Abstract

The Port Control Protocol (PCP) Anycast Addresses enable PCP clients to transmit signaling messages to their closest PCP-aware on-path NAT, Firewall, or other middlebox, without having to learn the IP address of that middlebox via some external channel. This document establishes one well-known IPv4 address and one well-known IPv6 address to be used as PCP Anycast Addresses.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ................................................. 3
2. PCP Server Discovery based on well-known IP Address .......... 4
   2.1. PCP Discovery Client behavior .......................... 4
   2.2. PCP Discovery Server behavior .......................... 4
3. Deployment Considerations ..................................... 5
4. IANA Considerations ............................................ 6
   4.1. Registration of IPv4 Special Purpose Address ............ 6
   4.2. Registration of IPv6 Special Purpose Address ............ 6
5. Security Considerations ........................................ 7
   5.1. Information Leakage through Anycast ...................... 7
   5.2. Hijacking of PCP Messages sent to Anycast Addresses .... 7
6. Acknowledgments ............................................... 8
7. References .................................................... 9
   7.1. Normative References ................................... 9
   7.2. Informative References ................................... 9
Authors’ Addresses ................................................ 10
1. Introduction

The Port Control Protocol (PCP) [RFC6887] provides a mechanism to control how incoming packets are forwarded by upstream devices such as Network Address Translator IPv6/IPv4 (NAT64), Network Address Translator IPv4/IPv4 (NAT44), and IPv6 and IPv4 firewall devices. Furthermore, it provides a mechanism to reduce application keep alive traffic [I-D.ietf-pcp-optimize-keepalives]. The PCP base protocol document [RFC6887] specifies the message formats used, but the address to which a client sends its request is either assumed to be the default router (which is appropriate in a typical single-link residential network) or has to be configured otherwise via some external mechanism, such as a configuration file or a DHCP option [RFC7291].

This document follows a different approach: it establishes two well-known anycast addresses for the PCP Server, one IPv4 address and one IPv6 address. These well-known addresses may be hard-coded into PCP clients. PCP clients usually send PCP requests to these addresses if no other PCP server addresses are known or after communication attempts to such other addresses have failed.

Using an anycast address is particularly useful in larger network topologies. For example, if the PCP-enabled NAT/firewall function is not located on the client’s default gateway, but further upstream in a Carrier-grade NAT (CGN), sending PCP requests to the default gateway’s IP address will not have the desired effect. When using a configuration file or the DHCP option to learn the PCP server’s IP address, this file or the DHCP server configuration must reflect the network topology, and the router and CGN configuration. This may be cumbersome to achieve and maintain. If there is more than one upstream CGN and traffic is routed using a dynamic routing protocol such as OSPF, this approach may not be feasible at all, as it cannot provide timely information on which CGN to interact with. In contrast, when using the PCP anycast address, the PCP request will travel through the network like any other packet, without any special support from DNS, DHCP, other routers, or anything else, until it reaches the PCP-capable device, which receives it, handles it, and sends back a reply. A further advantage of using an anycast address instead of a DHCP option is, that the anycast address can be hard-coded into the application. There is no need for an application programming interface for passing the PCP server’s address from the operating system’s DHCP client to the application. For further discussion of deployment considerations see Section 3.
2. PCP Server Discovery based on well-known IP Address

2.1. PCP Discovery Client behavior

The PCP anycast addresses, as defined in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, are added after the default router list (for IPv4 and IPv6) to the list of PCP server(s) (see Section 8.1, step 2. of [RFC6887]). This list is processed as specified in [RFC7488].

Note: If, in some specific scenario, it was desirable to use only the anycast address (and not the default router), this could be achieved by putting the anycast address into the configuration file, or DHCP option, etc.

2.2. PCP Discovery Server behavior

A PCP Server can be configured to listen on the anycast address for incoming PCP requests.

PCP responses are sent from that same IANA-assigned address (see Page 6 of [RFC1546] for further discussion).
3. Deployment Considerations

There are known limitations when there is more than one PCP-capable
NAT/firewall in a cascaded alignment, or in a parallel layout with
asymmetric routing, or similar scenarios. Mechanisms to deal with
those situations, such as state synchronization between PCP servers,
are beyond the scope of this document.

For general recommendations regarding operation of anycast services
see [RFC4786].
4. IANA Considerations

4.1. Registration of IPv4 Special Purpose Address

IANA is requested to assign a single IPv4 address from the 192.0.0.0/24 prefix and register it in the IANA IPv4 Special-Purpose Address Registry [RFC6890].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Address Block</td>
<td>192.0.0.??/32 (?? = TBD by IANA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Port Control Protocol Anycast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFC</td>
<td>This document, if approved (TBD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation Date</td>
<td>Date of approval of this document (TBD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination Date</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>True</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>True</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forwardable</td>
<td>True</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>True</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserved-by-Protocol</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2. Registration of IPv6 Special Purpose Address

IANA is requested to assign a single IPv6 address from the 2001:0000::/23 prefix and register it in the IANA IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registry [RFC6890].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Address Block</td>
<td>2001:??????????/128 (??? = TBD by IANA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Port Control Protocol Anycast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFC</td>
<td>This document, if approved (TBD)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Destination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forwardable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>True</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserved-by-Protocol</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Security Considerations

In addition to the security considerations in [RFC6887], two additional issues are considered here.

5.1. Information Leakage through Anycast

In a network without any border gateway, NAT or firewall that is aware of the PCP anycast address, outgoing PCP requests could leak out onto the external Internet, possibly revealing information about internal devices.

Using an IANA-assigned well-known PCP anycast address enables border gateways to block such outgoing packets. In the default-free zone, routers should be configured to drop such packets. Such configuration can occur naturally via BGP messages advertising that no route exists to said address.

Sensitive clients that do not wish to leak information about their presence can set an IP TTL on their PCP requests that limits how far they can travel into the public Internet.

5.2. Hijacking of PCP Messages sent to Anycast Addresses

The anycast addresses are treated by normal host operating systems just as normal unicast addresses, i.e., packets destined for an anycast address are sent to the default router for processing and forwarding. Hijacking such packets in the first network segment would effectively require to impersonate the default router, e.g., by means of ARP spoofing in an Ethernet network. If such attacks are a serious concern in a given scenario, much more severe consequences to other protocols have to be feared as well. Therefore, adequate measures have to be taken to prevent spoofing attacks targeted at the default router.

Once an anycast message is forwarded closer to the core network, routing will likely become subject to dynamic routing protocols such as OSPF or BGP. Anycast messages could be hijacked by announcing counterfeited messages in these routing protocols. But again, an attacker capable of performing these attacks could cause significantly more damage to other protocols and therefore adequate means should be taken to prevent these attacks.

In addition to following best current practices in first hop security and routing protocol security, PCP authentication [I-D.ietf-pcp-authentication] may be useful in some scenarios, although it might thwart the goal of fully automatic configuration in other scenarios.
6. Acknowledgments

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7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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