols prescribe a method for doing so, that SHOULD be used.
Otherwise we can compute K' as H(len(A)||A||len(B)||B||len(S)||S||
len(T)||T||len(K)||K) and use K' as the key.
Note that the calculation of S=wN+yG may be performed more
efficiently then by two separate scalar multiplications via Strauss's
algorithm.
3. Table of points for common groups
Every curve presented in the table below has an OID from [OID]. We
construct a string using the OID and the needed constant, for
instance "1.3.132.0.35 point generation seed (M)" for P-512. This
string is turned into an infinite sequence of bytes by hashing with
SHA256, and hashing that output again to generate the next 32 bytes,
and so on.
The initial segment of bytes is taken, and the first byte has all
bits but the low-order one cleared, and the second-order bit set.
This string of bytes is then interpreted as a SEC1 compressed point.
If this is impossible, then the next non-overlapping segment of
sufficient length is taken.
For P256:
M =
02886e2f97ace46e55ba9dd7242579f2993b64e16ef3dcab95afd497333d8fa12f
N =
03d8bbd6c639c62937b04d997f38c3770719c629d7014d49a24b4f98baa1292b49
For P384:
M =
030ff0895ae5ebf6187080a82d82b42e2765e3b2f8749c7e05eba366434b363d3dc
36f15314739074d2eb8613fceec2853
N =
02c72cf2e390853a1c1c4ad816a62fd15824f56078918f43f922ca21518f9c543bb
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252c5490214cf9aa3f0baab4b665c10
For P521:
M =
02003f06f38131b2ba2600791e82488e8d20ab889af753a41806c5db18d37d85608
cfae06b82e4a72cd744c719193562a653ea1f119eef9356907edc9b56979962d7aa
N =
0200c7924b9ec017f3094562894336a53c50167ba8c5963876880542bc669e494b25
32d76c5b53dfb349fdf69154b9e0048c58a42e8ed04cef052a3bc349d95575cd25
4. Security Considerations
A security proof for prime order groups is found in [REF]. Note that
the choice of M and N is critical for the security proof. The points
in the table of points were generated via the use of a hash function
to mitigate this risk.
There is no key-confirmation as this is a one round protocol. It is
expected that a protocol using this key exchange mechanism provides
key confirmation separately if desired.
Elements should be checked for group membership: failure to properly
validate group elements can lead to attacks. In particular it is
essential to verify that received points are valid compressions of
points on an elliptic curve when using elliptic curves. It is not
necessary to validate membership in the prime order subgroup: the
multiplication by cofactors eliminates this issue.
The choices of random numbers should be uniformly at random. Note
that to pick a random multiple of h in [0, ph) one can pick a random
integer in [0,p) and multiply by h.
This PAKE does not support augmentation. As a result, the server has
to store a password equivalent. This is considered a significant
drawback.
As specified the shared secret K is not suitable for use as a shared
key. It should be passed to a hash function along with the public
values used to derive it and the party identities to avoid attacks.
In protocols which do not perform this separately, the value denoted
K' should be used instead. This is critical for security.
5. IANA Considerations
No IANA action is required.
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6. Acknowledgments
Special thanks to Nathaniel McCallum for generation of test vectors.
Thanks to Mike Hamburg for advice on how to deal with cofactors.
Thanks to Fedor Brunner and the members of the CFRG for comments and
advice.
7. References
[REF] Abdalla, M. and Pointcheval, D. Simple Password-Based Encrypted
Key Exchange Protocols. Appears in A. Menezes, editor. Topics in
Cryptography-CT-RSA 2005, Volume 3376 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 191-208, San Francisco, CA, US Feb. 14-18, 2005.
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany.
[OID] Turner, S. and D. Brown and K. Yiu and R. Housley and T. Polk.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information. RFC 5480.
March 2009.
Author Addresses
Watson Ladd
watsonbladd@gmail.com
Berkeley, CA
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