YANG Data Model for a Centralized Keystore Mechanism

draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-08

Abstract

This document defines a YANG 1.1 module called "ietf-keystore" that enables centralized configuration of asymmetric keys and their associated certificates, and notification for when configured certificates are about to expire.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.

Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in progress. Please apply the following replacements:

- "VVVV" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft

Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:

- "2019-03-09" --> the publication date of this draft

The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:

- Appendix A. Change Log

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Internet-Draft A Centralized Keystore Mechanism March 2019

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1. Introduction

This document defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf-keystore" that enables centralized configuration of asymmetric keys and their associated certificates, and notification for when configured certificates are about to expire.

This module also defines Six groupings designed for maximum reuse. These groupings include one for the public half of an asymmetric key, one for both the public and private halves of an asymmetric key, one for both halves of an asymmetric key and a list of associated certificates, one for an asymmetric key that may be configured locally or via a reference to an asymmetric key in the keystore, one for a trust anchor certificate and, lastly, one for an end entity certificate.

Special consideration has been given for systems that have cryptographic hardware, such as a Trusted Protection Module (TPM). These systems are unique in that the cryptographic hardware completely hides the private keys and must perform all private key operations. To support such hardware, the "private-key" can be the special value "permanently-hidden" and the actions "generate-hidden-key" and "generate-certificate-signing-request" can be used to direct these operations to the hardware.

This document in compliant with Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, to support keys and associated certificates installed during manufacturing (e.g., for an IDevID [Std-802.1AR-2009] certificate), it is expected that such data may appear only in <operational>.

While only asymmetric keys are currently supported, the module has been designed to enable other key types to be introduced in the future.

The module does not support protecting the contents of the keystore (e.g., via encryption), though it could be extended to do so in the future.

It is not required that a system has an operating system level keystore utility to implement this module.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
3. The Keystore Model

3.1. Tree Diagram

This section provides a tree diagrams [RFC8340] for the "ietf-keystore" module that presents both the protocol-accessible "keystore" as well the all the groupings intended for external usage.

module: ietf-keystore
  +--rw keystore
    +--rw asymmetric-keys
      +--rw asymmetric-key* [name]
        +--rw name string
        +--rw algorithm? asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref
        +--rw public-key? binary
        +--rw private-key? union
          +---x generate-hidden-key
            +---w input
              +---w algorithm asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref
            +---x install-hidden-key
              +---w input
                +---w algorithm asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref
              +---w public-key? binary
              +---w private-key? binary
    +--rw certificates
      +--rw certificate* [name]
        +--rw name string
        +--rw cert? end-entity-cert-cms
          +---n certificate-expiration
            +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
          +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
            +---w input
              +---w subject binary
              +---w attributes? binary
            +--ro output
              +--ro certificate-signing-request binary

grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
  +-- (local-or-keystore)
    +--:(local) {local-keys-supported}?
      +-- local-definition
        +-- algorithm? asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref
        +-- public-key? binary
        +-- private-key? union
3.2. Example Usage

The following example illustrates what a fully configured keystore might look like in <operational>, as described by Section 5.3 in [RFC8342]. This datastore view illustrates data set by the manufacturing process alongside conventional configuration. This keystore instance has four keys, two having one associated certificate, one having two associated certificates, and one empty key.

========== NOTE: ‘\’ line wrapping per BCP XX (RFC XXXX) ===========

<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"
         xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin"
         or:origin="or:intended">

<asymmetric-keys>

<asymmetric-key>
  <name>ex-rsa-key</name>
  <algorithm>ct:rsa2048</algorithm>
  <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
  <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
  <certificates>
    <certificate>
      <name>ex-rsa-cert</name>
      <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
    </certificate>
  </certificates>
</asymmetric-key>

<!-- waiting for Haiguang fix... -->

<asymmetric-key>
  <name>tls-ec-key</name>
</asymmetric-key>

</asymmetric-keys>

</keystore>
<algorithm>ct:secp256r1</algorithm>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates>
  <certificate>
    <name>tls-ec-cert</name>
    <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
  </certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>

<asymmetric-key>
  <name>tpm-protected-key</name>
  <algorithm or:origin="or:system">ct:rsa2048</algorithm>
  <private-key or:origin="or:system">permanently-hidden</private-key>
  <public-key or:origin="or:system">base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
  <certificates>
    <certificate or:origin="or:system">
      <name>builtin-idevid-cert</name>
      <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
    </certificate>
    <certificate>
      <name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
      <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
    </certificate>
  </certificates>
</asymmetric-key>

<asymmetric-key>
  <name>tpm-protected-key2</name>
  <certificates>
    <certificate>
      <name>builtin-idevid-cert2</name>
    </certificate>
    <certificate>
      <name>my-ldevid-cert2</name>
    </certificate>
  </certificates>
</asymmetric-key>

</asymmetric-keys>
</keystore>
The following example module has been constructed to illustrate the "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping defined in the "ietf-keystore" module.

module ex-keystore-usage {
  yang-version 1.1;

  namespace "http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage";
  prefix "eku";

  import ietf-keystore {
    prefix ks;
    reference
      "RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
  }

  organization
    "Example Corporation";

  contact
    "Author: YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>";

  description
    "This module illustrates the grouping in the keystore draft called 'local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping'.";

  revision "YYYY-MM-DD" {
    description
      "Initial version";
    reference
      "RFC XXXX: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
  }

  container keystore-usage {
    description
      "An illustration of the various keystore groupings.";

    list just-a-key {
      key name;
      leaf name {
        type string;
        description
          "An arbitrary name for this key.";
      }
      uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping;
      description
        "An asymmetric key, with no certs, that may be configured locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key in the
keystore. The intent is to reference just the asymmetric key, not any certificates that may also be associated with the asymmetric key.

list key-with-certs {
    key name;
    leaf name {
        type string;
        description "An arbitrary name for this key.";
    }
    uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping;
    description "An asymmetric key and its associated certs, that may be configured locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key (and its associated certs) in the keystore.";
}

list end-entity-cert-with-key {
    key name;
    leaf name {
        type string;
        description "An arbitrary name for this key.";
    }
    uses ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping;
    description "An end-entity certificate, and its associated private key, that may be configured locally or be a reference to a specific certificate (and its associated private key) in the keystore.";
}
}

The following example illustrates what two configured keys, one local and the other remote, might look like. This example consistent with other examples above (i.e., the referenced key is in an example above).

========== NOTE: ‘\‘ line wrapping per BCP XX (RFC XXXX) ==========

<keystore-usage xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage">

<!-- ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping -->

</keystore-usage>
<just-a-key>
  <name>a locally-defined key</name>
  <local-definition>
    <algorithm
      ct:rsa2048
    </algorithm>
    <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
    <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
  </local-definition>
</just-a-key>

<just-a-key>
  <name>a keystore-defined key (and its associated certs)</name>
  <keystore-reference>ex-rsa-key</keystore-reference>
</just-a-key>

<!-- ks:local-or-keystore-key-and-end-entity-cert-grouping -->

<key-with-certs>
  <name>a locally-defined key with certs</name>
  <local-definition>
    <algorithm
      ct:rsa2048
    </algorithm>
    <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
    <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
    <certificates>
      <certificate>
        <name>a locally-defined cert</name>
        <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
      </certificate>
    </certificates>
  </local-definition>
</key-with-certs>

<key-with-certs>
  <name>a keystore-defined key (and its associated certs)</name>
  <keystore-reference>ex-rsa-key</keystore-reference>
</key-with-certs>

<!-- ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping -->

<end-entity-cert-with-key>
  <name>a locally-defined end-entity cert with key</name>
  <local-definition>
    <algorithm
      ct:rsa2048
    </algorithm>
    <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
    <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
  </local-definition>
</end-entity-cert-with-key>
<algorithm>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
</local-definition>
</end-entity-cert-with-key>

<end-entity-cert-with-key>
  <name>a keystore-defined certificate (and its associated key)</name>
  <keystore-reference>ex-rsa-cert</keystore-reference>
</end-entity-cert-with-key>
</keystore-usage>

3.3. YANG Module

This YANG module has normative references to [RFC8341] and [I-D.iets-netconf-crypto-types], and an informative reference to [RFC8342].

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2019-03-09.yang"
module ietf-keystore {
   yang-version 1.1;
   namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore";
   prefix ks;

   import ietf-crypto-types {
      prefix ct;
      reference
         "RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
   }

   import ietf-netconf-acm {
      prefix nacm;
      reference
         "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
   }

   organization
      "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

   contact
      "WG Web:   <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
     WG List:   <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
     Author:   Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>";

   ...
description
"This module defines a keystore to centralize management of security credentials.

The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see the RFC itself for full legal notices."

revision 2019-03-09 {
    description
    "Initial version";
    reference
    "RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a Centralized Keystore Mechanism";
}

// Features

feature keystore-supported {
    description
    "The 'keystore-supported' feature indicates that the server supports the keystore.";
}

feature local-keys-supported {
    description
    "The 'local-keys-supported' feature indicates that the server supports locally-defined keys.";
}

// Typedefs
typedef asymmetric-key-ref {

type leafref {
-path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key" 
+ "/ks:name";
}
}
description
"This typedef enables modules to easily define a reference to an asymmetric key stored in the keystore."
reference
"RFC 8342: Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)";
}

typedef asymmetric-key-certificate-ref {

type leafref {
-path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key" 
+ "/ks:certificates/ks:certificate/ks:name";
}
}
description
"This typedef enables modules to easily define a reference to a specific certificate associated with an asymmetric key stored in the keystore."
reference
"RFC 8342: Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)";
}

// Groupings

grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {

description
"A grouping that expands to allow the asymmetric key to be either stored locally, within the using data model, or be a reference to an asymmetric key stored in the keystore."
choice local-or-keystore {
-mandatory true;
-case local {
-if-feature "local-keys-supported";
-container local-definition {
-description
"Container to hold the local key definition.";
-uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
}
}
-case keystore {
-if-feature "keystore-supported";
-leaf keystore-reference {
-type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
-description
"A reference to an asymmetric key that exists in
the keystore. The intent is to reference just the
asymmetric key, not any certificates that may also
be associated with the asymmetric key.

A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the keystore.

A grouping that expands to allow an asymmetric key and its
associated certificates to be either stored locally, within
the using data model, or be a reference to an asymmetric key
(and its associated certificates) stored in the keystore.

choice local-or-keystore {  
  mandatory true;
  case local {  
    if-feature "local-keys-supported";
    container local-definition {  
      description
        "Container to hold the local key definition.";
      uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping;
    }
  }
  case keystore {  
    if-feature "keystore-supported";
    leaf keystore-reference {  
      type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
      description
        "A reference to a value that exists in the keystore.";
    }
  }
  description
    "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
    that exists in the keystore.";
}

A grouping that expands to allow an end-entity certificate
(and its associated private key) to be either stored locally,
within the using data model, or be a reference to a specific
certificate in the keystore.

choice local-or-keystore {  
  mandatory true;
  case local {  
    if-feature "local-keys-supported";
    container local-definition {  
      description
        "Container to hold the local key definition.";
      uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping;
    }
  }
  case keystore {  
    if-feature "keystore-supported";
    leaf keystore-reference {  
      type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
      description
        "A reference to a value that exists in the keystore.";
    }
  }
  description
    "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
    that exists in the keystore.";
}
mandatory true;
case local {
  if-feature "local-keys-supported";
  container local-definition {
    description
      "Container to hold the local key definition.";
    uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
    uses ct:end-entity-cert-grouping;
  }
}
case keystore {
  if-feature "keystore-supported";
  leaf keystore-reference {
    type ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref;
    description
      "A reference to a specific certificate, and its
      associated private key, stored in the keystore.";
  }
}

// protocol accessible nodes

container keystore {
  nacm:default-deny-write;
  description
    "The keystore contains a list of keys.";
  container asymmetric-keys {
    description
      "A list of asymmetric keys.";
    list asymmetric-key {
      must '(algorithm and public-key and private-key)
        or not (algorithm or public-key or private-key)';
      key "name";
      description
        "An asymmetric key.";
    }
    leaf name {
      type string;
      description
        "An arbitrary name for the asymmetric key. If the name
        matches the name of a key that exists independently in
        <operational> (i.e., a 'permanently-hidden' key), then
        the 'algorithm', 'public-key', and 'private-key' nodes
        MUST NOT be configured.";
    }
}
4. Security Considerations

The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.

The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content.

There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

/: The entire data tree defined by this module is sensitive to write operations. For instance, the addition or removal of keys, certificates, etc., can dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for the entire data tree.

/keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key: When writing this node, implementations MUST ensure that the strength of the key being configured is not greater than the strength of the underlying secure transport connection over which it is communicated. Implementations SHOULD fail the write-request if ever the strength of the private key is greater than the strength of the underlying transport, and alert the client that the strength of the key may have been compromised. Additionally, when deleting this node, implementations SHOULD automatically (without explicit request) zeroize these keys in the most secure manner available, so as to prevent the remnants of their persisted storage locations from being analyzed in any meaningful way.
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

/keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key: This node is additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never be returned to a client. The best reason for returning this node is to support backup/restore type workflows. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all" has been set for this data node. Note that this extension is inherited from the grouping in the [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] module.

5. IANA Considerations

5.1. The IETF XML Registry

This document registers one URI in the "ns" subregistry of the IETF XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is requested:

Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

5.2. The YANG Module Names Registry

This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the following registration is requested:

name:         ietf-keystore
prefix:       ks
reference:    RFC VVVV

6. References

6.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]
6.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Change Log

A.1. 00 to 01
- Replaced the ‘certificate-chain’ structures with PKCS#7 structures. (Issue #1)
- Added ‘private-key’ as a configurable data node, and removed the ‘generate-private-key’ and ‘load-private-key’ actions. (Issue #2)
- Moved ‘user-auth-credentials’ to the ietf-ssh-client module. (Issues #4 and #5)

A.2. 01 to 02
- Added back ‘generate-private-key’ action.
- Removed ‘RESTRICTED’ enum from the ‘private-key’ leaf type.
- Fixed up a few description statements.

A.3. 02 to 03
- Changed draft’s title.
- Added missing references.
- Collapsed sections and levels.
- Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section.
- Renamed ‘trusted-certificates’ to ‘pinned-certificates’.
- Changed ‘public-key’ from config false to config true.
- Switched ‘host-key’ from OneAsymmetricKey to definition from RFC 4253.

A.4. 03 to 04
- Added typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore paths
- Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams
- Removed Design Considerations section
- Moved key and certificate definitions from data tree to groupings
A.5. 04 to 05

- Removed trust anchors (now in their own draft)
- Added back global keystore structure
- Added groupings enabling keys to either be locally defined or a reference to the keystore.

A.6. 05 to 06

- Added feature "local-keys-supported"
- Added nacm:default-deny-all and nacm:default-deny-write
- Renamed generate-asymmetric-key to generate-hidden-key
- Added an install-hidden-key action
- Moved actions inside fo the "asymmetric-key" container
- Moved some groupings to draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types

A.7. 06 to 07

- Removed a "require-instance false"
- Clarified some description statements
- Improved the keystore-usage examples

A.8. 07 to 08

- Added "local-definition" containers to avoid possibility of the action/notification statements being under a "case" statement.
- Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, folding algorithm, and reformatted the YANG module.

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