Abstract

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) master secret is not cryptographically bound to important session parameters such as the client and server identities. Consequently, it is possible for an active attacker to set up two sessions, one with a client and another with a server, such that the master secrets on the two sessions are the same. Thereafter, any mechanism that relies on the master secret for authentication, including session resumption, becomes vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack, where the attacker can simply forward messages back and forth between the client and server. This specification defines a TLS extension that contextually binds the master secret to a log of the full handshake that computes it, thus preventing such attacks.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

In TLS [RFC5246], every session has a "master_secret" computed as:

\[
\text{master\_secret} = \text{PRF}\left(\text{pre\_master\_secret}, \text{"master\_secret"}, \\
\text{ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random}\right) [0..47];
\]

where the "pre_master_secret" is the result of some key exchange protocol. For example, when the handshake uses an RSA ciphersuite, this value is generated uniformly at random by the client, whereas for DHE ciphersuites, it is the result of a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.

As described in [TRIPLE-HS], in both the RSA and DHE key exchanges, an active attacker can synchronize two TLS sessions so that they
share the same "master_secret". For an RSA key exchange where the client is unauthenticated, this is achieved as follows. Suppose a client, C, connects to a malicious server, A. A then connects to a server, S, and completes both handshakes. For simplicity, assume that C and S only use RSA ciphersuites. (Note that C thinks it is connecting to A and is oblivious of S’s involvement.)

1. C sends a "ClientHello" to A, and A forwards it to S.

2. S sends a "ServerHello" to A, and A forwards it to C.

3. S sends a "Certificate", containing its certificate chain, to A. A replaces it with its own certificate chain and sends it to C.

4. S sends a "ServerHelloDone" to A, and A forwards it to C.

5. C sends a "ClientKeyExchange" to A, containing the "pre_master_secret", encrypted with A's public key. A decrypts the "pre_master_secret", re-encrypts it with S’s public key and sends it on to S.

6. C sends a "Finished" to A. A computes a "Finished" for its connection with S, and sends it to S.

7. S sends a "Finished" to A. A computes a "Finished" for its connection with C, and sends it to C.

At this point, both connections (between C and A, and between A and S) have new sessions that share the same "pre_master_secret", "ClientHello.random", "ServerHello.random", as well as other session parameters, including the session identifier and, optionally, the session ticket. Hence, the "master_secret" value will be equal for the two sessions and it will be associated both at C and S with the same session ID, even though the server identities on the two connections are different. Moreover, the record keys on the two connections will also be the same.

Similar scenarios can be achieved when the handshake uses a DHE ciphersuite, or an ECDHE ciphersuite with an arbitrary explicit curve. Even if the client or server does not prefer using RSA or DHE, the attacker can force them to use it by offering only RSA or DHE in its hello messages. Other key exchanges may also be vulnerable. If client authentication is used, the attack still works, except that the two sessions now differ on both client and server identities.

Once A has synchronized the two connections, since the keys are the same on the two sides, it can step away and transparently forward
messages between C and S, reading and modifying when it desires. In
the key exchange literature, such occurrences are called unknown key-
share attacks, since C and S share a secret but they both think that
their secret is shared only with A. In themselves, these attacks do
not break integrity or confidentiality between honest parties, but
they offer a useful starting point from which to mount impersonation
attacks on C and S.

Suppose C tries to resume its session on a new connection with A. A
can then resume its session with S on a new connection and forward
the abbreviated handshake messages unchanged between C and S. Since
the abbreviated handshake only relies on the master secret for
authentication, and does not mention client or server identities,
both handshakes complete successfully, resulting in the same session
keys and the same handshake log. A still knows the connection keys
and can send messages to both C and S.

Critically, on the new connection, even the handshake log is the same
on C and S, thus defeating any man-in-the-middle protection scheme
that relies on the uniqueness of finished messages, such as the
secure renegotiation indication extension [RFC5746] or TLS channel
bindings [RFC5929]. [TRIPLE-HS] describes several exploits based on
such session synchronization attacks. In particular, it describes a
man-in-the-middle attack that circumvents the protections of
[RFC5746] to break client-authenticated TLS renegotiation after
session resumption. Similar attacks apply to application-level
authentication mechanisms that rely on channel bindings [RFC5929] or
on key material exported from TLS [RFC5705].

The underlying protocol issue is that since the master secret is not
guaranteed to be unique across sessions, it cannot be used on its own
as an authentication credential. This specification introduces a TLS
extension that computes the "master_secret" value from the log of the
handshake that computes it, so that different handshakes will, by
construction, create different master secrets.

2. Requirements Notation

This document uses the same notation and terminology used in the TLS
Protocol specification [RFC5246].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. The TLS Session Hash

When a full handshake takes place, we define

\[
\text{session_hash} = \text{Hash}(\text{handshake_messages})
\]

where "handshake_messages" refers to all handshake messages sent or received, starting at client hello up to and including the Client Key Exchange message, including the type and length fields of the handshake messages. This is the concatenation of all the exchanged Handshake structures, as defined in Section 7.4 of [RFC5246].

The hash function "Hash" is defined by the ciphersuite in TLS 1.2. In all previous versions of TLS and in SSL 3.0, this function computes the concatenation of MD5 and SHA1.

There is no "session_hash" for resumed handshakes, as they do not lead to the creation of a new session.

Implementation note: As described in Section 4, the "session_hash" is used in the extended master secret computation. Hence, it must be possible to compute the session_hash before the master secret is computed. In SSL 3.0, the master secret is first needed in the Client’s CertificateVerify message. Hence, it is widespread implementation practice to compute the master secret as soon as the "pre_master_secret" is available, typically immediately before or after sending the Client Key Exchange message. The definition of "session_hash" given in this document requires minimal patches to such implementations in order to implement the extended master secret extension. Our definition is also compatible with the common implementation practice of keeping running hashes of the handshake log.

4. The extended master secret

When the extended master secret extension is negotiated, the "master_secret" is computed as

\[
\text{master_secret} = \text{PRF}(\text{pre_master_secret}, "extended master secret", \text{session_hash})
\]

The "session_hash" depends upon a handshake log that includes "ClientHello.random" and "ServerHello.random", in addition to ciphersuites, client and server certificates. Consequently, the extended master secret depends upon the choice of all these session parameters.
Our proposed design reflects the recommendation that keys should be bound to the security contexts that compute them [sp800-108]. The technique of mixing a hash of the key exchange messages into master key derivation is already used in other well-known protocols such as SSH [RFC4251].

5. Extension negotiation

5.1. Extension definition

This document defines a new TLS extension, "extended_master_secret" (with extension type TBA), which is used to signal both client and server to use the extended master secret computation. The "extension_data" field of this extension is empty. Thus, the entire encoding of the extension is XX XX 00 00.

If client and server agree on this extension and a full handshake takes place, both client and server MUST use the extended master secret derivation algorithm, as defined in Section 4.

5.2. Client and Server Behavior

In its ClientHello message, a client implementing this document MUST send the "extended_master_secret" extension.

If a server receives the "extended_master_secret" extension, it MUST include the "extended_master_secret" extension in its ServerHello message.

Implementation note: if the server decides to proceed with resumption, the extension does not have any effect. Requiring the extension to be included anyway makes the extension negotiation logic easier, because it does not depend on whether resumption is accepted or not. Moreover, a client may find useful to learn that the server supports this extension anyway.

6. Security Considerations

This entire document is about security, see [TRIPLE-HS] for more details.

7. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign an extension code point for the extended_master_secret extension to the TLS ExtensionType values registry as specified in TLS [RFC5246].
8. Acknowledgments

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9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References


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