This document specifies a profile for the ACE (Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments) framework to enable authorization in an MQTT-based publish-subscribe messaging system. Proof-of-possession keys, bound to OAuth2.0 access tokens, are used to authenticate and authorize MQTT Clients. The protocol relies on TLS for confidentiality and server authentication.
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1. Introduction

This document specifies a profile for the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. In this profile, Clients and a Broker use MQTT to exchange Application Messages. The protocol relies on TLS for communication security between entities. The MQTT protocol interactions are described based on the MQTT v5.0 - the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard-v5]. It is expected that MQTT deployments will retain backward compatibility for MQTT v3.1.1 clients, and therefore, this document also describes a reduced set of protocol interactions for MQTT v3.1.1 - the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard]. However, MQTT v5.0 is the RECOMMENDED version as it works more naturally with ACE-style authentication and authorization.

MQTT is a publish-subscribe protocol and after connecting to the MQTT Broker, a Client can publish and subscribe to multiple topics. The MQTT Broker is responsible for distributing messages published by the publishers to their subscribers. Messages are published under a Topic Name, and subscribers must subscribe to the Topic Names to receive the corresponding messages. The Broker uses the Topic Name in a published message to determine which subscribers to relay the messages.

In this document, topics, more specifically, Topic Names, are treated as resources. The Clients are assumed to have identified the publish/subscribe topics of interest out-of-band (topic discovery is not a feature of the MQTT protocol). A resource owner can pre-configure policies at the AS that give Clients publish or subscribe permissions to different topics.

Clients use an access token, bound to a proof-of-possession (PoP) key to authorize with the MQTT Broker their connection and publish/subscribe permissions to topics. In the context of this ACE profile, the Broker acts as the Resource Server (RS). In the rest of the document the terms "RS" and "Broker" are used interchangeably. This document describes how to authorise the following exchanges between the Clients and the Broker.

- Connection requests from the Clients to the Broker
- Publish requests from the Clients to the Broker, and from the Broker to the Clients
- Subscribe requests from Clients to the Broker

This document does not protect the contents of the PUBLISH message from the Broker, and hence, the content of the the PUBLISH message is
not signed or encrypted separately for the subscribers. This functionality may be implemented using the proposal outlined in the CoAP Pub-Sub Profile [I-D.palombini-ace-coap-pubsub-profile].

To provide communication confidentiality and RS authentication, TLS is used and TLS 1.3 is RECOMMENDED. This document makes the same assumptions as the Section 4 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] regarding Client and RS registration with the AS and setting up keying material. While the Client-Broker exchanges are only over MQTT, the required Client-AS and RS-AS interactions are described for HTTPS-based communication, using 'application/ace+json' content type, and unless otherwise specified, using JSON encoding. The token may be a reference, or JSON Web Token (JWT). For JWT tokens, this document follows RFC 7800 [RFC7800] for PoP semantics for JWTs. The Client-AS and RS-AS may also be other than HTTPS e.g., CoAP or MQTT. Implementations MAY also use 'application/ace+cbor' content type, and CBOR encoding, and CBOR Web Token (CWT) and associated PoP semantics to reduce the protocol memory and bandwidth requirements. For more information on Proof of Possession semantics for CWTs, see Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174], when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. ACE-Related Terminology

The terminology for entities in the architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0 RFC 6749 [RFC6749] such as "Client" (C), "Resource Server" (RS) and "Authorization Server" (AS).

The term "Resource" is used to refer to an MQTT Topic Name, which is defined in Section 1.3. Hence, the "Resource Owner" is any entity that can authoritatively speak for the topic.

Certain security-related terms such as "authentication", "authorization", "confidentiality", "(data) integrity", "message authentication code", and "verify" are taken from RFC 4949 [RFC4949].
1.3. MQTT-Related Terminology

The document describes message exchanges as MQTT protocol interactions. The Clients are MQTT Clients, which connect to the Broker to publish and subscribe to Application Messages, labeled with their topics. For additional information, please refer to the MQTT v5.0 - the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard-v5] or the MQTT v3.1.1 - the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard].

MQTT

Secured transport profile of MQTT. MQTTS runs over TLS.

Broker

The Server in MQTT. It acts as an intermediary between the Clients that publishes Application Messages, and the Clients that made Subscriptions. The Broker acts as the Resource Server for the Clients.

Application Message

The data carried by the MQTT protocol. The data has an associated QoS level and a Topic Name.

QoS level

The level of assurance for the delivery of an Application Message. The QoS level can be 0-2, where "0" indicates "At most once delivery", "1" "At least once delivery", and "2" "Exactly once delivery".

Topic Name

The label attached to an Application Message, which is matched to a Subscription.

Subscription

A subscription comprises a Topic Filter and a maximum Quality of Service (QoS).

Topic Filter

An expression that indicates interest in one or more Topic Names. Topic Filters may include wildcards.

MQTT sends various control messages across a network connection. The following is not an exhaustive list and the control packets that are not relevant for authorization are not explained. These include, for instance, the PUBREL and PUBCOMP packets used in the 4-step handshake required for the QoS level 2.

CONNECT
Client request to connect to the Broker. After a network connection is established, this is the first packet sent by a Client.

**CONNACK**
The Broker connection acknowledgment. The first packet sent from the Broker to a Client is a CONNACK packet. CONNACK packets contain return codes indicating either a success or an error state to a Client.

**AUTH**
Authentication Exchange. An AUTH packet is sent from the Client to the Broker or to the Broker to the Client as part of an extended authentication exchange. AUTH Properties include Authentication Method and Authentication Data. The Authentication Method is set in the CONNECT packet, and consequent AUTH packets follow the same Authentication Method. The contents of the Authentication Data are defined by the Authentication Method.

**PUBLISH**
Publish request sent from a publishing Client to the Broker, or from the Broker to a subscribing Client.

**PUBACK**
Response to PUBLISH request with QoS level 1. PUBACK can be sent from the Broker to a Client or a Client to the Broker.

**PUBREC**
Response to PUBLISH request with QoS level 2. PUBREC can be sent from the Broker to a Client or a Client to the Broker.

**SUBSCRIBE**
The Client subscribe request.

**SUBACK**
Subscribe acknowledgment.

**PINGREQ**
A ping request sent from a Client to the Broker. It signals to the Broker that the Client is alive, and is used to confirm that the Broker is also alive. The "Keep Alive" period is set in the CONNECT message.

**PINGRESP**
Response sent by the Broker to the Client in response to PINGREQ. It indicates the Broker is alive.
2. Authorizing Connection Requests

This section specifies how Client connections are authorized by the MQTT Broker. Figure 1 shows the basic protocol flow during connection set-up. The token request and response use the /token endpoint at the AS, specified in the Section 5.6 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Steps (D) and (E) are optional, and use the introspection endpoint, specified in the Section 5.7 of the ACE framework. The Client and Broker use HTTPS to communicate to AS via these endpoints. The Client and Broker use only MQTT to communicate between them.

If the Client is resource-constrained, a Client Authorisation Server may carry out the token request on behalf of the Client, and later, onboard the Client with the token. Also, the C-AS and Broker-AS interfaces may be implemented using protocols other than HTTPS, e.g., CoAP or MQTT. The interactions between a Client and its Client Authorization Server for token onboarding, and the MQTTS support for token requests are out of scope of this document.
2.1. Client Token Request to the Authorization Server (AS)

The first step in the protocol flow (Figure 1 (A)) is the token acquisition by the Client from the AS. When requesting an access token from the AS, the Client follows the token request as described in Section 5.6.1 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], however, it MUST set the profile parameter to ‘mqtt_tls’. The media format is ‘application/ace+json’. The AS uses JSON in the payload of its responses to both to the Client and the RS.

If the AS successfully verifies the access token request and authorizes the Client for the indicated audience (i.e., RS) and scopes (i.e., publish/subscribe permissions over topics), the AS issues an access token (Figure 1 (B)). The response includes the parameters described in Section 5.6.2 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. The included token is assumed to be Proof-of-Possession (PoP) token by default. This document follows RFC 7800 [RFC7800] for PoP semantics for JWTs. The PoP token includes a ‘cnf’ parameter with a symmetric or asymmetric PoP key. The ‘cnf’ parameter in the web tokens are to be consumed by the RS.
and not the Client. The PoP token may include a ‘rs_cnf’ parameter containing the information about the public key used by the RS to authenticate as described in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params].

The AS returns error responses for JSON-based interactions following the Section 5.2 of RFC 6749 [RFC6749]. When CBOR is used, the interactions must implement the Section 5.6.3 of ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

2.2. Client Connection Request to the Broker (C)

2.2.1. Client-Server Authentication over TLS and MQTT

The Client and the Broker MUST perform mutual authentication. The Client MAY authenticate to the Broker over MQTT or TLS. For MQTT, the options are "None" and "ace". For TLS, the options are "Anon" for anonymous client, and "Known(RPK/PSK)" for Raw Public Keys (RPK) and Pre-Shared Keys (PSK), respectively. Combined, the Client authentication takes the following options:

- "TLS:Anon-MQTT:None": This option is used only for the topics that do not require authorization, including the "authz-info" topic. Publishing to the "authz-info" topic is described in Section 2.2.2.

- "TLS:Anon-MQTT:ace": The token is transported inside the CONNECT message, and MUST be validated using one of the methods described in Section 2.2.2. This option also supports a tokenless connection request for AS discovery.

- "TLS:Known(RPK/PSK)-MQTT:none": For the RPK, the token MUST have been published to the "authz-info" topic. For the PSK, the token MAY be, alternatively, provided in the "psk_identity". The TLS session set-up is as described in DTLS profile for ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize].

- "TLS:Known(RPK/PSK)-MQTT:ace": This option SHOULD NOT be chosen. In any case, the token transported in the CONNECT overwrites any permissions passed during the TLS authentication.

It is RECOMMENDED that the Client follows TLS:Anon-MQTT:ace.

The Broker MUST be authenticated during the TLS handshake. If the Client authentication uses TLS:Known(RPK/PSK), then the Broker is authenticated using the respective method. Otherwise, to authenticate the Broker, the client MUST validate a public key from a X.509 certificate or an RPK from the Broker against the ‘rs_cnf’ parameter in the token response. The AS MAY include the thumbprint
of the RS’s X.509 certificate in the ‘rs_cnf’ (thumbprint as defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-x509]), then the client MUST validate the RS certificate against this thumbprint.

2.2.2. authz-info: The Authorization Information Topic

In the cases when the Client MUST transport the token to the Broker before the TLS handshake, the Client connects to the Broker and publishes its token to the "authz-info" topic. The "authz-info" topic MUST be publish-only (i.e., the Clients are not allowed to subscribe to it). "authz-info" is not protected, and hence, the Client authenticates with the RS using the "TLS:Anon-MQTT:None" option. After publishing the token, the Client disconnects from the Broker and is expected to try reconnecting over TLS.

The Broker stores and indexes all tokens received to this topic in its key store similar to DTLS profile for ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]. This profile follows the recommendation of Section 5.8.1 of ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], and expects that RS stores only one token per proof-of-possession key, and any other token linked to the same key overwrites existing token at the RS.

The Broker MUST verify the validity of the token (i.e., through local validation or introspection) as described in Section 2.2.5. To validate the token, RS MAY need to introspect the token with the AS e.g., if the token is a reference. If the token is not valid, the Broker MUST discard the token. Depending on the QoS level of the PUBLISH message, the Broker may return the error response as a PUBACK or a DISCONNECT message.

If the QoS level is equal to 0, and token is invalid or the claims cannot be obtained in the case of an introspected token, the Broker MUST send a DISCONNECT message with the reason code ‘0x87 (Not authorized)’. If the token does not parse to a token, the RS MUST send a DISCONNECT with the reason code ‘0x99 (Payload format invalid)’.

For the QoS level of the PUBLISH message is greater than or equal to 1, the Broker MAY return ‘Not authorized’ in PUBACK. If the token does not parse to a token, the PUBACK reason code is ‘0x99 (Payload format invalid)’.

It must be noted that when the AS sends the ‘Not authorized’ response, this corresponds to the token being invalid, and not that the actual PUBLISH message was not authorized. Given that the "authz-info" is a public topic, this response is not expected to cause a confusion.
2.2.3. Transporting Access Token Inside the MQTT CONNECT

This section describes how the Client transports the token to the Broker (RS) inside the CONNECT message. If this method is used, the Client TLS connection is expected to be anonymous, and the Broker is authenticated during the TLS connection set-up. The approach described in this section is similar to an earlier proposal by Fremantle et al. [fremantle14].

Figure 2 shows the structure of the MQTT CONNECT message used in MQTT v5.0. A CONNECT message is composed of a fixed header, a variable header and a payload. The fixed header contains the Control Packet Type (CPT), Reserved, and Remaining Length fields. The Variable Header contains the Protocol Name, Protocol Level, Connect Flags, Keep Alive, and Properties fields. The Connect Flags in the variable header specify the properties of the MQTT session. It also indicates the presence or absence of some fields in the Payload. The payload contains one or more encoded fields, namely a unique Client identifier for the Client, a Will Topic, Will Payload, User Name and Password. All but the Client identifier can be omitted depending on flags in the Variable Header.

```
0            8            16            24            32
+------------------------------------------------------+
| CPT=1 | Rsvd. | Remaining len. | Protocol name len. = 4 |
+------------------------------------------------------+
|                      'M' 'Q' 'T' 'T'                     |
+------------------------------------------------------+
| Proto.level=5 | Connect flags | Keep alive |
| Property length |
| Auth. Method (0x15) | ace |
| Auth. Data (0x16) | empty or token or token + PoP data |
+------------------------------------------------------+
| Payload |
```

Figure 2: MQTT v5 CONNECT control message with ACE authentication.

The CONNECT message flags are Username, Password, Will retain, Will QoS, Will Flag, Clean Start, and Reserved. Figure 6 shows how the MQTT connect flags MUST be set to use AUTH packets for authentication and authorisation. To use AUTH, the username and password flags MUST be set to 0. The RS MAY support token transport using username and password and the CONNECT message for that option is described in...
Section 6 for MQTT v3.1.1, which is the only option available to MQTT v3.1.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>User name</th>
<th>Pass.</th>
<th>Will retain</th>
<th>Will QoS</th>
<th>Will Flag</th>
<th>Clean</th>
<th>Rsvd.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flag</td>
<td>Flag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Start</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: CONNECT flags for AUTH

The Will Flag indicates that a Will message needs to be sent if network connection is not closed normally. The situations in which the Will message is published include disconnections due to I/O or network failures, and the server closing the network connection due to a protocol error. The Client may set the Will Flag as desired (marked as ‘X’ in Figure 3). If the Will Flag is set to 1 and the Broker accepts the connection request, the Broker must store the Will message, and publish it when the network connection is closed according to Will QoS and Will retain parameters, and MQTT Will management rules. To avoid publishing Will Messages in the case of temporary network disconnections, the Client may specify a Will Delay Interval in the Will Properties. Section 5 explains how the Broker deals with the retained messages in further detail.

In MQTT v5, to achieve a clean session (i.e., the session does not continue an existing session), the Client sets the Clean Start Flag to 1 and, the Session Expiry Interval to 0 in the CONNECT message. However, in this profile, the Broker MUST always start with a clean session regardless of how these parameters are set. The Broker MUST set the Session Present flag to 0 in the CONNACK packet to signal the Client that the Broker started a clean session.

2.2.4. Authentication Using AUTH Property

To use AUTH, the Client MUST set the Authentication Method as a property of a CONNECT packet by using the property identifier 21 (0x15). This is followed by a UTF-8 Encoded String containing the name of the Authentication Method, which MUST be set to ‘ace’. If the RS does not support this profile, it sends a CONNACK with a Reason Code of ‘0x8C (Bad authentication method)’.

The Authentication Method is followed by the Authentication Data, which has a property identifier 22 (0x16) and is binary data. Based on the Authentication Data, this profile allows:

- Proof-of-Possession using a challenge from the TLS session
Proof-of-Possession via Broker generated challenge/response

Unauthorised request and Authorisation Server discovery

2.2.4.1. Proof-of-Possession Using a Challenge from the TLS session

For this option, the Authentication Data MUST contain the token and the keyed message digest (MAC) or the Client signature. The secret that is used for the proof-of-possession calculation, i.e., to calculate the keyed message digest (MAC) or the Client signature, is obtained using a TLS exporter ([RFC5705] for TLS 1.2 and for TLS 1.3, Section 7.5 of [RFC8446]). The secret is exported from TLS using the exporter label ‘EXPORTER-ACE-Sign-Challenge’, an empty context, and length of 32 bytes. The token is also validated as described in Section 2.2.5 and the server responds with a CONNACK with the appropriate response code.

2.2.4.2. Proof-of-Possession via Broker-generated Challenge/Response

For this option, the RS follows a Broker-generated challenge/response protocol. The success case is illustrated in Figure 4. If the Authentication Data only includes the token, the RS MUST respond with an AUTH packet, with the Authenticate Reason Code set to ‘0x18 (Continue Authentication)’. This packet includes the Authentication Method, which MUST be set to ‘ace’ and Authentication Data. The Authentication Data MUST NOT be empty and contains an 8-byte nonce as a challenge for the Client. The Client responds to this with an AUTH packet with a reason code ‘0x18 (Continue Authentication)’. Similarly, the Client packet sets the Authentication Method to ‘ace’. The Authentication Data in the Client’s response contains a client-generated 8-byte nonce, and the signature or MAC computed over the RS nonce concatenated with the client nonce. Next, the token is validated as described in Section 2.2.5.
Figure 4: PoP Challenge/Response Protocol Flow - Success

2.2.4.3. Unauthorised Request: Authorisation Server Discovery

Finally, this document allows the CONNECT message to have the Authentication Method set to 'ace' followed by an empty Authentication Data field. This is the AS discovery option and the RS responds with the CONNACK reason code '0x87 (Not Authorized)' and includes a User Property (identified by 38 (0x26)) for the AS creation hints as defined in the Section 5.1.2 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

2.2.5. Token Validation

The RS MUST verify the validity of the token either locally (e.g., in the case of a self-contained token) or the RS MAY send an introspection request to the AS. RS MUST verify the claims according to the rules set in the Section 5.8.1.1 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

To authenticate the Client, the RS validates the signature or the MAC, depending on how the PoP protocol is implemented. Validation of the signature or MAC MUST fail if the signature algorithm is set to "none", when the key used for the signature algorithm cannot be determined, or the computed and received signature/MAC do not match.
2.2.6. The Broker’s Response to Client Connection Request

Based on the validation result (obtained either via local inspection or using the /introspection interface of the AS), the Broker MUST send a CONNACK message to the Client. The reason code of the CONNACK is ‘0x00 (Success)’ if the token validation is successful. The Broker MUST also set Session Present to 0 in the CONNACK packet to signal a clean session to the Client. In case of an invalid PoP token, the CONNACK reason code is ‘0x87 (Not Authorized)’.

If the Broker accepts the connection, it MUST store the token until the end of the connection. On Client or Broker disconnection, the Client is expected to provide a token again inside the next CONNECT message.

If the token is not self-contained and the Broker uses token introspection, it MAY cache the validation result to authorize the subsequent PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE messages. PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE messages, which are sent after a connection set-up, do not contain access tokens. If the introspection result is not cached, then the RS needs to introspect the saved token for each request. The Broker SHOULD also use a cache time out to introspect tokens regularly.

3. Authorizing PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE Messages

To authorize a Client’s PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE messages, the Broker needs to use the scope field in the token (or in the introspection result). The scope field contains the publish and subscribe permissions for the Client. Scope strings SHOULD be encoded as a permission, followed by an underscore, followed by a topic filter. Two permissions apply to topic filters: ‘publish’ and ‘subscribe’. Topic filters are implemented as described in MQTT specification and includes special wildcard characters. The multi-level wildcard, ‘#’, matches any number of levels within a topic, and the single-level wildcard, ‘+’, matches one topic level.

An example scope field may contain multiple such strings, space delimited, e.g., ‘publish_topic1 subscribe_topic2/# publish_+/topic3. This access token gives ‘publish’ permission to the ‘topic1’, ‘subscribe’ permission to all the subtopics of ‘topic2’, and ‘publish’ permission to all topic3, skipping one level. If the Will Flag is set, then the Broker MUST check that the token allows the publication of the Will message (i.e., the scope is "publish_" followed by the Will Topic).
3.1. PUBLISH Messages from the Publisher Client to the Broker

On receiving the PUBLISH message, the Broker MUST use the type of message (i.e., PUBLISH) and the Topic name in the message header to match against the scope string in the cached token or its introspection result. Following the example above, a client sending a PUBLISH message to ‘a/topic3’ would be allowed to publish, as the scope includes the string ‘publish_+/topic3’.

If the Client is allowed to publish to the topic, the RS must publish the message to all valid subscribers of the topic. In the case of an authorization failure, an error MAY be returned to the Client. For this the QoS level of the PUBLISH message MUST be set to greater than or equal to 1. This guarantees that RS responds with either a PUBACK or PUBREC packet with reason code ‘0x87 (Not authorized)’.

On receiving a PUBACK with ‘0x87 (Not authorized)’, the Client MAY reauthenticate as described in Section 4, and pass a new token following the same PoP methods as described in Figure 2.

3.2. PUBLISH Messages from the Broker to the Subscriber Clients

To forward PUBLISH messages to the subscribing Clients, the Broker identifies all the subscribers that have valid matching topic subscriptions (i.e., the tokens are valid, and token scopes allow a subscription to the particular topic). The Broker sends a PUBLISH message with the Topic name to all the valid subscribers.

RS MUST stop forwarding messages to the unauthorized subscribers. There is no way to inform the Clients with invalid tokens that an authorization error has occurred other than sending a DISCONNECT message. The RS SHOULD send a DISCONNECT message with the reason code ‘0x87 (Not authorized)’. Note that the server-side DISCONNECT is a new feature of MQTT v5.0 (in MQTT v3.1.1, the server needs to drop the connection).

3.3. Authorizing SUBSCRIBE Messages

In MQTT, a SUBSCRIBE message is sent from a Client to the Broker to create one or more subscriptions to one or more topics. The SUBSCRIBE message may contain multiple Topic Filters. The Topic Filters may include wildcard characters.

On receiving the SUBSCRIBE message, the Broker MUST use the type of message (i.e., SUBSCRIBE) and the Topic Filter in the message header to match against a scope string of the stored token or introspection result.
As a response to the SUBSCRIBE message, the Broker issues a SUBACK message. For each Topic Filter, the SUBACK packet includes a return code matching the QoS level for the corresponding Topic Filter. In the case of failure, the return code is 0x87, indicating that the Client is 'Not authorized'. A reason code is returned for each Topic Filter. Therefore, the Client may receive success codes for a subset of its Topic Filters while being unauthorized for the rest.

4. Token Expiration and Reauthentication

The Broker MUST check for token expiration whenever a CONNECT, PUBLISH or SUBSCRIBE message is received or sent. The Broker SHOULD check for token expiration on receiving a PINGREQUEST message. The Broker MAY also check for token expiration periodically e.g., every hour. This may allow for early detection of a token expiry.

The token expiration is checked by checking the ‘exp’ claim of a JWT or introspection response, or via performing an introspection request with the AS as described in Section 5.7 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Token expirations may trigger the RS to send PUBACK, SUBACK and DISCONNECT messages with return code set to ‘Not authorised’. After sending a DISCONNECT message, the network connection is closed, and no more messages can be sent. However, as a response to the PUBACK and SUBACK, the Client MAY re-authenticate by sending an AUTH packet with a Reason Code of ‘0x19 (Re-authentication)’.

To re-authenticate, the Client sends an AUTH packet with reason code ‘0x19 (Re-authentication)’. The Client MUST set the Authentication Method as ‘ace’ and transport the new token in the Authentication Data. The Client and the RS go through the same steps for proof of possession validation as described in Section 2.2. The Client SHOULD use the same method used for the first connection request. If the re-authentication fails, the server MUST send a DISCONNECT with the reason code ‘0x87 (Not Authorized)’. The Clients can also proactively update their tokens i.e., before they receive a message with ‘Not authorized’ return code.

5. Handling Disconnections and Retained Messages

In the case of a Client DISCONNECT, the Broker deletes all the session state but MUST keep the retained messages. By setting a RETAIN flag in a PUBLISH message, the publisher indicates to the Broker that it should store the most recent message for the associated topic. Hence, the new subscribers can receive the last sent message from the publisher of that particular topic without waiting for the next PUBLISH message. The Broker MUST continue
publishing the retained messages as long as the associated tokens are valid.

In case of disconnections due to network errors or server disconnection due to a protocol error (which includes authorization errors), the Will message must be sent if the Client supplied a Will in the CONNECT message. The Client’s token scopes MUST include the Will Topic. The Will message MUST be published to the Will Topic regardless of whether the corresponding token has expired. In the case of a server-side DISCONNECT, the server returns the ‘0x87 Not Authorized’ return code to the Client.

6. Reduced Protocol Interactions for MQTT v3.1.1

This section describes a reduced set of protocol interactions for the MQTT v3.1.1 Client.

6.1. Token Transport

As in MQTT v5, the Token MAY either be transported before the TLS session publishing to the "authz-info" topic, or inside the CONNECT message.

In MQTT v3.1.1, after the Client published to the "authz-info" topic, it is not possible for the Broker to communicate the result of the token validation as PUBACK reason codes or server-side DISCONNECT messages are not supported. In any case, an invalid token would fail the subsequent TLS handshake, which can prompt the Client to obtain a valid token.

To transport the token to the Broker inside the CONNECT message, the Client uses the username and password fields of the CONNECT message. Figure 5 shows the structure of the MQTT CONNECT message.
Figure 5: MQTT CONNECT control message. (CPT=Control Packet Type, Rsvd=Reserved, len=length, Proto=Protocol)

Figure 6 shows how the MQTT connect flags MUST be set to initiate a connection with the Broker.

Figure 6: MQTT CONNECT flags. (Rsvd=Reserved)

The Clean Session Flag is ignored, and the Broker always sets up a clean session. On connection success, the Broker MUST set the Session Present flag to 0 in the CONNACK packet.

The Client may set the Will Flag as desired (marked as ‘X’ in Figure 6). Username and Password flags MUST be set to 1 to ensure that the Payload of the CONNECT message includes both Username and Password fields.

The CONNECT in MQTT v3.1.1 does not have a field to indicate the authentication method. To signal that the Username field contains an ACE token, this field MUST be prefixed with ‘ace’ keyword, which is followed by the access token. The Password field MUST be set to the keyed message digest (MAC) or signature associated with the access token for proof-of-possession. The Client MUST apply the PoP key on the challenge derived from the TLS session as described in Section 2.2.4.1.
In MQTT v3.1.1, the MQTT Username as a UTF-8 encoded string (i.e., is prefixed by a 2-byte length field followed by UTF-8 encoded character data) and may be up to 65535 bytes. Therefore, an access token that is not a valid UTF-8 MUST be Base64 [RFC4648] encoded. (The MQTT Password allows binary data up to 65535 bytes.)

6.2. Handling Authorization Errors

Handling errors are more primitive in MQTT v3.1.1 due to not having appropriate error fields, error codes, and server-side DISCONNECTS. In the following, we list how errors are handled without such protocol support.

- **CONNECT without a token**: It is not possible to support AS discovery via sending a tokenless CONNECT message to the Broker. This is because a CONNACK packet in MQTT v3.1.1 does not include a means to provide additional information to the Client. Therefore, AS discovery needs to take place out-of-band. CONNECT attempt MUST fail.

- **Client-RS PUBLISH authorization failure**: In the case of a failure, it is not possible to return an error in MQTT v3.1.1. Acknowledgement messages only indicate success. In the case of an authorization error, the Broker SHOULD disconnect the Client. Otherwise, it MUST ignore the PUBLISH message. Also, as DISCONNECT messages are only sent from a Client to the Broker, the server disconnection needs to take place below the application layer.

- **SUBSCRIBE authorization failure**: In the SUBACK packet, the return code must be 0x80 indicating ‘Failure’ for the unauthorized topic(s). Note that, in both MQTT versions, a reason code is returned for each Topic Filter.

- **RS-Client PUBLISH authorization failure**: When RS is forwarding PUBLISH messages to the subscribed Clients, it may discover that some of the subscribers are no more authorized due to expired tokens. These token expirations SHOULD lead to disconnecting the Client rather than silently dropping messages.

7. IANA Considerations

This document registers ‘EXPORTER-ACE-Sign-Challenge from Section 2.2.4.1 in the TLS Exporter Label Registry TLS-REGISTRIES [RFC8447].

In addition, the following registrations are done for the ACE OAuth Profile Registry following the procedure specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

Note to the RFC editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[RFC-XXXX]" with the RFC number of this specification and delete this paragraph.

Name: mqtt_tls

Description: Profile for delegating Client authentication and authorization using MQTT as the application protocol and TLS for transport layer security.

CBOR Value:

Reference: [RFC-XXXX]

8. Security Considerations

This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Therefore, the security considerations outlined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] apply to this work.

In addition, the security considerations outlined in MQTT v5.0 - the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard-v5] and MQTT v3.1.1 - the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard] apply. Mainly, this document provides an authorization solution for MQTT, the responsibility of which is left to the specific implementation in the MQTT standards. In the following, we comment on a few relevant issues based on the current MQTT specifications.

To authorize a Client’s publish and subscribe requests in an ongoing session, the RS caches the access token after accepting the connection from the Client. However, if some permissions are revoked in the meantime, the RS may still grant publish/subscribe to revoked topics. If the RS caches the token introspection responses, then the RS should use a reasonable cache timeout to introspect tokens regularly. When permissions change dynamically, it is expected that AS also follows a reasonable expiration strategy for the access tokens.

The RS may monitor Client behaviour to detect potential security problems, especially those affecting availability. These include repeated token transfer attempts to the public "authz-info" topic, repeated connection attempts, abnormal terminations, and Clients that connect but do not send any data. If the RS supports the public
"authz-info" topic, described in Section 2.2.2, then this may be vulnerable to a DDoS attack, where many Clients use the "authz-info" public topic to transport fictitious tokens, which RS may need to store indefinitely.

9. Privacy Considerations

The privacy considerations outlined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] apply to this work.

In MQTT, the RS is a central trusted party and may forward potentially sensitive information between Clients. This document does not protect the contents of the PUBLISH message from the Broker, and hence, the content of the the PUBLISH message is not signed or encrypted separately for the subscribers. This functionality may be implemented using the proposal outlined in the CoAP Pub-Sub Profile [I-D.palombini-ace-coap-pubsub-profile]. However, this solution would still not provide privacy for other properties of the message such as Topic Name.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]

[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]

[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params]

[I-D.ietf-cose-x509]
10.2. Informative References

[fremantle14]

[I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]


Appendix A. Checklist for profile requirements

- AS discovery: AS discovery is possible with the MQTT v5.0 described in Section 2.2.
- The communication protocol between the Client and RS: MQTT
- The security protocol between the Client and RS: TLS
- Client and RS mutual authentication: Several options are possible and described in Section 2.2.1.
- Content format: For the HTTPS interactions with AS, "application/ace+json".
- PoP protocols: Either symmetric or asymmetric keys can be supported.
- Unique profile identifier: mqtt_tls
Token introspection: RS uses HTTPS /introspect interface of AS.

Token request: Client or its Client AS uses HTTPS /token interface of AS.

/authz-info endpoint: It MAY be supported using the method described in Section 2.2.2, but is not protected.

Token transport: Via "authz-info" topic, or in MQTT CONNECT message for both versions of MQTT. AUTH extensions also used for authentication and re-authentication for MQTT v5.0 as described in Section 2.2 and in Section 4.

Appendix B. Document Updates

Version 02 to 03:

- Added the option of Broker certificate thumbprint in the 'rs_cnf' sent to the Client.
- Clarified the use of a random nonce from the TLS Exporter for PoP, added to the IANA requirements that the label should be registered.
- Added a client nonce, when Challenge/Response Authentication is used between Client and Broker.
- Clarified the use of the "authz-info" topic and the error response if token validation fails.
- Added clarification on wildcard use in scopes for publish/subscribe permissions.
- Reorganised sections so that token authorisation for publish/subscribe messages are better placed.

Version 01 to 02:

- Clarified protection of Application Message payload as out of scope, and cited draft-palombini-ace-coap-pubsub-profile for a potential solution.
- Expanded Client connection authorization to capture different options for Client and Broker authentication over TLS and MQTT.
- Removed Payload (and specifically Client Identifier) from proof-of-possesion in favor of using tls-exporter for a TLS-session based challenge.
Moved token transport via "authz-info" topic from the Appendix to the main text.

Clarified Will scope.

Added MQTT AUTH to terminology.

Typo fixes, and simplification of figures.

Version 00 to 01:

Present the MQTTv5 as the RECOMMENDED version, and MQTT v3.1.1 for backward compatibility.

Clarified Will message.

Improved consistency in the use of terminology, and upper/lower case.

Defined Broker and MQTTS.

Clarified HTTPS use for C-AS and RS-AS communication. Removed reference to actors document, and clarified the use of client authorization server.

Clarified the Connect message payload and Client Identifier.

Presented different methods for passing the token, and PoP.

Added new figures to explain AUTH packets exchang, updated CONNECT message figure.

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The authors would like to thank Ludwig Seitz for his review and his input on the authorization information endpoint, presented in the appendix.

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