Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-05

Abstract

[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition] provides a definition of the route leak problem, and also enumerates several types of route leaks. This document first examines which of those route-leak types are detected and mitigated by the existing origin validation (OV) [RFC 6811]. It is recognized that OV offers a limited detection and mitigation capability against route leaks. This document specifies enhancements that significantly extend the route-leak prevention, detection, and mitigation capabilities of BGP. One solution component involves carrying a per-hop route-leak protection (RLP) field in BGP updates. The RLP field is proposed to be carried in a new optional transitive attribute, called BGP RLP attribute. The solution is meant to be initially implemented as an enhancement of BGP without requiring BGPsec [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. However, when BGPsec is deployed in the future, the solution can be incorporated in BGPsec, enabling cryptographic protection for the RLP field. That would be one way of implementing the proposed solution in a secure way. The document also includes a stopgap method for detection and mitigation of route leaks for an intermediate phase when OV is deployed but BGP protocol on the wire is unchanged.

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1. Introduction

[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition] provides a definition of the route leak problem, and also enumerates several types of route leaks. This document first examines which of those route-leak types are detected and mitigated by the existing Origin Validation (OV) [RFC6811] method. OV and BGPsec path validation [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] together offer mechanisms to protect against re-originations and hijacks of IP prefixes as well as man-in-the-middle (MITM) AS path modifications. Route leaks (see [I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition] and references cited at the back) are another type of vulnerability in the global BGP routing system against which OV offers only partial protection. BGPsec (i.e. path validation) provides cryptographic protection for some aspects of BGP update messages, but in its current form BGPsec doesn’t offer any protection against route leaks.

For the types of route leaks enumerated in [I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition], where the OV method does not offer a solution, this document specifies enhancements that significantly extend the route-leak prevention, detection, and mitigation capabilities of BGP. One solution component involves carrying a per-hop route-leak protection (RLP) field in BGP updates. The RLP field is proposed be carried in a new optional transitive attribute, called BGP RLP attribute. The solution is meant to be initially implemented as an enhancement of BGP without requiring BGPsec. However, when BGPsec is deployed in the future, the solution can be incorporated in BGPsec, enabling cryptographic protection for the RLP field. That would be one way of implementing the proposed solution in a secure way. It is not claimed that the solution detects all possible types of route leaks but it detects several types, especially considering some significant route-leak occurrences that have been observed in recent years. The document also includes a stopgap method (in Section 4) for detection and mitigation of route leaks for an intermediate phase when OV is deployed but BGP protocol on the wire is unchanged.

2. Related Prior Work

The basic idea and mechanism embodied in the proposed solution is based on setting an attribute in BGP route announcement to manage the transmission/receipt of the announcement based on the type of neighbor (e.g. customer, transit provider, etc.). Documented prior
work related to said basic idea and mechanism dates back to at least the 1980’s. Some examples of prior work are: (1) Information flow rules described in [proceedings-sixth-ietf] (see pp. 195-196); (2) Link Type described in [RFC1105-obsolete] (see pp. 4-5); (3) Hierarchical Recording described in [draft-kunzinger-idrp-ISO10747-01] (see Section 6.3.1.12). The problem of route leaks and possible solution mechanisms based on encoding peering-link type information, e.g. P2C (i.e. Transit-Provider to Customer), C2P (i.e. Customer to Transit-Provider), p2p (i.e. peer to peer) etc., in BGPsec updates and protecting the same under BGPsec path signatures have been discussed in IETF SIDR WG at least since 2011. [draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns] attempted to describe these mechanisms in a BGPsec context. The draft expired in 2012. [draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns] defined neighbor relationships on a per link basis, but in the current document the relationship is encoded per prefix, as routes for prefixes with different business models are often sent over the same link. Also [draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns] proposed a second signature block for the link type encoding, separate from the path signature block in BGPsec. By contrast, in the current document when BGPsec-based solution is considered, cryptographic protection is provided for Route-Leak Protection (RLP) encoding using the same signature block as that for path signatures (see Section 3.1).

3. Mechanisms for Detection and Mitigation of Route Leaks

Referring to the enumeration of route leaks discussed in [I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition], Table 1 summarizes the route-leak detection capability offered by OV and BGPsec for different types of route leaks. (Note: Prefix filtering is not considered here in this table. Please see Section 4.)

A detailed explanation of the contents of Table 1 is as follows. It is readily observed that route leaks of Types 1, 2, 3, and 4 are not detected by OV or BGPsec in its current form. Clearly, Type 5 route leak involves re-origination or hijacking, and hence can be detected by OV. In the case of Type 5 route leak, there would be no existing ROAs to validate a re-originated prefix or more specific, but instead a covering ROA would normally exist with the legitimate AS, and hence the update will be considered Invalid by OV.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Route Leak</th>
<th>Current State of Detection Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 1: Hairpin Turn with Full Prefix</td>
<td>Neither OV nor BGPsec (in its current form) detects Type 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2: Lateral ISP-ISP-ISP Leak</td>
<td>Neither OV nor BGPsec (in its current form) detects Type 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3: Leak of Transit-Provider Prefixes to Peer</td>
<td>Neither OV nor BGPsec (in its current form) detects Type 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 4: Leak of Peer Prefixes to Transit Provider</td>
<td>Neither OV nor BGPsec (in its current form) detects Type 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 5: Prefix Re-Origination with Data Path to Legitimate Origin</td>
<td>OV detects Type 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 6: Accidental Leak of Internal Prefixes and More Specifics</td>
<td>For internal prefixes never meant to be routed on the Internet, OV helps detect their leak; they might either have no covering ROA or have an AS0-ROA to always filter them. In the case of accidental leak of more specifics, they may be detected due to violation of ROA maxLength. BGPsec (i.e. path validation) in its current form does not detect Type 6. However, route leaks of Type 6 are least problematic due to the following reasons. In the case of leak of more specifics, the offending AS is itself the legitimate destination of the leaked more-specific prefixes. Hence, in most cases of this type, the data traffic is neither misrouted not denied service. Also, leaked announcements of Type 6 are short-lived and typically withdrawn quickly following the announcements. Further, the MaxPrefix limit may kick-in in some</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Examination of Route-Leak Detection Capability of Origin Validation and Current BGPsec Path Validation

In the case of Type 6 leaks involving internal prefixes that are not meant to be routed in the Internet, they are likely to be detected by OV. That is because such prefixes might either have no covering ROA or have an AS0-ROA to always filter them. In the case of Type 6 leaks that are due to accidental leak of more specifics, they may be detected due to violation of ROA maxLength. BGPsec (i.e. path validation) in its current form does not detect Type 6. However, route leaks of Type 6 are least problematic due to the following reasons. In the case of leak of more specifics, the offending AS is itself the legitimate destination of the leaked more-specific prefixes. Hence, in most cases of this type, the data traffic is neither misrouted not denied service. Also, leaked announcements of Type 6 are short-lived and typically withdrawn quickly following the announcements. Further, the MaxPrefix limit may kick-in in some
receiving routers and that helps limit the propagation of sometimes large number of leaked routes of Type 6.

Realistically, BGPsec may take a much longer time being deployed than OV. Hence solution proposals for route leaks should consider both scenarios: (A) OV only (without BGPsec) and (B) OV plus BGPsec. Assuming an initial scenario A, and based on the above discussion and Table 1, it is evident that the solution method should focus primarily on route leaks of Types 1, 2, 3, and 4. Section 3.1 and Section 3.3 describe a simple addition to BGP that facilitates detection of route leaks of Types 1, 2, 3, and 4. The simple addition involves a per-hop Route-Leak Protection (RLP) field. The RLP fields are carried in an optional transitive attribute in BGP, called BGP RLP attribute. When BGPsec is deployed, the RLP field will be accommodated in the existing Flags field (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]) which is cryptographically protected under path signatures. Section 3.2 describes intra-AS messaging and common practice for route leak prevention in major ISPs’ networks.

### 3.1. Route-Leak Protection (RLP) Field Encoding by Sending Router

The key principle is that, in the event of a route leak, a receiving router in a transit-provider AS (e.g. referring to Figure 1, ISP2 (AS2) router) should be able to detect from the update message that its customer AS (e.g. AS3 in Figure 1) SHOULD NOT have forwarded the update (towards the transit-provider AS). This means that at least one of the ASes in the AS path of the update has indicated that it sent the update to its customer or lateral (i.e. non-transit) peer, but forbade any subsequent ‘Up’ forwarding (i.e. from a customer AS to its transit-provider AS). For this purpose, a Route-Leak Protection (RLP) field to be set by a sending router is proposed to be used for each AS hop.
For the purpose of route-leak detection and mitigation proposed in this document, the RLP field value SHOULD be set to one of two values as follows:

- **0**: This is the default value (i.e. "nothing specified"),
- **1**: This is the ‘Do not Propagate Up or Lateral’ indication; sender indicating that the route SHOULD NOT be forwarded ‘Up’ towards a transit-provider AS or to a lateral (i.e. non-transit) peer AS.

The RLP indications SHOULD be set on a per prefix and per neighbor AS basis. This is because updates for prefixes with different business models are often sent over the same link between ASes.

There are two different scenarios when a sending AS SHOULD set value 1 in the RLP field: (a) when sending the update to a customer AS, and (b) when sending the update to a lateral peer (i.e. non-transit) AS.

In essence, in both scenarios, the intent of RLP = 1 is that the neighbor AS and any receiving AS along the subsequent AS path SHOULD NOT forward the update ‘Up’ towards its (receiving AS’s) transit-provider AS or laterally towards its peer (i.e. non-transit) AS. When sending an update ‘Up’ to a transit-provider AS, the RLP encoding SHOULD be set to the default value of 0. When a sending AS sets the RLP encoding to 0, it is indicating to the receiving AS that the update can be propagated in any direction (i.e. towards transit-provider, customer, or lateral peer). This two-state specification in the RLP field works for detection and mitigation of route leaks of...
Types 1, 2, 3, and 4 which are the focus here (see Section 3.3 and Section 3.4).

An AS SHOULD NOT rewrite/reset the values set by any preceding ASes in their respective RLP fields.

The proposed RLP encoding SHOULD be carried in BGP-4 [RFC4271] updates in a new BGP optional transitive attribute (see Section 3.1.1). And it SHOULD be carried in BGPsec in the Flags field (see Section 3.1.2).

3.1.1. BGP RLP Attribute

The BGP RLP attribute is a new BGP optional transitive attribute. The attribute type code for the RLP attribute is to be assigned by IANA. The value field of the RLP attribute is defined as a set of one or more RLP TLVs (Type, Length, Value) as described below:

```
+-----------------------+    >  (Most recently added)
| ASN: N                |
+-----------------------+    >  (Least recently added)
| RLP: N                |
+-----------------------+    >  (Most recently added)
| RLP: 1                |
+-----------------------+    >  (Most recently added)
| RLP: 1                |
+-----------------------+    >  (Most recently added)

Figure 2: RLP TLV format.
```

RLP TLV has these two components:

ASN: Four octets encoding the public registered AS number of a BGP speaker.

RLP Flag: One octet encoding the RLP Flag bits. Usage of these flag bits was described above and will be further discussed in subsequent sections.

If all ASes in the AS_PATH of a route are upgraded to participate in RLP, then the ASNs in the RLP TLV in Figure 2 will correspond one-to-one with sequence of ASes in the AS_PATH (excluding prepends). If some ASes do not participate, then one or more {ASN, RLP} tuples may be missing in the RLP TLV relative to the AS_PATH.
3.1.2. Carrying RLP Flag Values in the BGPsec Flags

In BGPsec enabled routers, the RLP encoding SHOULD be accommodated in the existing Flags field in BGPsec updates. The Flags field is part of the Secure_Path Segment in BGPsec updates [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. It is one octet long, and one Flags field is available for each AS hop, and currently only the first bit is used in BGPsec. So there are 7 bits that are currently unused in the Flags field. Two (or more if needed) of these bits can be designated for the RLP field. Since the BGPsec protocol specification requires a sending AS to include the Flags field in the data that are signed over, the RLP field for each hop (assuming it would be part of the Flags field) will be protected under the sending AS’s signature.

3.2. Intra-AS Messaging for Route Leak Prevention

The following procedure (or similar) for intra-AS messaging (i.e. between ingress and egress routers) for prevention of route leaks is a fairly common practice used by large ISPs. (Note: This information was gathered from discussions on the NANOG mailing list [Nanog-thread-June2016] as well as through private discussions with operators of large ISP networks.)

Routes are tagged on ingress to an AS with communities for origin, including the type of eBGP peer it was learned from (customer, transit-provider or peer), geographic location, etc. The community attributes are carried across the AS with the routes. Routes that the AS originates directly are tagged with similar origin communities when they are redistributed into BGP from static, IGP, etc. These communities are used along with additional logic in route policies to determine which routes are to be announced to which eBGP peers and which are to be dropped. Route policy is applied to eBGP sessions based on what set of routes they should receive (transit, full routes, internal-only, default-only, etc.). In this process, the ISP’s AS also ensures that routes learned from a transit-provider or a lateral peer (i.e. non-transit) at an ingress router are not leaked at an egress router to another transit-provider or lateral peer.

Additionally, in many cases, ISP network operators’ outbound policies require explicit matches for expected communities before passing routes. This helps ensure that that if an update has made it into the routing table (i.e. RIB) but has missed its ingress community tagging (due to a missing/misapplied ingress policy), it will not be inadvertently leaked.

The above procedure (or a simplified version of it) is also applicable when an AS consists of a single eBGP router. It is
recommended that all AS operators SHOULD implement the procedure described above (or similar that is appropriate for their network) to prevent route leaks that they have direct control over.

In the above described common practice, the IPS’s ingress and egress routers primarily rely on pre-configured knowledge of the peer type for each of its eBGP peers. However, as an additional measure of route-leak alertness, the ingress router SHOULD examine the RLP value set by the eBGP peer from which the route is received. If said eBGP peer is a customer (for the route), then the RLP value is expected to be set to 0 (see Section 3.1). And if said eBGP peer is a transit-provider or lateral peer, then the RLP field is expected to be set to 1. If the observed RLP value differs from the expectation, then the event SHOULD be logged, and said eBGP peer SHOULD be notified.

3.3. Recommended Actions at a Receiving Router for Detection of Route Leaks

An example set of receiver actions that work to detect and mitigate route leaks of Types 1, 2, 3, and 4 are provided here. This example algorithm serves as a proof of concept. However, other receiver algorithms or procedures can be designed (based on the same sender specification as in Section 3.1) and may perform with greater efficacy, and are by no means excluded.

A recommended receiver algorithm for detecting a route leak is as follows:

A receiving router SHOULD mark an update as a ‘Route Leak’ if ALL of the following conditions hold true:

1. The update is received from a customer or lateral peer AS.
2. The update has the RLP field set to 1 (i.e. ’Do not Propagate Up or Lateral’) indication for one or more hops (excluding the most recent) in the AS path.

The reason for stating "excluding the most recent" in the above algorithm is as follows. An ISP should look at RLP values set by ASes preceding the immediate sending AS in order to ascertain a leak. The receiving router already knows that the most recent hop in the update is from its customer or lateral-peer AS to itself, and it does not need to rely on the RLP field value set by said AS for detection of route leaks. (Note: The utility of RLP value set by the peer sending the update was discussed above in Section 3.2.)

If the RLP encoding is secured by BGPsec (see Section 3.1) and hence protected against tampering by intermediate ASes, then there would be
added certainty in the route-leak detection algorithm described above (see discussions in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2).

3.4. Possible Actions at a Receiving Router for Mitigation

After applying the above detection algorithm, a receiving router may use any policy-based algorithm of its own choosing to mitigate any detected route leaks. An example receiver algorithm for mitigating a route leak is as follows:

- If an update from a customer or lateral peer AS is marked as a 'Route Leak', then the receiving router SHOULD prefer an alternate unmarked route if available.

- If no alternate unmarked route is available, then the route marked as a 'Route Leak' MAY be accepted.

A basic principle here is that if an AS receives and marks a customer route as 'Route Leak', then the AS should override the "prefer customer route" policy, and instead prefer an alternate 'clean' route learned from another customer, a lateral peer, or a transit provider. This can be implemented by adjusting the local preference for the routes in consideration.

4. Stopgap Solution when Only Origin Validation is Deployed

A stopgap method is described here for detection and mitigation of route leaks for the intermediate phase when OV is deployed but BGP protocol on the wire is unchanged. The stopgap solution can be in the form of construction of a prefix filter list from ROAs. A suggested procedure for constructing such a list comprises of the following steps:

- ISP makes a list of all the ASes (Cust_AS_List) that are in its customer cone (ISP’s own AS is also included in the list). (Some of the ASes in Cust_AS_List may be multi-homed to another ISP and that is OK.)

- ISP downloads from the RPKI repositories a complete list (Cust_ROA_List) of valid ROAs that contain any of the ASes in Cust_AS_List.

- ISP creates a list of all the prefixes (Cust_Prfx_List) that are contained in any of the ROAs in Cust_ROA_List.

- Cust_Prfx_List is the allowed list of prefixes that is permitted by the ISP’s AS, and will be forwarded by the ISP to upstream ISPs, customers, and peers.
A route for a prefix that is not in Cust_Prfx_List but announced by one of ISP’s customers is ‘marked’ as a potential route leak. Further, the ISP’s router SHOULD prefer an alternate route that is Valid (i.e. valid according to origin validation) and ‘clean’ (i.e. not marked) over the ‘marked’ route. The alternate route may be from a peer, transit provider, or different customer.

Special considerations with regard to the above procedure may be needed for DDoS mitigation service providers. They typically originate or announce a DDoS victim’s prefix to their own ISP on a short notice during a DDoS emergency. Some provisions would need to be made for such cases, and they can be determined with the help of inputs from DDoS mitigation service providers.

For developing a list of all the ASes (Cust_AS_List) that are in the customer cone of an ISP, the AS path based Outbound Route Filter (ORF) technique [draft-ietf-idr-aspath-orf] can be helpful (see discussion in Section 5.4).

Another technique based on AS_PATH filters is described in [Snijders]. This method is applicable to very large ISPs (i.e. big networks) that have lateral peering. For a pair of such very large ISPs, say A and B, the method depends on ISP A communicating out-of-band (e.g. by email) with ISP B about whether or not it (ISP A) has any transit providers. This out-of-band knowledge enables ISP B to apply suitable AS_PATH filtering criteria for routes involving the presence of ISP A in the path and prevent certain kinds of route leaks (see [Snijders] for details).

5. Design Rationale and Discussion

This section provides design justifications for the methodology specified in Section 3, and also answers some questions that are anticipated or have been raised in the IETF IDR and SIDR working group meetings.

5.1. Is route-leak solution without cryptographic protection a serious attack vector?

It has been asked if a route-leak solution without BGPsec, i.e. when RLP bits are not protected, can turn into a serious new attack vector. The answer seems to be: not really! Even the NLRI and AS_PATH in BGP updates are attack vectors, and RPKI/OV/BGPsec seek to fix that. Consider the following. Say, if 99% of route leaks are accidental and 1% are malicious, and if route-leak solution without BGPsec eliminates the 99%, then perhaps it is worth it (step in the right direction). When BGPsec comes into deployment, the route-leak protection (RLP) bits can be mapped into BGPsec (using the Flags...
field) and then necessary security will be in place as well (within each BGPsec island as and when they emerge).

Further, let us consider the worst-case damage that can be caused by maliciously manipulating the RLP bits in an implementation without cryptographic protection (i.e. sans BGPsec). Manipulation of the RLP bits can result in one of two types of attacks: (a) Upgrade attack and (b) Downgrade attack. Descriptions and discussions about these attacks follow. In what follows, P2C stands for transit provider to customer (Down); C2P stands for customer to transit provider (Up), and p2p stands for peer to peer (lateral or non-transit relationship).

(a) Upgrade attack: An AS that wants to intentionally leak a route would alter the RLP encodings for the preceding hops from 1 (i.e. ‘Do not Propagate Up or Lateral’) to 0 (default) wherever applicable. This poses no problem for a route that keeps propagating in the ‘Down’ (P2C) direction. However, for a route that propagates ‘Up’ (C2P) or ‘Lateral’ (p2p), the worst that can happen is that a route leak goes undetected. That is, a receiving router would not be able to detect the leak for the route in question by the RLP mechanism described here. However, the receiving router may still detect and mitigate it in some cases by applying other means such as prefix filters [RFC7454]. If some malicious leaks go undetected (when RLP is deployed without BGPsec) that is possibly a small price to pay for the ability to detect the bulk of route leaks that are accidental.

(b) Downgrade attack: RLP encoding is set to 1 (i.e. ‘Do not Propagate Up or Lateral’) when it should be set to 0 (default). This would result in a route being mis-detected and marked as a route leak. By default RLP encoding is set to 0, and that helps reduce errors of this kind (i.e. accidental downgrade incidents). Every AS or ISP wants reachability for prefixes it originates and for its customer prefixes. So an AS or ISP is not likely to change an RLP value 0 to 1 intentionally. If a route leak is detected (due to intentional or accidental downgrade) by a receiving router, it would prefer an alternate ‘clean’ route from a transit provider or peer over a ‘marked’ route from a customer. It may end up with a suboptimal path. In order to have reachability, the receiving router would accept a ‘marked’ route if there is no alternative that is ‘clean’. So RLP downgrade attacks (intentional or accidental) would be quite rare, and the consequences do not appear to be grave.
5.2. Combining results of route-leak detection, OV and BGPsec validation for path selection decision

Combining the results of route-leak detection, OV, and BGPsec validation for path selection decision is up to local policy in a receiving router. As an example, a router may always give precedence to outcomes of OV and BGPsec validation over that of route-leak detection. That is, if an update fails OV or BGPsec validation, then the update is not considered a candidate for path selection. Instead, an alternate update is chosen that passed OV and BGPsec validation and additionally was not marked as route leak.

If only OV is deployed (and not BGPsec), then there are six possible combinations between OV and route-leak detection outcomes. Because there are three possible outcomes for OV (NotFound, Valid, and Invalid) and two possible outcomes for route-leak detection (marked as leak and not marked). If OV and BGPsec are both deployed, then there are twelve possible combinations between OV, BGPsec validation, and route-leak detection outcomes. As stated earlier, since BGPsec protects the RLP encoding, there would be added certainty in route-leak detection outcome if an update is BGPsec valid (see Section 5.1).

5.3. Are there cases when valley-free violations can be considered legitimate?

There are studies in the literature [Anwar] [Giotsas] [Wijchers] observing and analyzing the behavior of routes announced in BGP updates using data gathered from the Internet. In particular, the studies have focused on how often there appear to be valley-free (e.g. Gao-Rexford [Gao] model) violations, and if they can be explained [Anwar]. One important consideration for explanation of violations is per-prefix routing policies, i.e., routes for prefixes with different business models are often sent over the same link. One encouraging result reported in [Anwar] is that when per-prefix routing policies are taken into consideration in the data analysis, more than 80% of the observed routing decisions fit the valley-free model (see Section 4.3 and SPA-1 data in Figure 2). [Anwar] also observes, "it is well known that this model [the basic Gao-Rexford model and some variations of it] fails to capture many aspects of the interdomain routing system. These aspects include AS relationships that vary based on the geographic region or destination prefix, and traffic engineering via hot-potato routing or load balancing." So there may be potential for explaining the remaining (20% or less) violations of valley-free as well.

One major design factor in the methodology described in this document is that the Route-Leak Protection (RLP) encoding is per prefix. So
the proposed solution is consistent with ISPs’ per-prefix routing policies. Large global and other major ISPs will be the likely early adopters, and they are expected to have expertise in configuring policies (including per prefix policies, if applicable), and make proper use of the RLP indications on a per prefix basis. When said large ISPs participate in this solution deployment, it is envisioned that they would form a ring of protection against route leaks, and co-operatively avoid many of the common types of route leaks that are observed. Route leaks may still happen occasionally within the customer cones (if some customer ASes are not participating or not diligently implementing RLP), but said leaks would be much less likely to propagate from one large participating ISP to another.

5.4. Comparison with other methods, routing security BCP

It is reasonable to ask if techniques considered in BCPs such as [RFC7454] (BGP Operations and Security) and [NIST-800-54] may be adequate to address route leaks. The prefix filtering recommendations in the BCPs may be complementary but not adequate. The difficulty is in ISPs’ ability to construct prefix filters that represent their customer cones (CC) accurately, especially when there are many levels in the hierarchy within the CC. In the RLP-encoding based solution described here, AS operators signal for each route propagated, if it SHOULD NOT be subsequently propagated to a transit provider or peer.

AS path based Outbound Route Filter (ORF) described in [draft-ietf-idr-aspath-orf] is also an interesting complementary technique. It can be used as an automated collaborative messaging system (implemented in BGP) for ISPs to try to develop a complete view of the ASes and AS paths in their CCs. Once an ISP has that view, then AS path filters can be possibly used to detect route leaks. One limitation of this technique is that it cannot duly take into account the fact that routes for prefixes with different business models are often sent over the same link between ASes. Also, the success of AS path based ORF depends on whether ASes at all levels of the hierarchy in a CC participate and provide accurate information (in the ORF messages) about the AS paths they expect to have in their BGP updates.

5.5. Per-Hop RLP Flags or Single RLP Flag per Update?

The route-leak detection and mitigation mechanism described in this document is based on setting RLP flags on a per-hop basis. There is another possible mechanism based on a single RLP flag per update.

Method A - Per-Hop RLP Flags: The sender on each hop in the AS path sets RLP = 1 if sending the update to a customer or lateral peer.
(regardless of what the previous ASes in the path set their bits to).
No AS (if operating correctly) would rewrite/reset the RLP flags set
by any preceding AS (see Section 3.1).

Method B - Single RLP Flag per Update: As it propagates, the update
always has only one RLP flag. Once an AS (in the update path)
determines that it is sending an update towards a customer or lateral
peer AS, it sets the RLP flag. Once the flag is set, it would be
required that subsequent ASes in the path should always leave the
flag set.

Method B is functionally deficient when compared to Method A for
detection of route leaks. This becomes quite evident from the
illustration in Figure 3. With Method B in use, it is evident that
when AS3 receives an update, \( \{p \ [AS2, AS1] \text{ RLP}=1\} \) from AS2, there is
no way for it (AS3) to distinguish and tell if AS2 is leaking a route
learned from a transit-provider or lateral peer (AS1), or
legitimately forwarding a route learned from a customer (AS1).
Method A does not suffer from this inadequacy because if Method A
were used, then AS3 in Figure 3 will have the benefit of seeing the
RLP field values set by AS1 and AS2 individually. Thus in Method A,
a legitimate customer route forwarded from AS2 to AS3 will be
distinguishable from a leaked transit-provider or lateral-peer route.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>peer to peer (p2p) relation</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>p--</td>
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</table>
|-----+-----+         +-----+            Update -->        +-----+
|-----+-----+         +-----+            Method B: \( \{p \ [AS2 AS1] \text{ RLP}=1\}\) 
|       |       |            (independent of AS1’s relationship with AS2)

** Method B fails to differentiate leak versus legitimate

Method A: \( \{p \ [AS2 AS1] \text{ (RLP2}=1 \text{ RLP1}=1\}) \) -- route leak
(if AS1 is transit-provider or lateral peer of AS2)
Method A: \( \{p \ [AS2 AS1] \text{ (RLP2}=1 \text{ RLP1}=0\}) \) -- legitimate
(if AS1 is a customer of AS2)

** Method A successfully differentiates leak versus legitimate

Figure 3: Illustration of the basic notion of a route leak.

In general, Method A is more robust than Method B in the presence of
faulty operation (including route leaks) or lack of upgrade (to
perform RLP) on part of an AS in the AS path. [Sriram] further
illustrates this (see slides 5-9) under multiple partial deployment /
faulty implementation scenarios.
Further, it is feasible to provide cryptographic protection for the RLP encoding in the case Method A with the help of the BGPsec protocol (see Section 3.1.2). Method B is not amenable to be mapped into BGPsec.

6. Security Considerations

The proposed Route-Leak Protection (RLP) field requires cryptographic protection in order to prevent malicious route leaks. Since it is proposed that the RLP field be included in the Flags field in the Secure_Path Segment in BGPsec updates, the cryptographic security mechanisms in BGPsec are expected to also apply to the RLP field. The reader is therefore directed to the security considerations provided in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].

7. IANA Considerations

A request will be made to IANA for assignment of an attribute type code for the proposed new BGP RLP attribute.

8. Acknowledgements

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Authors’ Addresses

Kotikalapudi Sriram
US NIST
Email: ksriram@nist.gov

Doug Montgomery
US NIST
Email: dougm@nist.gov

Brian Dickson
Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com

Keyur Patel
Arrcus
Email: keyur@arrcus.com

Andrei Robachevsky
Internet Society
Email: robachevsky@isoc.org