Web Authorization Protocol T. Lodderstedt
Internet-Draft yes.com
Intended status: Standards Track B. Campbell
Expires: March 24, 2020 Ping Identity
N. Sakimura
Nomura Research Institute
D. Tonge
Moneyhub Financial Technology
F. Skokan
September 21, 2019

OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests


This document defines the pushed authorization request endpoint, which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0 authorization request to the authorization server via a direct request and provides them with a request URI that is used as reference to the data in a subsequent authorization request.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

In OAuth [RFC6749] authorization request parameters are typically sent as URI query parameters via redirection in the user-agent. This is simple but also yields challenges:

JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq] provides solutions for those challenges by allowing OAuth clients to wrap authorization request parameters in a signed, and optionally encrypted, JSON Web Token (JWT), the so-called "Request Object".

In order to cope with the size restrictions, JAR introduces the request_uri parameter that allows clients to send a reference to a request object instead of the request object itself.

This document complements JAR by providing an interoperable way to push the payload of a request object directly to the AS in exchange for a request_uri.

It also allows for clients to push the form encoded authorization request parameters to the AS in order to
exchange them for a request URI that the client can use in a subsequent authorization request.

For example, the following authorization request,

  GET /authorize?response_type=code
   &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
  Host: as.example.com

could be pushed directly to the AS by the client as follows,

  POST /as/par HTTP/1.1
  Host: as.example.com
  Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
  Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3


The AS responds with a request URI,

  HTTP/1.1 201 Created
  Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store
  Content-Type: application/json

    "request_uri": "urn:example:bwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2",
    "expires_in": 90

which is used by the client in the subsequent authorization request as follows,

  GET /authorize?request_uri=
    urn%3Aexample%3Abwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2 HTTP/1.1

The pushed authorization request endpoint thus fosters OAuth security by providing all clients a simple means for an integrity protected authorization request, but it also allows clients requiring an even higher security level, especially cryptographically confirmed non-repudiation, to explicitly adopt JWT-based request objects.

1.1. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This specification uses the terms "access token", "refresh token", "authorization server", "resource server", "authorization endpoint", "authorization request", "authorization response", "token endpoint", "grant type", "access token request", "access token response", and "client" defined by The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749].

2. Pushed Authorization Request Endpoint

The pushed authorization request endpoint shall be a RESTful API at the authorization server that accepts x-www-form-urlencoded POST requests.

The endpoint accepts the parameters defined in [RFC6749] for the authorization endpoint as well as all applicable extensions defined for the authorization endpoint. Some examples of such extensions include PKCE [RFC7636], Resource Indicators [I-D.ietf-oauth-resource-indicators], and OpenID Connect [OIDC].

The rules for client authentication as defined in [RFC6749] for token endpoint requests, including the applicable authentication methods, apply for the pushed authorization request endpoint as well. If applicable, the token_endpoint_auth_method client metadata parameter indicates the registered authentication method for the client to use when making direct requests to the authorization server, including requests to the pushed authorization endpoint.

Note that there's some potential ambiguity around the appropriate audience value to use when JWT client assertion based authentication is employed. To address that ambiguity the issuer identifier URL of the AS according to [RFC8414] SHOULD be used as the value of the audience. In order to facilitate interoperability the AS MUST accept its issuer identifier, token endpoint URL, or pushed authorization request endpoint URL as values that identify it as an intended audience.

2.1. Request

A client can send all the parameters that usually comprise an authorization request to the pushed authorization request endpoint. A basic parameter set will typically include:

Depending on client type and authentication method, the request might also include the client_id parameter. The request_uri authorization request parameter MUST NOT be provided in this case (see Section 3).

The client adds the parameters in x-www-form-urlencoded format with a character encoding of UTF-8 as described in Appendix B of [RFC6749] to the body of a HTTP POST request. If applicable, the client also adds client credentials to the request header or the request body using the same rules as for token endpoint requests.

This is illustrated by the following example

  POST /as/par HTTP/1.1
  Host: as.example.com
  Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
  Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3


The AS MUST process the request as follows:

  1. The AS MUST authenticate the client in same way as at the token endpoint.
  2. The AS MUST validate the request the same way as at the authorization endpoint. For example, the authorization server checks whether the redirect URI matches one of the redirect URIs configured for the client_id. It may also check whether the client is authorized for the scope for which it is requesting access. This validation allows the authorization server to refuse unauthorized or fraudulent requests early.

2.2. Successful Response

If the verification is successful, the server shall generate a request URI and return a JSON response that contains request_uri and expires_in members at the top level with 201 Created HTTP response code.

The request_uri value MUST be generated using a cryptographically strong pseudorandom algorithm such that it is computationally infeasible to predict or guess a valid value.

The request URI MUST be bound to the client_id of the client that posted the authorization request.

Since the request URI can be replayed, its lifetime SHOULD be short and preferably limited to one-time use.

The following is an example of such a response:

  HTTP/1.1 201 Created
  Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 15:22:31 GMT
  Content-Type: application/json

    "request_uri": "urn:example:bwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2",
    "expires_in": 3600

2.3. Error Response

2.3.1. Error responses Authentication required

If the client authentication fails, the authorization server shall return 401 Unauthorized HTTP error response. Authorization required

If the client is not authorized to perform the authorization request it wanted to post, the authorization server shall return 403 Forbidden HTTP error response. Invalid request

If the request object received is invalid, the authorization server shall return 400 Bad Request HTTP error response. Method not allowed

If the request did not use POST, the authorization server shall return 405 Method Not Allowed HTTP error response. Request entity too large

If the request size was beyond the upper bound that the authorization server allows, the authorization server shall return a 413 Request Entity Too Large HTTP error response. Too many requests

If the request from the client per a time period goes beyond the number the authorization server allows, the authorization server shall return a 429 Too Many Requests HTTP error response.

3. "request" Parameter

Clients MAY use the request parameter as defined in JAR to push a request object to the AS. The rules for signing and encryption of the request object as defined in JAR [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq] apply.

Clients MUST NOT combine other authorization request parameters with the request parameter at the pushed authorization request endpoint other than the client_id parameter which may be a part of the client authentication mechanism.

The following is an example of a request using a signed request object. The client is authenticated using its client secret BASIC authorization:

  POST /as/par HTTP/1.1
  Host: as.example.com
  Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
  Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3


The AS needs to take the following steps beyond the processing rules defined in Section 2.1:

  1. If applicable, the AS decrypts the request object as specified in JAR [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq], section 6.1.
  2. The AS validates the request object signature as specified in JAR [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq], section 6.2.
  3. If the client is a confidential client, the authorization server MUST check whether the authenticated client_id matches the client_id claim in the request object. If they do not match, the authorization server MUST refuse to process the request. It is at the authorization server's discretion to require the iss claim to match the client_id as well.

3.1. Error responses for Request Object

This section gives the error responses that go beyond the basic Section 2.3.

3.1.1. Authentication Required

If the signature validation fails, the authorization server shall return 401 Unauthorized HTTP error response. The same applies if the client_id or, if applicable, the iss claims in the request object do not match the authenticated client_id.

4. Authorization Request

The client uses the request_uri value as returned by the authorization server as authorization request parameter request_uri.

  GET /authorize?request_uri=
    urn%3Aexample%3Abwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2 HTTP/1.1

Clients are encouraged to use the request URI as the only parameter in order to use the integrity and authenticity provided by the pushed authorization request.

5. Authorization Server Metadata

If the authorization server has a pushed authorization request endpoint, it SHOULD include the following OAuth/OpenID Provider Metadata parameter in discovery responses:

pushed_authorization_request_endpoint : The URL of the pushed authorization request endpoint at which the client can exchange a request object for a request URI.

6. Security Considerations

6.1. Request URI Guessing

An attacker could attempt to guess and replay a valid request URI value and try to impersonat the respective client. The AS MUST consider the considerations given in JAR [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq], section 10.2, clause d on request URI entropy.

6.2. Request Object Replay

An attacker could replay a request URI captured from a legit authorization request. In order to cope with such attacks, the AS SHOULD make the request URIs one-time use.

6.3. Client Policy Change

The client policy might change between the lodging of the request object and the authorization request using a particular request object. It is therefore recommended that the AS checks the request parameter against the client policy when processing the authorization request.

7. Acknowledgements

This specification is based on the work towards Pushed Request Objects conducted at the Financial Grade API working group at the OpenID Foundation. We would would like to thank the members of this WG for their valuable contributions work.

We would like to thank ... for their valuable feedback on this draft.

8. IANA Considerations


9. References

9.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq] Sakimura, N. and J. Bradley, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-19, June 2019.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N. and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414, DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018.

9.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-oauth-resource-indicators] Campbell, B., Bradley, J. and H. Tschofenig, "Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-oauth-resource-indicators-08, September 2019.
[OIDC] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B. and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", Nov 2014.
[RFC7636] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J. and N. Agarwal, "Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients", RFC 7636, DOI 10.17487/RFC7636, September 2015.

Appendix A. Document History

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]


Authors' Addresses

Torsten Lodderstedt yes.com EMail: torsten@lodderstedt.net
Brian Campbell Ping Identity EMail: bcampbell@pingidentity.com
Nat Sakimura Nomura Research Institute EMail: nat@sakimura.org
Dave Tonge Moneyhub Financial Technology EMail: dave@tonge.org
Filip Skokan Auth0 EMail: panva.ip@gmail.com