User to User Kerberos Authentication using GSS-API
Preliminary Draft

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ABSTRACT

This draft proposes a simple extension to the Kerberos GSS-API mechanism to support user to user authentication both in the case where the client application explicitly requests user to user authentication and when it does not know whether the server supports user to user authentication.
1. Introduction

The Kerberos user-to-user authentication mechanism allows for a client application to connect to a service that is not in possession of a long-term secret key. Instead, the authentication request (AP request) is encrypted using the session key from the service’s ticket-granting ticket. According to RFC 1510 [1]:

If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional ticket has been included in the request, the KDC will decrypt the additional ticket using the key for the server to which the additional ticket was issued and verify that it is a ticket-granting ticket. If the request succeeds, the session key from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new ticket that is issued instead of using the key of the server for which the new ticket will be used (This allows easy implementation of user-to-user authentication, which uses ticket-granting ticket session keys in lieu of secret server keys in situations where such secret keys could be easily compromised.).

The current Kerberos GSS-API mechanism does not support this flavor of authentication, and new messages and flags are defined to add this support. For the case that the client knows that the service requires user-to-user authentication, a new message (KERB-TGT-REQUEST) is defined. In the case that a client sends a normal AP request but the service only supports user-to-user authentication, a new Kerberos error as well as error data type is defined.

2. User to User as a New Mechanism

In the case that the client application knows that the server only supports user-to-user authentication, then it is easiest to add this functionality as a new mechanism. The new protocol extends the existing Kerberos GSS-API protocol by adding an additional round trip to request the TGT from the service. As with all Kerberos GSS-API
messages, the following tokens are encapsulated in the GSS-API framing.

The first token of the exchange is as follows:

```markdown
KERB-TGT-REQUEST ::= SEQUENCE {
  pvno[0]                         INTEGER,
  msg-type[1]                     INTEGER,
  server-name[2]                  PrincipalName
  OPTIONAL,
  realm[3]                        Realm OPTIONAL
}
```

The TGT request consists of four fields:

- `pvno` and `msg-type` are as defined in RFC1510 section 5.4.1. `msg-type` is `KRB_TGT_REQ` (16).

- `server-name` - this field optionally contains the name of the server. If the client application doesn’t know the server name this can be left blank and the server application will pick the appropriate server credentials.

- `realm` - this field optionally contains the realm of the server. If the client application doesn’t know the server realm this field can be left blank and the server application will pick the appropriate server credentials.

The server name and realm are included to allow a server application to act for multiple principles in different realms and to choose which credentials to use. Depending on the implementation of the Kerberos mechanism, the application may call `gss_accept_sec_context()` multiple times until the token is accepted.

The response to the KERB-TGT-REQUEST message is as follows:

```markdown
KERB-TGT-REPLY ::= SEQUENCE {
  pvno[0]                         INTEGER,
  msg-type[1]                     INTEGER,
  ticket[2]                       Ticket,
  server-name[4]                  PrincipalName
  OPTIONAL,
  realm[5]                        Realm OPTIONAL
}
```

The TGT reply contains the following fields:

- `pvno` and `msg-type` are as defined in RFC1510 section 5.4.1. `msg-type` is `KRB_TGT_REQ` (17)

- `ticket` - contains the TGT for the service specified by the server name and realm passed by the client or the default service.

- `server-name` - server’s principal name. If the client
does not supply the server name, the server will return the name. This allows the client to discover the server’s principal name in situations where it isn’t known. However, if the client doesn’t know the server’s principal name then authentication is not mutual - any server can respond to the client.

realm - server’s realm name. Similar to the server-name field, this is returned if the client doesn’t provide a realm in the request.

The mechanism ID for user to user GSS-API Kerberos, in accordance with the mechanism proposed by SPNEGO for negotiating protocol variations, is:

{iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) krb5(2) usertouser(1)}

Following the exchange of the TGT request messages, the rest of the authentication is identical to the Kerberos GSS-API mechanism defined in RFC 1964 [2].

3. User to User With The Existing Mechanism

In the case that the client application doesn’t know that a service requires user-to-user authentication and sends a normal AP request, it may be useful to recover and have the server return the TGT in the error message. In this case, the server returns a KRB-ERROR message with the KRB_AP_ERR_USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED (0x42). The error data for contains a KERB-TGT-REPLY structure without the server name and realm fields, as they are already included in the KERB-ERROR message. The Kerberos mechanism then continues as in [2] but with a user-to-user ticket instead of a normal session ticket.

4. Security Considerations

There is some risk in a server handing out its ticket-granting-ticket to any client that requests it, in that it gives an attacker a piece of encrypted material to decrypt. However, the same material may be obtained from listening to any legitimate client connect. In addition, the server may divulge its name in the KERB-TGT-RESPONSE message allowing, but again this may be obtained from capturing any legitimate request to the server.

5. References


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