Retransmission Timeout Considerations

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Abstract

Each implementation of a retransmission timeout mechanism must balance correctness and timeliness and therefore no implementation suits all situations. This document provides for high-level guidance for retransmission timeout schemes appropriate for general
use in the Internet. Within the guidelines, implementations have latitude to define particulars that best address each situation.

Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

1 Introduction

Despite our best intentions and most robust mechanisms, reliability in networking ultimately requires a timeout and re-try mechanism. Often there are more timely and precise mechanisms for repairing loss (e.g., TCP's fast retransmit [RFC5681], NewReno [RFC6582] or selective acknowledgment scheme [RFC2018, RFC6675]) which require information exchange between components in the system. Such communication cannot be guaranteed. Alternatively, information coding can allow the recipient to recover from some amount of lost information without use of a retransmission. This latter provides probabilistic reliability. Finally, negative acknowledgment schemes exist that do not depend on positive feedback to prevent retransmissions (e.g., [RFC3940]). However, regardless of these useful alternatives, the only thing we can truly depend on is the passage of time and therefore our ultimate backstop to ensuring reliability is a timeout. (Note: There is a case when we cannot count on the passage of time, but in this case we believe repairing loss will be a moot point and hence we do not further consider this case in this document.)

Various protocols have defined their own timeout mechanisms (e.g., TCP [RFC6298], SCTP [RFC4960]). The specifics of retransmission timeouts often represent a particular tradeoff between correctness and responsiveness [AP99]. That is, waiting long enough to ensure retransmission correctness leads to unacceptably high delays. On the other hand, bounding delay often leads to incorrect retransmission decisions. Therefore, we have found that even though the procedures are standardized, implementations also often add their own subtle imprint on the specifics of the process to tilt the tradeoff between correctness and responsiveness in some way. At this point we recognize that often these specific tweaks are not crucial for network safety. Hence, in this document we outline the high-level principles that are crucial for any retransmission timeout scheme to follow. The intent is to then allow implementations of protocols and applications to instantiate mechanisms that best realize their specific goals within this framework. These specific mechanisms could be standardized or ad-hoc, but as long as they adhere to the guidelines given in this document they would be considered consistent with the standards.

2 Guidelines

We now list the four guidelines that apply when utilizing a
retransmission timeout (RTO).

(1) In the absence of any knowledge about the round-trip time (RTT) of a path the RTO MUST be conservatively set to no less than 1 second, per TCP’s current default RTO [RFC6298].

This guideline ensures two important aspects of the RTO. First, when transmitting into an unknown network, retransmissions will not be sent before an ACK would reasonably be expected to arrive and hence possibly waste scarce network resources. Second, as noted below, sometimes retransmissions can lead to ambiguities in assessing the RTT of a network path. Therefore, it is especially important for the first RTT sample to be free of ambiguities such that there is a baseline for the remainder of the communication.

(2) We specify three guidelines that pertain to the sampling of the RTT.

(a) In steady state the RTO MUST be set based on recent observations of both the RTT and the variance of the RTT.

   In other words, the RTO should be based on a reasonable amount of time that the sender should wait for an acknowledgment of the data before retransmitting the given data.

(b) RTT observations MUST be taken regularly.

   The exact definition of "regularly" is deliberately left vague. TCP takes an RTT sample once per RTT, or if using the timestamp option [RFC7323] on each acknowledgment arrival. [AP99] shows that both these approaches result in roughly equivalent performance for the RTO estimator. Additionally, [AP99] shows that taking only a single RTT sample per TCP connection is suboptimal. Therefore, for the purpose of this guideline we state that RTT samples SHOULD be taken at least once per RTT or as frequently as data is exchanged and ACKed if that happens less frequently than every RTT. However, we also recognize that it may not always be practical to take an RTT sample this often in all cases and hence this requirement is explicitly a "SHOULD" and not a "MUST".

(c) RTT samples used in the computation of the RTO MUST NOT be ambiguous.

   Assume two copies of some segment X are transmitted at times t0 and t1 and then segment X is acknowledged at time t2. In some cases, it is not clear which copy of X triggered the ACK and hence the actual RTT is either t2-t1 or t2-t0, but which is a mystery. Therefore, in this situation an implementation MUST use Karn’s algorithm [KP87,RFC6298] and use neither version of the RTT sample and hence not update
the RTO.

There are cases where two copies of some data are transmitted in a way whereby the sender can tell which is being acknowledged by an incoming ACK. E.g., TCP’s timestamp option [RFC7323] allows for segments to be uniquely identified and hence avoid the ambiguity. In such cases there is no ambiguity and the resulting samples can update the RTO.

(3) Each time the RTO fires and causes a retransmission the value of the RTO MUST be exponentially backed off such that the next firing requires a longer interval. The backoff may be removed after the successful transmission of non-retransmitted data.

This ensures network safety.

(4) Retransmission timeouts MUST be taken as indications of congestion in the network and the sending rate adapted using a standard mechanism (e.g., TCP collapses the congestion window to one segment [RFC5681]).

This ensures network safety.

An exception is made to this rule if a standard mechanism is used to determine that a particular loss is due to a non-congestion event (e.g., bit errors or packet reordering). In such a case a congestion control action is not required.

3 Discussion

We note that research has shown the tension between responsiveness and correctness of TCP’s RTO seems to be a fundamental tradeoff [AP99]. That is, making TCP’s RTO more aggressive (via the EWMA gains, lowering the minimum RTO, etc.) can reduce the time spent waiting on needed retransmissions. However, at the same time such aggressiveness leads to more needless retransmissions, as well. Therefore, being as aggressive as the guidelines sketched in the last section allow in any particular situation may not be the best course of action (e.g., because an RTO expiration carries a requirement to slow down).

While the tradeoff between responsiveness and correctness seems fundamental, the tradeoff can be made less relevant if the sender can detect and recover from spurious RTOs. Several mechanisms have been proposed for this purpose, such as Eifel [RFC3522], F-RTO [RFC5682] and DSACK [RFC2883,RFC3708]. Using such mechanisms may allow a data originator to tip towards being more responsive without incurring (as much of) the attendant costs of needless retransmits.

Also, note, that in addition to the experiments discussed in [AP99], the Linux TCP implementation has been using various non-standard RTO mechanisms for many years seemingly without large scale problems (e.g., using different EWMA gains). Also, a number of
implementations use minimum RTOs that are less than the 1 second specified in [RFC6298]. While the precise implications of this may show more spurious retransmits (per [AP99]) we are aware of no large scale problems caused by this change to the minimum RTO.

Finally, we note that while allowing implementations to be more aggressive may in fact increase the number of needless retransmissions the above guidelines fail safe in that they insist on exponential backoff of the RTO and a transmission rate reduction. Therefore, allowing implementers latitude in their instantiations of an RTO mechanism does not somehow open the flood gates to aggressive behavior. Since there is a downside to being aggressive the incentives for proper behavior are retained in the mechanism.

4 Security Considerations

This document does not alter the security properties of retransmission timeout mechanisms. See [RFC6298] for a discussion of these within the context of TCP.

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Normative References


Informative References


[ RFC3708 ] Blanton, E., M. Allman, "Using TCP Duplicate Selective Acknowledgement (DSACKs) and Stream Control Transmission


Authors’ Addresses

Mark Allman
International Computer Science Institute
1947 Center St. Suite 600
Berkeley, CA  94704
Phone: 440-235-1792
EMail: mallman@icir.org
http://www.icir.org/mallman