Retransmission Timeout Requirements

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html

The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

This Internet-Draft will expire on August 22, 2019.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Abstract

Ensuring reliable communication often manifests in a timeout and retry mechanism. Each implementation of a retransmission timeout mechanism represents a balance between correctness and timeliness and therefore no implementation suits all situations. This document provides high-level requirements for retransmission timeout schemes appropriate for general use in the Internet. Within the requirements, implementations have latitude to define particulars that best address each situation.
1 Introduction

Reliable transmission is a key property for many network protocols and applications. Our protocols use various mechanisms to achieve reliable data transmission. Often we use continuous or periodic acknowledgments from the recipient to inform the sender's notion of which pieces of data are missing and need to be retransmitted to ensure reliability. Alternatively, information coding---e.g., FEC---can be used to achieve probabilistic reliability without retransmissions. However, despite our best intentions and most robust mechanisms, the only thing we can truly depend on is the passage of time and therefore our ultimate backstop to ensuring reliability is a timeout and re-try mechanism. That is, the sender sets some expectation for how long to wait for confirmation of delivery for a given piece of data. When this time period passes without delivery confirmation the sender assumes the data was lost in transit and therefore schedules a retransmission. This process of ensuring reliability via time-based loss detection and resending lost data is commonly referred to as a "retransmission timeout (RTO)" mechanism.

Various protocols have defined their own RTO mechanisms (e.g., TCP [RFC6298], SCTP [RFC4960], SIP [RFC3261]). In this document, our use of "RTO" does not refer to any one specific scheme, but rather is a generic term that includes all timer-based retransmission mechanisms. The specifics of retransmission timeouts often represent a particular tradeoff between correctness and responsiveness [AP99]. In other words we want to simultaneously:

- wait long enough to ensure the detection of loss is correct and therefore a retransmission is in fact needed, and
- bound the delay we impose on applications before repairing loss.

Serving both of these goals is difficult as they pull in opposite directions. I.e., towards either (a) withholding needed retransmissions too long to ensure the original transmission is truly lost or (b) not waiting long enough---to help application responsiveness---and hence sending unnecessary (often denoted "spurious") retransmissions.

At this point, our experience has lead to a recognition that often specific tweaks that deviate from standardized RTO mechanisms do not materially impact network safety. Therefore, in this document we outline a set of high-level protocol-agnostic requirements for RTO
mechanisms. The intent is to provide a safe foundation on which implementations have the flexibility to instantiate mechanisms that best realize their specific goals.

2 Context

This document is a bit "weird" in that it is backwards from the way we generally like to engineer systems. Usually, we strive to understand high-level requirements as a starting point. We then methodically proceed to engineer specific protocols, algorithms and systems that meet these requirements. Within the standards process we have derived many retransmission timeouts without benefit from some over-arching requirements document---because we had no idea how to write such a requirements document! Therefore, we made the best specific decisions we could in response to specific needs.

At this point, however, we believe the community’s experience has matured to the point where we can define a set of high-level requirements for retransmission timers. That is, we now understand how to separate the aspects of retransmission timers that are crucial for network safety from those small details that do not materially impact network safety. There are two basic benefits of writing this high-level document post-facto:

- Existing retransmission timer mechanisms may be revisited with an eye towards changing the small and less crucial details to facilitate some benefit (e.g., performance), while at the same time not sacrificing network safety.

- Future retransmission timers will have a solid basis of experience to lean on rather than cobbling together a new retransmission timer from scratch and/or pieces parts of other specifications.

However, adding a requirements umbrella to a body of existing specific retransmission timer specifications is inherently messy and we run the risk of creating "inconsistencies". The correct way to view this document is as the default case and these other specifications as agreed upon deviations from the default. For instance, [RFC3261] uses a smaller initial timeout than this document specifies (requirement (1) in section 4). This situation does not render useless the general guidance in this document, but rather develops an initial retransmission timeout that is appropriate in a specific context. Likewise, TCP’s retransmission timer has a minimum value of 1 second [RFC6298], whereas this document does not specify that a minimum retransmission timeout is necessary at all. Again, this situation should be viewed as [RFC6298] providing a refinement for a specific case.

3 Scope

The principles we outline in this document are protocol-agnostic and widely applicable. We make the following scope statements about the application of the requirements discussed in Section 4:
The requirements in this document apply only to timer-based loss detection and retransmission.

While there are a bevy of uses for timers in protocols—such as rate-based pacing to connection failure detection to making congestion control decisions and beyond—these are outside the scope of this document.

The requirements in this document only apply to cases where loss detected via a timer is repaired by a retransmission of the original data.

Other cases are certainly possible—such as replacing the lost data with an updated version—but fall outside the scope of this document.

The requirements in this document apply only to endpoint-to-endpoint unicast communication. Reliable multicast (e.g., [RFC5740]) protocols are explicitly outside the scope of this document.

Protocols such as SCTP [RFC4960] and MP-TCP [RFC6182] that communicate in a unicast fashion with multiple specific endpoints can leverage the requirements in this document provided they track state and follow the requirements for each endpoint independently. I.e., if host A communicates with hosts B and C, A must use independent RTOs for traffic sent to B and C.

There are cases where state is shared across connections or flows (e.g., [RFC2140], [RFC3124]). The RTO is one piece of state that is often discussed as sharable. These situations raise issues that the simple flow-oriented RTO mechanism discussed in this document does not consider (e.g., how long to preserve state between connections). Therefore, while the general principles given in Section 4 are likely applicable, sharing RTOs across flows is outside the scope of this document.

The requirements in this document apply to reliable transmission, but do not assume that all data transmitted within a connection or flow is reliably sent.

E.g., a protocol like DCCP [RFC4340] could leverage the requirements in this document for the initial reliable handshake even though the protocol reverts to unreliable transmission after the handshake.

E.g., a protocol like SCTP [RFC4960] could leverage the requirements for data that is sent only "partially reliably". In this case, the protocol uses two phases for each message. In the first phase, the protocol attempts to ensure reliability and can leverage the requirements in this
document. At some point the value of the data is gone and the protocol transitions to the second phase where the data is treated as unreliably transmitted and therefore the protocol will no longer attempt to repair the loss—and hence there are no more retransmissions and the requirements in this document are moot.

(S.6) The requirements for RTO mechanisms in this document can be applied regardless of whether the RTO mechanism is the sole loss repair strategy or works in concert with other mechanisms.

E.g., for a simple protocol like UDP-based DNS [ ] a timeout and re-try mechanism is likely to act alone to ensure reliability.

E.g., within a complex protocol like TCP or SCTP we have designed methods to detect and repair loss based on explicit endpoint state sharing [RFC2018, RFC4960, RFC6675]. These mechanisms are preferred over the RTO as they are often more timely and precise than the coarse-grained RTO. In these cases, the RTO becomes a last resort when the more advanced mechanisms fail.

E.g., some protocols may leverage more than one retransmission timer simultaneously. In these cases, the general guidance in this document can be applied to all such timers.

4 Requirements

We now list the requirements that apply when designing retransmission timeout (RTO) mechanisms.

(1) In the absence of any knowledge about the latency of a path, the RTO MUST be conservatively set to no less than 1 second.

This requirement ensures two important aspects of the RTO. First, when transmitting into an unknown network, retransmissions will not be sent before an ACK would reasonably be expected to arrive and hence possibly waste scarce network resources. Second, as noted below, sometimes retransmissions can lead to ambiguities in assessing the latency of a network path. Therefore, it is especially important for the first latency sample to be free of ambiguities such that there is a baseline for the remainder of the communication.

The specific constant (1 second) comes from the analysis of Internet RTTs found in Appendix A of [RFC6298].

(2) As we note above, loss detection happens when a sender does not receive delivery confirmation within an some expected period of time. We now specify four requirements that pertain to setting the length of this expectation.
Often measuring the time required for delivery confirmation is framed as involving the "round-trip time (RTT)" of the network path as this is the minimum amount of time required to receive delivery confirmation and also often follows protocol behavior whereby acknowledgments are generated quickly after data arrives. For instance, this is the case for the RTO used by TCP [RFC6298] and SCTP [RFC4960]. However, this is somewhat misleading as the expected latency is better framed as the "feedback time" (FT). In other words, the expectation is not always simply a network property, but includes additional time before a sender should reasonably expect a response to a query.

For instance, consider a UDP-based DNS request from a client to a recursive resolver. When the request can be served from the resolver’s cache the FT likely well approximates the network RTT between the client and resolver. However, on a cache miss the resolver will request the needed information from one or more authoritative DNS servers, which will non-trivially increase the FT compared to the RTT between the client and resolver.

Therefore, we express the following requirements in terms of FT:

(a) In steady state the RTO SHOULD be set based on recent observations of both the FT and the variance of the FT.

   In other words, the RTO should represent an empirically-derived reasonable amount of time that the sender should wait for delivery confirmation before retransmitting the given data.

(b) FT observations SHOULD be taken regularly.

   Internet measurements show that taking only a single FT sample per TCP connection results in a relatively poorly performing RTO mechanism [AP99], hence this requirement that the FT be sampled continuously throughout the lifetime of communication.

   The notion of "regularly" SHOULD be defined as at least once per RTT or as frequently as data is exchanged in cases where that happens less frequently than once per RTT. However, we also recognize that it may not always be practical to take an FT sample this often in all cases. Hence, this once-per-RTT definition of "regularly" is explicitly a "SHOULD" and not a "MUST".

   As an example, TCP takes an FT sample roughly once per RTT, or if using the timestamp option [RFC7323] on each acknowledgment arrival. [AP99] shows that both these approaches result in roughly equivalent performance for the RTO estimator.

(c) FT observations MAY be taken from non-data exchanges.
Some protocols use keepalives, heartbeats or other messages to exchange control information. To the extent that the latency of these transactions mirrors data exchange, they can be leveraged to take FT samples within the RTO mechanism. Such samples can help protocols keep their RTO accurate during lulls in data transmission. However, given that these messages may not be subject to the same delays as data transmission, we do not take a general view on whether this is useful or not.

(d) An RTO mechanism MUST NOT use ambiguous FT samples.

Assume two copies of some segment X are transmitted at times t₀ and t₁ and then at time t₂ the sender receives confirmation that X in fact arrived. In some cases, it is not clear which copy of X triggered the confirmation and hence the actual FT is either t₂-t₁ or t₂-t₀, but which is a mystery. Therefore, in this situation an implementation MUST use Karn’s algorithm [KP87, RFC6298] and use neither version of the FT sample and hence not update the RTO.

There are cases where two copies of some data are transmitted in a way whereby the sender can tell which is being acknowledged by an incoming ACK. E.g., TCP’s timestamp option [RFC7323] allows for segments to be uniquely identified and hence avoid the ambiguity. In such cases there is no ambiguity and the resulting samples can update the RTO.

(3) Each time the RTO is used to detect a loss and a retransmission is scheduled, the value of the RTO MUST be exponentially backed off such that the next firing requires a longer interval. The backoff SHOULD be removed after the successful repair of the lost data and subsequent transmission of non-retransmitted data.

A maximum value MAY be placed on the RTO. The maximum RTO MUST NOT be less than 60 seconds (a la [RFC6298]).

This ensures network safety.

(4) Retransmissions triggered by the RTO mechanism MUST be taken as indications of network congestion and the sending rate adapted using a standard mechanism (e.g., TCP collapses the congestion window to one segment [RFC5681]).

This ensures network safety.

An exception could be made to this rule if an IETF standardized mechanism is used to determine that a particular loss is due to a non-congestion event (e.g., packet corruption). In such a case a congestion control action is not required. Additionally, RTO-triggered congestion control actions may be reversed when a standard mechanism determines that the cause of the loss was not congestion after all (e.g., [RFC5682]).
5 Discussion

We note that research has shown the tension between the responsiveness and correctness of retransmission timeouts seems to be a fundamental tradeoff in the context of TCP [AP99]. That is, making the RTO more aggressive (e.g., via changing TCP’s EWMA gains, lowering the minimum RTO, etc.) can reduce the time spent waiting on needed retransmissions. However, at the same time, such aggressiveness leads to more needless retransmissions. Therefore, being as aggressive as the requirements given in the previous section allow in any particular situation may not be the best course of action because an RTO expiration carries a requirement to invoke a congestion response and hence slow transmission down.

While the tradeoff between responsiveness and correctness seems fundamental, the tradeoff can be made less relevant if the sender can detect and recover from spurious RTOs. Several mechanisms have been proposed for this purpose, such as Eifel [RFC3522], F-RTO [RFC5682] and DSACK [RFC2883, RFC3708]. Using such mechanisms may allow a data originator to tip towards being more responsive without incurring (as much of) the attendant costs of needless retransmits.

Also, note, that in addition to the experiments discussed in [AP99], the Linux TCP implementation has been using various non-standard RTO mechanisms for many years seemingly without large scale problems (e.g., using different EWMA gains than specified in [RFC6298]). Further, a number of implementations use minimum RTOs that are less than the 1 second specified in [RFC6298]. While the implication of these deviations from the standard may be more spurious retransmits (per [AP99]), we are aware of no large scale network safety issues caused by this change to the minimum RTO.

Finally, we note that while allowing implementations to be more aggressive may in fact increase the number of needless retransmissions the above requirements fail safe in that they insist on exponential backoff of the RTO and a transmission rate reduction. Therefore, providing implementers more latitude than they have traditionally been given in IETF specifications of RTO mechanisms does not somehow open the flood gates to aggressive behavior. Since there is a downside to being aggressive the incentives for proper behavior are retained in the mechanism.

6 Security Considerations

This document does not alter the security properties of retransmission timeout mechanisms. See [RFC6298] for a discussion of these within the context of TCP.

Acknowledgments

This document benefits from years of discussions with Ethan Blanton, Sally Floyd, Jana Iyengar, Shawn Ostermann, Vern Paxson, and the members of the TCPM and TCP-IMPL working groups. Ran Atkinson,
Yuchung Cheng, David Black, Gorry Fairhurst, Mirja Kuhlewind, Nicolas Kuhn, Jonathan Looney and Michael Scharf provided useful comments on a previous version of this draft.

Normative References


Informative References


Authors’ Addresses

Mark Allman
International Computer Science Institute
1947 Center St. Suite 600
Berkeley, CA  94704

EMail: mallman@icir.org
http://www.icir.org/mallman

Expires: August 22, 2019

[Page 10]