Abstract

This document defines a YANG 1.1 data model for configuring global sets of X.509 certificates and SSH host-keys that can be referenced by other data models for trust. While the SSH host-keys are uniquely for the SSH protocol, the X.509 certificates may have multiple uses, including authenticating protocol peers and verifying signatures.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.

Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in progress. Please apply the following replacements:

- "XXXX" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft
- "YYYY" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types

Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:

- "2019-03-09" --> the publication date of this draft

The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:

- Appendix A. Change Log

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1. Introduction

This document defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] data model for configuring global sets of X.509 certificates and SSH host-keys that can be referenced by other data models for trust. While the SSH host-keys are uniquely for the SSH protocol, the X.509 certificates may be used for multiple uses, including authenticating protocol peers and verifying signatures.

This document in compliant with Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, to support trust anchors installed during manufacturing, it is expected that such data may appear only in <operational>.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Tree Diagram Notation

Tree diagrams used in this document follow the notation defined in [RFC8340].

2. The Trust Anchors Model

2.1. Tree Diagram

The following tree diagram provides an overview of the "ietf-trust-anchors" module.
module: ietf-trust-anchors
   +++-rw trust-anchors
       +++-rw pinned-certificates* [name] {x509-certificates}?
           +++-rw name       string
           +++-rw description? string
           +++-rw pinned-certificate* [name]
               +++-rw name       string
               +++-rw cert       trust-anchor-cert-cms
               +++-n certificate-expiration
                   ++- expiration-date  yang:date-and-time
           +++-rw pinned-host-keys* [name] {ssh-host-keys}?
               +++-rw name       string
               +++-rw description? string
               +++-rw pinned-host-key* [name]
                   +++-rw name     string
                   +++-rw host-key  ct:ssh-host-key

2.2. Example Usage

The following example illustrates trust anchors in <operational> as
described by Section 5.3 in [RFC8342]. This datastore view
illustrates data set by the manufacturing process alongside
conventional configuration. This trust anchors instance has six sets
of pinned certificates and one set of pinned host keys.

<trust-anchors
   xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-trust-anchors"
   xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin">
   <!-- Manufacturer’s trusted root CA certs -->
   <pinned-certificates or:origin="or:system">
       <name>manufacturers-root-ca-certs</name>
       <description>
       Certificates built into the device for authenticating
       manufacturer-signed objects, such as TLS server certificates,
       vouchers, etc. Note, though listed here, these are not
       configurable; any attempt to do so will be denied.
       </description>
       <pinned-certificate>
           <name>Manufacturer Root CA cert 1</name>
           <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
       </pinned-certificate>
       <pinned-certificate>
           <name>Manufacturer Root CA cert 2</name>
           <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
       </pinned-certificate>
   </pinned-certificates>
</trust-anchors>
<!-- specific end-entity certs for authenticating servers -->
<pinned-certificates or:origin="or:intended">
 <name>explicitly-trusted-server-certs</name>
 <description>
 Specific server authentication certificates for explicitly trusted servers. These are needed for server certificates that are not signed by a pinned CA.
 </description>
 <pinned-certificate>
  <name>Fred Flintstone</name>
  <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
 </pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>

<!-- trusted CA certs for authenticating servers -->
<pinned-certificates or:origin="or:intended">
 <name>explicitly-trusted-server-ca-certs</name>
 <description>
 Trust anchors (i.e. CA certs) that are used to authenticate server connections. Servers are authenticated if their certificate has a chain of trust to one of these CA certificates.
 </description>
 <pinned-certificate>
  <name>ca.example.com</name>
  <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
 </pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>

<!-- specific end-entity certs for authenticating clients -->
<pinned-certificates or:origin="or:intended">
 <name>explicitly-trusted-client-certs</name>
 <description>
 Specific client authentication certificates for explicitly trusted clients. These are needed for client certificates that are not signed by a pinned CA.
 </description>
 <pinned-certificate>
  <name>George Jetson</name>
  <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
 </pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>

<!-- trusted CA certs for authenticating clients -->
<pinned-certificates or:origin="or:intended">
 <name>explicitly-trusted-client-ca-certs</name>
 <description>
 Trust anchors (i.e. CA certs) that are used to authenticate
client connections. Clients are authenticated if their certificate has a chain of trust to one of these CA certificates.
</description>
<pinned-certificate>
  <name>ca.example.com</name>
  <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
</pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>

<!-- trusted CA certs for random HTTPS servers on Internet -->
<pinned-certificates or:origin="or:system">
  <name>common-ca-certs</name>
  <description>
    Trusted certificates to authenticate common HTTPS servers. These certificates are similar to those that might be shipped with a web browser.
  </description>
  <pinned-certificate>
    <name>ex-certificate-authority</name>
    <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
  </pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>

<!-- specific SSH host keys for authenticating clients -->
<pinned-host-keys or:origin="or:intended">
  <name>explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys</name>
  <description>
    Trusted SSH host keys used to authenticate SSH servers. These host keys would be analogous to those stored in a known_hosts file in OpenSSH.
  </description>
  <pinned-host-key>
    <name>corp-fw1</name>
    <host-key>base64encodedvalue==</host-key>
  </pinned-host-key>
</pinned-host-keys>

</trust-anchors>

The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration" notification in use with the NETCONF protocol.
2.3. YANG Module

This YANG module imports modules from [RFC8341] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-trust-anchors@2019-03-09.yang"
module ietf-trust-anchors {
  yang-version 1.1;
  prefix ta;

  import ietf-netconf-acm {
    prefix nacm;
    reference
      "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
  }

  import ietf-crypto-types {
    prefix ct;
    reference
      "RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
  }

  organization
    "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

  contact

}</CODE ENDS>
This module defines a data model for configuring global trust anchors used by other data models. The data model enables the configuration of sets of trust anchors. This data model supports configuring trust anchors for both X.509 certificates and SSH host keys.

The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices.

revision 2019-03-09 {
  description
    "Initial version";
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
}

/**************************************************
  /* Typedefs for leafrefs to commonly referenced objects */
/**************************************************/ feature x509-certificates {
  description
    "The 'x509-certificates' feature indicates that the server implements the /trust-anchors/pinned-certificates subtree.";
}
feature ssh-host-keys {
    description
        "The 'ssh-host-keys' feature indicates that the server
        implements the /trust-anchors/pinned-host-keys subtree.";
}

typedef pinned-certificates-ref {
    type leafref {
        path "/ta:trust-anchors/ta:pinned-certificates/ta:name";
        require-instance false;
    }
    description
        "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define a
        leafref to a 'pinned-certificates' object. The require
        instance attribute is false to enable the referencing of
        pinned certificates that exist only in <operational>.";
    reference
        "RFC 8342: Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)";
}

typedef pinned-host-keys-ref {
    type leafref {
        path "/ta:trust-anchors/ta:pinned-host-keys/ta:name";
        require-instance false;
    }
    description
        "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define a
        leafref to a 'pinned-host-keys' object. The require
        instance attribute is false to enable the referencing of
        pinned host keys that exist only in <operational>.";
    reference
        "RFC 8342: Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)";
}

container trust-anchors {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    description
        "Contains sets of X.509 certificates and SSH host keys.";
    list pinned-certificates {
        if-feature "x509-certificates";
    }
}
key "name";
description
  "A list of pinned certificates. These certificates can be
  used by a server to authenticate clients, or by a client
to authenticate servers. Each list of pinned certificates
SHOULD be specific to a purpose, as the list as a whole
may be referenced by other modules. For instance, a
RESTCONF server’s configuration might use a specific list
of pinned certificates for when authenticating RESTCONF
client connections."
leaf name {
  type string;
description
    "An arbitrary name for this list of pinned certificates.";
}
leaf description {
  type string;
description
    "An arbitrary description for this list of pinned
certificates.";
}
list pinned-certificate {
  key "name";
description
  "A pinned certificate."
  leaf name {
    type string;
description
      "An arbitrary name for this pinned certificate. The
      name must be unique across all lists of pinned
certificates (not just this list) so that leafrefs
from another module can resolve to unique values.";
  }
  uses ct:trust-anchor-cert-grouping {
    refine "cert" {
      mandatory true;
    }
  }
}
list pinned-host-keys {
  if-feature "ssh-host-keys";
  key "name";
description
  "A list of pinned host keys. These pinned host-keys can
be used by clients to authenticate SSH servers. Each
list of pinned host keys SHOULD be specific to a purpose,
so the list as a whole may be referenced by other modules.";
}

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For instance, a NETCONF client’s configuration might point to a specific list of pinned host keys for when authenticating specific SSH servers.

```yang
leaf name {
  type string;
  description
  "An arbitrary name for this list of pinned SSH host keys."
}
leaf description {
  type string;
  description
  "An arbitrary description for this list of pinned SSH host keys."
} list pinned-host-key {
  key "name";
  description
  "A pinned host key."
  leaf name {
    type string;
    description
    "An arbitrary name for this pinned host-key. Must be unique across all lists of pinned host-keys (not just this list) so that a leafref to it from another module can resolve to unique values."
  }
  leaf host-key {
    type ct:ssh-host-key;
    mandatory true;
    description
    "The binary public key data for this pinned host key."
    reference
    "RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography"
  }
}
```

3. Security Considerations

The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.
The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content.

There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

/:: The entire data tree defined by this module is sensitive to write operations. For instance, the addition or removal of any trust anchor may dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for the entire data tree.

None of the readable data nodes in this YANG module are considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments.

This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.

4. IANA Considerations

4.1. The IETF XML Registry

This document registers one URI in the "ns" subregistry of the IETF XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is requested:

Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

4.2. The YANG Module Names Registry

This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the following registration is requested:

name:         ietf-trust-anchors
prefix:       ta
reference:    RFC XXXX
5. References

5.1. Normative References


5.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Change Log

A.1. 00 to 01

- Added features "x509-certificates" and "ssh-host-keys".
- Added nacm:default-deny-write to "trust-anchors" container.

A.2. 01 to 02

- Switched "list pinned-certificate" to use the "trust-anchor-cert-grouping" from crypto-types. Effectively the same definition as before.

A.3. 02 to 03

- Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, folding algorithm, and reformatted the YANG module.

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