Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos

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1. Abstract

This document describes protocol extensions (hereafter called PKINIT) to the Kerberos protocol specification [1]. These extensions provide a method for integrating public key cryptography into the initial authentication exchange, by passing digital certificates and associated authenticators in preauthentication data fields.

2. Introduction

A client typically authenticates itself to a service in Kerberos
using three distinct though related exchanges. First, the client requests a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) from the Kerberos authentication server (AS). Then, it uses the TGT to request a service ticket from the Kerberos ticket-granting server (TGS). Usually, the AS and TGS are integrated in a single device known as a Kerberos Key Distribution Center, or KDC. (In this document, we will refer to both the AS and the TGS as the KDC.) Finally, the client uses the service ticket to authenticate itself to the service.

The advantage afforded by the TGT is that the client need explicitly request a ticket and expose his credentials only once. The TGT and its associated session key can then be used for any subsequent requests. One result of this is that all further authentication is independent of the method by which the initial authentication was performed. Consequently, initial authentication provides a convenient place to integrate public-key cryptography into Kerberos authentication.

As defined, Kerberos authentication exchanges use symmetric-key cryptography, in part for performance. One cost of using symmetric-key cryptography is that the keys must be shared, so that before a client can authenticate itself, he must already be registered with the KDC.

Conversely, public-key cryptography (in conjunction with an established Public Key Infrastructure) permits authentication without prior registration with a KDC. Adding it to Kerberos allows the widespread use of Kerberized applications by clients without requiring them to register first with a KDC—a requirement that has no inherent security benefit.

As noted above, a convenient and efficient place to introduce public-key cryptography into Kerberos is in the initial authentication exchange. This document describes the methods and data formats for integrating public-key cryptography into Kerberos initial authentication.

3. Extensions

This section describes extensions to [1] for supporting the use of public-key cryptography in the initial request for a ticket.

Briefly, this document defines the following extensions to [1]:

1. The client indicates the use of public-key authentication by including a special preauthenticator in the initial request. This preauthenticator contains the client’s public-key data and a signature.

2. The KDC tests the client’s request against its policy and trusted Certification Authorities (CAs).
3. If the request passes the verification tests, the KDC replies as usual, but the reply is encrypted using either:

   a. a symmetric encryption key, signed using the KDC’s signature key and encrypted using the client’s encryption key; or

   b. a key generated through a Diffie-Hellman exchange with the client, signed using the KDC’s signature key.

Any keying material required by the client to obtain the Encryption key is returned in a preauthentication field accompanying the usual reply.

4. The client obtains the encryption key, decrypts the reply, and then proceeds as usual.

Section 3.1 of this document defines the necessary message formats. Section 3.2 describes their syntax and use in greater detail.

3.1. Definitions, Requirements, and Constants

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [12].

3.1.1. Required Algorithms

All PKINIT implementations MUST support the following algorithms:

- Reply key (or DH-derived key): AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 etype.

- Signature algorithm: SHA-1 digest and RSA.

- Reply key delivery method: ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman with a non-zero nonce.

- Unkeyed checksum type for the paChecksum member of PKAuthenticator: SHA1 (unkeyed), Kerberos checksum type 14 [11].

3.1.2. Defined Message and Encryption Types
PKINIT makes use of the following new preauthentication types:

- PA-PK-AS-REQ
- PA-PK-AS-REP

PKINIT also makes use of the following new authorization data type:

- AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS

PKINIT introduces the following new error codes:

- KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62
- KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63
- KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG 64
- KDC_ERR_KEY_SIZE 65
- KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66
- KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70
- KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71
- KDC_ERR_REVOKE_CERTIFICATE 72
- KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73
- KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75

PKINIT uses the following typed data types for errors:

- TD-DH-PARAMETERS TBD
- TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104
- TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105
- TD-UNKEYED-CHECKSUM-INFO 109

PKINIT defines the following encryption types, for use in the AS-REQ message (to indicate acceptance of the corresponding encryption OIDs in PKINIT):

- dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9
- md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10
- sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11
- rc2CBC-EnvOID 12
- rsaEncryption-EnvOID (PKCS1 v1.5) 13
- rsaES-OAEP-EnvOID (PKCS1 v2.0) 14
- des-ede3-cbc-EnvOID 15

The above encryption types are used by the client only within the KDC-REQ-BODY to indicate which CMS [2] algorithms it supports. Their use within Kerberos EncryptedData structures is not specified by this document.

The ASN.1 module for all structures defined in this document (plus Import statements for all imported structures) are given in Appendix A. In the event of a discrepancy between Appendix A and the portions of ASN.1 in the main text, the appendix is normative.
All structures defined in this document MUST be encoded using Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER). All imported data structures must be encoded according to the rules specified in Kerberos [1] or CMS [2] as appropriate.

Interoperability note: Some implementations may not be able to decode CMS objects encoded with BER but not DER; specifically, they may not be able to decode infinite length encodings. To maximize interoperability, implementers SHOULD encode CMS objects used in PKINIT with DER.

3.1.3. Algorithm Identifiers

PKINIT does not define, but does make use of, the following algorithm identifiers.

PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifier for Diffie-Hellman key agreement [9]:

dhpublicnumber

PKINIT uses the following signature algorithm identifiers [8, 12]:

sha-1WithRSAEncryption (RSA with SHA1)
md5WithRSAEncryption (RSA with MD5)
id-dsa-with-shal (DSA with SHA1)

PKINIT uses the following encryption algorithm identifiers [5] for encrypting the temporary key with a public key:

rsaEncryption (PKCS1 v1.5)
id-RSAES-OAEP (PKCS1 v2.0)

PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifiers [2] for encrypting the reply key with the temporary key:

des-ede3-cbc (three-key 3DES, CBC mode)
rc2-cbc (RC2, CBC mode)
aes256_CBC (AES-256, CBC mode)

3.2. PKINIT Preauthentication Syntax and Use

This section defines the syntax and use of the various preauthentication fields employed by PKINIT.

3.2.1. Client Request
The initial authentication request (AS-REQ) is sent as per [1]; in addition, a preauthentication field contains data signed by the client’s private signature key, as follows:

```
WrapContentInfo ::= OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
    -- Contains a BER encoding of
    -- ContentInfo
})

WrapIssuerAndSerial ::= OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
    -- Contains a BER encoding of
    -- IssuerAndSerialNumber
})

PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
    signedAuthPack          [0] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
        -- Type is SignedData.
        -- Content is AuthPack
        -- (defined below).
    trustedCertifiers       [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA OPTIONAL,
        -- A list of CAs, trusted by
        -- the client, used to certify
        -- KDCs.
    kdcCert                 [2] IMPLICIT WrapIssuerAndSerial
        OPTIONAL,
        -- Identifies a particular KDC
        -- certificate, if the client
        -- already has it.

...

TrustedCA ::= CHOICE {
    caName                  [1] Name,
        -- Fully qualified X.500 name
        -- as defined in RFC 3280 [4].
    issuerAndSerial         [2] IMPLICIT WrapIssuerAndSerial,
        -- Identifies a specific CA
        -- certificate.

...

AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
    pkAuthenticator         [0] PKAuthenticator,
    clientPublicValue       [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
        -- Defined in RFC 3280 [4].
        -- Present only if the client
        -- is using ephemeral-ephemeral
        -- Diffie-Hellman.
    supportedCMSTypes       [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
        OPTIONAL,
        -- List of CMS encryption types
        -- supported by client in order
        -- of (decreasing) preference.

...
PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
    cusec [0] INTEGER (0..999999),
    ctime [1] KerberosTime,
        -- cusec and ctime are used as -- in [1], for replay
        -- prevention.
    nonce [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
        -- Binds reply to request,
        -- MUST be zero when client
        -- will accept cached
        -- Diffie-Hellman parameters
        -- from KDC. MUST NOT be
        -- zero otherwise.
    paChecksum [3] Checksum,
        -- Defined in [1].
        -- Performed over KDC-REQ-BODY,
        -- MUST be unkeyed.
    ...
}

The ContentInfo in the signedAuthPack is filled out as follows:

1. The eContent field contains data of type AuthPack. It MUST contain the pkAuthenticator, and MAY also contain the client’s Diffie-Hellman public value (clientPublicValue).

2. The eContentType field MUST contain the OID value for id-pkauthdata: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkauthdata(1)}

3. The signerInfos field MUST contain the signature over the AuthPack.

4. The certificates field MUST contain at least a signature verification certificate chain that the KDC can use to verify the signature over the AuthPack. The certificate chain(s) MUST NOT contain the root CA certificate.

5. If a Diffie-Hellman key is being used, the parameters MUST be chosen from Oakley Group 2 or 14. Implementations MUST support Group 2; they are RECOMMENDED to support Group 14. (See RFC 2409 [10].)

6. The KDC may wish to use cached Diffie-Hellman parameters. To indicate acceptance of caching, the client sends zero in the nonce field of the pkAuthenticator. Zero is not a valid value for this field under any other circumstances. Since zero is used to indicate acceptance of cached parameters, message binding in this case is performed using only the nonce in the main request.

3.2.2. Validation of Client Request
Upon receiving the client’s request, the KDC validates it. This section describes the steps that the KDC MUST (unless otherwise noted) take in validating the request.

The KDC must look for a client certificate in the signedAuthPack. If it cannot find one signed by a CA it trusts, it sends back an error of type KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying e-data for this error is a TYPED-DATA (as defined in [1]). For this error, the data-type is TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS, and the data-value is the DER encoding of

\[
\text{TrustedCertifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF Name}
\]

If, while verifying the certificate chain, the KDC determines that the signature on one of the certificates in the signedAuthPack is invalid, it returns an error of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying e-data for this error is a TYPED-DATA, whose data-type is TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX, and whose data-value is the DER encoding of the index into the CertificateSet field, ordered as sent by the client:

\[
\text{CertificateIndex ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber}
\]

\[
\text{-- IssuerAndSerialNumber of -- certificate with invalid signature}
\]

If more than one certificate signature is invalid, the KDC MAY send one TYPED-DATA per invalid signature.

The KDC MAY also check whether any certificates in the client’s chain have been revoked. If any of them have been revoked, the KDC MUST return an error of type KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE; if the KDC attempts to determine the revocation status but is unable to do so, it SHOULD return an error of type KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN. The certificate or certificates affected are identified exactly as for an error of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE (see above).

In addition to validating the certificate chain, the KDC MUST also check that the certificate properly maps to the client’s principal name as specified in the AS-REQ as follows:

1. If the KDC has its own mapping from the name in the certificate to a Kerberos name, it uses that Kerberos name.

2. Otherwise, if the certificate contains a SubjectAltName extension with a Kerberos name in the otherName field, it uses that name. The otherName field (of type AnotherName) in the SubjectAltName extension MUST contain the following:

\[
\text{The type-id is:}
\]

\[
\text{krb5PrincipalName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= \{ iso (1) org (3) dod (6)}
\]
The value is:

KRB5PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
    realm                   [0] Realm,
    principalName           [1] PrincipalName
}

If the KDC does not have its own mapping and there is no Kerberos name present in the certificate, or if the name in the request does not match the name in the certificate (including the realm name), or if there is no name in the request, the KDC MUST return error code KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH. There is no accompanying e-data for this error.

Even if the chain is validated, and the names in the certificate and the request match, the KDC may decide not to trust the client. For example, the certificate may include an Extended Key Usage (EKU) OID in the extensions field. As a matter of local policy, the KDC may decide to reject requests on the basis of the absence or presence of specific EKU OIDs. In this case, the KDC MUST return error code KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED. The PKINIT EKU OID is defined as:

{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkekuoid(4) }

If the client’s signature on the signedAuthPack fails to verify, the KDC MUST return error KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG. There is no accompanying e-data for this error.

The KDC MUST check the timestamp to ensure that the request is not a replay, and that the time skew falls within acceptable limits. The recommendations clock skew times in [1] apply here. If the check fails, the KDC MUST return error code KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT or KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW, respectively.

If the clientPublicValue is filled in, indicating that the client wishes to use ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman, the KDC checks to see if the parameters satisfy its policy. If they do not, it MUST return error code KDC_ERR_KEY_SIZE. The accompanying e-data is a TYPED-DATA, whose data-type is TD-DH-PARAMETERS, and whose data-value is the DER encoding of a DomainParameters (see [3]), including appropriate Diffie-Hellman parameters with which to retry the request.

The KDC MUST return error code KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH if the client included a kdcCert field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ and the KDC does not have the corresponding certificate.

The KDC MUST return error code KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED if the client did not include a kdcCert field, but did include a trustedCertifiers field, and the KDC does not possesses a certificate issued by one of
the listed certifiers.

If there is a supportedCMSTypes field in the AuthPack, the KDC must check to see if it supports any of the listed types. If it supports more than one of the types, the KDC SHOULD use the one listed first. If it does not support any of them, it MUST return an error of type KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.

3.2.3. KDC Reply

Assuming that the client’s request has been properly validated, the KDC proceeds as per [1], except as follows.

The KDC MUST set the initial flag and include an authorization data of type AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS in the issued ticket. The value is an OCTET STRING containing the DER encoding of InitialVerifiedCAs:

\[
\text{InitialVerifiedCAs} ::= \text{SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE} \{ \\
\text{ca} \ [0] \text{Name}, \\
\text{Validated} \ [1] \text{BOOLEAN}, \\
\ldots \\
\}\n\]

The KDC MAY wrap any AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS data in AD-IF-RELEVANT containers if the list of CAs satisfies the KDC’s realm’s policy. (This corresponds to the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED ticket flag.) Furthermore, any TGS must copy such authorization data from tickets used in a PA-TGS-REQ of the TGS-REQ to the resulting ticket, including the AD-IF-RELEVANT container, if present.

Application servers that understand this authorization data type SHOULD apply local policy to determine whether a given ticket bearing such a type *not* contained within an AD-IF-RELEVANT container is acceptable. (This corresponds to the AP server checking the transited field when the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag has not been set.) If such a data type is contained within an AD-IF-RELEVANT container, AP servers MAY apply local policy to determine whether the authorization data is acceptable.

The AS-REP is otherwise unchanged from [1]. The KDC encrypts the reply as usual, but not with the client’s long-term key. Instead, it encrypts it with either a generated encryption key, or a key derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange. The contents of the PA-PK-AS-REP indicate the type of encryption key that was used:

\[
\text{PA-PK-AS-REP} ::= \text{CHOICE} \{ \\
\text{dhSignedData} \ [0] \text{IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,} \\
\quad \text{-- Type is SignedData.} \\
\quad \text{-- Content is KDCDHKeyInfo} \\
\quad \text{-- (defined below).} \\
\text{encKeyPack} \ [1] \text{IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,} \\
\quad \text{-- Type is EnvelopedData.} \\
\quad \text{-- Content is SignedData over}
\]

The fields of the ContentInfo for dhSignedData are to be filled in as follows:

1. The eContent field contains data of type KDCDHKeyInfo.

2. The eContentType field contains the OID value for
   id-pkdhkeydata: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1)
   security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkdhkeydata(2) }

3. The signerInfos field contains a single signerInfo, which is the signature of the KDCDHKeyInfo.

4. The certificates field contains a signature verification certificate chain that the client will use to verify the KDC's signature over the KDCDHKeyInfo. This field may only be left empty if the client did include a kdcCert field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ, indicating that it has the KDC's certificate. The certificate chain MUST NOT contain the root CA certificate.

5. If the client and KDC agree to use cached parameters, the KDC MUST return a zero in the nonce field and include the expiration time of the cached values in the dhKeyExpiration field. If this time is exceeded, the client MUST NOT use the reply. If the time is absent, the client MUST NOT use the reply and MAY resubmit a request with a non-zero nonce, thus indicating non-acceptance of the cached parameters.

The KDC reply key is derived as follows:

1. Both the KDC and the client calculate the shared secret value
DHKey = g^{ab} \mod p

where a and b are the client’s and KDC’s private exponents, respectively. DHKey, padded first with leading zeros as needed to make it as long as the modulus p, is represented as a string of octets in big-endian order (such that the size of DHKey in octets is the size of the modulus p).

2. Let K be the key-generation seed length [6] of the reply key whose enctype is selected according to [1].

3. Define the function octetstring2key() as follows:

```plaintext
octetstring2key(h, x) == random-to-key(K-truncate(
    h(0x00 | x) |
    h(0x01 | x) |
    h(0x02 | x) |
    ...
))
```

where x is an octet string; h:octet string -> octet string is a cryptographically strong hash function; | is the concatenation operator; 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, etc. are each represented as a single octet; random-to-key() is an operation that generates a protocolkey from a bitstring of length K; and K-truncate truncates its input to K bits. Both K and random-to-key() are defined in the kcrypto profile [6] for the enctype of the reply key.

A good example of h() is SHA1.

4. Define H to be a hash function based on operations of a given checksum type [6], as follows:

```plaintext
H(x) = get_mic(dummy-key, x)
```

where x is an octet string.

H() MUST be a cryptographically strong hash, in order to be suitable for use in the octetstring2key() operation above.

5. The client specifies a checksum type to use in the paChecksum of the PKAuthenticator. If the H() operation based on this checksum is not suitable for use in octetstring2key(), or this checksum type is too weak or not supported by the KDC, the KDC MUST return an error of type KDC_ERR_PA_CHKSUMTYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED. The accompanying e-data for this error is a TYPED-DATA: the data-type is TD-UNKEYED-CHECKSUM-INFO, and the data-value is the DER encoding of
UNKEYED-CHECKSUM-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
    cksumtype            [0] Int32,
    ...
}

This list is in the preference order (best choice first) of the KDC, and the client SHOULD retry with the first available checksum type.

6. When cached DH parameters are used, let n_c be the clientDHNonce, and n_k be the serverDHNonce; otherwise, let both n_c and n_k be empty octet strings. The reply key k is

\[ k = \text{octetstring2key}(H, \text{DHKey} \mid n_c \mid n_k) \]

where H() is the hash function based on the checksum type used in the paChecksum of the PKAuthenticator (as defined in step 4).

Both the KDC and the client calculate the value \( g^{(ab)} \mod p \), where a and b are the client’s and KDC’s private exponents, respectively. They both take the first k bits of this secret value as a key generation seed, where the parameter k (the size of the seed) is dependent on the selected key type, as specified in [6]. The seed is then converted into a protocol key by applying to it a random-to-key function, which is also dependent on key type.

If the KDC and client are not using Diffie-Hellman, the KDC encrypts the reply with an encryption key, packed in the encKeyPack, which contains data of type ReplyKeyPack:

\[
\text{ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE} \begin{aligned} \\
\text{replyKey} &\quad [0] \text{EncryptionKey}, \\
\text{nonce} &\quad [1] \text{INTEGER} (0..4294967295),
\end{aligned}
\]

The fields of the ContentInfo for encKeyPack MUST be filled in as follows:

1. The content is of type SignedData. The eContent for the SignedData is of type ReplyKeyPack.
2. The eContentType for the SignedData contains the OID value for id-pkrkeydata: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkrkeydata(3) }

3. The signerInfos field contains a single signerInfo, which is the signature of the ReplyKeyPack.

4. The certificates field contains a signature verification certificate chain that the client will use to verify the KDC's signature over the ReplyKeyPack. This field may only be left empty if the client included a kdcCert field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ, indicating that it has the KDC's certificate. The certificate chain MUST NOT contain the root CA certificate.

5. The contentType for the EnvelopedData contains the OID value for id-signedData: { iso (1) member-body (2) us (840) rsadsi (113549) pkcs (1) pkcs7 (7) signedData (2) }

6. The recipientInfos field is a SET which MUST contain exactly one member of type KeyTransRecipientInfo. The encryptedKey for this member contains the temporary key which is encrypted using the client’s public key.

7. The unprotectedAttrs or originatorInfo fields MAY be present.

3.2.4. Validation of KDC Reply

Upon receipt of the KDC’s reply, the client proceeds as follows. If the PA-PK-AS-REP contains a dhSignedData, the client obtains and verifies the Diffie-Hellman parameters, and obtains the shared key as described above. Otherwise, the message contains an encKeyPack, and the client decrypts and verifies the temporary encryption key.

In either case, the client MUST check to see if the included certificate contains a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName or iPAddress (if the KDC is specified by IP address instead of name). If it does, it MUST check to see if that extension matches the KDC it believes it is communicating with, with matching rules specified in RFC 2459. Exception: If the client has some external information as to the identity of the KDC, this check MAY be omitted.

The client also MUST check that the KDC’s certificate contains an extendedKeyUsage OID of id-pkkdcekuoid:

{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkkdcekuoid(5) }

If all applicable checks are satisfied, the client then decrypts the
main reply with the resulting key, and then proceeds as described in [1].

4. Security Considerations

PKINIT raises certain security considerations beyond those that can be regulated strictly in protocol definitions. We will address them in this section.

PKINIT extends the cross-realm model to the public-key infrastructure. Users of PKINIT must understand security policies and procedures appropriate to the use of Public Key Infrastructures.

Standard Kerberos allows the possibility of interactions between cryptosystems of varying strengths; this document adds interactions with public-key cryptosystems to Kerberos. Some administrative policies may allow the use of relatively weak public keys. Using such keys to wrap data encrypted under stronger conventional cryptosystems may be inappropriate.

PKINIT requires keys for symmetric cryptosystems to be generated. Some such systems contain "weak" keys. For recommendations regarding these weak keys, see [1].

PKINIT allows the use of a zero nonce in the PKAuthenticator when cached Diffie-Hellman keys are used. In this case, message binding is performed using the nonce in the main request in the same way as it is done for ordinary AS-REQs (without the PKINIT pre-authenticator). The nonce field in the KDC request body is signed through the checksum in the PKAuthenticator, which cryptographically binds the PKINIT pre-authenticator to the main body of the AS Request and also provides message integrity for the full AS Request.

However, when a PKINIT pre-authenticator in the AS-REP has a zero-nonce, and an attacker has somehow recorded this pre-authenticator and discovered the corresponding Diffie-Hellman private key (e.g., with a brute-force attack), the attacker will be able to fabricate his own AS-REP messages that impersonate the KDC with this same pre-authenticator. This compromised pre-authenticator will remain valid as long as its expiration time has not been reached and it is therefore important for clients to check this expiration time and for the expiration time to be reasonably short, which depends on the size of the Diffie-Hellman group.

If a client also caches its Diffie-Hellman keys, then the session key could remain the same during multiple AS-REQ/AS-REP exchanges and an attacker which compromised the session key could fabricate his own AS-REP messages with a pre-recorded pre-authenticator until the client starts using a new Diffie-Hellman key pair and while the KDC pre-authenticator has not yet expired. It is therefore not recommended for KDC clients to also cache their Diffie-Hellman keys.
Care should be taken in how certificates are chosen for the purposes of authentication using PKINIT. Some local policies may require that key escrow be used for certain certificate types. Deployers of PKINIT should be aware of the implications of using certificates that have escrowed keys for the purposes of authentication.

PKINIT does not provide for a "return routability" test to prevent attackers from mounting a denial-of-service attack on the KDC by causing it to perform unnecessary and expensive public-key operations. Strictly speaking, this is also true of standard Kerberos, although the potential cost is not as great, because standard Kerberos does not make use of public-key cryptography.

The syntax for the AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS authorization data does permit empty SEQUENCEs to be encoded. Such empty sequences may only be used if the KDC itself vouches for the user’s certificate. [This seems to reflect the consensus of the Kerberos working group.]

5. Acknowledgements

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6. Expiration Date

This draft expires January 25, 2004.

7. Bibliography

[1] RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications.


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Appendix A. PKINIT ASN.1 Module

KerberosV5-PK-INIT-SPEC {  
    iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)  
    security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) pkinit(TBD)  
} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

IMPORTS  
    SubjectPublicKeyInfo, AlgorithmIdentifier, Name  
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso (1) identified-organization (3)  
    dod (6) internet (1) security (5) mechanisms (5)  
    pkix (7) id-mod (0) id-pkix1-explicit (18) }

    ContentInfo, IssuerAndSerialNumber  
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax { iso(1) member-body(2)  
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)  
    modules(0) cms(1) }

    KerberosTime, Checksum, TYPED-DATA, PrincipalName, Realm, EncryptionKey  
FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)  
    dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4)  
    krb5spec2(2) }

id-pkinit  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  
    { iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) security (5)  
    kerberosV5 (2) pkinit (3) }

id-pkdhkeydata  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit 1 }

id-pkdkeydata  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit 2 }

id-pkrkeydata  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit 3 }

id-pkekuoid  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit 4 }

id-pkkdcekuoid  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit 5 }

pa-pk-as-req INTEGER ::= TBD

pa-pk-as-rep INTEGER ::= TBD
pa-pk-ocsp-req INTEGER ::= TBD
pa-pk-ocsp-rep INTEGER ::= TBD

ad-initial-verified-cas INTEGER ::= TBD

td-dh-parameters INTEGER ::= TBD
td-trusted-certifiers INTEGER ::= 104
td-certificate-index INTEGER ::= 105

WrapContentInfo ::= OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
    -- Contains a BER encoding of
    -- ContentInfo
})

WrapIssuerAndSerial ::= OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
    -- Contains a BER encoding of
    -- IssuerAndSerialNumber
})

PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
signedAuthPack [0] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA OPTIONAL,
kdcCert [2] IMPLICIT WrapIssuerAndSerial OPTIONAL,
...
}

TrustedCA ::= CHOICE {
    caName [1] Name,
    issuerAndSerial [2] IMPLICIT WrapIssuerAndSerial,
    ...
}

AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,
clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
...
}

PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
cusec [0] INTEGER (0..999999),
ctime [1] KerberosTime,
nonce [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
paChecksum [3] Checksum,
...
}

TrustedCertifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF Name

CertificateIndex ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber
KRB5PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
  realm [0] Realm,
  principalName [1] PrincipalName
}

InitialVerifiedCAs ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
  ca [0] Name,
  validated [1] BOOLEAN,
  ...
}

PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE {
  dhSignedData [0] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
  encKeyPack [1] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
  ...
}

KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
  subjectPublicKey [0] BIT STRING,
  nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
  dhKeyExpiration [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
  ...
}

ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE {
  replyKey [0] EncryptionKey,
  nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
  ...
}

END

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