Deprecating RC4 in all IETF Protocols
draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die-00

[[RFC-Editor: Please replace all instances of xxxx in this document with the RFC number of draft-ietf-curdle-des-des-des-die-die-die-]]

[[RFC-Editor: please replace the second character of my surname by U+00E2 when publishing as RFC in the header and in all pages. Non-ASCII characters are allowed in RFCs as per RFC 7997.]]

Abstract

RC4 is extremely weak as shown by RFC 6649 and RFC 7457, is prohibited in TLS by RFC 7465, is prohibited in Kerberos by RFC xxxx and it needs to be prohibited in all IETF protocols. Documents that provide technology that can only use RC4 are obsoleted by this document, so this document obsoletes and moves to Historic RFC 3078 "Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption (MPPE) Protocol" (only supports RC4, RFC 3079 that is also part of that protocol is also obsoleted), RFC 4345 "Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol" (note Arcfour and RC4 are synonymous), RFC 4757 "The RC4-HMAC Kerberos Encryption Types Used by Microsoft Windows" (only supports RC4) and RFC 6229 "Test Vectors for the Stream Cipher RC4" (provides test vectors for historic cryptography). RFC 2118, RFC 3501, RFC 3961, RFC 4120, RFC 4253, RFC 6150, RFC 6649, RFC 6733, RFC 7457, RFC 7905 and RFC xxxx are updated to note the deprecation of RC4 in all IETF protocols. (Please do not confuse RFC 4757 with RFC 7457.)

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2018.
1. Introduction

RC4 is extremely weak [RFC6649, RFC7457, RFCxxxx] and this document deprecates its use in all IETF protocols, including Kerberos and Secure Shell (SSH). The reasons for obsoleting RFC 3078, RFC 3079, RFC 4345 and RFC 4757 and moving them to Historic are discussed in Section 2. The updates to RFC 2118, RFC 3501, RFC 3961, RFC 4120, RFC 4253, RFC 6150, RFC 6649, RFC 6733, RFC 7457, RFC 7905 and RFC xxxx and the reasons for doing them are specified in sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14, respectively. The status of
the updated RFCs as of the writing of this document is available in Appendix A.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119, RFC8174].

2. Why obsolete those RFCs and move them to Historic

RFC 3078 is no longer used by supported Microsoft Windows versions and is moved to Historic and obsoleted by this document as it only supports RC4 for encryption. RFC 2118 is updated to note the moving of RFC 3078 (that updated RFC 2118) to Historic and its obsoleting. RFC 3079, that is effectively part of RFC 3078, is also moved to Historic as it only supports RC4 for encryption.

RFC 4345 defines the "arcfour-128" and "arcfour-256" modes for Secure Shell (SSH), and is moved to Historic as RC4 is extremely weak [RFC6649, RFC7457, RFCxxxx] and there is research that is at least 5 years old that totally breaks all practical usage of RC4 [RFC6649].

RFC 4757 is obsoleted and moved to Historic as it is no longer used by supported Microsoft Windows versions (support for Windows XP ended 8 April 2014, any unofficial support for officially unsupported Microsoft Windows versions will certainly remove RC4) and specifies RC4-HMAC as used by Microsoft Windows in Kerberos, that should have been obsoleted, not updated, by RFC 6649. RFC xxxx also obsoletes RFC 4757. Additionally, MD4 is extremely weak and not one-way [RFC6150] and this is another reason to move RFC 4757 to Historic, as well as the myriads of other reasons specified in [RFC6150].

RFC 6229 provides test vectors for RC4 and is obsoleted and moved to Historic by this document as RC4 is deprecated in all IETF protocols.

3. Updates to RFC 2118

RFC 2118 is updated to note the obsoleting of RFC 3078 and the moving of RFC 3078 to Historic (see Section 2).

4. Updates to RFC 3501

In Section 11.1 of [RFC3501], it is stated that:

```plaintext
IMAP client and server implementations MUST implement the
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 (TLS) cipher suite, and SHOULD implement the
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (TLS) cipher suite. This is
important as it assures that any two compliant implementations can be
```
configured to interoperate. All other cipher suites are OPTIONAL. Note that this is a change from section 2.1 of {IMAP_TLS}.

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The above paragraph of [RFC3501] required that implementations of IMAP clients and servers implement a RC4 cipher suite in TLS (contradicts [RFC7465]) and recommends implementing a weak cipher suite (DSA is not recommended by some sources and 3DES is used in the suite). Unfortunately, at the time of writing of RFC 3501, AES cipher suites were extremely new (the first AES cipher suites were defined in RFC 3268, published in June 2002), less than 1 year old and the strongest choice they have come up with at the time was TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.

As the document is over 14 years old, the above paragraph of [RFC3501] is replaced with the following paragraph:

***

IMAP client and server implementations were formerly required to implement TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 {TLS}, an extremely weak cipher suite [RFC6151, RFC6649, RFC7457, RFCxxxx, RFCyyyy] that TLS clients MUST NOT implement per [RFC7465]. Compatibility requirements were removed in the grounds of security, and all clients and servers SHOULD implement TLS 1.2 {TLS} and the TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 {TLS} cipher suite.

***

The TLS reference in [RFC3501] should be replaced with a reference to RFC 5246, and references to RFC 6151, RFC 6649, RFC 7457, RFC 7465, RFC xxxx and this document (as RFC yyyy) should be added.

5. Updates to RFC 3961

RFC 3961 is updated to note the deprecation of rc4-hmac and rc4-hmac-exp (referred to in Section 8 of [RFC3961]). rc4-hmac is NOT RECOMMENDED by [RFCxxxx] and rc4-hmac-exp is NOT RECOMMENDED by [RFC6649].

6. Updates to RFC 4120

RFC 4120 is updated to note the deprecation of rc4-hmac and rc4-hmac-exp.

7. Updates to RFC 4253

RFC 4253 is updated to note the deprecation of arcfour and 3des-cbc.
This document changes "OPTIONAL" to "NOT RECOMMENDED" for arcfour and "REQUIRED" to "OPTIONAL" for 3des-cbc in the table of Section 6.3 of [RFC4253] as 3DES is weak and maintaining the requirement will compromise systems. [RFC4253] was published in 2006, 11 years ago, and states that ""At some future time, it is expected that another algorithm, one with better strength, will become so prevalent and ubiquitous that the use of "3des-cbc" will be deprecated by another STANDARDS ACTION.""

The "future time" referred to by [RFC4253] is set to 2017, the "STANDARDS ACTION" is set to the publication of this document and the "algorithm" is set to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), as AES is ubiquitous in Kerberos implementations (see Section 11).

The paragraph on RC4 (called "arcfour" in [RFC4253]) in Section 6.3 of [RFC4253] currently reads:

"The "arcfour" cipher is the Arcfour stream cipher with 128-bit keys. The Arcfour cipher is believed to be compatible with the RC4 cipher [SCHNEIER]. Arcfour (and RC4) has problems with weak keys, and should be used with caution."

It should read:

"The "arcfour" cipher is the Arcfour stream cipher with 128-bit keys. The Arcfour cipher is believed to be compatible with the RC4 cipher [SCHNEIER]. Arcfour (and RC4) are extremely weak [RFC6649, RFC7457, RFCxxxx, RFCyyyy] and therefore their use is NOT RECOMMENDED."

References to RFC 6649, RFC 7457, RFC xxxx and this document (the reference to this document is RFCyyyy in the above paragraph) should be added to Section 6.3 of [RFC4253].

8. Updates to RFC 6150

RFC 6150 moves MD4 to Historic. Note the RFC contains a typo: "MD2" should be "MD4". RFC 6150 references RFC 4757, obsoleted by this document, as using MD4. The expression "with the one exception of Microsoft’s use of MD4 as part of RC4-HMAC in Windows,", as well as all expressions indicating algorithms using RC4 are a problem to the deprecation of MD4, should be removed from Section 4 of [RFC6150].

9. Updates to RFC 6649

RFC 6649, also known as BCP 179, deprecates DES, RC4-HMAC-EXP and other weak cryptography in Kerberos. It is updated to note the deprecation of rc4-hmac and the deprecation of RC4 in all IETF protocols.
The security considerations of [RFC6649] (Section 6 of [RFC6649]) read, in their last paragraph:

```markdown
***
The security considerations of [RFC4757] continue to apply to RC4-HMAC, including the known weaknesses of RC4 and MD4, and this document does not change the Informational status of [RFC4757] for now. The main reason to not actively discourage the use of RC4-HMAC is that it is the only encryption type that interoperates with older versions of Microsoft Windows once DES and RC4-HMAC-EXP are removed. These older versions of Microsoft Windows will likely be in use until at least 2015.
***
```

This is updated to note that Windows XP is without official support for 3 years (support for Windows XP ended 8 April 2014).

An important quote from [RFC6649] (Section 6 of [RFC6649]):

```markdown
***
Removing support for single DES improves security because DES is considered to be insecure. RC4-HMAC-EXP has a similarly inadequate key size, so removing support for it also improves security.
***
```

10. Updates to RFC 6733

Section 13.1. of [RFC6733] currently reads:

```markdown
***
Diameter nodes MUST be able to negotiate the following TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP cipher suites:

- TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
- TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
- TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

Diameter nodes SHOULD be able to negotiate the following TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP cipher suite:

- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

Note that it is quite possible that support for the TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cipher suite will be REQUIRED at some future date. Diameter nodes MAY negotiate other TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP cipher suites.
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The above paragraphs required that clients implement two RC4 cipher suites and a 3DES cipher suite (but recommends implementing an AES cipher suite).
RFC 6733 was published in October 2012, and the above paragraphs of [RFC6733] are to be replaced with:

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Diameter nodes were formerly required to implement insecure RC4 cipher suites and weak 3DES cipher suites. RC4 MUST NOT be used because it is prohibited by RFC 7465.

Diameter nodes MUST support at least one of the following cipher suites:

```plaintext
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA was not chosen to be absolutely required as Diameter nodes may require all connections to use forward secrecy by only implementing cipher suites with forward secrecy.

TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA is not a forward secrecy cipher suite because all connections can be decrypted once the private RSA key is known by an attacker.
```

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Several choices were given because of patent concerns with Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and problems of older implementations with ECC and GCM cipher suites.

11. Updates to RFC 7457

RFC 7457, an Informational RFC describing attacks against Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS), is updated to note the deprecation of RC4 in all IETF protocols.

12. Updates to RFC 7465

RFC 7465 prohibits RC4 cipher suites in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and is updated to note the deprecation of RC4 in all IETF protocols.

13. Updates to RFC 7905

RFC 7905, describing the ChaCha20-Poly1305 stream cipher to replace RC4 in Transport Layer Security (TLS), is updated to note the deprecation of RC4 in all IETF protocols, including TLS. [RFC7465],
that prohibited RC4 cipher suites, did not update RFC 7905, so this
document will do so.

14. Updates to RFC xxxx

RFC xxxx deprecates 3DES and RC4 in Kerberos, obsoletes RFC 4757 and
updates RFC 3961, and is updated by this document to note the
moving of RC4 RFCs (RFC 4345 and RFC 6229) and Microsoft technology
dependent on RC4 (RFC 3078 and RFC 4757).

An important quote from [RFCxxxx] (Section 5.4 of [RFCxxxx]):

"Fortunately, modern (i.e., supported) Kerberos implementations
support a secure alternative to RC4, in the form of AES. Windows has
supported AES since 2007-2008 with the release of Windows Vista and
Server 2008, respectively; MIT Kerberos [MITKRB5] has fully supported
AES (including the GSSAPI mechanism) since 2004 with the release of
version 1.3.2; Heimdal [HEIMDAL] has fully supported AES since 2005
with the release of version 0.7. Though there may still be issues
running ten-year-old unsupported software in mixed environments with
new software, issues of that sort seem unlikely to be unique to
Kerberos, and the administrators of such environments are expected to
be capable of devising workarounds."

(note the quote contains typos: "Fortunatlyely" and "aministrators")

15. Action to be taken

RC4 MUST NOT be used in new implementations of IETF protocols, and
RC4 MUST be eliminated as fast as possible from the existing Internet
infrastructure, as RC4 is extremely weak [RFC6649, RFC7457, RFCxxxx].
New RFCs MAY use the phrase "RC4 is extremely weak [RFC6649, RFC7457,
RFCxxxx]" with references to RFC 6649, RFC 7457 and RFC xxxx. Whether
the references to these documents is normative or informative is
determined by BCP 9 and BCP 97, whose relevant documents for this
purpose are RFC 2026, RFC 3967, RFC 4897, RFC 6410 and RFC 8067.

Microsoft Corporation SHOULD take action to eradicate RC4 in all
its software and systems.

New IETF protocols MUST NOT allow RC4, and new versions of existing
IETF protocols MUST either not allow RC4 or recommend not to use RC4
(for example, using "NOT RECOMMENDED" or "SHOULD NOT").

16. IANA Considerations

IANA may need to take action as the status for RC4 and 3DES
algorithms for Secure Shell (SSH) is changed by this document
(see Section 6, that updates [RFC4253]).
17. Security Considerations

This document deprecates RC4, that is obsolete cryptography, and several attacks that render it useless have been published [RFC6649]. Refer to Section 5 of [RFCxxxx] for further security considerations.

18. Acknowledgements

[[RFC-Editor: When possible, add native names according to the conventions of RFC 7997.]]

Thanks to the following people for writing reference material:

* Sean Turner and Lily Chen for writing RFC 6151, that contains updated security considerations for MD5 and HMAC-MD5.

* Love Hornquist Astrand and Tom Yu for writing RFC 6649, that deprecates weak cryptographic algorithms in Kerberos.

* Yaron Sheffer, Ralph Holz and Peter Saint-Andre for writing RFC 7457, that summarises known attacks against Transport Layer Security (TLS).


* Julien Elie for sending me an email about the requirements to implement RC4 cipher suites in RFC 3501 and RFC 6733.

Also thanks to SSL Labs for capping server grades to B (RC4 only used with older protocols) and C (RC4 used with modern protocols) when servers support RC4, and flagging cipher suites and clients using RC4 with a red colour (for INSECURE and RC4). You can test any server at <https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/>.

Refer to the acknowledgements section of RFC 6649, RFC 7457 and RFC xxxx for further acknowledgements.

19. References

19.1. Normative References


19.2. Informative References


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Appendix A. Status of Updated Documents as of 2017-06-24

[[RFC-Editor: Please replace with updated data when publishing as RFC and replace "2017-06-24" by the date of publishing. Leave the table below in a page of its own.]]
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<td>Best Current Practice (BCP 179)</td>
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Appendix B. Changelog

[[RFC-Editor: please remove this section when publishing.]]

WG draft (draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die):

00 - dummy update to get the draft into the curdle WG.

Individual draft (draft-luis140219-curdle-rc4-die-die-die):

02 - changed title to "Deprecating RC4 in all IETF Protocols", changed the header of all pages to "Deprecating RC4 in all Protocols", updated RFC 3501 and RFC 6733, simplified the reference to draft-ietf-curdle-des-des-des-die-die-die to a simple "Work in Progress" reference and fixed typos.

01 - explained reasons for updating RFC 7905 and added an informative reference to RFC 4757 to take away a missing reference warning.

00 - first version. [RFCxxxx] is a reference to draft-ietf-curdle-des-des-des-die-die-die. The quote in Section 11 is from version 03 of this draft (posted 2017-06-15)