Abstract

This document updates PKINIT, as defined in RFC 4556, to remove protocol structures tied to specific cryptographic algorithms. The PKINIT key derivation function is made negotiable, the digest algorithms for signing the pre-authentication data and the client’s X.509 certificates are made discoverable.

These changes provide preemptive protection against vulnerabilities discovered in the future against any specific cryptographic algorithm, and allow incremental deployment of newer algorithms.

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1. Introduction

This document updates PKINIT [RFC4556] to remove protocol structures tied to specific cryptographic algorithms. The PKINIT key derivation function is made negotiable, the digest algorithms for signing the pre-authentication data and the client’s X.509 certificates are made discoverable.

These changes provide preemptive protection against vulnerabilities discovered in the future against any specific cryptographic algorithm, and allow incremental deployment of newer algorithms.

In August 2004, Xiaoyun Wang’s research group reported MD4 [RFC6150] collisions generated using hand calculation [WANG04], alongside attacks on later hash function designs in the MD4, MD5 [RFC1321] and SHA [RFC6234] family. These attacks and their consequences are discussed in [RFC6194]. These discoveries challenged the security of protocols relying on the collision resistance properties of these hashes.

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called for actions to update existing protocols to provide crypto algorithm agility so that protocols support multiple cryptographic algorithms (including hash functions) and provide clean, tested transition strategies between algorithms.

This document updates PKINIT to provide crypto algorithm agility. Several protocol structures used in the [RFC4556] protocol are either tied to SHA-1, or do not support negotiation or discovery, but are instead based on local policy. The following concerns have been addressed in this update:

- The checksum algorithm in the authentication request is hardwired to use SHA-1 [RFC6234].
- The acceptable digest algorithms for signing the authentication data are not discoverable.
- The key derivation function in Section 3.2.3 of [RFC4556] is hardwired to use SHA-1.
- The acceptable digest algorithms for signing the client X.509 certificates are not discoverable.

To address these concerns, new key derivation functions (KDFs), identified by object identifiers, are defined. The PKINIT client provides a list of KDFs in the request and the Key Distribution Center (KDC) picks one in the response, thus a mutually-supported KDF
is negotiated.

Furthermore, structures are defined to allow the client to discover the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] digest algorithms supported by the KDC for signing the pre-authentication data and signing the client X.509 certificate.

2. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. paChecksum Agility

The paChecksum defined in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC4556] provides a cryptographic binding between the client’s pre-authentication data and the corresponding Kerberos request body. This also prevents the KDC body from being tampered with. SHA-1 is the only allowed checksum algorithm defined in [RFC4556]. This facility relies on the collision resistance properties of the SHA-1 checksum [RFC6234].

When the reply key delivery mechanism is based on public key encryption as described in Section 3.2.3. of [RFC4556], the asChecksum in the KDC reply provides the binding between the pre-authentication and the ticket request and response messages, and integrity protection for the unauthenticated clear text in these messages. However, if the reply key delivery mechanism is based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement as described in Section 3.2.3.1 of [RFC4556], the security provided by using SHA-1 in the paChecksum is weak. In this case, the new KDF selected by the KDC as described in Section 6 provides the cryptographic binding and integrity protection.

4. CMS Digest Algorithm Agility

When the KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED error is returned as described in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC4556], implementations conforming to this specification can OPTIONALLY send back a list of supported CMS types signifying the digest algorithms supported by the KDC, in the decreasing preference order. This is accomplished by including a TD_CMS_DATA_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS typed data element in the error data.
The corresponding data for the TD_CMS_DATA_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS contains the ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X680] [X690] encoded TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA structure defined as follows:

TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF
  AlgorithmIdentifier
  -- Contains the list of CMS algorithm [RFC5652]
  -- identifiers that identify the digest algorithms
  -- acceptable by the KDC for signing CMS data in
  -- the order of decreasing preference.

The algorithm identifiers in the TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS identify digest algorithms supported by the KDC.

This information sent by the KDC via TD_CMS_DATA_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS can facilitate troubleshooting when none of the digest algorithms supported by the client is supported by the KDC.

5. X.509 Certificate Signer Algorithm Agility

When the client’s X.509 certificate is rejected and the KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED error is returned as described in section 3.2.2 of [RFC4556], conforming implementations can OPTIONALLY send a list of digest algorithms acceptable by the KDC for use by the Certificate Authority (CA) in signing the client’s X.509 certificate, in the decreasing preference order. This is accomplished by including a TD_CERT_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS typed data element in the error data. The corresponding data contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of the structure TD-CERT-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA defined as follows:
The KDC fills in allowedAlgorithm field with the list of algorithm [RFC5652] identifiers that identify digest algorithms that are used by the CA to sign the client’s X.509 certificate and acceptable by the KDC in the process of validating the client’s X.509 certificate, in the order of decreasing preference. The rejectedAlgorithm field identifies the signing algorithm for use in signing the client’s X.509 certificate that has been rejected by the KDC in the process of validating the client’s certificate [RFC5280].

6. KDF agility

Based on [RFC3766] and [X9.42], Section 3.2.3.1 of [RFC4556] defines a Key Derivation Function (KDF) that derives a Kerberos protocol key based on the secret value generated by the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This KDF requires the use of SHA-1 [RFC6234].

New KDFs defined in this document based on [SP80056A] can be used in conjunction with any hash functions.

A new KDF is identified by an object identifier. The following KDF object identifiers are defined:
id-pkinit-kdf OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit 6 }

-- PKINIT KDFs
id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit-kdf 1 }
   -- SP800 56A ASN.1 structured hash based KDF using SHA-1
id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit-kdf 2 }
   -- SP800 56A ASN.1 structured hash based KDF using SHA-256
id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit-kdf 3 }
   -- SP800 56A ASN.1 structured hash based KDF using SHA-512
id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit-kdf 4 }
   -- SP800 56A ASN.1 structured hash based KDF using SHA-384

Where id-pkinit is defined in [RFC4556]. The id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1
KDF is the ASN.1 structured hash based KDF (HKDF) [SP80056A] that
uses SHA-1 [RFC6234] as the hash function. Similarly id-pkinit-kdf-
ah-sha256 and id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512 are the ASN.1 structured HKDF
using SHA-256 [RFC6234] and SHA-512 [RFC6234] respectively.

To name the input parameters, an abbreviated version of the ASN.1
version of the KDF from [SP80056A] is described below, use [SP80056A]
for the full reference.

1.  reps = ceiling (keydatalen/hash length (H))
2.  Initialize a 32-bit, big-endian bit string counter as 1.
3.  For i = 1 to reps by 1, do the following:
   1.  Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo).
   2.  Increment counter (modulo 2^32)
4.  Set key_material = Hash1 || Hash2 || ... so that length of key is
   K bits.
5.  The above ASN.1 structured [SP80056A] HKDF produces a bit string
   of length K in bits as the keying material, and then the AS reply
   key is the output of random-to-key() [RFC3961] using that
   returned keying material as the input.

The input parameters for these KDFs are provided as follows:

- The key data length (K) is the key-generation seed length in bits
  [RFC3961] for the Authentication Service (AS) reply key. The
  enctype of the AS reply key is selected according to [RFC4120].
- The hash length (H) is 160 bits for id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1, 256
  bits for id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256, 384 bits for id-pkinit-kdf-ah-
sha384 and 512 bits for id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512.

- The secret value (Z) is the shared secret value generated by the Diffie-Hellman exchange. The Diffie-Hellman shared value is first padded with leading zeros such that the size of the secret value in octets is the same as that of the modulus, then represented as a string of octets in big-endian order.

- The algorithm identifier (algorithmID) input parameter is the identifier of the respective KDF. For example, this is id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1 if the KDF is the [SP80056A] ASN.1 structured HKDF using SHA-1 as the hash.

- The initiator identifier (partyUInfo) contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of the KRB5PrincipalName [RFC4556] that identifies the client as specified in the AS-REQ [RFC4120] in the request.

- The recipient identifier (partyVInfo) contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of the KRB5PrincipalName [RFC4556] that identifies the TGS as specified in the AS-REQ [RFC4120] in the request.

- The supplemental public information (suppPubInfo) is the ASN.1 DER encoding of the structure PkinitSuppPubInfo as defined later in this section.

- The supplemental private information (suppPrivInfo) is absent.

- The maximum hash input length is $2^{64}$ in bits.

The structure for OtherInfo is defined as follows:

```plaintext
OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithmID   AlgorithmIdentifier,
    partyUInfo    [0] OCTET STRING,    
    partyVInfo    [1] OCTET STRING,    
    suppPubInfo   [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,    
    suppPrivInfo  [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
```

The structure PkinitSuppPubInfo is defined as follows:
PkinitSuppPubInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
  enctype          [0] Int32,
    -- The enctype of the AS reply key
  as-REQ           [1] OCTET STRING,
    -- This contains the AS-REQ in the request.
  pk-as-rep        [2] OCTET STRING,
    -- Contains the DER encoding of the type
...}

The PkinitSuppPubInfo structure contains mutually-known public information specific to the authentication exchange. The enctype field is the enctype of the AS reply key as selected according to [RFC4120]. The as-REQ field contains the DER encoding of the type AS-REQ [RFC4120] in the request sent from the client to the KDC. Note that the as-REQ field does not include the wrapping 4 octet length field when TCP is used. The pk-as-rep field contains the DER encoding of the type PA-PK-AS-REP [RFC4556] in the KDC reply. The PkinitSuppPubInfo provides a cryptographic bindings between the pre-authentication data and the corresponding ticket request and response, thus addressing the concerns described in Section 3.

The KDF is negotiated between the client and the KDC. The client sends an unordered set of supported KDFs in the request, and the KDC picks one from the set in the reply.

To accomplish this, the AuthPack structure in [RFC4556] is extended as follows:

AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
  pkAuthenticator   [0] PKAuthenticator,
  clientPublicKeyInfo [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
  supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  clientDHNonce     [3] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
...,
  supportedKDFs     [4] SEQUENCE OF KDFAlgorithmId OPTIONAL,
    -- Contains an unordered set of KDFs supported by the
    -- client.
...}

KDFAlgorithmId ::= SEQUENCE {
  kdf-id            [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    -- The object identifier of the KDF
...
The new field supportedKDFs contains an unordered set of KDFs supported by the client.

The KDFAlgorithmId structure contains an object identifier that identifies a KDF. The algorithm of the KDF and its parameters are defined by the corresponding specification of that KDF.

The DHRepInfo structure in [RFC4556] is extended as follows:

```
DHRepInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
dhSignedData         [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
    serverDHNonce        [1] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
    ...,
    kdf                  [2] KDFAlgorithmId OPTIONAL,
                        -- The KDF picked by the KDC.
    ...
}
```

The new field kdf in the extended DHRepInfo structure identifies the KDF picked by the KDC. This kdf field MUST be filled by the conforming KDC if the supportedKDFs field is present in the request, and it MUST be one of the KDFs supported by the client as indicated in the request. Which KDF is chosen is a matter of the local policy on the KDC.

If the supportedKDFs field is not present in the request, the kdf field in the reply MUST be absent.

If the client fills the supportedKDFs field in the request, but the kdf field in the reply is not present, the client can deduce that the KDC is not updated to conform with this specification. In that case, it is a matter of local policy on the client whether to reject the reply when the kdf field is absent in the reply.

Implementations conforming to this specification MUST support id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256.

This document introduces the following new PKINIT error code:

- KDC_ERR_NO_ACCEPTABLE_KDF 82

If no acceptable KDF is found, the error KDC_ERR_NO_ACCEPTABLE_KDF (82) will be returned.
This section contains test vectors for the KDF defined above.

7.1. Common Inputs

Z: Length = 256 bytes, Hex Representation = (All Zeros)

```plaintext
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
```

client: Length = 9 bytes, ASCII Representation = lha@SU.SE

server: Length = 18 bytes, ASCII Representation = krbtgt/SU.SE@SU.SE

as-req: Length = 10 bytes, Hex Representation = 

```plaintext
AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA AAAAA
```

pk-as-rep: Length = 9 bytes, Hex Representation = 

```plaintext
BBBBBBBB BBBBBBB BBBBB
```

ticket: Length = 55 bytes, Hex Representation = 

```plaintext
61353033 A0030201 05A1071B 05535552E 5345A210 300EA003 020101A1 0730051B
036C6861 A311300F A0030201 12A20804 0668656A 68656A
```

7.2. Test Vector for SHA-1, enctype 18

7.2.1. Specific Inputs

```plaintext
algorithm-id: (id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1) Length = 8 bytes, Hex Representation = 2B060105 02030601

enctype: (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96) Length = 1 byte, Decimal Representation = 18
```

7.2.2. Outputs
key-material: Length = 32 bytes, Hex Representation =
E6AB38C9 413E035B B079201E D0B6B73D 8D49A814 A737C04E E6649614 206F73AD

key: Length = 32 bytes, Hex Representation =
E6AB38C9 413E035B B079201E D0B6B73D 8D49A814 A737C04E E6649614 206F73AD

7.3. Test Vector for SHA-256, enctype

7.3.1. Specific Inputs

algorithm-id: (id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256) Length = 8 bytes, Hex Representation = 2B060105 02030602

enctype: (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96) Length = 1 byte, Decimal Representation = 18

7.3.2. Outputs

key-material: Length = 32 bytes, Hex Representation =
77EF4E48 C420AE3F EC75109D 7981697E ED5D295C 90C62564 F7BFD101 FA9bC1D5

key: Length = 32 bytes, Hex Representation =
77EF4E48 C420AE3F EC75109D 7981697E ED5D295C 90C62564 F7BFD101 FA9bC1D5

7.4. Test Vector for SHA-512, enctype

7.4.1. Specific Inputs

algorithm-id: (id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512) Length = 8 bytes, Hex Representation = 2B060105 02030603

enctype: (des3-cbc-sha1-kd) Length = 1 byte, Decimal Representation = 16

7.4.2. Outputs

key-material: Length = 24 bytes, Hex Representation =
D3C78A79 D65213EF E9A826F7 5DFB01F7 2362FB16 FB01DAD6

key: Length = 32 bytes, Hex Representation =
D3C78A79 D65213EF E9A826F7 5DFB01F7 2362FB16 FB01DAD6
8. Security Considerations

This document describes negotiation of checksum types, key derivation functions and other cryptographic functions. If negotiation is done unauthenticated, care MUST be taken to accept only acceptable values.

9. Acknowledgements

Jeffery Hutzelman, Shawn Emery, Tim Polk and Kelley Burgin reviewed the document and provided suggestions for improvements.

10. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to update the following registrations in the Kerberos Pre-authentication and Typed Data Registry created by section 7.1 of RFC 6113 to refer to this specification. These values were reserved for this specification in the initial registrations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>[ALG-AGILITY]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TD-CERT-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>[ALG-AGILITY]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. References

11.1. Normative References


11.2. Informative References


Appendix A.  PKINIT ASN.1 Module

KerberosV5-PK-INIT-Agility-SPEC {
    iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) pkinit(5) agility (1)
} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

IMPORTS
    AlgorithmIdentifier, SubjectPublicKeyInfo
    FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso (1)
    identified-organization (3) dod (6) internet (1)
    security (5) mechanisms (5) pkix (7) id-mod (0)
    id-pkix1-explicit (18) }
    -- As defined in RFC 5280.

    Ticket, Int32, Realm, EncryptionKey, Checksum
    FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
    dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
    modules(4) krb5spec2(2) }
    -- as defined in RFC 4120.

    PKAuthenticator, DHNonce
    FROM KerberosV5-PK-INIT-SPEC {
    iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) pkinit(5) }
    -- as defined in RFC 4556.

TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF
    AlgorithmIdentifier
    -- Contains the list of CMS algorithm [RFC5652]
    -- identifiers that identify the digest algorithms
    -- acceptable by the KDC for signing CMS data in
    -- the order of decreasing preference.

TD-CERT-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA ::= SEQUENCE {
    allowedAlgorithms [0] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier,
    -- Contains the list of CMS algorithm [RFC5652]
    -- identifiers that identify the digest algorithms
    -- that are used by the CA to sign the client’s
    -- X.509 certificate and acceptable by the KDC in
    -- the process of validating the client’s X.509
    -- certificate, in the order of decreasing
    -- preference.
    rejectedAlgorithm [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
    -- This identifies the digest algorithm that was
    -- used to sign the client’s X.509 certificate and
-- has been rejected by the KDC in the process of
-- validating the client’s X.509 certificate
-- [RFC5280].
...

OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
  algorithmID   AlgorithmIdentifier,
  partyUInfo    [0] OCTET STRING,
  partyVInfo    [1] OCTET STRING,
  suppPubInfo   [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
  suppPrivInfo  [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}

PkinitSuppPubInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
  enctype       [0] Int32,
  -- The enctype of the AS reply key.
  as-REQ        [1] OCTET STRING,
  -- This contains the AS-REQ in the request.
  pk-as-rep     [2] OCTET STRING,
  -- Contains the DER encoding of the type
  ...
}

AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
  pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,
  clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
  supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
    OPTIONAL,
  clientDHNonce   [3] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
  ...
  supportedKDFs    [4] SEQUENCE OF KDFAlgorithmId OPTIONAL,
  -- Contains an unordered set of KDFs supported by the
  -- client.
  ...
}

KDFAlgorithmId ::= SEQUENCE {
  kdf-id        [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  -- The object identifier of the KDF
  ...
}

DHRepInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
  dhSignedData  [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
  serverDHNonce [1] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
  ...
}
kdf                   [2] KDFAlgorithmId OPTIONAL,
     -- The KDF picked by the KDC.
     ...
} END

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