Abstract

This document mainly analyzes the key revocation issue with host identities (HIs) in the Host Identity Protocol (HIP). Generally, key revocation is an important functionality of key management systems; it is concerned with the issues of removing antique cryptographic keys from operational usages when they are not secure or not secure enough any more. This functionality is particularly important for the security systems expected to execute for long periods. This document also attempts to investigate several key issues that a designer of HI revocation mechanisms need to carefully consider.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction

In a HIP architecture [RFC5201], a HIP host needs to generate a "permanent" public key pair before it communicates with other HIP hosts. The public key is used as its HI while the private key is kept securely by the host. When two HIP hosts attempt to initiate a communication (e.g., a TCP session), they can take advantage of their HI key pairs to perform mutual authentication and distribute keying materials for securing subsequent data and signaling packets. Therefore, the security of HIP architectures largely relies on the security of those HI key pairs. If the HI key pair of a HIP host is revealed, an attacker can easily impersonate the victim to carry out malicious attacks without being detected.

It has been widely recognized that a cryptographic key (which can be either a symmetric key or a public key) should have a reasonable valid period [Recommendations]. After having been employed for a certain period, a cryptographic key will be in more dangers of compromise. As time elapses, an attacker can collect more materials (e.g., encrypted data, signatures and associated plain texts, etc.) and obtain more time to compromise the key. In addition, unexpected key disclosure is a common practical issue, which may be caused by, e.g., improper key management policies or hardware stealing. Consequently, in the design of a security system which is expected to execute for a long period, the issues with revoking the cryptographic keys which do not have enough security strengths must be considered.

In current HIP architectures, the key revocation issues with transient (session) keys have been well discussed. HIP allows two communicating hosts to update their transient keys securely at run time. However, the key revocation issues with permanent keys (i.e., HIs) have not been well explored yet. No facility is provided for HI revocation either.

2. Terminologies

BEX: Base Exchange

HIP: Host Identity Protocol

PKI: Public Key Infrastructure

3. Key Management

Key management aims at guaranteeing the security of cryptographic keys during the period of their application and includes all of the
provisions made in a security system design which are related to
generation, validation, exchange, storage, safeguard, application,
and replacement of cryptographic keys. Appropriate key management is
critical to security mechanisms providing confidentiality, entity
authentication, data origin authentication, data integrity, and
digital signatures. Specifically, a full-fledged key management
system should be able to support [Menezes et al. 1996]:

1. Initialization of system users within a domain;
2. Generation, distribution, and installation of keying material;
3. Controlling the use of keying material;
4. Update, revocation, and destruction of keying material; and
5. Storage, backup/recovery, and archival of keying material.

4. Key Revocation

Key revocation is an essential functionality of a security system.
By refreshing antique cryptographic keys, a security system can
reduce the dangers of being compromised. Key revocation is also an
important step when a security system attempts to confine and recover
from the damages caused by attacks. The criteria measuring a key
revocation mechanism should include security, efficiency, latency,
overheads in terms of communication, and etc.

4.1. Classification of permanent Key Revocation Mechanisms

Cryptographic keys adopted in a security system can be classified
into permanent keys and transient keys according to their life
periods. As indicated by the name, permanent keys are maintained by
holders for relatively long periods which can be various from months
to years. Because frequent usages of permanent keys can damage their
security strength and reduce their valid periods, in many security
mechanisms, permanent keys are employed to generate and distribute
transient keys which are only valid in relatively short periods
(e.g., within a single TCP session). Key revocation issues with
transient keys have been taken account of in most authentication
mechanisms (e.g., Kerberos, IPSec, SSL, etc.). For instance, in
Kerberos, a user can use her password to obtain a session key from a
KDC; the session key then can be further used to securely discard and
update antique sub-session keys. The revocation of transient keys is
also considered in the design of HIP. A basic handshaking protocol
(i.e., the HIP Base Exchange) has been proposed. Using it, two
communicating HIP hosts can employ the authenticated Diffie-Hellman
algorithm to securely distribute keying materials which will be used to generate new cryptographic keys in the following communications. After a handshake, the hosts are able to refresh their transient keys and the corresponding HIP associations, using Update packets.

The revocation issues with permanent keys are also taken into account in lots of key management mechanisms (e.g., PGP, PKI, Peer-to-Peer Key Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks [Merwe et al. 2007]). Particularly, in PKI, key revocation issues are addressed in certificate revocation mechanisms.

4.2. Classification of permanent Key Revocation Mechanisms

This draft focuses on the issues with permanent key revocation in HIP. In the remainder of this draft, key revocation indicates permanent key revocation, without mentioned otherwise.

Mechanisms for key revocation can be classified in different ways, according to:

- Whether additional operations are needed. If a key revocation mechanism does not need any additional operation in the revoking process of a cryptographic key, it is called an implicit key revocation mechanism. The basic idea of an implicit HI revocation mechanism is to associate a key with a valid period and use cryptographic methods to prove the binding between the key and its valid period. Therefore, after the pre-defined period expires, the key is obsolete automatically. For instance, in PKI, a Certificate Authority (CA) can issue a certificate for a user in order to assert the association between the user and its public key. The certificate is associated with a life period. When the period expires, the user’s public key is revoked automatically. If a key revocation mechanism needs to carry out additional operations (e.g., notifications) to revoke a cryptographic key, it is called an explicit key revocation mechanism. In different explicit key revocation mechanisms, such operations can be performed either by a dedicated server or by the owner of the key. Compared with implicit key revocation mechanisms, an explicit key revocation mechanism has the capability to revoke a cryptographic key before its life period expires. For instance, in X.509 [RFC2459] based systems, an issuer can generate a list of certificates, which were revoked for some reasons before their expiring dates, for users to consult.

- Whether a secure third party is needed. In some revocation mechanisms, the status information of a cryptographic key is provided by a secure third party. A proof of validity is performed during each request from users, and the secure third
party provides up-to-date information. Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) for X.509 certificate is such a mechanism. An OSPF client generates an OCSP request that primary contains the information of one or more queried certificates and send it to a trusted OCSP server. After receiving the OCSP request, the server creates an OCSP response containing the updated status information of the queried certificates. In some other revocation mechanism, validity information is distributed to the requester by a non-secured server. For example, in PGP, a principal can use its revoked key to sign a key revocation certificate and uploaded it to a key repository server. The server is regarded as "non-secured" only because the server only provides a repository service and does not make any assertion. Certificates themselves are individually secured by the signatures thereon, and need not be transferred over secured channels. In fact, authorization policies to a repository server in the form of write and delete protection is mandatory so as to enable maintenance and update without denial of service.

The list is adopted. According to the information provided, key revocation mechanisms can be classified into black list mechanisms and white list mechanisms. A black list mechanism can provide the information of the keys which are not valid anymore. The Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is an example of this kind of mechanism. In a CRL, revoked certificates are listed in a signed list, so that users can query the information about the revoked keys whenever it is convenient. White list mechanisms, instead, only provide information of valid keys. For example, SSH specify a kind of resource record (RR) called SSHFP [RFC4255]. A SSHFP RR contains the information of the fingerprint of a valid cryptographic key. If a key needs to be revoked, the associated SSHFP RR is removed. If a user cannot find the associated SSHFP RR from DNS, she will believe that the key inquired about is no longer valid.

The way of distributing revocation information. In a key revocation mechanism applying the push model, upon a key is revoked, a server proactively contacts the related users to inform the case. In contrast, in a key revocation mechanism applying the pull model, a client needs to query a server for particular revocation information. OCSP, CRL, and the key revocation mechanisms adopted in PGP and SSH all belong to this category.

There are few discussions about the HI revocation issues with HIP. In the current HIP architecture, hosts are allowed to update their identifiers arbitrarily without notifying others. The lack of HI revocation mechanism can be taken advantage of by attackers to, for instance, escape tracking, bypass ACLs (Access Control Lists),
impersonate others using the compromised HIs, etc. In remainder of this document, candidate approaches and related issues are discussed.

5. Implicit HI Revocation in HIP

Implicit key revocation is the simplest key revocation approach. By associating an HI with a life period, the holder of the HI needs to update the HI periodically so as to reduce the risk that the HI is compromised. In addition, life periods of HIs can help users to verify how long an HI has been used and how long the HI will still be valid. This is enable host managers to define more specific security policies.

Note that the HI and the HIT of a host are cryptographic associated. A revocation of an HI will cause the revocation of the correspondent HIT, and vice versa. Therefore, without losing generality, in this document we assume that the life periods of an HI and its HIT are identical and they are generated and revoked concurrently in a same process.

The life period of an HI can be specified either by the holder of the HI or by a trusted authority. During HIP BEXs, such life period information can be encapsulated in parameters and transported within HIP packets. If the life period of the HI is specified by its holder, the holder needs to use the associated private key to sign the parameter. If the life period of the HI is specified by a trusted authority, the authority needs to use its private key to sign a life period certificate for the HI. The certificate can be encapsulated within a CERT parameter and transported in HIP packets.

Figure 1 illustrates an extended HOST_ID parameter which is able to transport an HI and the associated life period. This parameter can be adopted in the cases where the life period of the HI is specified by its holder. Similar with the life periods of X.509 certificates, the life period of an HI is specified by a Not Before Time and a Not After Time. In this parameter, the NB Length and NA Length fields indicate the lengths of Not Before Time and Not After Time fields respectively. The Not-Before-Time and the Not-After-Time can be in a format of either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime defined in [RFC2459].

During a HIP base exchange, the parameter containing Initiator’s HI and the associated life period information is transported in the I2 packet, while the parameter containing Responser’s HI and the associated life period information is transported in the R1 packet.
The approach to enabling a holder to specify the life period of its HI does not rely on any trusted third party and introduces little performance penalty in verifying the life period. However, a concern about this approach is how to ensure that HIP hosts will appropriately define and manage the life periods of their HIs. In practice, the revocation and refreshment of an HI can be quite complex. Apart from updating the key material locally, additional operations also need to be performed (e.g., updating the associated HIP resource record in DNS, proactively informing the partners which may be affected by the revocation, etc.). Therefore, a lazy manager of a HIP host may attempt to avoid refreshing the HI and HIT of her host. If the manager assigns an extremely long life period for its HI, other HIP hosts can easily detect the problem and refuse to communicate with the host. However, if the manager selects to assign a new life period with a reasonable length for her HI whenever the old life period has expired, the renewal of the life period can be difficult to be detected in current HIP architectures. For instance, in practice a HIP host normally does not maintain the HIs and other related information of its communicating partners for a long period, in order to reduce memory consumption and foil deny-of-service attacks. Moreover, because HITs are treated by applications as ordinary IP addresses which have no expire date, in referral scenarios the receiver of a HIT may not be able to obtain the knowledge of the life period of a HIT from the referrer. In the current HIP resolution solutions (e.g., HIP RR), there is no concern about the life periods of HIs. On such occasions, a host can only obtain the life period information from its communicating partner.
(i.e., the holder of the HI). Therefore, in current HIP architectures, the approach which allows a holder to specify the life period of its HI can only be feasible in the environments where there has already been a certain level of trust between two HIP hosts beforehand, that is, a HIP host can believe its communicating partner has specified an appropriate life period for its HI and will only attempt to use it within the valid period.

The issues mentioned above can be largely addressed by assigning a trusted authority to manage the life periods of HIs. However, a dedicated trust third party may introduce complexity into the current HIP architecture, impose additional communications (e.g., registration process, generation of certificate chain, etc.), and cause issues in terms of scalability and trust. The details of the issues imposed by such dedicated authorities are discussed in section 6.

In the remainder of this sub-section, we introduce two complementary approaches to mitigating the issues of arbitrarily modifying HI life periods while imposing little performance penalty to HIP hosts. The first approach is to extend resolution systems (e.g., DNS servers) to provide trustable life-period information of HIs. In this approach, the life-period information can be encapsulated in the same packet with other mapping information and sent back to users so as to eliminate addition communicating overheads between users and resolutions systems.

In order to achieve this, spaces for the life period information needs to be allocated in the resource records sent back to users. In Figure 2, an extension of the HIP RR with life period information is illustrated. Same as the extended HOST_ID parameter in Figure 1, the NB Length and NA Length fields indicate the lengths of Not Before Time and Not After Time fields respectively. The Not-Before-Time and the Not-After-Time can be in a format of either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime defined in [RFC2459].
The basic functionality of a resolution server is to provide mapping information for users. In practice, it is normally the responsibility of authorized users to maintain and update the contents of RRs while resolution servers can verify the contents of RRs against certain security policies. Therefore, in this approach, information of the life period of an HI, just like the other information in the RR, can be provided by an authorized user at the registration time. After the registration, the life period information is only allowed to be updated by the ones who have higher privileges (e.g., server managers).

Let us use DNS servers as an example. After a user uploads the information of a HIP host in an authoritative DNS server, the user is not allowed to modify the Not Before Time and Not After Time fields of the HI any more. Moreover, after the life period of the HI has expired, the associated RRs needs to be removed.

Until now, the ID to Locator mapping solutions in HIP has not been standardized yet. We argue that it is desired to integrate the implicit key revocation functionality into such systems.

The second approach is to introduce the life periods of HIs into the generating process of HITs. For instance, the life period of an HI can be used as a part of the input for generating the associated HIT. This approach makes it computational difficult for the holder of an HI to modify the life period without modifying the associated HIT. Therefore, after a host advertises its contacting information in...
resolution servers, any attempts to modify the life period of the HI can be easily detected. For instance, in the case a host obtains a HIT from its referrer. It needs to first obtain the knowledge to access the host holding the HIT from resolution servers. Then it can get the associated HI and the life period from the HIT holder, and re-calculate the HIT to verify whether the life period of the HIT is valid. This approach needs little modification on the resolution servers and can be applied independently. A disadvantage of this approach is its inflexibility in the cases where the life periods of HIs need to be extended.

6. Explicit HI Revocation in HIP

As mentioned previously, in many typical scenarios a cryptographic key should not be used any more even when it is still in its valid life period. For instance, when a key is detected to be compromised, it must be revoked immediately even if it has not reached its expiration date. In such a case, explicit key revocation is needed.

When an HI needs to be removed from operational use prior to its originally scheduled expiry, the revocation of the HI needs to be informed to all the hosts which might be affected. If there is no dedicated third party to rely on, the holder of the HI needs to deliver the revocation certificate signed by the associated private key to all the affected partners. The poor scalability of this type of solution is always a subject of debates. First of all, this solution requires the holder an HI to maintain a long list of information about the partner which may be affected by the revocation; this job can be onerous and error prone. In addition, because HIP does not support multicast, the holder has to generate a notification packet for each of its partners, and send them out during the revocation. When the number of related partners increases, the holder may have to spend a large amount of bandwidth, memory and computing resources in generating and delivering the notification packets. In order to improve the performance of this solution, the holder can send the certificate to a limited set of partners. These partners then relay the certificate to others. However, this solution may introduce additional latency and make the delivery of the certificate un-reliable. Besides the above issues, this solution requires all the involved partners to be online during an HI revocation process, which can be hardly fulfilled on many occasions. Basically, this solution is only suitable in the circumstances where the number of involved hosts is relatively small and stable.

The experiences in PKI demonstrate that pull models can be more scalable in dealing with a large amount of users, and as a result,
most of the certification revocation mechanisms (e.g., Certification Revocation Lists (CRLs), delta CRLs [RFC2459], and the On-Line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)) proposed in PKI are based on pull models. In these mechanisms, the revocation information is maintained in a third party for users to query whenever it is convenient.

PKI has provided a set of certificate management mechanisms. On many occasions, it is feasible for HIP to take advantage of PKI style solutions to address the issues with HI management.

However, it should be realized that PKI oriented solutions are not silver bullets and cannot be utilized to address all the issues that HIP has to encounter. After HIP has been globally deployed, it is expected that there will be billions of HIP users which may belong to different organizations and attach to the Internet through different ISPs. Due to the poor scalability of PKI and lack of trust, it is extremely difficult (if possible) to put such a big amount of geographically distributed users under the control of a unique PKI security domain. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there will be many different security domains all over the world. When two HIP hosts belong to two different security domains, it may be difficult for a host to verify the assertion made by the security server in the domain of the other one. Although there have been solutions of generating trust relationship across various security domains, all of them impose additional overheads with respect to the construction and verification of credential chains, communications with remote security servers, which negatively influences the performance of HIP. Therefore, the HIP community argues that two HIP-aware hosts should be able to communicate without any additional security facilities. Actually, the only third party server introduced in the base-line HIP architecture is the Rendezvous Server (RVS) [RFC5204]. A RVS only relays messages for the hosts which attempts to communicate with mobile hosts and provides little security functionality. The HIP hosts intending to communicate with each other still need to use the HIP Base Exchange protocol to carry out authentication and exchange keying material for future communications. However, RVSES can be extended to support HI revocation if necessary. When a mobile host changes its HI, it can inform its RVS. Therefore, when the RVS find that a host attempts to access the mobile host with the antique HI, the RVS can send the mapping information of the antique HI and the new HI to the host. The RVS needs to use its private key to sign the mapping information in order to ensure the information will not be tampered. Upon receiving the mapping information, the remote host can use the new HI in the subsequent communications. Additionally, since it is suggested in [RFC5204] that a user get the information of RVSES from DNS, the security of the communication between the remote host and
DNS servers needs to be protected. Otherwise, an attacker can easily convince a witness that she is a legal RVS by forwarding a bogus DNS server consisting of its information to the witness. DNSSEC can be applied to address this issue.

Also, resolution servers can be potentially adopted to construct a global explicit HI revocation mechanism applying a pull model. For instance, when a host intends to revoke its HI, it can send a revocation certificate signed by its private key to an authoritative DNS server. After receiving the certificate, the correspondent RR will be removed, and thus users will not obtain the information about the revoked HI any more. Therefore, DNS servers can perform as a white list HI revocation mechanism, just similar with what specified in SSH. To avoid the long delay in the spread of revocation information caused by caching RRs on DNS resolvers, the TTL (Time To Life) of RRs can be set to zero. In order to secure the revocation information, DNSSEC should be adopted.

7. Related Discussions

7.1. Influence of HI revocation on Already Generated HIP Associations

In this sub-section, we investigate the possibility of using already generated HIP associations to transport the update information after the correspondent HI key pair is no longer valid.

In a BEX, HI key pairs of the both communicating partners are used to carry out mutual authentication while the key materials for securing subsequent communication are generated by the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. Therefore, if an HI key pair is secure at the time when a HIP association is generated, the later revocation of the HI key pair will not affect the security of the keying materials. Assume there is an attacker which has compromised the HI key pair. It is still computational difficult for the attacker to decrypt the packets transported between the communicating partners. Because the Update packets are under the protection of HMAC, the attacker cannot forge them to interfere with the communications. Note that the attacker can try to forge Notify packets. However, according to [RFC 5201] Notify packets are only informative, which will not affect the state of the communicating partners. Therefore, if no explicit key revocation occurs, the expiry of an HI will not affect the security of HIP associations generated using the HI when it is still valid. They still can be used until they reach their expiring time. However, if an HI is found to be compromised, the security of the keying materials of the already generated HIP associations cannot be guaranteed. In practice, the compromise of a cryptographic key can be perceived only after the attacks employing the key are detected.
It is difficult for one to identify the exact time from which the key is no longer secure. Hence, under this circumstance, the pre-generated HIP associations can only be used to deliver revocation certificates, as it is difficult for the communicating partners to know whether the HI is still secure when the HIP associations were generated.

7.2. HI Refreshment

In key management mechanisms, key refreshment is concerned with the issues of using new cryptographic keys to take place of "old" ones. Therefore, it closely related with key revocation. A refreshment procedure of a key can occur either before or after the revocation of the key (Note that in the first case the key is still valid). In this section, we briefly discuss the issues with HI refreshment in HIP.

Ideally, the refreshment of an operational HI should be performed before its crypt-period is expired. That is, when an HI refreshment process is performed, the HI expected to be updated is still valid. The holder then can use the old HI to establish secure channels, and use Update packets to transport the refreshment information to related partners (in a push model) or to trusted third parties (in a pull model). In the Update packets, the new HI and other related information are encapsulated. Therefore, before the old HI expires, both HIs are valid, and the HIP associations generated with the old HI can still be applied.

In practice, the third parties deployed for HI revocation can also be used to support HI refreshment. For instance, when using a pull model, a host can transport the HI revoking and the refreshing information to a third party. Therefore, when a user inquires of the third party about the status information of an HI, the user can get the status of the HI inquired about as well as the associated refreshment information.

If an HI needs to be revoked due to accident disclosure or compromise, the update of the HI can be a little more complex, as a host cannot use the invalid key to securely transport the refreshment information any more. If a host has multiple HIs, it can also select a valid HI to generate secure channels to transport the refreshment information of another HI. The refreshment information can be transported in an Update packet in which both the new HI and the old HI are contained. This solution require that the partner communicating with the host can ensure that the HI used to generate secure channel and the HI going to be refreshed are possessed by the same HIP host. Such knowledge can be obtained from resolution systems or provided by the host. In the cases where all the HIs of a
host become invalid (e.g., the host is found to compromised), the host only can distribute the refreshment information using an out-of-band way.

A host can also implement a pull model by directly transporting the update information to resolution servers. If the information is forwarded to a DNS server, users can query the latest HI using FQDN of the host. In a resolution system providing ID to locator mapping services (e.g., DHT), users can only try to query the resolution systems using old HIs. In this case, besides the IP addresses inquired, the resolution system should also provide the latest HIs and other useful information. Note that it is assumed that no two HIs of different hosts are identical, even if they are adopted in different period. In practice, because the length of HIs is long, the possibility that two hosts select a same HI can be very low. In order to further reduce the possibility, a user can also provide the life period of the inquired HIT in a query.

8. Conclusions

Key revocation is critical for HIP to be secure, practical and manageable. Particularly, HIP hosts are expected to keep working securely for a relatively long period, proper key revocation mechanisms for HIs must be provided. This document focuses on con/pro of different key revocations and analyzes their performances in different practical scenarios. Although key management has been an active research area for a long period and lots of successful key-management systems (e.g., PKI) are widely adopted in practice, many issues (e.g., scalability, lack of trust) still exist. There is no solution being found to meet the timeliness and performance requirements of all applications and environments that HIP is expected to support [McDaniel et al. 2001]. Therefore, it is predictable that various HI revocation approaches will be adopted after HIP has been globally adopted.

9. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA.

10. Security Considerations

The whole document is about security.
11. Acknowledgements

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12.1. Normative References


12.2. Informative References

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[Recommendations]
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