BGP IPsec Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute
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Abstract

The BGP Encapsulation Subsequence Address Family Identifiers (SAFI) provides a method for the dynamic exchange of encapsulation information, and the indication of encapsulation protocol types to be used for different next hops. Currently support for GRE, L2TPv3 and IP in IP tunnel types are defined. This document defines support for IPsec tunnel types.

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1. Introduction

The BGP [RFC4271] Encapsulation Subsequence Address Family Identifiers (SAFI) allows for the communication of tunnel information and the association of this information to a BGP next hop. The Encapsulation SAFI can be used to support the mapping of prefixes to next hops and tunnels of the same address family, IPv6 prefixes to IPv4 next hops and tunnels using [RFC4798], and IPv4 prefixes to IPv6 next hops and tunnels using [V4NLRI-V6NH]. The Encapsulation SAFI can also be used to support the mapping of VPN prefixes to tunnels when VPN prefixes are advertised per [RFC4364] or [RFC4659]. [SOFTWARE] provides useful context for the use of the Encapsulation SAFI.

The Encapsulation SAFI is defined in [ENCAPS-SAFI]. [ENCAPS-SAFI] also defines support for the GRE [RFC2784], L2TPv3 [RFC3931] and IP in IP [RFC2003] tunnel types. This document builds on [ENCAPS-SAFI] and defines support for IPsec tunnels. Support is defined for IP Authentication Header in Tunnel-mode (AH), [RFC4302], and for IP Encapsulating Security Payload in Tunnel-mode (ESP), [RFC4303]. The IPsec architecture is defined in [RFC4301]. Support for IP in IP, [RFC2003], and MPLS-in-IP, [RFC4023] protected by IPsec Transport Mode is also defined.

The Encapsulation NLRI Format is not modified by this document.

1.1. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Tunnel Encapsulation Types

Per [ENCAPS-SAFI], tunnel type is indicated in the Tunnel Encapsulation attribute. This document defines the following tunnel type values:

- Transmit tunnel endpoint: Tunnel Type = 3
- IPsec in Tunnel-mode: Tunnel Type = 4 [RFC4302], [RFC4303]
- IP in IP Tunnel with IPsec Transport Mode: Tunnel Type = 5 [RFC2003], [RFC4303]
- MPLS-in-IP Tunnel with IPsec Transport Mode: Tunnel Type = 6 [RFC4023]

Note, see Section 4.3 of [ENCAPS-SAFI] for a discussion on the
advertisement and use of multiple tunnel types.

Note, the specification in [RFC4023] for MPLS-in-IP tunnels with IPsec Transport mode applies as well to IP in IP tunnels.

This document does not specify the use of the sub-TLV types defined in [ENCAPS-SAFI] with these tunnel types. See below for the definition of a specific sub-TLV for use with the defined tunnel types.

3. Use of IPsec Tunnel Types

The IPsec Tunnel types are defined above with the values 4, 5 and 6. If a R1 is a BGP speaker that receives an Encapsulation SAFI update from another BGP speaker, R2, then if R1 has any data packets for which R2 is the BGP next hop, R1 MUST initiate an IPsec SA of the specified "tunnel type", and all such data packets MUST be sent through that SA.

Let R1 and R2 be two BGP speakers that may send data packets through R3, such that the data packets from R1 and from R2 may be received by R3 over the same interface. In this case, when R3 sends an Encapsulation SAFI which indicates an IPsec tunnel type to R2, then R3 SHOULD also send an update specifying an Encapsulation SAFI with an IPsec tunnel type to R1. That is, on a given interface, if IPsec is required for any data packets, it SHOULD be required for all. This eliminates dependence on the IPsec selector mechanisms to correctly distinguish traffic which needs to be protected from traffic which does not.

Security policy has the granularity of BGP speaker to BGP speaker. The required security policies must be configured into the BGP speakers. Policies for each SA will typically be established using IKEv2, [RFC4306], with either public-key or pre-shared key authentication. The SA MAY also be configured via manual techniques. Manual configuration specification and considerations are defined in [RFC4301], [RFC4302] and [RFC4303] (and includes keys, SPI numbers, IPsec protocol, integrity/encryption algorithms, and sequence number mode).

4. IPsec Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLV

This document defines a new sub-TLV for use with the Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute defined in [ENCAPS-SAFI]. The new sub-TLV is referred to as the "IPsec Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLV", and one or more of the sub-TLVs MAY be included in any Encapsulation SAFI NLRI ([ENCAPS-SAFI]) indicating a Tunnel Type defined in this document. Support for the IPsec Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLV MUST be implemented whenever the tunnel types defined in this document are
implemented. However, its use is OPTIONAL, and is a matter of policy.

The sub-TLV type of the IPsec Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLV is 3. The sub-TLV length is variable. The structure of the sub-TLV is as follows:

- Authenticator Type: two octets

  This document defines authenticator type 1, "SHA-1 hash of public key", as defined in section 3.7 of RFC 4306.

- Value: (variable)

  A value used to authenticate the BGP speaker that generated this NLRI. The length of this field is not encoded explicitly, but can be calculated as (sub-TLV length - 2).

  In the case of authenticator type 1, this field contains the 20-octet value of the hash.

A BGP speaker which sends the IPsec Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLV with authenticator type 1 MUST be configured with a private key, public key pair, the public key being the key whose hash is sent in the value field of the sub-TLV. The BGP speaker MUST either (a) be able to generate a self-signed certificate for the public key, or else (b) be configured with a certificate for the public key.

When the IPsec Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLV is used, it is highly RECOMMENDED that the integrity of the BGP session itself be protected. This is usually done by using the TCP MD5 option [RFC2385].

4.1. Use of the IPsec Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLV

If a IPsec Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLV with authenticator type 1 is present in the Encapsulation SAFI update, then R1 (as defined above in Section 3) MUST use IKEv2 [RFC4306] to obtain a certificate from R2 (as defined above in Section 3), and R2 MUST send a certificate for the public key whose hash occurred in the value field of the IPsec Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLV. R1 MUST NOT attempt to establish an SA to R2 UNLESS the public key in the certificate hashes to the same value that occurs in one of the IPsec Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLVs.

R2 MUST also perform the reciprocal processing. Specifically, when establishing an SA from R1 and R1 has advertised the IPsec Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLV with authenticator type 1, R2 MUST use IKEv2 [RFC4306] to obtain a certificate from R1, and R1 MUST send a certificate for the public key whose hash occurred in the value field.
of the IPsec Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLV. R2 MUST NOT attempt
establish an SA to R1 UNLESS the public key in the certificate hashes
to the same value that occurs in one of the IPsec Tunnel
Authenticator sub-TLVs.

Note that the "Transmit tunnel endpoint" tunnel type (value = 3) may
be used by BGP speaker that does not want to be the receiving
endpoint of an IPsec tunnel, but only the transmitting endpoint.

5. Security Considerations

This document uses IP based tunnel technologies to support data plane
transport. Consequently, the security considerations of those tunnel
technologies apply. This document defines support for IPsec AH
[RFC4302] and ESP [RFC4303]. The security considerations from those
documents as well as [RFC4301] apply to the data plane aspects of
this document.

As with [ENCAPS-SAFI], any modification of the information that is
used to form encapsulation headers, or to choose a tunnel type, or to
choose a particular tunnel for a particular payload type, user data
packets may end up getting misrouted, misdelivered, and/or dropped.
Misdelivery is less of an issue when IPsec is used as such
misdelivery is likely to result in a failure of authentication or
decryption at the receiver. Furthermore, in environments where
authentication of BGP speakers is desired, the IPsec Tunnel
Authenticator sub-TLV defined in Section 4 may be used.

More broadly, the security considerations for the transport of IP
reachability information using BGP are discussed in [RFC4271] and
[RFC4272], and are equally applicable for the extensions described in
this document.

If the integrity of the BGP session is not itself protected, then an
imposter could mount a denial of service attack by establishing
numerous BGP sessions and forcing an IPsec SAs to be created for each
one. However, as such an imposter could wreak havoc on the entire
routing system, this particular sort of attack is probably not of any
special importance.

It should be noted that a BGP session may itself be transported over
an IPsec tunnel. Such IPsec tunnels can provide additional security
to a BGP session. The management of such IPsec tunnels is outside the
scope of this document.
6. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to administer assignment of new namespaces and new values for namespaces defined in this document and reviewed in this section.

Upon approval of this document, the IANA will make the assignment in the "BGP Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute Tunnel Types" and the "BGP Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute Sub-TLVs" registries.

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7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


8. Acknowledgments

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