A DANE Record and DNSSEC Authentication Chain Extension for TLS
draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07

Abstract

This draft describes a new TLS extension for transport of a DNS record set serialized with the DNSSEC signatures needed to authenticate that record set. The intent of this proposal is to allow TLS clients to perform DANE authentication of a TLS server without needing to perform additional DNS record lookups. It is not intended to be used to validate the TLS server’s address records.

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1. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Introduction

This draft describes a new TLS [RFC5246] [TLS13] extension for transport of a DNS record set serialized with the DNSSEC signatures [RFC4034] needed to authenticate that record set. The intent of this proposal is to allow TLS clients to perform DANE Authentication.
[RFC6698] [RFC7671] of a TLS server without performing additional DNS record lookups and incurring the associated latency penalty. It also provides the ability to avoid potential problems with TLS clients being unable to look up DANE records because of an interfering or broken middlebox on the path between the client and a DNS server [HAMPERING]. And lastly, it allows a TLS client to validate the server’s DANE (TLSA) records itself without needing access to a validating DNS resolver to which it has a secure connection.

This mechanism is useful for TLS applications that need to address the problems described above, typically web browsers or SIP/VoIP [RFC3261] and XMPP [RFC7590]. It may not be relevant for many other applications. For example, SMTP MTAs are usually located in data centers, may tolerate extra DNS lookup latency, are on servers where it is easier to provision a validating resolver, or are less likely to experience traffic interference from misconfigured middleboxes. Furthermore, SMTP MTAs usually employ Opportunistic Security [RFC7672], in which the presence of the DNS TLSA records is used to determine whether to enforce an authenticated TLS connection. Hence DANE authentication of SMTP MTAs will typically not use this mechanism.

The extension described here allows a TLS client to request that the TLS server return the DNSSEC authentication chain corresponding to its DANE record. If the server is configured for DANE authentication, then it performs the appropriate DNS queries, builds the authentication chain, and returns it to the client. The server will usually use a previously cached authentication chain, but it will need to rebuild it periodically as described in Section 5. The client then authenticates the chain using a pre-configured trust anchor.

This specification is based on Adam Langley’s original proposal for serializing DNSSEC authentication chains and delivering them in an X.509 certificate extension [I-D.agl-dane-serializechain]. It modifies the approach by using wire format DNS records in the serialized data (assuming that the data will be prepared and consumed by a DNS-specific library), and by using a TLS extension to deliver the data.

As described in the DANE specification [RFC6698] [RFC7671], this procedure applies to the DANE authentication of X.509 certificates or raw public keys [RFC7250].

3. DNSSEC Authentication Chain Extension

3.1. Protocol, TLS 1.2
A client MAY include an extension of type "dnssec_chain" in the (extended) ClientHello. The "extension_data" field of this extension MUST be empty.

Servers receiving a "dnssec_chain" extension in the ClientHello and which are capable of being authenticated via DANE, return a serialized authentication chain in the extended ServerHello message using the format described below. If a server is unable to return an authentication chain, or does not wish to return an authentication chain, it does not include a dnssec_chain extension. As with all TLS extensions, if the server does not support this extension it will not return any authentication chain.

3.2. Protocol, TLS 1.3

A client MAY include an extension of type "dnssec_chain" in the ClientHello. The "extension_data" field of this extension MUST be empty.

Servers receiving a "dnssec_chain" extension in the ClientHello, and which are capable of being authenticated via DANE, return a serialized authentication chain in the extension block of the Certificate message containing the end entity certificate being validated, using the format described below.

The extension protocol behavior otherwise follows that specified for TLS version 1.2.

3.3. Raw Public Keys

[RFC7250] specifies the use of raw public keys for both server and client authentication in TLS 1.2. It points out that in cases where raw public keys are being used, code for certificate path validation is not required. However, DANE, when used in conjunction with the dnssec_chain extension, provides a mechanism for securely binding a raw public key to a named entity in the DNS, and when using DANE for authentication a raw key may be validated using a path chaining back to a DNSSEC trust root. This has the added benefit of mitigating an unknown key share attack, as described in [I-D.barnes-dane-uks], since it effectively augments the raw public key with the server’s name and provides a means to commit both the server and the client to using that binding.
The UKS attack is possible in situations in which the association between a domain name and a public key is not tightly bound, as in the case in DANE in which a client either ignores the name in the certificate (as specified in [RFC7671]) or there is no attestation of trust outside of the DNS. The vulnerability arises in the following situations:

- If the client does not verify the identity in the server’s certificate (as recommended in Section 5.1 of [RFC7671]), then an attacker can induce the client to accept an unintended identity for the server,

- If the client allows the use of raw public keys in TLS, then it will not receive any indication of the server’s identity in the TLS channel, and is thus unable to check that the server’s identity is as intended.

The mechanism for conveying DNSSEC validation chains described in this document results in a commitment by both parties, via the TLS handshake, to a validated domain name and EE key.

The mechanism for encoding DNSSEC authentication chains in a TLS extension, as described in this document, is not limited to public keys encapsulated in X.509 containers but MAY be applied to raw public keys and other representations, as well.

### 3.4. DNSSEC Authentication Chain Data

The "extension_data" field of the "dnssec_chain" extension MUST contain a DNSSEC Authentication Chain encoded in the following form:

```
opaque AuthenticationChain<1..2^16-1>
```

The AuthenticationChain structure is composed of a sequence of uncompressed wire format DNS resource record sets (RRset) and corresponding signatures (RRSIG) record sets.

This sequence of native DNS wire format records enables easier generation of the data structure on the server and easier verification of the data on client by means of existing DNS library functions.

Each RRset in the chain is composed of a sequence of wire format DNS resource records. The format of the resource record is described in RFC 1035 [RFC1035], Section 3.2.1.
RR(i) = owner | type | class | TTL | RDATA length | RDATA

where RR(i) denotes the ith RR.

The resource records that make up a RRset all have the same owner, type and class, but different RDATA as specified in [RFC2181], Section 5. Each RRset in the sequence is followed by its associated RRsigs. This RRset has the same owner and class as the preceding RRset, but has type RRSIG. The Type Covered field in the RDATA of the RRsigs identifies the type of the preceding RRset as described in [RFC4034], Section 3. The RRsigs record wire format is described in [RFC4034], Section 3.1. The signature portion of the RDATA, as described in the same section, is the following:

signature = sign(RRSIG_RDATA | RR(1) | RR(2) ... )

where RRSIG_RDATA is the wire format of the RRSIG RDATA fields with the Signer’s Name field in canonical form and the signature field excluded.

The first RRset in the chain MUST contain the TLSA record set being presented. However, if the owner name of the TLSA record set is an alias (CNAME or DNAME), then it MUST be preceded by the chain of alias records needed to resolve it. DNAME chains SHOULD omit unsigned CNAME records that may have been synthesized in the response from a DNS resolver. (If unsigned synthetic CNAMEs are present, then the TLS client will just ignore them, as they are not necessary to validate the chain.)

The subsequent RRsets MUST contain the full set of DNS records needed to authenticate the TLSA record set from the server’s trust anchor. Typically this means a set of DNSKEY and DS RRsets that cover all zones from the target zone containing the TLSA record set to the trust anchor zone. The TLS client should be prepared to receive this set of RRsets in any order.

Names that are aliased via CNAME and/or DNAME records may involve multiple branches of the DNS tree. In this case, the authentication chain structure needs to include DS and DNSKEY record sets that cover all the necessary branches.
If the TLSA record set was synthesized by a DNS wildcard, the chain MUST include the signed NSEC or NSEC3 [RFC5155] records that prove that there was no explicit match of the TLSA record name and no closer wildcard match.

The final DNSKEY RRset in the authentication chain corresponds to the trust anchor (typically the DNS root). This trust anchor is also preconfigured in the TLS client, but including it in the response from the server permits TLS clients to use the automated trust anchor rollover mechanism defined in RFC 5011 [RFC5011] to update their configured trust anchor.

The following is an example of the records in the AuthenticationChain structure for the HTTPS server at www.example.com, where there are zone cuts at "com." and "example.com." (record data are omitted here for brevity):

```plaintext
_.443._tcp.www.example.com. TLSA
RRSIG(_.443._tcp.www.example.com. TLSA)
example.com. DNSKEY
RRSIG(example.com. DNSKEY)
example.com. DS
RRSIG(example.com. DS)
com. DNSKEY
RRSIG(com. DNSKEY)
com. DS
RRSIG(com. DS)
. DNSKEY
RRSIG(. DNSKEY)
```

4. Construction of Serialized Authentication Chains

This section describes a possible procedure for the server to use to build the serialized DNSSEC chain.

When the goal is to perform DANE authentication [RFC6698] [RFC7671] of the server, the DNS record set to be serialized is a TLSA record set corresponding to the server’s domain name, protocol, and port number.
The domain name of the server MUST be that included in the TLS server_name extension [RFC6066] when present. If the server_name extension is not present, or if the server does not recognize the provided name and wishes to proceed with the handshake rather than to abort the connection, the server picks one of its configured domain names associated with the server IP address to which the connection has been established.

The TLSA record to be queried is constructed by prepending the _port and _transport labels to the domain name as described in [RFC6698], where "port" is the port number associated with the TLS server. The transport is "tcp" for TLS servers, and "udp" for DTLS servers. The port number label is the left-most label, followed by the transport, followed by the base domain name.

The components of the authentication chain are typically built by starting at the target record set and its corresponding RRSIG. Then traversing the DNS tree upwards towards the trust anchor zone (normally the DNS root), for each zone cut, the DNSKEY and DS RRsets and their signatures are added. However, see Section 3.4 for specific processing needed for aliases and wildcards. If DNS response messages contain any domain names utilizing name compression [RFC1035], then they MUST be uncompressed.

Newer DNS protocol enhancements, such as the EDNS Chain Query extension [RFC7901] if supported, may offer easier ways to obtain all of the chain data in one transaction with an upstream DNSSEC aware recursive server.

5. Caching and Regeneration of the Authentication Chain

DNS records have Time To Live (TTL) parameters, and DNSSEC signatures have validity periods (specifically signature expiration times). After the TLS server constructs the serialized authentication chain, it SHOULD cache and reuse it in multiple TLS connection handshakes. However, it MUST refresh and rebuild the chain as TTLs and signature validity periods dictate. A server implementation could carefully track these parameters and requery component records in the chain correspondingly. Alternatively, it could be configured to rebuild the entire chain at some predefined periodic interval that does not exceed the DNS TTLs or signature validity periods of the component records in the chain.
6. Verification

A TLS client making use of this specification, and which receives a DNSSEC authentication chain extension from a server, MUST use this information to perform DANE authentication of the server. In order to do this, it uses the mechanism specified by the DNSSEC protocol [RFC4035] [RFC5155]. This mechanism is sometimes implemented in a DNSSEC validation engine or library.

If the authentication chain is correctly verified, the client then performs DANE authentication of the server according to the DANE TLS protocol [RFC6698] [RFC7671].

Clients MAY cache the server’s validated TLSA RRset or other validated portions of the chain as an optimization to save signature verification work for future connections. The period of such caching MUST NOT exceed the TTL associated with those records. A client that possesses a validated and unexpired TLSA RRset or the full chain in its cache does not need to send the dnssec_chain extension for subsequent connections to the same TLS server. It can use the cached information to perform DANE authentication.

7. Trust Anchor Maintenance

The trust anchor may change periodically, e.g. when the operator of the trust anchor zone performs a DNSSEC key rollover. TLS clients using this specification MUST implement a mechanism to keep their trust anchors up to date. They could use the method defined in [RFC5011] to perform trust anchor updates inband in TLS, by tracking the introduction of new keys seen in the trust anchor DNSKEY RRset. However, alternative mechanisms external to TLS may also be utilized. Some operating systems may have a system-wide service to maintain and keep the root trust anchor up to date. In such cases, the TLS client application could simply reference that as its trust anchor, periodically checking whether it has changed. Some applications may prefer to implement trust anchor updates as part of their automated software updates.

8. Mandating use of this extension

Green field applications that are designed to always employ this extension, could of course unconditionally mandate its use.

If TLS applications want to mandate the use of this extension for specific servers, clients could maintain a whitelist of sites where the use of this extension is forced. The client would refuse to authenticate such servers if they failed to deliver this extension. Client applications could also employ a Trust on First Use (TOFU)
like strategy, whereby they would record the fact that a server offered the extension and use that knowledge to require it for subsequent connections.

This protocol currently provides no way for a server to prove that it doesn’t have a TLSA record. Hence absent whitelists, a client misdirected to a server that has fraudulently acquired a public CA issued certificate for the real server’s name, could be induced to establish a PKIX verified connection to the rogue server that precluded DANE authentication. This could be solved by enhancing this protocol to require that servers without TLSA records need to provide a DNSSEC authentication chain that proves this (i.e. the chain includes NSEC or NSEC3 records that demonstrate either the absence of the TLSA record, or the absence of a secure delegation to the associated zone). Such an enhancement would be impossible to deploy incrementally though since it requires all TLS servers to support this protocol.

One possible way to address the threat of attackers that have fraudulently obtained valid PKIX credentials, is to use current PKIX defense mechanisms, such as checking Certificate Transparency logs to detect certificate misissuance. This may be necessary anyway, as TLS servers may support both DANE and PKIX authentication. Even TLS servers that support only DANE may be interested in detecting PKIX adversaries impersonating their service to DANE unaware TLS clients.

9. DANE and Traditional PKIX Interoperation

When DANE is being introduced incrementally into an existing PKIX environment, there may be scenarios in which DANE authentication for a server fails but PKIX succeeds, or vice versa. What happens here depends on TLS client policy. If DANE authentication fails, the client may decide to fallback to traditional PKIX authentication. In order to do so efficiently within the same TLS handshake, the TLS server needs to have provided the full X.509 certificate chain. When TLS servers only support DANE-EE or DANE-TA modes, they have the option to send a much smaller certificate chain: just the EE certificate for the former, and a short certificate chain from the DANE trust anchor to the EE certificate for the latter. If the TLS server supports both DANE and traditional PKIX, and wants to allow efficient PKIX fallback within the same handshake, they should always provide the full X.509 certificate chain.
10. Security Considerations

The security considerations of the normatively referenced RFCs all pertain to this extension. Since the server is delivering a chain of DNS records and signatures to the client, it MUST rebuild the chain in accordance with TTL and signature expiration of the chain components as described in Section 5. TLS clients need roughly accurate time in order to properly authenticate these signatures. This could be achieved by running a time synchronization protocol like NTP [RFC5905] or SNTP [RFC5905], which are already widely used today. TLS clients MUST support a mechanism to track and rollover the trust anchor key, or be able to avail themselves of a service that does this, as described in Section 7. Security considerations related to mandating the use of this extension are described in Section 8.

11. IANA Considerations

This extension requires the registration of a new value in the TLS ExtensionsType registry. The value requested from IANA is 53, and the extension should be marked "Recommended" in accordance with "IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS" [TLSIANA].

12. Acknowledgments

Many thanks to Adam Langley for laying the groundwork for this extension. The original idea is his but our acknowledgment in no way implies his endorsement. This document also benefited from discussions with and review from the following people: Viktor Dukhovni, Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Jeff Hodges, Allison Mankin, Patrick McManus, Rick van Rein, Ilari Liusvaara, Eric Rescorla, Gowri Visweswaran, Duane Wessels, Nico Williams, and Paul Wouters.

13. References

13.1. Normative References


13.2. Informative References


Appendix A.  Test vectors

The provided test vectors will authenticate the certificate used with https://example.com/, https://example.net/ and https://example.org/ at the time of writing:

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIF8jCCBNqgAwIBAgIQDmTF+8I2reFLFyrQceMsDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBw
MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEVMBMGA1UEChMMRGlnaUNlcnQgSW5jMRkwFwYDVQQLExB3
d3cuGlnaW1nQnY2MTsMS8LQYDVQQDEyEWEhbHVlfG9uZ3RvcCBTeS5wYXZl
h0NvZ3RvcCBTeS5wZXRlUAoGBXM0YjUwNiZCQzEpMB0GA1UEAxMkY2hlbWluZ3RvcCBTeS5wYXZl
h0NvZ3RvcCBTeS5wZXRlUQwEAwIBAgIWCXZvclMwlrQYDVR0PAQH/BBAGggH5oB:
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

For brevity and reproducability all DNS zones involved with the test vectors are signed using keys with algorithm 13: ECDSA Curve P-256 with SHA-256.

To reflect operational practice, different zones in the examples are in different phases of rolling their signing keys:

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To reflect operational practice, different zones in the examples are in different phases of rolling their signing keys:
All zones use a Key Signing Key (KSK) and Zone Signing Key (ZSK), except for the example.com and example.net zones which use a Combined Signing Key (CSK).

The root and org zones are rolling their ZSK’s.

The com and org zones are rolling their KSK’s.

The test vectors are DNSSEC valid in the same period as the certificate is valid, which is in between November 3 2015 and November 28 2018, with the following root trust anchor:

```text
.  IN  DS  ( 47005 13 2 2eb6e9f2480126691594d649a5a613de3052e37861634641bb568746f2ffcd4d )
```

**A.1. \_443\_._tcp.\_www.example.com**

```text
\_443\_._tcp.\_www.example.com. 3600 IN TLSA ( 3 11 c66bef6a5c1a3e78b82016e13f314f3cc5fa25b1e52a9b9adb9ec5989b165a da )
\_443\_._tcp.\_www.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG ( TLSA 13 5 3600 20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com. uml1DUjp5RfrXn9WtuMxEQy+yzgrONcuzsnyfOOGSzwaDdkSOJKndcfbb2IlUUV04Z+V488+SD1jr7/21tsKA== )
example.com. 3600 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13 JnAIxygJTZz+psWvbrfUWLv6ULqIyUS2QdHeUH9V35bs1WEjPzrrlxCUs75s /TszF2MaGWWvlusieh5mHcXza== ) ; Key ID = 1870
example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 2 3600 20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com. HujaA9vQTBcMxMeaYjDCOF0FyYHaHajT15xPztrp5u6P2yV8naYQLG3zelfIgaerWBOagXXb1aSsByYbW69L5U3uSdg== )
example.com. 900 IN DS ( 1870 13 2 9b533a049798e900b5c29c90cd25a986e8a44f319ac3c302baefc08f5b81e16 )
example.com. 900 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 2 900 20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com. Ltua9ntaQzVNk5UztzjN38Bqs6mJ8KAT7L4+AxevDL+z0Jft7RC1/g6QrfaIn1wgQ4U7TvC8PYODU/HYtwQ== )
com. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13 7IIE5Dol8jSMUqHTvOo1IzpaEbdQ9qRxfi/zQcSdufUKLhpByvLzpSAQTqyWj3URi28L3Fa2q6LMO2UzZ1QGcw== ) ; Key ID = 34327
com. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13 Rbkc0+96Xzmpn8jYIuM41ryAp3egQjSmBaSoiA7H76Tm0RLHPNUx1vk+n0QfIc3I8xf2DNw8WaOe3/g2QAw== ) ; Key ID = 18931
com. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13 szc7biLo5J40Hlkvan1v2rf4aD4Yyf+NHA/GAgdnS1L9xxK9Izg68XHkqck4RtDiVkc371JNAaGmSlHhrGuoY0tka== ) ; Key ID = 28809
com. 900 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000 )
```
A hex dump of the wire format data of this content is:

```
0000:  04 5f 34 34 33 04 5f 74  63 70 03 77 77 77 07 65
0010:  78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63  6f 6d 00 00 34 00 01 00
0020:  00 0e 10 00 23 03 01 01  c6 6b ef 6a 5c 1a 3e 78
0030:  b8 20 16 e1 3f 31 4f 3c  c5 fa 25 b1 e5 2a ab 9a
da 9e 5f 34 33 33 04 5f 74
```
_25._tcp.example.com wildcard

_A.2. _25._tcp.example.com wildcard_

_25._tcp.example.com. 3600 IN TLSA ( 3 1 1
c66bef6a5c1a3e78b82016e13f314f3cc5fa25b1e52a9b9ad9b9ec5989b165
da )

_25._tcp.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG ( TLSA 13 3 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com. e7Q5L2x7Ca3SkSY6pRjgqtRxkEN1uYUcgymLp6GQ4zxAZxc01Y1vGqxN4eNA+yBn1USIJQ46kkv5PC79Qipg== )

*.tcp.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG ( NSEC 13 3 3600


20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com.

example.com.  3600 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
JnA1XgyJTZz+psWvbrfUWLV6ULqJyUS2QdhUH9VK35bs1WeJpRzrlxCUs7s/TsSf2MaGWVvlsuieh5mHcXzA== ) ; Key ID = 1870

example.com.  3600 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 2 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com.
HujA9vQTBcXMeaYjDOCF0fYyHhaajT15xPztrp5u6P2yYV8naYQLG3zUF1gaerWBQagXXb1aSbBywB96LJ3u5dgg== )

example.com.  900 IN DS ( 1870 13 2 e9b533a049798e900b5c29c90cd25a9868a44f319ac3cd302bafce8f5b81e16 )

example.com.  900 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 2 900 20181128000000
15201103000000 34327 com.
1tua9ntAqZvOnK5utztiJn38BqsmJ8KAT7L4+AxevDL+z0Jf77RC1/g6QrfaIn1wqF4U7TvC8PYODUU/HywQ== )
com.  900 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
7IIE5650i18JSMUqHTvO1izapDEoBq9qRxFi/zQsCdufULKhpBvYpLpxSAQTqCWj
3URlZ8L1Fa2gBLMOZUzZl1QCe== ) ; Key ID = 34327
com.  900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
Rbkco+96XZmpn8yJiuM41ryAp3eGqJSmBaSoliA7H76tmoRLHNPvUX1vKn+nQ0f
Ic318xfZDnw8aPe3g/2QA/w== ) ; Key ID = 18931
com.  900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
szc7biLo5J4OHlkan1vZrF4aD4Y4Yf+NHA/GAqdnS1YzxK9Izg68XHkqck4Rt
Di Vk371NArqmgSlHbrGu0yOTKA== ) ; Key ID = 28809
com.  900 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 18931 com.
I2M7BrfrcGvbhJlfcVr6c3Hudgy3MLNCSNhV255/NmB3ZiFcvIDn0iqXPm
7YQyrvFi6utyxBu/fSD651ARw== )
com.  900 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 28809 com.
8qZOV4M48wgt5XPWhG2H04FAD6Kvs5eIHUZuz+7DVcrZ/XMEvRMIHcm1Q+sqOs
hm4C6vK2BoO24PHXoZ2N1Lw== )

.  86400 IN DS ( 18931 13 2 20f7a9db42d0e2042fbfbb9f9ea015941202f9eabb94487e658c188ee7bc752115)
.  86400 IN DS ( 28809 13 2 ad66b32767f976232a45eda773e92c69e870643bbde681d342a9e5cf2sbb380)

.  86400 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 1 86400 20181128000000
20151103000000 31918 .
5KQVaXpN+6k7VEGMmeyky2/Y3wIhGM70Fkm0vp5NmQ6KPk8L1XMLPjtcJDWG2jce
EU3Uc4z2DUXzzyWgEDdrS0cdw== )
.  86400 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
zKz+DCWkNA/vuheiVPcGsH40U84KZA1rMlryoyo9WHzf8PsFp/o8J8vmjyyW
P98c0bc4d8NvLxzbUzo3+F== ) ; Key ID = 31918

.  86400 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
8wMZZ4lzHdyKZ4f8kys/t3Q1MlveAdbsbyqWrMhwddSXCYGRrsAbPprieRW
xVcdvItolF8cRbD5TN0R3XEQ== ) ; Key ID = 2635

.  86400 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13

A.3. \_443\_tcp.www.example.org CNAME

\_443\_tcp.www.example.org. 3600 IN CNAME (dane311.example.org.)
\_443\_tcp.www.example.org. 3600 IN RRSIG (CNAME 13 5 3600 20181128000000 20151103000000 56566 example.org. wLQYbRMMqrcXCD65GZJqwsswD0TDF2VQk1BYdYCMo+JTjgvZw1UFYmcJXmwJsl KezlIzsDkW6jK0LMJ3YUw3Bmw==) dane311.example.org. 3600 IN TLSA (3 1 c66be6f6a5c1a3e78b82016e13f314f3cc5fa25b1e52a9ba9d9ec5989b165 ada)

dane311.example.org. 3600 IN RRSIG (TLSA 13 3 3600 20181128000000 20151103000000 56566 example.org. All1KvcpLz/9vGx/JQFwNEKW0Cbhjo61l65ELWS0xPvYj508QnsBrkzFCM41Ts g94s5VvzMLYsZI2To2hcCdgg==) example.org. 3600 IN DNSKEY (256 3 13 NrbL6utGqIWwrhhjjeexdA6bMdD1lC1hj0Fnpvea1AMy2yuy83TmoGn9R966N UR5TLG4Zh+YPbbmuUixse4n3sw==; Key ID = 56566)

dane311.example.org. 3600 IN DNSKEY (257 3 13 uspaqp17jsMTX6AWVgmbog/3Sttz+9ANFUWL6qKUHR0BQoChQWj8jyYUUr Wy9ttxxesN9Mk04LurFght1LQ==; Key ID = 44384)

dane311.example.org. 3600 IN RRSIG (DNSKEY 13 2 3600 20181128000000 20151103000000 44384 example.org. ZsQ5w1Z2wofDq7uY1voqEeq9byHb159Ap4EPXdB4PpnWyt2djKIElgXCIfIlrU EUC1d1aKb2SorZez18EJ8LMVJuw==)

example.org. 900 IN DS (44384 13 2 ec307e2efc8f0117ed96ab48a513c 8003ed9d121f1ff11a08b4cdd348d909aa6)

example.org. 900 IN RRSIG (DS 13 2 900 20181128000000 20151103000000 9523 org. 15KUWAanKJeAUdgm461deGg6Vm6bVKeaWLr34FTJlfMWWi+jkmA6SM/bBq k2BjtMWT55XersA+11FQNOQI/Q==)

example.org. 900 IN DNSKEY (256 3 13 fulP60znhhSSER9How1LpTpyKQdM6ixcgkTE0gqVdsLx+DSNHSsc69o6fLWC0e HfWX7kz1BB0vLrvsJtXJ6g==; Key ID = 47417)

example.org. 900 IN DNSKEY (256 3 13 zTHbb7JM627Bjr8CGOySUarsic91xZU3vL5RjVix9YH6+iwPBXb6qfHyQHy mLM1AAooXhB7UKEBVgDVN8sQ==; Key ID = 9523)

example.org. 900 IN DNSKEY (256 3 13 Uf24EyNt5lDMcLwVr+dHPInhSpmpJnqAQNUtouU+SGLu+1FRRIBetgw1bJUZNI6 Dlger0VJTM0QuX/JVXXcGVGoQ==; Key ID = 49352)
A.4. _443._tcp.www.example.net DNAME

e.example.net. 3600 IN DNAME example.com.
e.example.net. 3600 IN RRSIG ( DNAME 13 2 3600 20181128000000
20151103000000 48085 example.net.
+MJa5zEmYh/KHYobhabF3ibfJ5xhJDA76Sugc/LFyTDJbmYW/n1Yf3XLdcDh
71vNfCkPuv6eCkSFGrVvwiA== )
_.443._tcp.www.example.net. 3600 IN CNAME ( _.443._tcp.www.example.com. )
_.443._tcp.www.example.com. 3600 IN TLSA  ( 3 1
	c66bef6a5c1a3e78b82016e13f314f3cc5fa25b1e52a9b9adb9ec5989b165
	ada )
_.443._tcp.www.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG ( TLSA 13 5 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com. )
example.net.  3600  IN  DNSKEY  ( 257 3 13
X9GHpJcS7bqKEVesLiVAbdHUHTZqqBbVs3mzIqmdp+5cIJK7qDazwH68Kts8d
9MvN55HddWgsmeRhzgePz6hMg== ) ; Key ID = 48085
example.net.  3600  IN  RRSIG  ( DNSKEY 13 2 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 48085 example.net.
Qu7q2IheqxAKGnchYSvQeJuXdnBj/+wJoEmv67wemOUI6qvWVIo535w+hguUV
m2m/W5rp3qWBGChLxxfqI9k13g== )
example.net.  900 IN DS  ( 48085 13 7 2c1998ce63df60e2fa41640c545f
88f463dad8cd5d0742777b4a7c04502921be )
example.net.  900 IN RRSIG  ( DS 13 2 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 10713 net.
xxSIJlpOSmrUgwR++os2SHtpRf53S095G6FQyH51Es1ntn2q0q0p/AVr1B8q
Qw3qsmXJrwGW3Fbkv60/tWcg== )
net.  900 IN DNSKEY  ( 256 3 13
061Eq0s4sBcSPlz17vt4nFSGLMxAGquLSt0seamRKcni4i/1w/vtyfqALuLF
JiFjtcCKHMPi8H1qjgEBwGCA== ) ; Key ID = 10713
net.  900 IN DNSKEY  ( 257 3 13
LnKNCPE+v384MVnsQgF2hn82NwStLYO6LzjggVsAKgu4XzncaDgq1R/7XZRO5
oVx2Zthxxn2uI+msBrrycAcAVA== ) ; Key ID = 485
net.  900 IN RRSIG  ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 485 net.
CC494bZrtBHIXmE2pe6E3h6L0R5fRR/MEuClfsfC6/d1CjRwFjCy9e0KnF
ar4xbp77dvEwgGHN1awEo6jw== )
net.  86400 IN DS  ( 483 13 2 ab25a2941aa7f1eb868888b783b25587515a0c
d8c247769b23adb13ca234dc05 )
net.  86400 IN RRSIG  ( DS 13 1 86400 20181128000000
20151103000000 31918 .
q+G4197pYFgAUhzzW5S+YoFiJc5omUbe20H28AwMHOrx19BdpG/2XhKDQ5F3
tUNerRmk1bym74/JxtLpGXAW== )
. 86400 IN DNSKEY  ( 253 13
zKz+DCWkNA/vuheiVPCQg6H04u8KZAlrMRiYozj98WHzf8P5Fr/or8j8vmjjWP
P98ctbte488NvLXzbgUzo3+FA== ) ; Key ID = 31918
. 86400 IN DNSKEY  ( 253 13
8wMz24z1LyKz4f8yX+t3Q1mgVeadbsbqyWwhddDSCZYGhRsAbPpier8W
xbVcClv0r1FbcRDMDTNO0REQ== ) ; Key ID = 2635
. 86400 IN DNSKEY  ( 253 13
yv+VNTUjxZiGvtr060hVbrV9H6vVusQTP911xCxFzhZ0JxMnQFBmqb1c8X1vQ
+gDOXnFQTs6gfrMmxyGOrRg== ) ; Key ID = 47005
. 86400 IN RRSIG  ( DNSKEY 13 0 86400 20181128000000
20151103000000 47005 5
ehAzUZ3yToPShKkKrvrMdz+DKvWVfyzS+GR251QThnu+u1MzXhQ5+kSha65B
Y2AIUpAmpHENrGrw2pV3N3e74iZa== )
examp...
Internet-Draft         TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension             March 2018

RFC 8484: TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension

example.com.  900  IN  RRSIG  ( DS 13 2 900 20181128000000 20151103000000
com.  900  IN  RRSIG  ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000 20151103000000
com.  900  IN  RRSIG  ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000 20151103000000
com.  900  IN  RRSIG  ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000 20151103000000
com.  900  IN  RRSIG  ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000 20151103000000

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