Mitigating Teredo Rooting Loop Attacks

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Abstract

Recently, a number of routing loop vulnerabilities were discovered in Teredo. This document specifies a number of security checks to be performed by Teredo hosts and Teredo servers such that these vulnerabilities are eliminated.

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1. Introduction

[USENIX-WOOT] describes a number routing loop attacks that can be performed, in a number of scenarios, against IPv6 automatic tunneling mechanisms, possibly resulting in Denial of Service (DoS). This document discusses the two Teredo routing loop attacks described [USENIX-WOOT], and specifies a number of security checks such that these vulnerabilities are eliminated.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. Teredo Attacks

2.1. Teredo Client to NAT

This attack targets a Teredo client and the NAT(s) through which the Teredo client connects to the public Internet. It assumes that the NAT is of type "cone", and that the aforementioned NAT supports hairpin routing with source address translation.

The attack is initiated by sending a Teredo packet, with its IPv4 Source Address and its IPv4 Destination Address set to the Teredo Mapped Address of the victim Teredo client, and the UDP Source Port and the UDP Destination Port set to the Teredo Mapped Port of the victim Teredo client. The IPv6 Source Address and IPv6 Destination Address of the encapsulated IPv6 packet are Teredo addresses, with their client IPv4 field and their Port field set to the "mapped IPv4 address" and the obfuscated "mapped UDP port" of the victim Teredo client, respectively. The C (cone) bit of the IPv6 Destination Address should be set to "1" (indicating a cone NAT) and the UG bits of the same address should be set to "00" (indicating a non-global unicast identifier). The Server IPv4 field and/or the other bits of the Flags field of the IPv6 Destination Address should be different from that of the victim Teredo client, such that the resulting address is not the IPv6 address of the victim Teredo client.

The idea is that the forged IPv6 Source Address be such that it passes the source address validation checks recommended in [RFC4380]. The forged IPv6 Destination Address should cause the packet to be looped back to the victim Teredo client, but should not be the Teredo address of the victim Teredo client (or else the packet would be processed by the Teredo client and the loop would not occur).

Assuming that there already exists a corresponding mapping in the NAT
(as a result of the Teredo Initial Qualification Procedure), the victim Teredo client will receive the forged packet.  [Nakibly and Arov, 2009] found that in some implementations, if the receiving node is in forwarding mode (i.e., it is acting as a router), it will forward the encapsulated IPv6 packet over the Teredo tunnel (as the victim Teredo client was not the final destination of the packet).  This will result in a forwarding loop that will finish only when the Hop Limit field of the encapsulated IPv6 packet is decremented to 0, possibly leading to a Denial of Service (DoS).

There are a number of considerations that should be made about this attack vector.  Some of these considerations are operational, while others have to do with the Teredo implementation at the victim Teredo client.

2.1.1. Operational considerations

Firstly, given the deployment model of Teredo, it seems unlikely that a node acting as a router would enable Teredo for obtaining its IPv6 connectivity.  Secondly, enforcement of ingress/egress filtering would probably mitigate this attack (although it would not prevent a malicious node on the same network as the victim Teredo client from launching the attack).

2.1.2. Implementation considerations

Given that Teredo is a mechanism of "last resort" for obtaining IPv6 connectivity by IPv6 hosts, a node SHOULD NOT forward over the Teredo tunnel IPv6 packets that were not originated on the local node, and SHOULD discard those packets received over the Teredo tunnel that are not destined to the Teredo client.  These security checks completely eliminate this vulnerability.

2.2. Teredo Server

This attack vector engages only one victim, a Teredo server, and consists in having the Teredo server send a Teredo bubble destined to itself, which will result in a forwarding loop that will continue indefinitely.

As the Teredo server decapsulates the bubble packet (an empty IPv6 datagram) and re-encapsulates it in another IPv4 packet before forwarding it, there is no mechanism to limit the number of times a bubble packet is "forwarded".

The attack consists in sending a forged "Teredo bubble" with the IPv4 Source Address and the IPv4 Destination Address both set to the IPv4 address of the victim Teredo server, and the UDP Source Port and the
UDP Destination Port both set to the Teredo UDP Port (3544). The
IPv6 Source Address and the IPv6 Destination Address of the
encapsulated IPv6 packet should have their client IPv4 field set to
the obfuscated IPv4 address of the victim Teredo server, and the
their Port field set to the obfuscated Teredo UDP port (3544). The
Server IPv4 field and the Flags field can be set to any value.

The idea is that the IPv6 Source Address must be such that the
forged Teredo packet will pass the source address validation
checks described in [RFC4380]. The IPv6 Destination Address must
be such that the forged Teredo bubble is re-sent by the victim
Teredo server to its own IPv4 address and Teredo UDP Port.

There are a number of considerations that should be made about this
attack vector. Some of these considerations are operational, while
others have to do with the Teredo implementation at the victim Teredo
client.

2.2.1. Operational considerations

Implementation of ingress/egress filtering would probably mitigate
this attack. However, ingress/egress filtering should not be relied
upon as the "first line of defense".

2.2.2. Implementation considerations

In order for this attack to succeed, a Teredo server must be willing
to accept a Teredo packet that contains its own address in the IPv4
Source Address field, and accept the Source Address and the
Destination Address of the encapsulated IPv6 packet to embed its own
(obfuscated) address in the "client IPv4" field. There are no
legitimate reasons for a Teredo packet to contain such values.
Therefore, this vulnerability could be eliminated by having Teredo
servers silently discard such Teredo packets.

Teredo servers MUST discard Teredo packets that have an IPv4 Source
Address equal to one of the receiving server’s IPv4 addresses, and
MUST discard Teredo packets that embed the (obfuscated) IPv4 address
of the receiving server in the "client IPv4" field of the Source
Address or the Destination Address of the encapsulated IPv6 packet.

3. Security Considerations

This document updates [RFC4380] such that the two Teredo routing loop
vulnerabilities described in [USENIX-WOOT] are eliminated.
4. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

5. Acknowledgements

The routing loop attacks against Teredo discussed in this document were discovered by Gabi Nakibly and Michael Arov, and documented in [USENIX-WOOT].

This document is heavily based on the upcoming document "Security Implications of the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)" [CPNI-IPv6].

Fernando Gont would like to thank CPNI (http://www.cpni.gov.uk) for their continued support.

6. References

6.1. Normative References


6.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Changes from previous versions of the draft (to be removed by the RFC Editor before publishing this document as an RFC)
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