Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols
draft-ietf-anima-voucher-03

Abstract

This document defines a strategy to securely assign a pledge to an owner, using an artifact signed, directly or indirectly, by the pledge’s manufacturer. This artifact is known as a "voucher".

The voucher artifact is a YANG-defined JSON document that has been signed using a PKCS#7 structure. The voucher artifact is generated by the pledge’s manufacture or delegate (i.e. the MASA).

This document only defines the voucher artifact, leaving it to other documents to describe specialized protocols for accessing it.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 9, 2017.
1. Introduction

This document defines a strategy to securely assign a pledge to an owner, using an artifact signed, directly or indirectly, by the pledge’s manufacturer or delegate (i.e. the MASA). This artifact is known as the voucher.
The voucher artifact is a JSON document, conforming to a data model described by YANG [RFC7950], that has been signed using a PKCS#7 structure.

A voucher may be useful in several contexts, but the driving motivation herein is to support secure bootstrapping mechanisms. Assigning ownership is important to bootstrapping mechanisms so that the pledge can authenticate the network that’s trying to take control of it.

The lifetimes of vouchers may vary. In some bootstrapping protocols the vouchers may be ephemeral, whereas in others the vouchers may be potentially long-lived. In order to support the second category of vouchers, this document recommends using short-life vouchers with programatic renewal, enabling the MASA to communicate the ongoing validity of vouchers.

This document only defines the voucher artifact, leaving it to other documents to describe specialized protocols for accessing it. Some bootstrapping protocols using the voucher artifact defined in this draft include: [I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch], [I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join], and [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]).

2. Terminology

Imprint: The process where a device obtains the cryptographic key material to identify and trust future interactions with a network. This term is taken from Konrad Lorenz’s work in biology with new ducklings: "during a critical period, the duckling would assume that anything that looks like a mother duck is in fact their mother." An equivalent for a device is to obtain the fingerprint of the network’s root certification authority certificate. A device that imprints on an attacker suffers a similar fate to a duckling that imprints on a hungry wolf. Securely imprinting is a primary focus of this document.[imprinting]. The analogy to Lorenz’s work was first noted in [Stajano99theresurrecting].

Domain: The set of entities or infrastructure under common administrative control. The goal of the bootstrapping protocol is to enable a Pledge to discover and join a Domain.

Join Registrar (and Coordinator): A representative of the domain that is configured, perhaps autonomically, to decide whether a new device is allowed to join the domain. The administrator of the domain interfaces with a Join Registrar (and Coordinator) to control this process. Typically a Join Registrar is "inside" its
domain. For simplicity this document often refers to this as just "Registrar".

MASA: The Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) service that signs vouchers. In some bootstrapping protocols, the MASA may have Internet presence and be integral to the bootstrapping process, whereas in other protocols the MASA may be an offline service that has no active role in the bootstrapping process.

Pledge: The prospective device attempting to find and securely join a domain. When shipped it only trusts authorized representatives of the manufacturer.

Registrar See Join Registrar

TOFU: Trust on First Use. This is where a Pledge device makes no security decisions but rather simply trusts the first Domain entity it is contacted by. Used similarly to [RFC7435]. This is also known as the "resurrecting duckling" model.

Voucher: A signed statement from the MASA service that indicates to a Pledge the cryptographic identity of the Domain it should trust.

3. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in the sections below are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

4. Survey of Voucher Types

A voucher is a cryptographically protected statement to the Pledge device authorizing a zero-touch "imprint" on the Join Registrar of the domain. The specific information a voucher provides is influenced by the bootstrapping use case.

The voucher can impart the following information to the Join Registrar and Pledge:

Assertion Basis: Indicates the method that protects the imprint (this is distinct from the voucher signature that protects the voucher itself). This might include manufacturer asserted ownership verification, assured logging operations or reliance on Pledge endpoint behavior such as secure root of trust of measurement. The Join Registrar might use this information. Only some methods are normatively defined in this document. Other methods are left for future work.
Authentication of Join Registrar: Indicates how the Pledge can authenticate the Join Registrar. This might include an indication of the private PKIX trust anchor used by the Registrar, or an indication of a public PKIX trust anchor and additional CN-ID or DNS-ID information to complete authentication. Symmetric key or other methods are left for future work.

Anti-Replay Protections: Time or nonce based information to constrain the voucher to time periods or bootstrap attempts.

A number of bootstrapping scenarios can be met using differing combinations of this information. All scenarios address the primary threat of a Man-in-The-Middle Registrar gaining control over the Pledge device. The following combinations are "types" of vouchers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voucher Name</th>
<th>Assertion Log-</th>
<th>Veri-</th>
<th>Registrar ID Trust</th>
<th>CN-ID or DNS-ID</th>
<th>Validity RTC</th>
<th>Nonce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audit</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonceless</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner Audit</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner ID</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bearer out-of-scope</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>wildcard</td>
<td>optional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: All voucher types include a 'Pledge ID serial number' (Not shown for space reasons)

Audit Voucher: An Audit Voucher is named after the logging assertion mechanisms that the Registrar then "audits" to enforce local policy. The Registrar mitigates a MiTM Registrar by auditing that an unknown MiTM registrar does not appear in the log entries. This does not direct prevent the MiTM but provides a response mechanism that ensures the MiTM is unsuccessful. This advantage is that actual ownership knowledge is not required on the MASA service.

Nonceless Audit Voucher: An Audit Voucher without a validity period statement. Fundamentally the same as an Audit Voucher except that it can be issued in advance to support network partitions or to provide a permanent voucher for remote deployments.
Ownership Audit Voucher: An Audit Voucher where the MASA service has verified the Registrar as the authorized owner. The MASA service mitigates a MiTM Registrar by refusing to generate Audit Voucher’s for unauthorized Registrars. The Registrar uses audit techniques to supplement the MASA. This provides an ideal sharing of policy decisions and enforcement between the vendor and the owner.

Ownership ID Voucher: An Ownership ID Voucher is named after inclusion of the Pledge’s CN-ID or DNS-ID within the voucher. The MASA service mitigates a MiTM Registrar by identifying the specific Registrar (via WebPKI) authorized to own the Pledge.

Bearer Voucher: A Bearer Voucher is named after the inclusion of a Registrar ID wildcard. Because the Registrar identity is not indicated this voucher type must be treated as a secret and protected from exposure as any ‘bearer’ of the voucher can claim the Pledge device. Publishing a nonceless bearer voucher effectively turns the specified Pledge into a "TOFU" device with minimal mitigation against MiTM Registrars. Bearer vouchers are out-of-scope.

5. Voucher

The voucher’s purpose is to securely assign a pledge to an owner. The voucher informs the pledge which entity it should consider to be its owner.

The voucher is signed a PKCS#7 SignedData structure, as specified by Section 9.1 of [RFC2315], encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.

The PKCS#7 structure MUST contain JSON-encoded content conforming to the YANG module specified in Section 5.3.

The PKCS#7 structure MUST also contain a ‘signerInfo’ structure, as described in Section 9.1 of [RFC2315], containing the signature generated over the content using the MASA’s private key.

The PKCS#7 structure SHOULD also contain all of the certificates leading up to and including the MASA’s trust anchor certificate known to the pledges.

The PKCS#7 structure MAY also contain revocation objects for any intermediate CAs between the voucher-issuer and the trust anchor known to the pledge.
5.1. Tree Diagram

The following tree diagram [I-D.bjorklund-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams] illustrates a high-level view of a voucher document. Each field in the voucher is fully described by the YANG module provided in Section 5.3. Please review this YANG module for a detailed description of the voucher format.

```yang
module: ietf-voucher
  +--ro voucher
    +--ro created-on                       yang:date-and-time
    +--ro expires-on?                      yang:date-and-time
    +--ro assertion                        enumeration
    +--ro serial-number                    string
    +--ro idevid-issuer?                   binary
    +--ro pinned-domain-cert*              binary
    +--ro domain-cert-revocation-checks?   boolean
    +--ro nonce?                           binary
    +--ro last-renewal-date?               yang:date-and-time
```

5.2. Examples

This section provides a couple Voucher examples for illustration purposes.

The following example illustrates an ephemeral voucher (uses a nonce) encoded in JSON. As is expected with a dynamically-generated voucher, only a single pledge (device-identifier) is specified. The MASA generated this voucher using the 'logged' assertion type, knowing that it would be suitable for the pledge making the request.

```json
{
  "ietf-voucher:voucher": {
    "created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",
    "assertion": "logged",
    "serial-number": "JADA123456789",
    "serial-number-issuer": "some binary identifier",
    "domain-cert-trusted-ca": "base64-encoded X.509 DER",
    "domain-cert-identifier": {
      "subject": "base64-encoded Subject DER"
    },
    "nonce": "base64-encoded octet string"
  }
}
```

The following illustrates a long-lived voucher (no nonce), encoded in XML. This particular voucher applies to more than one pledge.
(unique-id), which might relate to, for instance, they were all issued as part of the same purchase order. This voucher includes both a trust anchor certificate (trusted-ca-certificate) as well as some additional information (cn-id and dns-id) that can be used to identify a specific domain certificate issued, perhaps indirectly, by the trust anchor CA.

```json
{
    "ietf-voucher:voucher": {
        "created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",
        "expires-on": "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z",
        "assertion": "verified",
        "serial-number": "JADA123456789",
        "serial-number-issuer": "some binary identifier",
        "domain-cert-trusted-ca": "base64-encoded X.509 DER",
        "domain-cert-identifier": {
            "subject": "base64-encoded Subject DER"
        },
        "assert-revocations-on-PKIX-certs": "false",
        "last-renewal-date": "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z"
    }
}
```

### 5.3. YANG Module

```yml
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-voucher@2017-06-07.yang"

module ietf-voucher {
    yang-version 1.1;

    namespace
        "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher";
    prefix "vch";

    import ietf-yang-types {
        prefix yang;
        reference "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
    }

    import ietf-restconf {
        prefix rc;
        description
            "This import statement is only present to access the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
        reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
    }
}
```

organization
This module defines the format for a voucher, which is produced by a pledge’s manufacturer or delegate (MASA) to securely assign one or more pledges to an ‘owner’, so that the pledges may establish a secure connection to the owner’s network infrastructure.


Initial version;
node is optional because its primary purpose is for human consumption. However, when present, pledges that have reliable clocks SHOULD ensure that this created-on value is not greater than the current time."
}

leaf expires-on {
  type yang:date-and-time;
  must "not(../nonce)"
  description
  "A value indicating when this voucher expires. The node is optional as not all pledges support expirations, such as pledges lacking a reliable clock.

  If this field exists, then the the pledges MUST ensure that the expires-on time has not yet passed. A pledge without an accurate clock cannot meet this requirement.

  The expires-on value MUST NOT exceed the expiration date of any of the listed ‘pinned-domain-cert’ certificates."
}

leaf assertion {
  type enumeration {
    enum verified {
      description
      "Indicates that the ownership has been positively verified by the MASA (e.g., through sales channel integration)."
    }
    enum logged {
      description
      "Indicates that this ownership assignment has been logged into a database maintained by the MASA, after first verifying that there has not been a previous claim in the database for the same pledge (voucher transparency)."
    }
  }
  mandatory true;
  description
  "The assertion is a statement from the MASA regarding how the owner was verified. This statement enables pledges to support more detailed policy checks. Pledges MUST ensure that the assertion provided is acceptable before processing the voucher.";
}
leaf serial-number {
    type string;
    mandatory true;
    description
    "The serial number of the hardware. When processing a
    voucher, a pledge MUST ensure that its serial number
    matches this value. If no match occurs, then the
    pledge MUST NOT process this voucher.";
}

leaf idevid-issuer {
    type binary;
    description
    "The RFC5280 4.2.1.1 Authority Key Identifier OCTET STRING
    from the pledge’s IDevID certificate. Optional since some
    serial-numbers are already unique within the scope of a
    MASA. Inclusion of the statistically unique key identifier
    ensures statistically unique identification of the hardware.
    When processing a voucher, a pledge MUST ensure that its
    IDevID Authority Key Identifier matches this value. If no
    match occurs, then the pledge MUST NOT process this voucher.

    When issuing a voucher, the MASA MUST ensure that this field
    is populated for serial numbers that are not otherwise unique
    within the scope of the MASA.";
}

leaf-list pinned-domain-certificate {
    type binary;
    min-elements 1;
    description
    "An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC 5280,
    Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
    rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.

    This certificate is used by a pledge to trust a public key
    infrastructure, in order to verify a domain certificate
    supplied to the pledge separately by the bootstrapping
    protocol. The domain certificate MUST have this certificate
    somewhere in its chain of certificates. This certificate
    MAY be an end-entity certificate, including a self-signed
    entity.";
    reference
    "RFC 5280:
    Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
    and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
    ITU-T X.690:
    Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
leaf domain-cert-revocation-checks {
    type boolean;
    must "../expires-on";
    description
    "A processing instruction to the pledge that it MUST verify
    the revocation status for the domain certificate. This
    instruction is only available for vouchers that expire. If
    this field is not set, then normal PKIX behaviour applies
    to validation of the domain certificate.";
}

leaf nonce {
    type binary {
        length "8..32";
    }
    must "not(../expires-on)";
    description
    "A value that can be used by a pledge in some bootstrapping
    protocols to enable anti-replay protection. This node is
    optional because it is not used by all bootstrapping
    protocols.
    
    When present, the pledge MUST compare the provided nonce
    value with another value that the pledge randomly generated
    and sent to a bootstrap server in an earlier bootstrapping
    message. If the values do not match, then the pledge MUST
    NOT process this voucher.";
}

leaf last-renewal-date {
    type yang:date-and-time;
    must "../expires-on";
    description
    "The date that the MASA projects to be the last date it
    will renew a voucher on. This field is merely informative, it
    is not processed by pledges.
    
    Circumstances may occur after a voucher is generated that
    may alter a voucher’s validity period. For instance, a
    vendor may associate validity periods with support contracts,
    which may be terminated or extended over time.";
}
6. Design Considerations

6.1. Renewals instead of Revocations

The lifetimes of vouchers may vary. In some bootstrapping protocols, the vouchers may be created and consumed immediately whereas, in other bootstrapping solutions, there may be a significant delay between when a voucher is created and when it is consumed. In cases when there is a delay, there is a need for the pledge to ensure that the assertions made when the voucher was created are still valid when it is consumed.

A revocation artifact is generally used to verify the continued validity of an assertion such as a PKIX certificate, web token, or a "voucher". With this approach, a potentially long-lived assertion is paired with a reasonably fresh revocation status check to ensure that the assertion is still valid. However, this approach increases solution complexity, as it introduces the need for additional protocols and code paths to distribute and process the revocations.

Addressing the short-comings of revocations, this document recommends instead the use of lightweight renewals of short-lived non-revocable vouchers. That is, rather than issue a long-lived voucher, the expectation is for the MASA to instead issue a short-lived voucher along with a promise (reflected in the 'last-renewal-date' field) to re-issue the voucher again when needed. Importantly, while issuing the initial voucher may incur heavyweight verification checks (are you who you say you are? does the pledge actually belong to you?), re-issuing the voucher should be a lightweight process, as it ostensibly only updates the voucher’s validity period. With this approach, there is only the one artifact, and only one code path is needed to process it, without any possibility for a pledge to choose to skip the revocation status check because, for instance, the OCSP Responder is not reachable.

While this document recommends issuing short-lived vouchers, the voucher artifact does not restrict the ability to create a long-lived vouchers, if required, however no revocation method is described.

Note that a voucher may be signed by a chain of intermediate CAs leading up to the trust anchor certificate known by the pledge. Even
though the voucher itself is not revocable, it may still be revoked, per se, if one of the intermediate CA certificates is revoked.

6.2. Voucher Per Pledge

The solution described herein originally enabled a single voucher to apply to many pledges, using lists of regular expressions to represent ranges of serial numbers. However, it was determined that blocking the renewal of a voucher that applied to many devices would be excessive when only the ownership for a single pledge needed to be blocked. Thus, the voucher format now only supports a single serial-number to be listed.

7. Security Considerations

7.1. Clock Sensitivity

An attacker could use an expired voucher to gain control over a device that has no understanding of time.

To defend against this there are three things: devices are required to verify that the expires-on field has not yet passed. Devices without access to time can use nonces to get ephemeral vouchers. Thirdly, vouchers without expiration times may be used, which will appear in the audit log, informing the security decision.

This document defines artifacts containing time values for voucher expirations, which require an accurate clock in order to be processed correctly. Vendors planning on issuing vouchers with expiration values must ensure devices have an accurate clock when shipped from manufacturing facilities, and take steps to prevent clock tampering. If it is not possible to ensure clock accuracy then vouchers with expirations should not be issued.

7.2. Protect Voucher PKI in HSM

A voucher is signed by a CA, that may itself be signed by a chain of CAs leading to a trust anchor known to a pledge. Revocation checking of the intermediate certificates may be difficult in some scenarios. The voucher format supports the existing PKIX revocation information distribution within the limits of the current PKI technology (a PKCS7 structure can contain revocation objects as well), but pledges MAY accept vouchers without checking X.509 certificate revocation (when ‘domain-cert-revocation-checks’ is false). Without revocation checking, a compromised MASA keychain could be used to issue vouchers ad infinitum without recourse. For this reason, MASA implementations wanting to support such deployments SHOULD ensure that all the CA
private keys used for signing the vouchers are protected by hardware security modules (HSMs).

7.3. Test Domain Certificate Validity when Signing

If a domain certificate is compromised, then any outstanding vouchers for that domain could be used by the attacker. The domain administrator is clearly expected to initiate revocation of any domain identity certificates (as is normal in PKI solutions).

Similarly they are expected to contact the MASA to indicate that an outstanding (presumably short lifetime) voucher should be blocked from automated renewal. Protocols for voucher distribution are RECOMMENDED to check for revocation of any domain identity certificates before automated renewal of vouchers.

8. IANA Considerations

8.1. The IETF XML Registry

This document registers a URIs in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is requested:

    Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF.
    XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

8.2. The YANG Module Names Registry

This document registers a YANG module in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format defined in [RFC6020], the following registration is requested:

    name:     ietf-voucher
    prefix:   vch
    reference: RFC XXXX

9. References

9.1. Normative References

9.2. Informative References

[I-D.bjorklund-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams]

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join]

[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]

[I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch]

[imprinting]


Appendix A. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered by last name):

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