Safe IKE Recovery
draft-detienne-ikev2-recovery-03

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Abstract

The Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2 (IKEv2) suffers from the limitation of not having a means to quickly recover from a stale state known as dangling Security Associations (SA’s) where one side has SA’s that the corresponding party does not have anymore.

This Draft proposes to address the limitation by offering an immediate, DoS-free recovery mechanism for IKE that can be used in all failover or post-crash situations.
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1. Introduction

If an IKEv2 ([IKEv2]) endpoint receives an IPsec packet that it does not recognize (invalid SPI), a specific notify (INVALID_SPI) can be sent back to the originating peer to take action. This payload is typically only going to be trusted if it is protected by a IKE_SA as unprotected notifies can easily be forged. Similarly, an IKEv2 endpoint receiving an unrecognized IKE message MAY send back an INVALID_IKE_SPI notify to the originating peer. In order to validate those unauthenticated messages, a polling sequence has to be started.

The polling sequence works as follow. When a peer doubts the liveness of its remote peer, it can send empty informational exchanges expecting a reply confirming liveness. This works as informational exchanges are supposed to be acknowledged in IKEv2.

Practical mechanisms offered so far suffer from one of the following limitations:
- poll based and slow to react or resource hungry
- based on unauthenticated packets and hence open to denial of service attacks
- resource intensive (mostly CPU)

This memo proposes to decrease the time incurred by this sequence.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [Bra97].

2. Protocol overview

2.1. Protocol requirements

Dangling SA’s can arise from many situations and in many network deployment contexts. The protocol described herein is meant to solve the dangling SA problem in all possible contexts, without making any assumption on resource availability that IKE does not already make. Since speed is the main driver for this memo, the protocol must minimize the time taken to identify then repair a dangling SA condition.

2.1.1. Security level

The security level of the protocol is targeted to be at least as secure as IKE itself; i.e., the recovery protocol MUST NOT offer an entry point to an attack that IKE alone could resist to (sufficient level of security).
2.1.2. Network scenarios

2.1.2.1. Remote access vs. lan-to-lan

The protocol must be independent of the network deployment. I.e., the protocol must be usable in lan-to-lan as well as in remote-access types of situations or any other use case that can be deployed. No restriction must be made for the scope of the recovery protocol.

2.1.2.2. Failover pairs and clusters

The protocol must work in the presence of failover pairs or clusters. Some network deployments will involve clusters of devices acting as a single device and those clusters may be extremely large. No assumption must be made as to the devices or group of devices that will implement the protocols. No back-channel mechanism should be necessary for the cluster to support the recovery protocol fully and securely; it is not expected that the cluster will be practically able to maintain communication between its elements, yet failover and recovery between elements of the cluster must remain possible.

2.1.2.3. Transition smoothness

The protocol must cover for transitions; in particular, it must cover what happens when the SA search indices are changed. For example, if the (IKE_SPI,src_addr,dst_addr) tuple changes as would be the case in an IKE rekey or a MOBIKE update, the recovery protocol must support that transition smoothly.

Ideally, the protocol must be insensitive to SA index changes and must avoid deleting state in order to preserve the data flow until new SA’s are in place to take care of it.

2.1.3. Lightweightness

The protocol should be lightweight and consume minimum amounts of network, memory and computational resources to validate dangling state. Ideally, the protocol should not consume anything that is not strictly necessary to the security and validity of the protocol. Also, the protocol should avoid state creation until absolutely necessary.

This requirement is particularly important for resource constrained devices as well as for multiprotocol devices whose memory and CPU is claimed by and shared with other protocols or tasks. This requirement is the main reason for ruling out Birth Certificates as described in [BIRTHCERT].
2.2. High level description

The recovery procedure works in 3 stages:
1. An invalid IKE or ESP packet is received by either peer
2. The remote peer is notified through a protected or unprotected notify
   * Protected notifies are implicitly trusted
   * The remote peer attempts to confirm the legitimacy of Unprotected Notifies
3. The remote peer deletes or recreates the SA’s in error

2.3. Notation

The IKEv2 notation will be used throughout this document with one notable addition. Parent SA describes an IKE_SA from which a CHILD_SA has been derived.

The following notation is specific to this document:
- Cookie_X: a cookie generated by peer X that is to be reflected by peer Y.
- CHECK_SPI(QUERY/ACK/NACK, Cookie): a contextual notation to express that cookie data is attached to a CHECK_SPI payload CHECK_SPI(QUERY/ACK/NACK). See Section 6.

2.4. Protocol design guidelines

The general approach to recovering from dangling SA situations is to send proofs of desynchronization and liveness. It is admittedly difficult for two gateways to demonstrate they did have SA’s but have lost them without a secure, authenticated channel to do so. It is however relatively easy for these gateways to provide valuable hints about the lost SA’s.

This memo presents a protocol that builds enough trust for those hints to be taken in account. The basic principle is that an attacker taking advantage of this recovery procedure would have to be positioned on the network such that it could perform more interesting attacks than tackling recovery. I.e. the barrier for attacking IKE recovery is as high or higher than other parts of the IKE protocol.

The recovery of SA’s as outlined in this memo occurs in three phases:
- Unrecognized SPI’s are detected
- The protocol collects clues of previous connectivity
- The SA’s are repaired by [IKEv2] or by reconstructing the SA from the "ticket"

This memo follows the below guidelines:
o  event driven protocol -- no polling involved
o  re-create SA’s instead of deleting them upon error
o  let the side that still has the SA’s negotiate fresh SA’s after a failure
o  do not generate state when it can be avoided; reduce CPU cost

2.5.  Protocol design rationale

IKEv2 already specifies a poll-based peer liveness detection mechanism. While this type of mechanism helps recovery in most situations, the time taken for recovery tends to be high. Convergence time requirements are getting shorter and faster protocols are becoming a necessity.

The protocol in this memo is triggered when dangling SA’s are detected, i.e. when a peer receives unrecognized SPI’s. This event is in turn triggered when there is actual traffic to be sent so there would be little point in just deleting SA’s then hoping for the systems to recreate them. Instead, these SA’s SHOULD be repaired as fast as possible in order for the underlying network traffic to be forwarded. This protocol assumes that the dangling SA’s are meant to be rebuilt and not deleted.

The device that has the SA’s also has all the information needed to rekey them and becomes the defacto initiator at the end of the recovery procedure. This is particularly important for systems with dynamic security policies that do not specify how to build the SA; it may not be obvious for those peers to determine which security parameter they should use to recreate the SA they are now missing. When recreating the SA, the peer that has SA’s implicitly knows what to rebuild and can use the old SA as a template.

The choice of the rekeyer also brings in an added security value. The side that wants to transmit data or at least that pretends having SA’s has to demonstrate ‘willingness’ to actually transmit. Correspondingly it also means that the gateway that does not have SA’s is not forced to negotiate anything it may not need. It is important to note that the initial effort of setting up timers and retransmitting, etc... is left to the side that wants to transmit data.

Last but not least, the protocol can remain stateless until sufficient proof of liveness is discovered. In fact, one of the protocol variations in this memo allows full statelessness at the expense of a round trip time. In an other variation, some small but reboot-resistant storage (a key) is used to accelerate the recovery.
3. IKE recovery

3.1. IKE Recovery options

During their IKEv2 exchange, two peers negotiate support for IKE Recovery. If both peers can store ephemeral information as well as longer term additional information related to IKE Recovery, an accelerated procedure for setting up new SAs can be used. This procedure is called Ticket Based IKE Recovery and is described in Section 3.3.

If either peer cannot store ephemeral or long term information, peers fall back to Stateless IKE Recovery described in Section 3.2.

In either case, IKE Recovery is negotiated during the initial IKE exchange by advertising capabilities as described in Section 5.

3.2. Stateless IKE Recovery

3.2.1. Introducing CHECK_SPI

In order to achieve stateless IKE recovery, this memo introduces a new notify type called CHECK_SPI. The CHECK_SPI payload carries an SPI (IKE_SA or Child SA) and one of three sub-types (QUERY, ACK, NACK). The semantic of the CHECK_SPI subtypes is the following:
- QUERY: a peer queries the remote peer SA DB for the presence of the SA whose value is in the payload
- ACK: a peer confirms it has the SA specified in the payload
- NACK: a peer confirms it does not have the SA specified in the payload

The payload format of the CHECK_SPI notify is covered in Section 6.

3.2.2. Stateless recovery by invalid IKE packets

When an IKE peer X receives an IKE packet with an unknown IKE SPI (A,B), that is not an initialization offer (IKE_SA_INIT), peer X SHOULD send an unprotected INVALID_IKE_SPI notification.

Peer X                             Peer Y
HDR(A,B) ...                      HDR(A,B) ...
----------------------------------
<-----------------------------------
HDR(A,B) INVALID_IKE_SPI(A,B)      HDR(A,B) ...
---------------------------------->

Even if another IKE_SA exists with the remote peer Y, the
notification MUST NOT be sent protected since peer Y may not share this SA either.

In order to limit the risk of Denial of Service attacks, the sending of the INVALID_IKE_SPI notification MUST be rate limited.

When peer Y receives the unauthenticated INVALID_IKE_SPI referencing the offending IKE SPI (A,B), Y MUST perform the following actions:

- verify that (A,B) is indeed an active IKE_SPI with X
- send to X a notify type CHECK_SPI(QUERY, (A,B), Cookie_Y)

Peer X

\[
\text{HDR}(A,B) \text{ INVALID\_IKE\_SPI}(A,B) \]
\[
\text{-------------------------------------------->}
\]

Peer Y

\[
\text{HDR}(A,B) \text{ CHECK\_SPI}(\text{QUERY}(A,B),\text{Cookie}_Y) \]
\[
\text{<-------------------------------------------->}
\]

The sending of the CHECK_SPI packet MUST be rate limited on a per peer basis.

State SHOULD NOT have been generated by either X or Y at this point. If the INVALID_IKE_SPI or CHECK_SPI notification gets lost, and X indeed does not have the IKE SPI, the process will start over again at the next protected IKE message sent by Y to X.

When peer X receives an unauthenticated CHECK_SPI(QUERY, (A,B)) packet, it MUST perform a look up for (A,B) in its IKE_SA database. Depending on whether X has or does not have the offending SA, it SHOULD reply with an IKE packet CHECK_SPI(ACK/NACK, (A,B)). The cookie data in the CHECK_SPI(ACK/NACK) packet is the same as that recieved in the CHECK_SPI(QUERY), i.e. the cookie is reflected back in the response.

Section 3.2.4 discusses cookie generation in greater detail. For now, it is enough to know that the cookie should contain enough information for peer Y to validate the CHECK_SPI(ACK/NACK) response without having to keep any state.

Peer X

\[
\text{HDR}(A,B) \text{ CHECK\_SPI}(\text{QUERY},(A,B),\text{Cookie}_Y) \]
\[
\text{<-------------------------------------------->}
\]

Peer Y

\[
\text{HDR}(A,B) \text{ CHECK\_SPI}(\text{ACK}/\text{NACK},(A,B),\text{Cookie}_Y) \]
\[
\text{[N(\text{Cookie}_X)}\]
\[
\text{<-------------------------------------------->}
\]
When peer Y receives the CHECK_SPI(ACK/NACK, Cookie_Y) packet, it MUST ensure Cookie_Y is valid. If it is not, the packet MUST be dropped and a rate limited message MUST be logged.

If Cookie_Y is valid and the remote peer X confirms it has the IKE SPI (via CHECK_SPI(ACK,...)), a rate limited message SHOULD be logged; this could be a race condition or an attack from a spoofing attacker.

If Cookie_Y is valid and the remote peer X confirms it does NOT have the IKE SPI (via CHECK_SPI(NACK,...)), peer Y SHOULD initiate a new IKE exchange to renegotiate the Parent SA. The parameters of the negotiation SHOULD be taken primarily from the configuration (security policy) and, if absent, taken from the confirmed dangling SA. Renegotiation of CHILD_SA’s SHOULD follow the Parent IKE_SA creation. The original SA’s SHOULD be deleted after successful creation of the new SA’s.

Peer X can also include an optional N(Cookie_X) payload in the CHECK_SPI(ACK/NACK) packet. This Cookie MUST be reflected back by Y in the new IKE exchange that completes the recovery. This additional cookie saves one round trip between peers that require an anti-spoofing Cookie exchange.

A complete recovery exchange for IKE SA’s would look like:

Peer X                                                  Peer Y

```
HDR(A,B) ...
<-------------------------------------------->
HDR(A,B) INVALID_IKE_SPI(A,B)
-------------------------------------------->
HDR(A,B) CHECK_SPI(QUERY,(A,B), Cookie_Y)
<-------------------------------------------->
HDR(A,B) CHECK_SPI(NACK,(A,B), Cookie_Y)
 [N(Cookie_X)]
-------------------------------------------->
HDR(A’,0) SAi1, KEi, Ni, [N(Cookie_X)]
<-------------------------------------------->
```

...
3.2.3. Wait before rekey

There exists a particular attack where a man-in-the-middle can snoop and inject traffic but cannot block or drop packets. This attack can spoof INVALID_SPI (allegedly from X), forcing a CHECK_SPI(QUERY) from Y. The attacker would spoof back CHECK_SPI(NACK) to force an undue rekey. Since the attacker cannot block packets, the CHECK_SPI(QUERY) will also reach X, who will reply with CHECK_SPI(ACK).

Y receives CHECK_SPI(NACK) first and MAY wait for a few msec before creating a new SA. Y will eventually receive BOTH a CHECK_SPI(ACK) and a CHECK_SPI(NACK). Which is dubious. The SIR process should then stop and log an error, saving the SA.

The process is illustrated below:

X                 Attacker                Y
               Inv SPI
------------------>  
CHECK_SPI(QUERY)  
<------------------------
CHECK_SPI(NACK)    Should rekey         
-------------------->      but wait a few msec
CHECK_SPI(ACK)    Hint of attack        
-------------------->      => no rekey

Ideally, the round-trip-time should be measured during the IKE exchange and Y wait for a full RTT before initiating a rekey.

Given that IKE itself is subject to DH computation by a man-in-the-middle, also considering that SA’s are dampened after creation (see Section 4.2), the staging complexity and limited interest of this attack makes it rather impractical. An implementation MAY decide to implement this final safety delay but this is strictly optional.

3.2.4. Stateless IKE Recovery cookie

The cookie information is chosen by the peer that emits it. As such, the cookie has strictly no meaning for the remote peer and can thus be chosen as seen fit. This section provides recommendations on how to generate and validate those cookies.
When an IKE endpoint sends an unauthenticated CHECK_SPI, the cookie payload following the notify is computed as follow:

$$\text{Cookie} = \langle \text{VersionIDofSecret} \rangle \big| H(<\text{secret}> \big| \text{CHECK_SPI}(\ldots, \text{Query}) \big| \text{ip.src} \big| \text{ip.dst} \big| \text{udp.src} \big| \text{udp.dst})$$

where

- $<\text{secret}>$ is a randomly generated secret known only to the responder and periodically changed
- $<\text{VersionIDofSecret}>$ should be changed whenever $<\text{secret}>$ is regenerated
- $\text{CHECK_SPI}(\ldots, \text{Query})$ is the content of the CHECK_SPI notify payload where the operation subtype has been set to Query (cf. Section 6)
- $\text{ip.src}$ is the source ip address of the IKE packet
- $\text{ip.dst}$ is the destination ip address of the IKE packet
- $\text{udp.src}$ is the source udp port of the IKE packet
- $\text{udp.dst}$ is the destination udp port of the IKE packet

Upon reception of a CHECK_SPI(ACK or NACK) response containing a cookie, a peer can verify whether this is the reply to a Query it placed by recomputing the cookie and comparing it to the cookie in the CHECK_SPI message.

In order to minimize the range of cryptographic attacks on $<\text{secret}>$, messages SHOULD have a limited life time.

### 3.3. Ticket based IKE recovery using Session Resumption

#### 3.3.1. Ticket Based Recovery

If both peers can store ephemeral information and support IKE Session Resumption as described in [IKERESUME], an accelerated procedure can be used. This procedure is called Ticket Based IKE Recovery.

The ticket based IKE Recovery method relies on an unauthenticated INVALID_IKE_SPI along with a cookie for detection of a dangling SA. Recovery is effected using session resumption exchange described in [IKERESUME] to recover from a Dangling SA condition. This memo introduces a variation to the Session Resumption Exchange for protection against Denial of Service Attacks

#### 3.3.2. Choice of Recovery Mechanism

The choice of using Stateless IKE Recovery or Ticket Based Recovery depends upon the capabilities of the endpoint and its peer as well.
It could also depend on policy.

During Recovery, the endpoint that has the SA, also knows about the peers capabilities whereas the endpoint that has lost its SA can be presumed to not know its peers capabilities. This endpoint only offers a hint of its capabilities by responding to an invalid packet with an INVALID_SPI followed by a cookie.

The endpoint that has the SA can choose to respond to an unauthenticated INVALID_SPI based on its knowledge of the peer capabilities. If it has a session resumption ticket from the peer, it SHOULD initiate an IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange, else it SHOULD send a CHECK_SPI query. If the peer is not capable of Safe IKE Recovery, the endpoint SHOULD fall back to liveness checks or other mechanisms recommended by [IKEv2].

If the endpoint that receives an IKE_SESSION_RESUME packet is unable to use the resumption ticket for any reason, it should respond with a RESUME_NACK followed by the peer cookie it received in the clear. This allows the peer to initiate a full IKEv2 exchange safely.

3.3.3. Ticket based recovery by invalid IKE packets

When a peer X receives an IKE packet with an unknown IKE_SPI, it SHOULD send an unprotected INVALID_IKE_SPI notify to the sender Y. The INVALID_IKE_SPI MUST be followed with a Cookie payload. The cookie payload content is relevant only to the generator of the cookie and a suggested format for it is described in Section 3.2.4.

When peer Y receives the INVALID_IKE_SPI referencing the IKE_SPI(A,B) followed by CHECK_SPI(Cookie_X), it MUST perform the following actions:

- verify that (A,B) is an active IKE_SA it has with X. If no such SA exists a rate limited message SHOULD be logged.
- verify that it possesses a resumption ticket given to it by X and initiate an IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange with X. This memo requires that the IKE_SESSION_RESUME packet MUST carry COOKIE_X received in the INVALID_SPI packet encrypted in the SK payload. Y also generates and sends another cookie COOKIE_Y in the clear.
At step(1), if Peer Y does not support [IKERESUME], it MUST ignore CHECK_SPI(COOKIE_X) and fall back to the stateless recovery method in Section 3.2. Otherwise, on step (2), Peer Y responds to the invalid SPI by sending back the resumption ticket as well as COOKIE_X under the cover of SK.

Peer X, on receiving the TICKET_RESUME notify with a cookie payload on step (2) MUST look up the SA (A,B) in its SA database. If the SA exists, it MUST respond with a protected CHECK_SPI(ACK) that includes the peer cookie COOKIE_Y and a rate limited message SHOULD be logged.

If the SA does not exist, X should decrypt the SK payload using the contents of the ticket and validate COOKIE_X. If the cookie is not valid the packet should be dropped and a rate limited message SHOULD be logged.

If packet (2) is rejected for any other reason, Peer X responds with a CHECK_SPI(NACK) containing COOKIE_Y and the exchange continues statelessly as described in Section 3.2.

If packet (2) is finally accepted and validated, peer X sends back an IKE_SESSION_RESUME response to create a new SA. The response packet also includes CHECK_SPI(COOKIE_Y) which is simply sent back unchanged but protected inside the SK payload. Peer X can also proceed to computing and creating state for a new SA as described in [IKERESUME]. A further cookie exchange as described in [IKERESUME] is not required as the two peers have already reflected COOKIE_X.
Peer Y performs the following actions on Packet (3) depending on the response it gets back from X:

- On receiving a SESSION_RESUME response, Peer Y decrypts the SK payload and validates the COOKIE2, and proceeds to create a new SA. If the cookie is invalid a rate limiting message is logged and the packet is dropped.
- If the Peer Y receives a CHECK_SPI(NACK) followed by the cookie COOKIE_Y, Y MAY proceed to initiating a regular IKEv2 session.
- If a protected CHECK_SPI(ACK) response is received, a rate limiting message is logged.
- If the Peer Y receives a N(TICKET_NACK) notification, Y MAY initiate a regular IKEv2 exchange.

Packet (4) is an empty informational liveliness message sent from Y to X using the newly installed SA, after a successful SESSION_RESUME exchange.

Note: It is to be noted that the Stateful Ticket Recovery exchange described above could be used without any change, to complete a recovery even when if the QCD_TOKEN based method described in [QCD] is used for detection of Invalid SAS.

3.4. IPsec SA recovery

We are now considering the case of an IKE endpoint Y sending an ESP or AH packet (or any type of traffic supported by a CHILD_SA) to peer X who does not have the corresponding phase 2 SA. We will differentiate two subcases depending on the presence or not of an IKE SA between the two peers.

The recovery procedure will be roughly the same as for the Dangling Parent SA case but for children SA’s, we send protected notifications whenever we can.

Peer X

ESP(SPI) ...

Peer Y

<--------------------------------------------

On receiving an unrecognized ESP or AH packet, Peer X SHOULD notify the remote peer Y. The method will be different, according to the presence of an IKE_SA with Y.

3.4.1. In the presence of an IKE_SA

In IKEv2, when an IKE_SA is available between two peers, CHILD_SA’s SHOULD not be out of sync thanks to the acknowledgement and retransmissions of notifies. IKEv2 however does not specify what to
do when a peer does not eventually respond to protected DELETE_SPI notifies.

This section augments the IKEv2 specification in order to allow the recovery of stale SA's in case peers decided to keep the Parent SA nevertheless.

If an IKE_SA is available with the remote peer, peer X MUST send a protected INVALID_SPI notification to the Y. The notification MUST be protected by the Parent SA and MUST contain the SPI of the invalid packet.

Peer X

ESP(SPI) ...
<--------------------------------------------------------------->

HDR(A,B) SK{INVALID_SPI(SPI)}
--------------------------------------------------------------->

At this point, Y MUST check whether it has the offending SA. If so, it SHOULD re-key or delete the child SA according to its security policy. This document suggests that Y SHOULD delete the dangling SA but MAY rekey if deemed adequate. If the offending SA is not to be found, a message SHOULD be logged as the triggering ESP packet may be an attack or the result of a race condition. The logging MUST be rate limited.

3.4.2. In the absence of an IKE_SA

If an IKE_SA is not available with peer Y, an unprotected INVALID_SPI notification MUST be sent. The notification MUST contain the SPI of the invalid packet.

Peer X

ESP(SPI) ...
<--------------------------------------------------------------->

HDR(0,0) INVALID_SPI(SPI)
--------------------------------------------------------------->

Note: An IKE SPI of (0,0) is used since there is no other IKE SPI to use (by construction)

Peer Y MUST verify whether it has the offending CHILD_SA; if it does not, Y MUST log a rate limited message and drop the notify. If Y owns the offending SA, Y MUST perform the following:
ensure the unauthenticated INVALID_SPI notify is legitimate
rebuild the dangling SA’s with the remote peer if needed

The following procedure will help determining whether the INVALID_SPI notify is legitimate.

Peer Y MUST send a protected CHECK_SPI notify to X. Since Y has the
CHILD_SA, it MUST have its Parent SA by construction.

Peer X                                                  Peer Y

HDR(0,0) INVALID_SPI(SPI)
-------------------------------------------->
HDR(A,B) SK{CHECK_SPI(QUERY, SPI)}
<-------------------------------------------->

If X can decrypt the CHECK_SPA(QUERY) notification from Y, i.e. it has
a valid IKE_SA(A,B), the situation can be either of the following:
therY also generates and sends another cookie COOKIE_Y in the
clear is a logic error on X as it should have sent the
INVALID_SPI protected
the INVALID_SPI request that led to the CHECK_SPI notify has been
forged
there was a race condition in an earlier exchange

X MUST try to identify which condition it has met, e.g. by checking
SPI is in the SA database and MUST log a message about a possible
security alert.

Under normal recovery circumstances, X will not have the PARENT SA.
In this case, X MUST reply with an unprotected INVALID_IKE_SPI(A,B)
and fall back into the Parent SA recovery procedure.

The Parent SA recovery procedure could use either stateless or Ticket
based recovery. The overall recovery scheme for CHILD_SA’s using the
Stateless IKE recovery procedure can be summarized as follows:
3.5. Mandatory Initiators

There are cases where the side having the SA’s cannot act as an
initiator in a recovery procedure and has to rely on the peer device
to initiate recovery. These exceptions include:
- Specific implementations, typically in remote access, that rely on
  the ‘client’ to be a pure initiator.
- Gateways that are behind a dynamic PAT device and that cannot be
  reached directly from outside. These devices have to be
  initiators of the connection in order to set up the translation
  rules.

We call such devices Mandatory Initiators and in the context of this
document, they will eventually become responsible for recovering the
SA’s.

Mandatory Initiators SHOULD be determined by the system administrator
through their configuration or implicitly through the set of features
they are configured for. Mandatory Initiators MAY determine by
themselves whether they are behind a dynamic PAT device. The
determination can for instance arise from analyzing the NAT-T
payloads described in [NAT-T].

Because Mandatory Initiators are actually IKEv2 initiators, they
typically know by configuration which peers they should have a
connection with, even if the SA’s are missing. If this is indeed the case, the following Mandatory Initiator recovery procedure SHOULD be followed.

The recovery procedure for Mandatory Initiators is the same as for other peers with change in the last step containing the CHECK_SPI(NACK) where the Mandatory Initiator actually sends initiates an an IKEv2 Initial Exchange along with the CHECK_SPI(NACK) payload.

Example CHILD_SA recovery exchange with mandatory initiator (Parent SA present):

Peer X                                                  Peer Y
            HDR(A,B) ...
                      <--------------------------------------------
            HDR(A,B) INVALID_IKE_SPI(A,B)
                        -------------------------->
            HDR(A,B) CHECK_SPI(QUERY,(A,B), Cookie_X)
                      <--------------------------------------------
            HDR(A',0) SAI1, KEi, Ni,
            CHECK_SPI(NACK,(A,B), Cookie_X)
                        -------------------------->
                      ...

When Peer Y receives the Initial Offer, it MUST verify it has the IKE SPI in the CHECK_SPI reply. In other words, the recovery procedure HINTS the Mandatory Initiator about a need for resynchronizing the SA’s. This hint MAY be ignored, according to the local peer policy.

If it does not have the corresponding IKE SA, Y MUST log a rate limited message and drop the message. If Y owns the IKE SPI, it MUST validates the cookie as described in Section 3.2.4 and proceed with the IKE exchange, according to its security policy.

In any case, X SHOULD NOT retransmit the Initial Offer. The process will restart by itself if the IKE SA is indeed missing and further offending ESP or IKE packets are emitted. If X receives a valid Message 2, it can proceed with the rest of the IKEv2 negotiation and retransmit as necessary.

Example CHILD_SA recovery exchange with mandatory initiator (no Parent SA):
3.6. Recovery closure

In many cases, the outcome of the recovery procedure yields to the creation of a new IKE_SA. Either side may be left with an old IKE_SA and dangling CHILD_SA’s. In order to recover entirely, the old CHILD_SA’s SHOULD be recreated (entirely renegotiated) under the protection of the new Parent SA. After which, the old SA’s (IKE_SA and CHILD_SA’s) SHOULD be entirely deleted.

3.7. Dealing with race conditions

When a peer deletes SA’s, a DELETE payload is sent that MUST be acknowledged. Before the delete notify reaches the remote peer, further ESP packets for the now deleted SPI may be received. These ESP packets MUST be silently discarded as long the DELETE Notify can be retransmitted.

4. Throttling and dampening

An important aspect of the security in IKE recovery has to do with limiting the CPU utilization. In order to thwart flood types denial of service attacks, strict rate limiting and throttling mechanisms have to be enforced.

All the notifications that are exchanged during IKE recovery SHOULD
be rate limited. This paragraph provides information on the way rate
limiting should take place.

4.1. Invalid SPI throttling

The sending of all Invalid SPI notifies MUST be rate limited one way
or an other. The rate limiting SHOULD be performed on a per peer
basis but dynamic state creation SHOULD be avoided as much as
possible (it can be; this is an implementation matter).

Invalid SPI rate limiting protects against natural dangling SA
occurrences. I.e. normal traffic conditions may cause unrecognized
SPI’s to be received and this message is the most important to
protect. Indeed, it is not realistic to send one notification per
bad ESP packet received. On high speed links, this could mean
t housands of IKE notifies sent for the same offending SPI.

The receiving of unauthenticated Invalid SPI notifies MUST as well be
rate limited. Again, the rate limiting SHOULD be performed on a per
peer basis without dynamic state creation. In normal circumstances,
the peer receiving Invalid SPI notifies has an SA with the peer
sendig those notifies and already maintains peer-related data
structures that can help in maintaining adequate counters.

Authenticated Invalid SPI notifies can be accepted without
throttling.

4.2. Dampening

After one of the following conditions:
  o the natural creation or rekey of one or more SA’s
  o the recovery of one or more SA’s
  o the failure in recovering an SA owned by the local security
gateway
  o the logging of an error or warning message involving an SA owned
    by the local security gateway

The peer with which SA’s were created, attempted or against which a
log was emitted SHOULD be dampened, which means that all the
unauthenticated Invalid SPI and Check SPI messages emitted by that
peer MUST be ignored for a chosen duration.

This protection prevents a man-in-the-middle from forcing the fast
recreation of SA’s and potentially depleting the entropy of systems
under attack. It also deals efficiently with race conditions that may
occur after a rekey.
4.3. User controls

Because throttling at large is related to speed, the network implementation around the security gateways has a major influence on the pertinence of the parameters controlling rate limiting. It is difficult to provide good absolute values for the rate limiters, considering that these are implementation dependent.

As such, for the sake of fitness in practical deployments, a system implementing this memo MUST provide administrative controls over the rate limiter parameters.

5. Negotiating IKE recovery

IKE recovery capabilities MUST be advertised through a Vendor ID payload.

In the first two messages of the Parent SA negotiation, the Vendor ID payload for this specification MUST be sent if supported (and it MUST be received by both sides). The content of the payload is the ASCII string:

```
SECURE IKE RECOVERY, or in hex: 53 45 43 55 52 45 20 49 4b 45 20 52
45 43 4f 56 45 52 59
```

The peers’ capability for IKE Session Resumption is known implicitly from receiving the resumption ticket.

Determining peer capability can be useful for two reasons at least. First, this information MAY let a system decide to fallback to another recovery mechanism, such as from Ticket based Recovery to Stateless Safe IKE Recovery or falling back to the one embedded in IKEv2.

Knowledge of the peer’s capabilities can be used by the ‘live peer’ (the one that still has the SA’s) in order to determine whether it is normal or not to receive unauthenticated INVALID_SPI with or without cookies or CHECK_SPI notifies. A peer that has lost information about it’s peer SHOULD go under the assumption that peer does understand IKE Recovery as described in this memo. This assumption implies that INVALID_SPI notifies with cookies and CHECK_SPI notifies can be sent. If the remote peer does not support IKE Recovery, it will just ignore these messages.

In general, it is useful for system administrators to monitor the capabilities of a remote system connecting to a local security gateway and there is an interest in advertising the IKE Recovery
6. Payload formats

For reference, the Notify Payload is defined as follows:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
! Next Payload  !C!  RESERVED   !         Payload Length        !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
!  Protocol ID  !   SPI Size    !      Notify Message Type      !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
! ~  Security Parameter Index (SPI)  ~  !
! ~  !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
! ~  Notification Data  ~  !
! ~  !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
```

The meaning of the fields is the same as defined in [IKEv2].

This memo introduces a new Notify Message Type that is being developed with a Private Use Type:

- **CHECK_SPI:** 32770

An official IANA assigned number MUST be assigned if this document reaches final recommendation state.

The notification data area is formatted as such:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
! Subtype       !  CookieSize   |            RESERVED           |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
!                            Cookie                             |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
```

- **Subtype** (1 Octet) - This field determines the operation being performed (Query, Reply_ACK, Reply_NACK, Lone_Cookie)
- **CookieSize** - The size of the optional cookie embedded in the CHECK_SPI notify. If there is no cookie, CookieSize is set to 0 (zero).
Cookie - The optional cookie embedded in the payload. Its size depends on the value CookieSize.

The list of operations and their corresponding value:
- Query: 0
- Reply_ACK: 1
- NACK: 2

7. IANA Considerations

This document requires the following notification to be registered by IANA. The corresponding registry was established by IANA.
- CHECK_SPI Notification type (Section 6).

8. Security Considerations

IKE recovery self-protection is discussed all along the document and contains many mechanism to thwart denial of service attacks.

IKE recovery is subject to a man-in-the-middle attack that can let the attacker trigger a renegotiation. It has to be noticed that an attacker able to block ESP and/or IKE packets can cause IKE itself to also tear down and trigger a rekey of IKE SA’s. With throttling and dampening enabled, IKE recovery is able to reduce the amount of rekeys/negotiations to as low a rate as IKEv2.

Overall, IKE Recovery is not more vulnerable than IKEv2 and even improves on the security of IKEv2 by resynchronizing SA’s more rapidly which is important with dynamic policies.

9. Collapsed stateless exchange

In order to save on round-trips, IKE Recovery can be collapsed into an IKEv2 exchange. The recovery case goes as follows:
In the exchange above, X sends an optional N(Cookie_X) in the INVALID_IKE_SPI notify if it expects cookies to be used when acting as a responder. Cookie_X is reflected by peer Y as in a normal IKE

10. Change log

NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: This section is to be removed in the final RFC

10.1. Changes from draft-fdetienn-sir-02

Minor changes around rate limiting. Removed implementation recommendation to keep only high level recommendation.

11. References

11.1. Normative References


[NAT-T] Kivinen, "RFC 3947, Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the

11.2. Informative References


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