Definition of ROLIE CSIRT Extension
draft-banghart-mile-rolie-csirt-00

Abstract

This document extends the Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange (ROLIE) core to add the information type categories and related requirements needed to support Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) use cases. The indicator and incident information types are defined as ROLIE extensions. Additional supporting requirements are also defined that describe the use of specific formats and link relations pertaining to the new information types.

Contributing to this document

The source for this draft is being maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes should be submitted as pull requests at <https://github.com/CISecurity/ROLIE>. Instructions are on that page as well. Editorial changes can be managed in GitHub, but any substantial issues need to be discussed on the MILE mailing list.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.
Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ...................................................... 3
2. Terminology ...................................................... 4
3. New information-types .............................................. 4
   3.1. The "incident" information type .............................. 4
   3.2. The "indicator" information type ............................ 5
4. Usage of CSIRT Information Types in the Atom Publishing Protocol .................................................. 5
   4.1. / (forward slash) Resource URL ................................ 5
5. Usage of CSIRT Information Types in the atom:feed element .................................................. 5
6. Usage of CSIRT Information Types in an atom:entry .................................................. 5
   6.1. Use of the atom:link element .................................. 6
       6.1.1. Link relations for the 'incident' information-type .................. 6
       6.1.2. Link relations for the 'indicator' information-type ............... 6
       6.1.3. Link relations for both information-types ....................... 7
   6.2. Use of the rolie:format element ............................... 7
       6.2.1. IODEF Format ........................................... 8
       6.2.2. STIX Format ........................................... 8
   6.3. Additional requirements for use of IODEF ....................... 8
       6.3.1. The IODEF Document .................................... 8
       6.3.2. Category Element ...................................... 9
       6.3.3. Entry Elements ...................................... 9
       6.3.4. User Authorization .................................. 10
       6.3.5. Expectation and Impact Classes ......................... 10
       6.3.6. Search ............................................... 10
7. IANA Considerations ............................................... 11
   7.1. incident information-type .................................... 11
   7.2. indicator information-type ................................... 11
8. Security Considerations ........................................... 11
9. Normative References ............................................. 11
Appendix A. Non-Normative Examples ................................ 12
   A.1. Use of Link Relations ...................................... 12
       A.1.1. Use Case: Incident Sharing .............................. 13
1. Introduction

Threats to computer security are evolving ever more rapidly as time goes on. As software increases in complexity, the number of vulnerabilities in systems and networks can increase exponentially. Threat actors looking to exploit these vulnerabilities are making more frequent and more widely distributed attacks across a large variety of systems. The adoption of liberal information sharing amongst attackers allows a discovered vulnerability to be shared and used to attack a vulnerable system within a narrow window of time. As the skills and knowledge required to identify and combat these attacks become more and more specialized, even a well established and secure system may find itself unable to quickly respond to an incident. Effective identification of and response to a sophisticated attack requires open cooperation and collaboration between defending operators, software vendors, and end-users. To improve the timeliness of responses, automation must be used to acquire, contextualize, and put to use shared computer security information.

CSIRTs share two primary forms of information: incidents and indicators. Using these forms of information, analysts are able to perform a wide range of activities both proactive and reactive to ensure the security of their systems.

Incident information describes a cyber security incident. Such information may include attack characteristics, information about the attacker, and attack vector data. Sharing this information helps analysts within the sharing community to inoculate their systems against similar attacks, providing proactive protection.

Indicator information describes the symptoms or necessary pre-conditions of an attack. Everything from system vulnerabilities to unexpected network traffic can help analysts secure systems and prepare for an attack. Making this information available for sharing aids in the proactive defense of systems both within an operating unit but also for any CSIRTs that are part of a sharing consortium.

As a means to bring automation of content discovery and dissemination into the CSIRT domain, this specification provides an extension to the Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange (ROLIE) core [I-D.ietf-mile-rolie] designed to address CSIRT use cases. The primary purpose of this extension is to define two new information
types: incident, and indicator, along with formats and link relations that support these information-types.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST," "MUST NOT," "REQUIRED," "SHALL," "SHALL NOT," "SHOULD," "SHOULD NOT," "RECOMMENDED," "MAY," and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Definitions for some of the common computer security-related terminology used in this document can be found in Section 2 of [RFC5070].

3. New information-types

This document defines the following two information types:

3.1. The "incident" information type

The "incident" information type represents any information describing or pertaining to a computer security incident. This document uses the definition of incident provided by [RFC4949]. Provided below is a non-exhaustive list of information that may be considered to be an incident information type.

- Timing information: start and end times for the incident and/or the response.
- Descriptive information: plain text or machine readable data that provides some degree of description of the incident itself.
- Response information: the methods and results of a response to the incident.
- Meta and contact information: data about the CSIRT that recorded the information, or the operator that enacted the response.
- Effect and result information: data that describes the effects of an incident, or what the final results of the incident are.

Note again that this list is not exhaustive, any information that is in the abstract realm of an incident should be classified under this information-type.
3.2. The "indicator" information type

The "indicator" information type represents computer security indicators or any information surrounding them. This document uses the definition of indicator provided by [RFC4949]. Some examples of indicator information is provided below, but note that indicator is defined in an abstract sense, to be understood as a flexible and widely-applicable definition.

- Specific vulnerabilities that indicate a vector for attack.
- Signs of malicious reconnaissance.
- Definitions of patterns of other indicators.
- Events that may indicate an attack and information regarding those events.
- Meta information about the collecting agent.

This list is intended to provide examples of the indicator information-type, not to define it.

4. Usage of CSIRT Information Types in the Atom Publishing Protocol

These requirements apply when a ROLIE repository contains any Collections with categories with scheme attributes of either CSIRT information type, or if the CSIRT information types appear in the Categories document.

4.1. / (forward slash) Resource URL

The forward slash resource URL MUST be supported as defined in Section 5.5 [I-D.ietf-mile-rolie]. Note that this is a stricter requirement than the core document.

5. Usage of CSIRT Information Types in the atom:feed element

This document does not define any additional requirements for Feeds.

6. Usage of CSIRT Information Types in an atom:entry

This document defines the following requirements for any Entries that are of the CSIRT information type categories.
6.1. Use of the atom:link element

These sections define requirements for atom:link elements in Entries. Note that the requirements are determined by the information type that appears in either the Entry or in the parent Feed.

6.1.1. Link relations for the 'incident' information-type

If the category of an Entry is the incident information type, then the following requirements MUST be followed for inclusion of atom:link elements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Conformance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>indicators</td>
<td>Provides a link to a collection of zero or more instances of cyber security indicators that are associated with the resource.</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evidence</td>
<td>Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that provides some proof of attribution for an incident. The evidence may or may not have any identified chain of custody.</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attacker</td>
<td>Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that provides a representation of the attacker.</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vector</td>
<td>Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that provides a representation of the method used by the attacker.</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Link Relations for Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange

6.1.2. Link relations for the 'indicator' information-type

If the category of an Entry is the indicator information type, then the following requirements MUST be followed for inclusion of atom:link elements.
6.1.3. Link relations for both information-types

Regardless of the category of an Entry, the following requirements MUST be followed for inclusion of atom:link elements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Conformance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>assessments</td>
<td>Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that represent the results of executing a benchmark.</td>
<td>MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reports</td>
<td>Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that represent RID reports.</td>
<td>MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traceRequests</td>
<td>Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that represent RID traceRequests.</td>
<td>MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investigationRequests</td>
<td>Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that represent RID investigationRequests.</td>
<td>MAY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Link Relations for Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange

6.2. Use of the rolie:format element

This document defines two additional valid values for the ‘ns’ attribute of the rolie:format element. Both of these formats are valid for either information type.
6.2.1. IODEF Format

If, and only if, the content of the Entry contains an IODEF document, then the ‘ns’ attribute of the rolie:format element MUST be ‘TODO-IODEF-URN’.

Any entry using the IODEF format MUST conform to the requirements in Section 6.3

The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) is a format for representing computer security information commonly exchanged between Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) or other operational security teams.

IODEF conveys indicators, incident reports, response activities, and related meta-data in an XML serialization. This information is formally structured in order to support and encourage automated machine-to-machine security communication, as well as enhanced processing at the endpoint.

The full IODEF specification provides further high-level discussion and technical details.

6.2.2. STIX Format

If, and only if, the content of the Entry contains a STIX document, then the ‘ns’ attribute of the rolie:format element MUST be ‘TODO-STIX-URN’.

STIX is a structured language for describing a wide range of security resources. STIX approaches the problem with a focus on flexibility, automation, readability, and extensibility.

The use of STIX as the content of an Entry does not impose any additional requirements on ROLIE implementations.

6.3. Additional requirements for use of IODEF

This section provides the normative requirements for usage of the IODEF format.

6.3.1. The IODEF Document

An IODEF document that is carried in an Atom Entry SHOULD NOT contain a <relatedActivity> element. Instead, the related activity SHOULD be available via a link rel=related.
An IODEF document that is carried in an Atom Entry SHOULD NOT contain a <history> element. Instead, the related history SHOULD be available via a link rel="history" (todo: or a fully qualified link rek name). The associated href MAY leverage OpenSearch to specify the required query.

### 6.3.2. Category Element

A collection or entry containing IODEF incident content MUST contain at least two <category> element. One category element must have the scheme attribute be equal to ‘urn:ietf:params:rolie:category:iodef:purpose’ and the other ‘urn:ietf:params:rolie:category:iodef:restriction’. This metadata provides valuable metadata for searching and organization.

When the scheme attribute of this element is ‘urn:ietf:params:rolie:category:iodef:purpose’, the term attribute MUST be constrained as per section 3.2 of IODEF, e.g. traceback, mitigation, reporting, or other.

When the scheme attribute of this element is ‘urn:ietf:params:rolie:category:iodef:restriction’, the term attribute MUST be constrained as per section 3.2 of IODEF, e.g. public, need-to-know, private, default.

### 6.3.3. Entry Elements

AUTHORS NOTE: This section is TODO.

An entry containing an IODEF payload MUST contain an <ROLIE-CSIRT:ID> element. This element The ID element for an Atom entry SHOULD be established via the concatenation of the value of the name attribute from the IODEF <IncidentID> element and the corresponding value of the <IncidentID> element. This requirement ensures a simple and direct one-to-one relationship between an IODEF incident ID and a corresponding Feed entry ID and avoids the need for any system to maintain a persistent store of these identity mappings.

(todo: Note that this implies a constraint on the IODEF document that is more restrictive than the current IODEF schema. IODEF section 3.3 requires only that the name be a STRING type. Here we are stating that name must be an IRI. Possible request to update IODEF to constrain, or to support a new element or attribute).
6.3.4. User Authorization

When the content model for the Atom <content> element of an Atom Entry contains an <IODEF-Document>, then authorization MUST be adjudicated based upon the Atom <category> element(s), whose values have been mapped as per Section 6.3.2.

6.3.5. Expectation and Impact Classes

It is frequently the case that an organization will need to triage their investigation and response activities based upon, e.g., the state of the current threat environment, or simply as a result of having limited resources.

In order to enable operators to effectively prioritize their response activity, it is RECOMMENDED that feed implementers provide Atom categories that correspond to the IODEF Expectation and Impact classes. The availability of these feed categories will enable clients to more easily retrieve and prioritize cyber security information that has already been identified as having a specific potential impact, or having a specific expectation.

Support for these categories may also enable efficiencies for organizations that already have established (or plan to establish) operational processes and workflows that are based on these IODEF classes.

6.3.6. Search

Implementers SHOULD support search based upon the IODEF AlternativeID class as a search parameter.

Implementers SHOULD support search based upon the four timestamp elements of the IODEF Incident class: <startTime>, <EndTime>, <DetectTime>, and <ReportTime>.

Implementers MAY support additional search capabilities based upon any of the remaining elements of the IODEF Incident class, including the <Description> element.

Collections that support use of the RID schema as a content model in the Atom member entry <content> element (e.g. in a report resource representation reachable via the "report" link relationship) MUST support search operations that include the RID MessageType as a search parameter, in addition to the aforementioned IODEF schema elements, as contained within the <ReportSchema> element.
7. IANA Considerations

7.1. incident information-type

IANA has added an entry to the "ROLIE Security Resource Information Type Sub-Registry" registry located at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/rolie/category/information-type>.

The entry is as follows:

name: incident
index: TBD
reference: This document, Section 3.1

7.2. indicator information-type

IANA has added an entry to the "ROLIE Security Resource Information Type Sub-Registry" registry located at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/rolie/category/information-type>.

The entry is as follows:

name: indicator
index: TBD
reference: This document, Section 3.2

8. Security Considerations

This document implies the use of ROLIE in high-security use cases, as such, added care should be taken to fortify and secure ROLIE repositories and clients using this extension. The guidance in the ROLIE core specification is strongly recommended, and implementers should consider adding additional security measures as they see fit.

9. Normative References

Appendix A. Non-Normative Examples

TODO

A.1. Use of Link Relations

A key benefit of using the RESTful architectural style is the ability to enable the client to navigate to related resources through the use of hypermedia links. In the Atom Syndication Format, the type of the related resource identified in a <link> element is indicated via the "rel" attribute, where the value of this attribute identifies the kind of related resource available at the corresponding "href" attribute. Thus, in lieu of a well-known URI template the URI itself is effectively opaque to the client, and therefore the client must understand the semantic meaning of the "rel" attribute in order to successfully navigate. Broad interoperability may be based upon a sharing consortium defining a well-known set of Atom Link Relation types. These Link Relation types may either be registered with IANA, or held in a private registry.

Individual CSIRTs may always define their own link relation types in order to support specific use cases, however support for a core set of well-known link relation types is encouraged as this will maximize interoperability.

In addition, it may be beneficial to define use case profiles that correspond to specific groupings of supported link relationship types. In this way, a CSIRT may unambiguously specify the classes of use cases for which a client can expect to find support.

The following sections provide non-normative examples of link relation usage. Three distinct cyber security information sharing use case scenarios are described. In each use case, the unique benefits of adopting a resource-oriented approach to information sharing are highlighted.
sharing are illustrated. It is important to note that these use cases are intended to be a small representative set and is by no means meant to be an exhaustive list. The intent is to illustrate how the use of link relationship types will enable this resource-oriented approach to cyber security information sharing to successfully support the complete range of existing use cases, and also to motivate an initial list of well-defined link relationship types.

A.1.1. Use Case: Incident Sharing

This section provides a non-normative example of an incident sharing use case.

In this use case, a member CSIRT shares incident information with another member CSIRT in the same consortium. The client CSIRT retrieves a feed of incidents, and is able to identify one particular entry of interest. The client then does an HTTP GET on that entry, and the representation of that resource contains link relationships for both the associated "indicators" and the incident "history", and so on. The client CSIRT recognizes that some of the indicator and history may be relevant within her local environment, and can respond proactively.

Example HTTP GET response for an incident entry:
As can be seen in the example response, the Atom <link> elements enable the client to navigate to the related indicator resources, and/or the history entries associated with this incident.
A.1.2. Use Case: Collaborative Investigation

This section provides a non-normative example of a collaborative investigation use case.

In this use case, two member CSIRTs that belong to a closed sharing consortium are collaborating on an incident investigation. The initiating CSIRT performs an HTTP GET to retrieve the service document of the peer CSIRT, and determines the collection name to be used for creating a new investigation request. The initiating CSIRT then POSTs a new incident entry to the appropriate collection URL. The target CSIRT acknowledges the request by responding with an HTTP status code 201 Created.

Example HTTP GET response for the service document:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:09:11 GMT
Content-Length: 934
Content-Type: application/atomsvc+xml;charset=utf-8

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<service xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2007/app" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
    <atom:title type="text">RID Use Case Requests</atom:title>
    <collection href="http://www.example.org/csirt/RID/InvestigationRequests">
      <atom:title type="text">Investigation Requests</atom:title>
      <accept>application/atom+xml; type=entry</accept>
    </collection>
    <collection href="http://www.example.org/csirt/RID/TraceRequests">
      <atom:title type="text">Trace Requests</atom:title>
      <accept>application/atom+xml; type=entry</accept>
    </collection>
  </workspace>
</service>

As can be seen in the example response, the Atom <collection> elements enable the client to determine the appropriate collection URL to request an investigation or a trace.

The client CSIRT then POSTs a new entry to the appropriate feed collection. Note that the <content> element of the new entry may contain a RID message of type "InvestigationRequest" if desired, however this would NOT be required. The entry content itself need
only be an IODEF document, with the choice of the target collection resource URL indicating the callers intent. A CSIRT would be free to use any URI template to accept investigationRequests.

POST /csirt/RID/InvestigationRequests HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org
Content-Type: application/atom+xml;type=entry
Content-Length: 852

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<entry xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <title>New Investigation Request</title>
  <id>http://www.example2.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456</id>
  <!-- id and updated not guaranteed to be preserved -->
  <!-- may want to profile that behavior in this document -->
  <updated>2012-08-12T11:08:22Z</updated>
  <author><name>Name of peer CSIRT</name></author>
  <content type="application/xml">
    <iodef:IODEF-Document lang="en" xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef:Incident purpose="traceback" restriction="need-to-know">
        <iodef:IncidentID name="http://www.example2.org/csirt/private/incidents">123</iodef:IncidentID>
        <!-- ...additional incident data... -->
      </iodef:Incident>
    </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  </content>
</entry>

The receiving CSIRT acknowledges the request with HTTP return code 201 Created.
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 19:17:11 GMT
Content-Length: 906
Content-Type: application/atom+xml;type=entry
Location: http://www.example.org/csirt/RID/InvestigationRequests/823
ETag: "8a9h9he4qphqh"

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<entry xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
    <title>New Investigation Request</title>
    <id>http://www.example.org/csirt/RID/InvestigationRequests/823</id>
    <updated>2012-08-12T11:08:30Z</updated>
    <published>2012-08-12T11:08:30Z</published>
    <author><name>Name of peer CSIRT</name></author>
    <content type="application/xml">
        <iodef:IODEF-Document lang="en" xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
            <iodef:Incident purpose="traceback" restriction="need-to-know">
                <iodef:IncidentID name="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents">123</iodef:IncidentID>
                <!-- ...additional incident data.... -->
            </iodef:Incident>
        </iodef:IODEF-Document>
    </content>
</entry>

Consistent with HTTP/1.1 RFC, the location header indicates the URL of the newly created InvestigationRequest. If for some reason the request were not authorized, the client would receive an HTTP status code 403 Unauthorized. In this case the HTTP response body may contain additional details, if an as appropriate.

### A.1.3. Use Case: Cyber Data Repository

This section provides a non-normative example of a cyber security data repository use case.

In this use case a client accesses a persistent repository of cyber security data via a RESTful usage model. Retrieving a feed collection is analogous to an SQL SELECT statement producing a result set. Retrieving an individual Atom Entry is analogous to a SQL SELECT statement based upon a primary key producing a unique record. The cyber security data contained in the repository may include different data types, including indicators, incidents, benchmarks, or any other related resources. In this use case, the repository is queried via HTTP GET, and the results that are returned to the client
may optionally contain URL references to other cyber security
resources that are known to be related. These related resources may
also be persisted locally, or they may exist at another (remote)
cyber data repository.

Example HTTP GET request to a persistent repository for any resources
representing Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks:

GET /csirt/repository/ddos
Host: www.example.org
Accept: application/atom+xml

The corresponding HTTP response would be an XML document containing
the DDOS feed.

Example HTTP GET response for a DDOS feed:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:20:11 GMT
Content-Length: nnnn
Content-Type: application/atom+xml;type=feed;charset="utf-8"

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom
 file:/C:/schemas/atom.xsd
 urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0
 file:/C:/schemas/iodef-1.0.xsd"
 xml:lang="en-US">
<generator version="1.0" xml:lang="en-US">
 emc-csirt-iodef-feed-service</generator>
<id>http://www.example.org/csirt/repository/ddos</id>
<title type="text" xml:lang="en-US">
 Atom formatted representation of a feed of known ddos resources.
</title>
<author>
 <email>csirt@example.org</email>
 <name>EMC CSIRT</name>
</author>

<!-- By convention there is usually a self link for the feed -->
<link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/repository/ddos"
 rel="self"/>
<entry>
  <id>http://www.example.org/csirt/repository/ddos/123456</id>
  <title>Sample DDOS Incident</title>
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/repository/ddos/123456" rel="self"/>
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/repository/ddos/123456" rel="alternate"/>
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/repository/ddos/987654" rel="related"/>
  <link href="http://www.cyber-agency.gov/repository/indicators/1a2b3c" rel="related"/>
  <published>2012-08-04T18:13:51.0Z</published>
  <updated>2012-08-05T18:13:51.0Z</updated>
  <category term="traceback" scheme="purpose" label="trace back"/>
  <category term="need-to-know" scheme="restriction" label="need to know"/>
  <category term="ddos" scheme="ttp" label="tactics, techniques, and procedures"/>
  <summary>A short description of this DDOS attack, extracted from the IODEF Incident class, <description> element. </summary>
</entry>

This feed document has two atom entries, one of which has been elided. The completed entry illustrates an Atom <entry> element that provides a summary of essential details about one particular DDOS incident. Based upon this summary information and the provided category information, a client may choose to do an HTTP GET operation to retrieve the full details of the DDOS incident. This example shows how a persistent repository may provide links to additional resources, both local and remote.

Note that the provider of a persistent repository is not obligated to follow any particular URL template scheme. The repository available at the hypothetical provider "www.example.com" uses a different URL pattern than the hypothetical repository available at "www.cyber-agency.gov". When a client de-references a link to resource that is located in a remote repository the client may be challenged for authentication credentials acceptable to that provider. If the two
repository providers choose to support a federated identity scheme or some other form of single-sign-on technology, then the user experience can be improved for interactive clients (e.g., a human user at a browser). However, this is not required and is an implementation choice that is out of scope for this specification.

Authors’ Addresses

John P. Field
Pivotal Software, Inc.
625 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York
USA

Phone: (646)792-5770
Email: jfield@pivotal.io

Stephen A. Banghart
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, Maryland
USA

Phone: (301)975-4288
Email: sab3@nist.gov